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Moral objectivity: Kant, Hume and psychopathy 
 
 
Moral objectivity is about genuinely better or worse courses of action and states of affairs in 
the moral domain. It seems good to aim at an identification of objective moral justifications 
that is maximally independent of subjectivity (at least if the threat of relativism is to be 
avoided). Having said that, it seems problematic to accept objective discriminations or 
justifications that are devoid of subjectivity. Every account of objective moral justifications 
seems in need of some sort of relationship with naturalistic human minds. How else could 
such justifications enter the universe? 
In this study I build towards arguments for deciding when claims about the status of 
moral objectivity are overambitious. I offer three lines of argument that point to moral 
objectivity being essentially anti-realist and (as such) mind-dependent. The first is grounded 
LQ+XPH¶VH[FOXVLYHO\SV\FKRORJLFDOFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶,WLVSDUDGLJPDWLFDOO\ZHOO
LOOXVWUDWHGE\.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
The second and third lines of argument are grounded in research about the nature 
and etiology of psychopathy. The second is about conceptual relativity regarding normative 
judgements about good practical lives. The third is about libertarian freedom over innately 
given components, components crucial to the psychological possibility of taking account of 
others in evaluative decision-making. Due to conceptual and empirical problems about 
(possible worlds of) human nature, which will be laid out, these two lines of argument need 
further conceptual and empirical attention.  
Additional to my constructive theory about the limits of moral objectivity, my study 
contains a critical reflection on methodological aspects of the contemporary meta-ethical 
GHEDWH2YHUDOOP\VWXG\LVDFULWLFDOFDOOIRUEHWWHUUHIOHFWLRQRQWKHFRQFHSWµUHDVRQ¶DQGD
deeper involvement with theoretical claims about human nature.  
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Notes on citations 
 
In this study, I have made use of the Selby-Bigge and Nidditch second edition of A Treatise 
of Human Nature. I have used the Selby-Bigge and Nidditch third edition of An Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Full 
references are as follows: 
  
Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature [2nd edition, 1978, edited, with an analytical index, by L.A.  
Selbe-Bigge. Text revised and notes by P.H. Nidditch]. Oxford: Clarendon Press.      
 
Hume, D. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the  
Principles of Morals [3d edition, 1975, edited with introduction, comparative table of 
contents, and analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Text revised and notes by P.H. Nidditch]. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
In the running main text, I generally use the abbreviation Treatise for A Treatise of Human 
Nature rather than the full title. In the running main text, I generally use the abbreviation 
EPM for An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals and EHU for +XPH¶V book An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. In the running main text, I use the full name of 
a particular work by Hume if and when I am concerned with other works by Hume.  
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When it comes to typical in-text referencing (for paraphrasing and quotations), in the 
PDLQWH[W,XVHµ7¶, µ(30¶DQGµ(+8¶IRUWKHZRUNVPHQWLRQHGDERYH. An example would be 
(T: 267) to refer to page 267 of the Treatise.     
The following shortened titles and abbreviations are used for in-text referencing to 
refer to the following works by Hume: 
 
CL: µOf civil liberty¶ 
DP: µDissertation on the passions¶ 
DT: µOf the delicacy of taste and passion¶ 
,1µ2ILQWHUHVW¶ 
LG: µLetter from a gentleman¶ 
06µ2Ithe PLGGOHVWDWLRQRIOLIH¶ 







The abovementioned works can all be found on the scholarly website www.davidhume.org, 
a website I have used in this study for investigation of the abovementioned works.  
 
Typically I have kept the original references of secondary literature, sometimes slightly 
adjusted for consistency in referencing style. Unless otherwise noted, there are no major 
discrepancies between original references to primary work of Hume as used in secondary 






Notes on citations 
 
Quotations from KDQW¶VZRUNVDUHFLWHGLQWKHERG\RIWKHWH[WE\abbreviation deduced from 
WKHQDPHRIWKHRULJLQDO*HUPDQZRUNVHHEHORZIRUDOLVWRIDEEUHYLDWLRQVHJµ*¶IRU
.DQW¶VGrundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals) and page number. An example would be (G: 394). The page numbers are those as 
in Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then Berlin-
Brandenburg) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter, 1900±).   
In terms of general use of abbreviations in in-text referencing, an exception is made for 
references to the Critique of Pure Reason, which are cited by the customary use of the 
pagination of its first (A) and second (B) editions. An electronic version of the Academy 
editions can be found on http://www.korpora.org/Kant/ (which I have generally used with 
additional help from hard copy books). 
The following German shortened titles and abbreviations are used to refer to specific 
works by Kant.  
 
Anfang:  µ0XWPDǃOLFKHU$QIDQJGHU0HQVFKHQJHVFKLFKWH' (Conjectural beginning of 
human history), 81: 107±232. 
Ende:    µ'DV(QGHDOOHU'LQJH¶(The end of all things), 8: 325±39. 
G:   Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals), 4: 385±463. 
Idee:   µ,GHH]XHLQHUDOOJHPHinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absichtµ (Idea for a 
                                                          
1
 This number is the volume number that reflects one of the 29 volumes of the Academy edition and indicates here 
in which one of those the text at issue can be found. In terms of the text at issue, .DQW¶VWH[Wµ$QIDQJ¶FDQEHIRXQG
in volume 8 of the Academy edition. 
 
2
 These indicate the page numbers of the text in a particular volume. 
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universal history with a cosmopolitan aim), 8: 15±31. 
KpV:  Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason), 5: 1±163. 
KrV: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason), 3 (B / 2. Auflage): 1-553; 
4 (A / 1. Auflage): 1-238.  
KU:   Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of the Power of Judgment), 5: 
165±485. 
MAN:   Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science), 4: 465±565. 
MdS:   Metaphysik der Sitten (Metaphysics of Morals), 6: 203±493. 
Prol:   Prolegomena zu einer jeder kunftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft 
wird auftreten konnen (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That 
Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science), 4: 253±383. 
Rel:   Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blosen Vernunft (Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason), 6: 1±202. 
 
In the main body of the text, lecture transcriptions (that are also part of the Academy 
edition) are referred to by the name of the transcriber (e.g., Collins) followed by volume and 
page number. References to handwritten notes by Kant are indicated by the compound 
*HUPDQWHUPµ+DQGVFKULIWOLFKHU1DFKODVV¶Slus volume number and page number of the 
Academy edition. 
 
I use, with occasional modifications, the following English translations of these major works 
by Kant: 
 
G:  Paton, H.J. (1964). Immanuel Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New  
York: Harper & Row.  
MdS:   Ladd, J. (1965). The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Indianapolis, New York, Kansas  
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City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. [first part of The Metaphysics of Morals] 
Gregor, M.J. (1964). Immanuel Kant. The Doctrine of Virtue. New York: Harper &  
Row. [second part of The Metaphysics of Morals] 
KpV:   White Beck, L. (1949). Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: The University of  
Chicago Press. 
KrV:    Kemp-Smith, N. (1933). ,PPDQXHO.DQW¶V&ULWLTXHRI3XUH5HDVRQ. Hongkong: The  
MacMillan Press LTD.  
KU:     Guyer, P. & Wood, A. (general editors); Guyer, P. (specific volume editor and  
translator) and Matthews, E. (specific volume translator) (2000). Critique of the 
Power of Judgement. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. 




Guyer, P. & Wood, A. (general editors); Heath, P. (specific volume editor and translator) and 
Schneewind. J.B (specific volume editor) (1997). Lectures on Ethics. The Cambridge Edition 
of the Works of Immanuel Kant (general editors Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.3 
  
All other translations are my own. 
 
References to quotations from translated works have the following form: (G-Paton: 91 / G: 
424). First the translated work is given together with the page number where the referenced 
sentence or passage can be found in the translated work. Subsequently, the page number of 
the sentence or passage as in the original German academy edition is given. NB: for 
                                                          
3
 I am grateful to Robert Louden for having inspired me as to the above notes on translations of and referencing to 





original German Academy edition. The traditional Academy volume and page numbers (and 





Moral objectivity: Kant, Hume and psychopathy 
 
Intellectual questions about µmoral objectivity¶ concern the existence, non-existence and 
nature of genuinely better and worse courses of action, states of affairs, and the like. In 
contemporary meta-ethics, debates about moral objectivity are frequently debates about 
realism and anti-realism, indeed between realists and anti-realists. Moral anti-realists stress 
the dependence of the ordinary world on our minds. They hold that morality is not built into 
or otherwise essentially part of the fabric of the world. That being an essential commitment 
of all anti-realists, anti-realists vary in their view as to whether or not and if so how the 
essential anti-realist commitment just expressed is compatible with the existence of 
genuinely better and worse courses of DFWLRQLHµPRUDOREMHFWLYLW\¶ 
$VIRUWKHSRVLWLRQµPRUDOUHDOLVP¶DV6WHSKHQ)LQOD\QRWHVWKHcontemporary 
GHEDWHRYHUµPRUDOUHDOLVP¶DFHQWXU\DIWHULWZDVODXQFKHGE\*(0RRUH¶VPrincipa Ethica, 
is a tangled and bewildering web. As he explains: 
 
7KLVLVODUJHO\GXHWRGUDPDWLFGLIIHUHQFHVLQZKDWSKLORVRSKHUVDVVXPHLWLVDERXW«$
pivotal problem is the lack RIFRQVHQVXVRYHUZKDWµUHDOLVP¶VKRXOGPHDQLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
ethics; we shall see that the variety of metaethical claims labeled µUHDOLVW¶FDQQRWEHFROOHFWLYHO\
FKDUDFWHUL]HGDQ\OHVVYDJXHO\WKDQDVKROGLQJWKDWµPRUDOLW\¶LQVRPHIRUPKDVVRPHNLQGRU
RWKHURILQGHSHQGHQFHIURPSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVRUSUDFWLFHV:HORRNLQYDLQIRUDUHIHUHQFHIRU
µPRUDOLW\¶DQGDNLQGRIDWWLWXGe-independence common throughout the debate. (Finlay, 2007) 
 
I will come back to moral realism soon. Let me first briefly say something about realism 
about the external world.  
According to Alex Miller, the everyday world of (a) macroscopic objects and (b) their 





(Miller, 2009: introduction). The other aspect concerns a claim about independence: the fact 
that the rock is being made of granite and that the moon exists and is spherical is 
independent of anything people say or think about the matter.  
Miller suggests that realism as a generic position (covering different positions about 
different subject matters) takes the following form: 
 
a, b, and c [the distinctive objects of a particular subject matter] and so on exist, and the fact that 
they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane 
empirical dependencies of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of 
anyone's beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. (Miller, 2009; introduction)  
 
According to Miller, there are at least two ways in which a non-realist can reject the 
existence dimension of realism about a particular subject matter. The first way rejects the 
existence dimension by rejecting the claim that the distinctive objects of that subject matter 
exist.  The second way admits that those objects exist, but denies that they instantiate any of 
the properties distinctive of that subject matter. The first can be illustrated by means of 
)LHOG¶VHUURU-WKHRU\DERXWDULWKPHWLFDQGWKHVHFRQGYLD0DFNLH¶VHUURU-theory about 
PRUDOLW\%ULHIO\DFFRUGLQJWR)LHOG¶VHUURU-theory of arithmetic, the objects distinctive of 
arithmetic do not exist, and it is this which leads to the rejection of the existence dimension 
of arithmetical realism, at least as platonically conceived. Mackie on the other hand proposes 
an error-theoretic account of morals, not because there are no objects or entities that could 
IRUPWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIHWKLFVLWLVQRSDUWRI0DFNLH¶VSURMHFWWRGHQ\WKHH[LVWHQFHRI
persons and their actions and so on), but because it is implausible to suppose that the sorts of 
properties that moral properties would have to be are ever instantiated in the world (Mackie, 
197l Chapter 1) (see Miller, 2009). An alternative, seemingly compatible way of reading 
Mackie would be to say that according to Mackie moral values have a conceptual nature ±
that is, they are necessarily and essentially both objective and prescriptive - that cannot be 
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found anywhere in the world. What moral values amount to conceptually speaking is not 
part of the fabric of the world; there is no place in the universe where this concept of moral 
values is instantiated.  
Let me now return to moral realism. I have already said that in meta-ethics moral 
realist views come in a bewildering and tangled variety. There are forms of moral realism 
which claim that moral reality transcends all forms of mind-dependence. But descriptively 
speaking (i.e. looking at what actually exists in the meta-ethical debate) a commitment to 
that idea is not a feature of all moral realist theories. And it might also not be a normatively 
necessary condition. Further to the descriptive issue, there is a wide variety of actual realist 
views in meta-ethics and sometimes these views are really very different. Therefore it is 
difficult to say what moral realism generically amounts to descriptively. And because of the 
fact that many self-ascribed moral realist views seem prima facie entitled to describe their 
view as a realist view, it is difficult to say what moral realism ±as a general position- 
normatively amounts to.  
Returning again to the descriptive issue, it is beyond doubt that there are large 
differences between some self-ascribed moral realist views, but there are also some features 
moral realist theories share. First, there is the obvious feature of making a claim about the 
existence of moral reality (facts, values, properties). Moral reality somehow exists. 
Furthermore, it seems to be the case that nearly all characterizations of contemporary forms 
of moral realism include some version of the following two core claims: 
 
(i) Ethical discourse is assertoric and descriptive; ethical claims purport to state ethical facts 
by attributing ethical properties to people, actions, institutions, etc. and are thus true or 
false depending on whether their descriptions of things are accurate or not (and similarly, 
the ethical beliefs expressed by such claims are true or false depending on whether their 




(ii) At least some ethical claims, when literally construed, are true in the above sense. 
(Fitzpatrick, 2009) 1 
 
Often there is a focus on semantic and other language issues in meta-ethics when people 
advocate or oppose a theory about moral realism. The question however is whether, strictly 
speaking, there can be a legitimate relationship between semantic and other language 
matters and debate about the correctness of moral realism. There seems to be something 
plausible about 'HYLWW¶VUHPDUNWKDW³5HDOLVPVD\VQRWKLQJVHPDQWLFDWDOOEH\RQG«PDNLQJ
the negative claim point that our semantic capacities do not constitute the world.´ (Devitt, 
1991: 392, cited in Miller, 2009: § 6).3 
My aim in this study is to offer argumentative evidence for the view that moral 
objectivity, if it exists, is essentially non-realist.  I offer three different sorts of argumentative 
contributions for the view that there is an essential non-realist component to the nature of 
morality. 2QHRIWKHPLVEDVHGLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGZHOO-LOOXVWUDWHGE\.DQW¶V
philosophy. The other two are based in arguments about human nature.  These in turn arise 
from the science of psychopathy, which in my study partly functions as a negative test case: 
reflections on psychopathy lead to conclusions about the nature of typical practical agents as 
well as the nature of the moral judgements they make. 
 
                                                          
1
 One plausible and standard way to make distinctions in between the class of moral realist theories as they exist in 
meta-ethics is by distinguishing mind-independent from mind-dependent views. Another way is to distinguish 
between non-QDWXUDOLVWDQGQDWXUDOLVWIRUPVRIUHDOLVP$V&XQHRFRUUHFWO\DUJXHV³DFFRUGLQJWRWKHµVWDQGDUG
GHILQLWLRQ¶PRUDOQDWXUDOLVPLVWKHYLHZWKDWWKHUHare things that display moral properties and that all such 
properties are natural. Moral nonnaturalism, by contrast, is the position that there are things that have moral 
SURSHUWLHVDWOHDVWVRPHRIZKLFKDUHQRWQDWXUDO´&XQHR-2). Cuneo argues that he follows Nicholas 
6WXUJHRQKHUHµ0RUDO1DWXUDOLVP¶. In Copp, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: 




 Devitt, M. (1991). Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
3




Having just mentioned that I intend to offer criteria for the view that moral 
objectivity, if it exists, is essentially non-realist, this study is not best understood as a 
polemical attack on moral realism. Rather, this study is best seen as a project in which I want 
to embark on a secure philosophical pathway by identifying criteria by means of which 
preposterous theoretical claims about the objective nature of moral objectivity can be 
avoided. Because this study is not best seen as a polemical attack on realism, I prefer to use 
WKHWHUPµnon-UHDOLVW¶UDWKHUWKDQµanti-UHDOLVW¶IRUWKHDUJXPHQWDWLYHFULWHULDI offer. What 
FRPHVRQWRSRIWKHMXVWPHQWLRQHGUHDVRQIRUSUHIHUULQJWKHWHUPµQRQ-UHDOLVW¶RYHUµDQWL-
UHDOLVW¶LVWKDWDWOHDVWprima facie there is reason to think that not anything goes in the moral 
domain; that there are somehow genuinely better and worse courses of action. I take it that 
the idea that there are genuinely better and worse courses of action runs the risk of being 
RYHUVKDGRZHGE\WKHSROHPLFDOWHUPµDQWL¶ 
As indicated, in this study I want to make a contribution to a framework of non-
realist boundaries within which there might well be genuine standards of moral rightness 
and wrongness. Having said that, it is beyond the purposes of this study to provide a 
substantive positive meta-ethical theory of the nature of moral knowledge/moral objectivity. 
That is, it is beyond the purposes of this study to give an account of what in a deeply meta-
ethical theoretical way it means that there are better and worse courses of action in the 
moral domain. Such an account may or may not have a relationship with first-order 
normative theories. In any case, offering any first-order normative theories is also beyond 
the purposes of this study.  
So, in this study I aim for theoretical criteria that make clear that there are limits to 
an often proclaimed realist nature of moral objectivity. How should one go about with such a 
SURMHFW":KHUHVKRXOGRQHVWDUWRQH¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQV"Many will assume that if there are any 
limits to the realist nature of moral objectivity, then these limits have something to do with 
the relationship between sentiments and moral evaluations. Suppose that is true, then the 
question is what type of affective involvement matters, why and how exactly. Will any type 
18 
 
of emotional outburst of any sort of (human adult) agent (resulting in any moral evaluation) 
do? Why, or why not? What is so essential and crucial about the identified relevant types of 
sentiment? Are they perhaps a reflection of some type of lack of freedom we have, where 
this type of freedom is crucial as a constraint on the hardness of moral objectivity? If not 
that, what then is it that is so important about these sentiments? 
I have just supposed that sentiments are the cause of some constraints on the hardness 
of objectivity. But perhaps it is rather the case that the bounds of moral objectivity come 
from there being limitations as to the power of an intellectual IDFXOW\FDOOHGµUHDVRQ¶ 
FRPSDUHVRPHQRUPDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQFDOOHGµUHDVRQ¶2USHUKDSVWKHUHLVDQLVVXHZLWKboth 
sentiments and an intellectual faculty of reason when it comes to constraints on the hardness 
of objectivity. If both, are the two somehow two sides of the same limiting coin or do they 
both constrain in an independent way?   








.DQWDQGWKHVHFRQFHSWLRQV¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK.DQW¶VDSULRULjustification of practical reason, 
i.e. the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) that is illustrative for conclusions about the limits of 
PRUDOREMHFWLYLW\¶,OOXVWUDWLYH¶KHUHPHDQVWKDWVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJDILQH-grained dissection of 
+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQZLOOVXIILFHWRJLYHXVRQHFULWHULRQIRUWKHUHEHLQJa non-realist 
component to moral objectivity. This first criterion however is helpfully comprehended 
when presented in the context of an interaction with FUL.  
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FUL plays an important role in my study as an object of investigation. What 
characterizes this Kantian moral principle is that it probably is the most µHPSLULFDODYHUVH¶
LQFOXGLQJµVHQWLPHQW-averse¶ principle available in moral philosophy. The other side of the 
coin is that FUL is an a priori principle. What is possibly more controversial but nevertheless 
seems striking about FUL is that it has a scent of being a mind-independent one. Having said 
that, at the same time, FUL seems to be a mind-dependent principle in the sense of it being 
grounded in an intellectual reasoning procedure. The union of all these features makes it that 
FUL is an ultimate challenge to as well as a paradigmatic object of investigation for my 
account about the limits of moral objectivity. Because of its alleged mind-independent 
aspect, FUL is an ultimate challenge in the sense of it being an ultimate object to surpass. 
Namely, mind-independence of the principle would mean that there is no theoretical 
dependence on whatever form of subjectivity. This rules out limiting influences on the 
hardness of moral objectivity, including those paradigmatic candidates for such limiting 
LQIOXHQFHVFDOOHGµsentimentV¶ FUL is a paradigmatic object of investigation rather than 
challenge, because of the thought that it is mind-dependent. Because of this, FUL at face 
value seems to keep itself in touch with the empirical world, which seems a desirable thing. 
(NB: my investigation will show WKDW.DQW¶Vphilosophy has clear problems meeting this 
apparently desirable thing.) As to a connection with the empirical world, a starting point for 
my investigation as to the limits of moral objectivity is a prima facie agreement with Simon 
%ODFNEXUQ¶VYLHZWKDWPRUDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQVWKDWGHVHUYHDVWDWXVRIREMHFWLYLW\LQRQHZD\RU
another should find room for ethics in the natural order we inhabit, and of which we are 
part (Blackburn, 1998: 49). The only alternatives to this plausible idea seem to be some sort 
of theological account of moral objectivity or else an appeal to fully mind-independent 
factual entities. The latter run a huge risk of being obscure entities. The former face the old 
and famous Euthyphro dilemma. 
This study is set-up as follows. In chapter 1, I start with a discussion of psychopathy; 
largely an empirical discussion, but one accompanied by philosophical reflections. In my 
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study, psychopaths partly serve as a negative test case. If and when they do so, that means 
that the focus is on psychopaths to discover something about us typical practical agents 
involved in the moral domain through thought and deeds. By focusing on psycKRSDWKV¶
atypical affective and conative actual mental life and predispositions for these mental states, 
the goal is to learn something about typical KXPDQEHLQJV¶FDSDFLWLHVDQGSUHGLVSRVLWLRQVWKDW
in our daily life play a role in the acknowledgement of moral discriminations. If and when 
psychopaths do not function as a negative test case, then that means that their presence 
(their existence) in the world is in some way directly important to the identification of 
criteria for the boundaries of moral objectivity.  
In chapter 2, I GLVVHFW+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\DERXWUHDVRQEHOLHISDVVLRQDQGPRUDOLW\
Through this, I arrive at one important ingredient for my own philosophical theory as to the 
OLPLWVRIPRUDOREMHFWLYLW\+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶+DYLQJVaid that, there is a further 
XSVKRWRIP\VWXG\RI+XPH¶VZRUN$WWHQWLRQIRU+XPH¶VZRUNDOVRSURYLGHVXVWKH
substantive arguments for the claim that the neo-Humean Split and the Inertia of Belief 
Thesis that are essential to contemporary meta-ethical neo-Humeanism are unsupported 
ZKHQRQHORRNVDW+XPH¶VWH[WV4 1RWHWKDW+XPH¶VInertia of reason ¶thesis, is of crucial 
importance as to my conclusions about the limits of moral objectivity, while the Inertia of 
belief thesis is not.  
Chapter 3 is an intermezzo chapter. In it, I discuss certain aspects of the 
methodological culture of meta-ethics, one of which concerns a bad reading of certain 
DVSHFWVRI+XPH¶VZRUNHVSHFLDOO\+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIEHOLHI7KLV chapter is different from 
the others in the sense that it does not make a constructive contribution to my argument 
about the limits of moral objectivity. Rather, in this chapter I explore unfruitful 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIPLVUHDGLQJFHUWDLQDVSHFWVRI+XPH¶VZRUN±especially his views of belief - 
for the contemporary meta-ethical debate at large with its core attention for the problems of 
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 By the neo-Humean Split I mean neo-+XPHDQLVP¶VVKDUSDQGHVVHQWLDOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQEHOLHIVDQGGHVLUHV




the nature and status of moral objectivity; the nature and status of moral judgements and the 
nature of moral motivation. Through this discussion other less fortunate aspects of the 
methodological culture of meta-ethics will reveal themselves. Aspects that seem to obstruct a 
more fruitful collective intellectual pathway to a solution of the three core meta-ethical 
objectives I have just mentioned.  
In chapter 4, I dissect .DQW¶Vpractical philosophy.  This dissection paradigmatically 
LQFOXGHVDGLVVHFWLRQRI.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRIµ9HUQXQIW¶DVZHOODVDWKRURugh discussion of the 
ILUVWYHUVLRQRI.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHFUL. Importantly (from the perspective of the 
DLPRIP\VWXG\,FRQQHFW.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRI9HUQXQIWWRFUL as a moral principle in the 
way I believe Kant wanted them to be connected.  
In the final chapter, chapter 5, ,SUHVHQWWKHILUVWFULWHULRQEDVHGLQ+XPH¶V
philosophy. I also present a shared argumentative basis for two further theoretical criteria for 
there being an anti-realist component to moral objectivity. In the general conclusion I split 
this shared argumentative basis into two different argumentative branches for two further 
criteria for there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity.  
This study will focus a lot on issues of human nature. My own contribution to that 
comes mainly in the form of reflections on the nature and etiology of psychopathy (but I also 
GLVFXVV.DQW¶VDQG+XPH¶VYLHZVRIKXPDQQDWXUH My study is meant to be a call for more 
engagement with theoretical claims about human nature. I intend to make clear that deeper 
engagement is important to solve the problem of moral objectivity. Indeed, it seems the case 
that such an engagement is first necessary to comprehend the meta-ethical intellectual 
problem of moral objectivity in a sufficiently deep sense, a sense that leads to the deeply 
satisfactory philosophical conclusions about the matter. By means of this study, I want to 
make clear that more and deeper engagement with issues about human nature should be an 
integral component of meta-ethical discussion.5 
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 I believe that the following remark by Ian Shapiro about human nature and political philosophy is one meta-




                                                                                                                                                                                           
³Every political philosophy takes for granted a view of human nature, and every view of human nature is 
controversial. .... Some political philosophers have taken the view that human nature is an immutable given, 
others that it is shaped (in varying degrees) by culture and circumstance. Differences about the basic attitudes of 
human beings toward one another ± whether selfish, altruistic or some combination ± have also exercised 
political philosophers. Although none of these questions has been settled definitively, various advances have 











be sufficient for me, if I can bring it into a little more fashion.                    
(Hume, T: 273) 
 
 
Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let private interest have engrossed every so much his 
attention; yet in instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel some 
propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if everything else be equal. 
:RXOGDQ\PDQZKRLVZDONLQJDORQJWUHDGDVZLOOLQJO\RQDQRWKHU¶VJRXW\WRHVZKRPKHKDV
no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement?                                     
 
(Hume, EPM: 226) 
 
 
No man is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in capacity for it he 
would be morally dead. And if ... the moral life-force could no longer excite this feeling, then 
humanity would dissolve ... into mere animality and be mixed irrevocably with the mass of other 
natural beings.                                                                          
  (Kant, MM: 398, MM-Gregor: 60)1 
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 ,Q*UHJRU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHDFDGHP\YHUVLRQWKHRULJLQDO*HUPDQSDVVDJHLVWREHIRXQGRQSDJH,QP\




How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
KHGHULYHVQRWKLQJIURPLWH[FHSWWKHSOHDVXUHRIVHHLQJLW«7KDWZHRIWHQGHULYHVRUURZRI
others, is of a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, 
like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and 
humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, 
the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.  
 
(Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiment: 13) 
 
Though psychopaths know, in some sense, what it means to wrong people, to act immorally, this 
kind of judgment has for them no motivational component at all. They do not care about others 
or their duties to them, have no concern for others' rights and feelings, do not accept 
responsibility, and do not know what it is like to defer one's own gratifications out of respect for 
the dignity of another human being. Quite significantly, they feel no guilt, regret, shame, or 
remorse (though they may superficially fake these feelings) when they have engaged in harmful 
conduct. They are paradigms of individuals whom Kant would calOPRUDOO\GHDG´ (Murphy, 
1972: 286-7) 
 
In this chapter, I start my project of investigating the limits of moral objectivity by means of 
a focus on psychopathy. This chapter on psychopathy should give us information about what 
it is that makes it impossible to sincerely take the interest of others into account in thought. 
This information then will be a basis for the second and third line of reasoning that speak in 
favour of their being a non-realist component to moral objectivity.  
I proceed as follows. In § 2, I point out two conceptions of psychopathy that are held 
by a rather large number of people unfamiliar with the current diagnostic criteria of 




In § 3, I give a brief introduction into the history of (research on) psychopathy. This 
will help us understand contemporary constructs of psychopathy and current measurement 
tools used to diagnose psychopathy.  
In § 4, I discuss the dominant academic conception of psychopathy: psychopathy as a 
distinct cluster of behaviour and inferred personality traits (as advocated and developed by 
Robert Hare2). I also discuss the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (the PCL-R) which is 
currently the gold standard tool (used by clinicians) for measuring psychopathy. Importantly, 
I explain the PCL-5¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK+DUH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISV\FKRSDWK\MXVWPHQWLRQHGAt 
the HQGRI,SUHVHQWVRPHUHIOHFWLRQVRQSV\FKRSDWK\DQGWKHFRQFHSWµGLVRUGHU¶ 
In § 5, I focus on the statistical concept/method called µIDFWRUDQDO\VLV¶. I include an 
explanation of the relationship between this widely applied statistical method and (on the 
other hand) data coming from the use of measurement instruments (such as the PCL-R). We 
need to understand something (elementary) about how factor analysis works to comprehend 
one ground on basis of which psychopathy researchers might make certain conceptual claims 
about the nature of psychopathy. 
In § 6, I focus on prevalence rates of psychopathy. I first discuss the general 
prevalence rate of psychopathy and then proceed with prevalence rates for a variety of sub-
SRSXODWLRQVHJWKHIRUHQVLFSRSXODWLRQDQGµWKHKRXVHKROGSRSXODWLRQ¶,H[SUHVVP\
doubts about the dominant view that the general prevalence rate of psychopathy amounts to 
1% of the human population. In this section I also explain something about the relationship 
and differences between psychopathy and anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). This will 
help us to critically reflect on the claimed prevalence rates of psychopathy.  
In § 7,OHDYH+DUH¶VZLGHO\VKDUHGFRQFHSWLRQRISV\FKRSDWK\EHKLQGIRUDwhile and 
switch to a discussion of five further conceptions of psychopathy. These are: (i) psychopathy 
as an extreme variation of normal personality traits; (ii) psychopathy as a neurological deficit; 
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 Note that there do exist RWKHUWKHRULHVLQWKHILHOGWKDWFRXOGEHJURXSHGXQGHUWKHDEVWUDFWKHDGLQJµSV\FKRSDWK\DV
DGLVWLQFWFOXVWHURIEHKDYLRXUDQGLQIHUUHGSHUVRQDOLW\WUDLWV¶1RWHIXUWKHUPRUHWKDW,EHOLHYHWKDWRQHVD\DVD




(iii) psychopathy as a genetic deficit; (iv) psychopathy as an inhibition problem and (v) 
psychopathy as an adaptive reproductive strategy. These conceptions reflect different 
descriptions or at least different emphases of empirical researchers as to the nature of 
empirical psychopathy. Many of them are not mutually exclusive and most of them are also 
compatible with psychopathy as a personality syndrome as the first conception presented.   
In § 8, I present some reflections and research on psychopathy in females. Currently 
research on psychopathy in females is still quite in its infancy, but there is some. 
In § 9, I focus on the etiology of psychopathy. This section is especially important for 
the theory about the bounds of moral objectivity.  
In the final § 10, I look ahead by drawing some connections between the current 
chapter and upcoming considerations in other chapters.   
 
 
2. The popular conception of psychopathy 
 
Let me now start with presenting the phenomenon of psychopathy. James Blair, Derek 
Mitchell and Karina Blair open their The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain in the 
following way: 
 
Humans have long been concerned by or fascinated with the concept of evil and the people 
thought to personify evil. Say the word psychopaths and most people can easily conjure up an 
image of someone they believe to embody the word. Some may think of characters from movies: 
Hannibal Lecter from The Silence of the Lambs, Mr Blonde from Reservoir Dogs, Norman Bates 
from Psycho, and Freddy Krueger from A Nightmare on Elm Street. Others may gain inspiration 
from the world of politics and claim that Adolf Hitler, Sadam Hussein, Margaret Thatcher, 
George W. Bush or even Bill Clinton is psychopathic. Yet more may consider their current 




And at the very beginning of his seminal work Without Conscience: the Disturbing World of 
the Psychopaths among us, psychopathy pioneer Robert Hare tells us: 
 
When I agreed to write this book I knew it would be difficult to present hard scientific data and 
circumspection in a way that the public could understand. I would have been quite comfortable 
remaining in my ivory tower, having esoteric discussions with other researchers and writing 
technical books and articles. However, in recent years, there has been a dramatic upsurge in the 
SXEOLF¶VH[SRVXUHWRWKHPDFKLQDWLRQVDQGGHSUHGDWLRQVRISV\FKRSDWKV7KHQHZVPHGLDDUe filled 
with dramatic accounts of violent crime, financial scandals, and violations of the public trust. 
Countless movies and books tell the stories of serial killers, con artists, and members of organized 
crime. Although many of these accounts and portrayals are of psychopaths, many others are not, 
and this important distinction is often lost on the news media, the entertainment industry, and 
WKHSXEOLF«7K>H@IDLOXUHWRGLVWLQJXLVKFOHDUO\EHWZHHQRIIHQGHUVZKRDUHSV\FKRSDWKVDQG
those who are not has dire consequences for society, as this book makes clear. (Hare, 1993: xi-xii) 
 
Taking these quotations in a wider empirical context (i.e. both a clinical context and a 
research context), what these two quotations represent is the widespread view of experts  
WKDWOD\SHRSOH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWSV\FKRSDWKVDUHLVVXERSWLPDORUHYHQSURIRXQGO\
wrong. The dominant view amongst empirical experts is that the construct of psychopathy 
amounts to a certain distinct cluster of personality traits and behaviours, including e.g. a lack 
of empathy and extremely manipulative behaviour. While experts see these traits as traits 
that paradigmatically characterize psychopaths, they hold that only under certain strict 
clinical criteria (to which we come in § 4) the presence of this cluster of traits and 
behaviours reflects psychopathy. So according to these researchers, the absence of empathy 
and the presence of manipulative behaviour we might very reasonably ascribe to our boss or 
ex-partner rarely - very rarely - means that our boss or partner is a psychopath. Not 
everyone who presents with certain traits and behaviour that paradigmatically characterizes 
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psychopaths is a psychopath. As mentioned, more information about the clinical criteria for 
psychopathy follows later. 
Another thing that needs to be said from an academic perspective and in response to 
the popular conception of psychopathy is that most scientists hold that the cluster of traits 
and behaviours that characterize psychopaths need not include extremely violent behaviour 
as paradigmatically shown by movie characters such as Hannibal Lecter.3 Having mentioned 
that scientists typically hold that the class of psychopaths does not exclusively consist of 
extremely violent people, it is also important to note that another typical view amongst 
experts is that not all violent criminals are psychopaths. This is so because not all violent 
criminals present with a distinct cluster of traits and behaviour that function as criteria for a 
diagnosis of psychopathy. 
 
 
3. The history of psychopathy 
 
It may very well be the case that there have been psychopaths since the beginnings of 
human history. That could be explained by psychopathy being an adaptive evolutionary 
strategy (more on that in § 7.6 below). In any case, any affirmative or negative answer to that 
issue is dependent on what the construct of psychopathy amounts to. And that might be a 
topic that is never beyond reasonable conceptual discussion.  
When it comes to the existence of actual psychopaths, suggestions from Hervey 
Cleckley lead us back to around 400 BC to the Greek statesman and general Alcibiades as a 
human being who might really have embodied (the right use of) the word µpsychopath¶ 
(Cleckley, 1988: 325-336). When it comes to early conceptualizations we might have one in a 
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 Note however that psychopaths commit more than twice as many violent and aggressive acts, both in and out of 







The man without moral feeling is the kind who will take an oath with no sense of 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\«%\QDWXUHKHLVDEDVHNLQGRISHUVRQODFNLQJWKHPRVWHOHPHQWDU\VHQVHRI
decency and capable of absolutely nothing. He leaves his mother without support in her old 
DJH«NQRZVWKHLQVLGHRIWKHWRZQMDLOEHWWHUWKDQKLVRZQKRXVH«,QFRXUWKHLVFDSDEOHRI
playing any role: defendant, plaintiff, or witness. He knows a good many rascals. (see Babiak & 
Hare 2006: 320) 
 
It seems best to say that as an academic field of research psychopathy (only) really developed 
from 1941 onwards. In 1941 Hervey Cleckley published the first edition of his book The 
Mask of Sanity, a pioneering work on psychopathy. From that point onwards academics 
became heavily interested in studying psychopathy (see Vitale & Newman, 2001). Cleckley 
ZDVDSV\FKLDWULVW&OHFNOH\¶VERRNRIIHUHGWKHILUVWWUXO\FRPSUHKHQVLYHFOLQLFDOGHVFULSWLRQV
of human beings that Cleckley identified as very different from his other patients; human 
beings Cleckley himself labelled as psychopaths and human beings who would now be really 
good candidates for a diagnosis of psychopathy according to what now are dominant clinical 
criteria, FULWHULDWKDWKDYHEHHQKHDYLO\LQIOXHQFHGE\&OHFNOH\¶s work. Cleckley found the 
following traits in this special group of his patients, RUµFOLHQWV¶DVFOLQLFLDQVQRZW\SLFDOO\FDOO
them.  
 
x superficial charm and good intelligence 
x absence of delusions and other irrational thinking 
x DEVHQFHRIµQHUYRXVQHVV¶RUother psychoneurotic manifestations 
x unreliability 
x untruthfulness and insincerity 
x lack of remorse of shame 
30 
 
x inadequately motivated anti-social behaviour 
x poor judgment and failure to learn by experience 
x pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love 
x general poverty in major affective reactions 
x specific loss of insight 
x unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations 
x fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink and sometimes without 
x suicide rarely carried out 
x sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated 
x failure to follow any life plan4   
 
 
4. Psychopathy as a distinct cluster of personality traits and behaviours 
4.1. An introduction 
 
,QWKHGHFDGHVDIWHUWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI&OHFNOH\¶VSV\FKRSDWK\FULWHULDDFDGHPLFVKDYHXVHG
these criteria to make reliable measurement tools for the clinical assessment of psychopathy 
(Vitale & Newman, 2001). This counts first and foremost for psychopathy expert Robert 
Hare. Hare has developed a conception of psychopathy that is now the dominant one in the 
academic and clinical field. According to Hare, psychopathy is a distinctive cluster of 
behaviours and inferred personality traits (1993: ix; cf Hare & Neumann, 2008: 222). The 
candidate character traits are all summed up in the most frequently used diagnostic tool for 
the measurement of psychopathy, the Psychopathy Checklist-R- Revised (PCL-R), developed 
by Hare himself. The PCL-R contains 20 items. These are: 
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 These are the traits (16 in total) as they can be found in the fifth and final edition of The Mask of Sanity (see 1988, 
esp. 338-9). The initial (1941) version of the book contained 21 features of the clinical profile of psychopaths. By 
the time of the publication of the fifth version, Cleckley had removed a few items, split one item into two and 





x Glib/superficial charm 
x Grandiose sense of self-worth 
x Pathological lying 
x Conning/manipulative 
x Lack of remorse or guilt 
x Shallow affect 
x Callous/lack of empathy 
x Failure to accept responsibility for own actions 
x Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom 
x Parasitic lifestyle 
x Poor behavioural controls 
x Early behavioural problems 
x Lack of realistic long-term goals 
x Impulsivity 
x Irresponsibility 
x Juvenile delinquency 
x Revocation of conditional release 
x Promiscuous sexual behaviour 
x Many short-term marital affairs 
x Criminal versatility 
 
The clinician scores those items by means of a semi-structured interview and additionally 
case-histor\LQIRUPDWLRQ(DFKLWHPLVVFRUHGµ¶µ¶RUµ¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKLW
applies to the individual. The total score can therefore range from 0-40. The cut-off point for 
psychopathy is 30 (Hare, 1996; Edens, 2001).  The PCL-R is considered to be the most valid 
and reliable measurement tool for measuring psychopathy in adults (Fulero, 1995). Casual 
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inspection of the published literature shows that since 2001, more than 50 articles (not 
including those articles from the royalties-receiver of the PCL-R: Robert Hare), describe it as 
WKHµJROGVWDQGDUG¶+DUH	1HXPDQQ  
As mentioned, besides a semi-structured interview, there is a case-history part of the 
DVVHVVPHQW7KLVSDUWFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHLWHPVFRUHVE\ORRNLQJDWWKHVXEMHFW¶VEDFNJURund, 
including such things as work and educational history. It is very important to adopt this case-
study part - that does not rely on the words of the potential psychopath - as part of the 
assessment, because psychopaths lie frequently and often do it rather well; it is not 
uncommon for even experienced interviewers to be tricked by psychopaths in the sense of 
coming to believe their untrue and insincere stories (see Hare, 1993:124).5  
In her (2009) Mette Kreis argues that the PCL-R has shaped current conceptualization 
of psychopathy to the point where the measure has become synonymous with the construct 
(Kreis, 2009: 30). This claim needs some attention.  
In their (2010a and 2010b), Jennifer Skeem and David Cooke argue that the 
psychopathy construct should never be conflated with its measurement tool (s) (cf Kreis, 
2009: 30). Skeem and Cooke also make the specific point that the psychopathy construct as 
advocated by Hare and the PCL-R are intertwined in a vicious way. Hare and his colleague 
Craig Neumann agree with the first general point made by Skeem and Cooke, but disagree 
with the latter specific accusation as to the relationship between the PCL-R and the 
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 There are two psychopathy measurement tools that can be considered as close family members of the PCL-R. Both 
are derived from the PCL-R. One of them, the PCL-R: Screening Version (SV) is in fact a somewhat shorter version 
of the PCL-R. Since the PCL-R:SV can be completed in the absence of criminal record information, it is more 
appropriate than the PCL-R for use in non-forensic settings and is particularly well-suited for use in civil psychiatric 
HYDOXDWLRQVDQGVWXGLHVRIFRPPXQLW\VDPSOHV8OOULFK6)DUULQJWRQ'3&RLG-:µ3V\FKRSDWKLF
SHUVRQDOLW\WUDLWVDQGOLIHVXFFHVV¶Personality and Individual Differences, 44, pp. 1162-1171). The PCL-R: SV has 
12 items. The cut off score for psychopathy as measured by the PCL-R: SV is 18 (out of 24). (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 
28; Babiak, Neumann, Hare, 2010).  
The second derivative of the PCL-R is the PCL-R-YV. This measurement tool is just as the PCL-R based 
on a semi-structured interview and collateral information. And just as the PCL-R it consists of 20 items designed to 
measure interpersonal, affective and behavioural features related to psychopathic traits (see Hare, 1996; see also 
Finger, Marsh, Mitchell, Reid, Budhani, Kosson, 2006). The most significant difference is that the PCL-R-YV 





construct that accompanies it (Hare & Neumann, 2010). I think Hare and Neumann are right 
in that the construct of psychopathy as (first and foremost) embraced by Hare and the PCL-R 
as a measurement tool are fundamentally distinct. Reflection on the construct of 
psychopathy - KHDYLO\LQIRUPHGE\&OHFNOH\¶VFRQFOXVLRQV- has preceded the development of 
the PCL-R. Furthermore, as far as I can judge, Hare has always been aware of how important 
it is to distinguish the construct from the measurement tool. Having said that, I believe that 
the empirical field of psychopathy currently stands still and has been standing still for quite a 
while in terms of conceptual reflection on the construct because of the dominance of the 
PCL-R. And since the PCL-R construct (rather than the measurement instrument) seems to 
VWDQGVWLOOWRRLQWHUPVRIFULWLFDOUHIOHFWLRQVLQFHLWVLQLWLDOHVWDEOLVKPHQW.UHLV¶FODLPWKDW
³the PCL-R has shaped current conceptualization of psychopathy to the point where the 
PHDVXUHKDVEHFRPHV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKWKHFRQVWUXFW´ (Kreis, 2009: 31) seems to contain a 





Rather often clinicians and empirical researchers describe psycKRSDWK\DVDµGLVRUGHU¶This is 
a striking and rather awkward claim since clinicians and empirical researchers generally do 
not regard psychopaths as personifying a normative sense of abnormality. Or, a bit more 
careful, psychopaths are considered to be normatively normal in at least the following sense:  
LQFRQWUDVWWRSHRSOHZKRSUHVHQWZLWKFHUWDLQRWKHUµSHUVRQDOLW\GLVRUGHUV¶SV\FKRSDWKVDUH 
not subject to delusions or other states are a straightforward candidate for the catchy term 
µFUD]\¶RUµPDG¶RUµLQVDQH¶5REHUW+DUHVWDWHV 
 
Psychopaths are not disoriented or out of touch with reality, nor do they experience the 
delusions, hallucinations, or intense subjective distress that characterize most other mental 
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disorders. Unlike psychotic individuals, psychopaths are rational and aware of what they are 
doing and why. (Hare, 1993: 22) 
 
And Jeffrey Murphy claims: 
 
[U]nlike the psychotic, the psychopath seems to suffer from no obvious cognitive or volitional 
impairments.6 He knows what he is doing (he has no delusions); and, since he typically does just 
what he wants to do, it would be odd to call him compulsive or to claim that he acts on 
LUUHVLVWLEOHLPSXOVHV7KXVKHLVE\QRPHDQVFOHDUO\µLQVDQH¶E\FXUUHQWO\DFFHpted medical or 
legal standards. (Murphy, 1972: 285) 
 
As Hare implicitly argues, a psychopath who has killed someone has not done that because of 
orders received from a Martian in a spaceship or something like that (see Hare, 1993: 22). 
Psychopaths are not crazy in that sense and therefore (I argue) possibly not crazy at all. The 
fact that psychopaths are capable of controlling their behaviour (note that they are aware of 
the potential consequences of their acts) also speaks against seeing them as being somehow 
µPDG¶µLQVDQH¶ or µFUD]\¶VHH+DUH 
The question we are left with then is why it is  empirical researchers and clinical 
SUDFWLWLRQHUVVRIUHTXHQWO\FDOOSV\FKRSDWK\DµGLVRUGHU¶GHVSLWHWKHPQRWEHLQJLQFOLQHGWR
GHVFULEHSV\FKRSDWKVDVµLQVDQH¶µPDG¶RUµFUD]\¶"7KHUHDUHWZRVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGFDQGLGDWH
explanations (rather than justifications) for this. The two might very well be related. First, 
WKHIUHTXHQWXVHRIWKHZRUGµGLVRUGHU¶PLJKWKDYHWREHH[SODLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWDOWKRXJK
psychopathy is not in the current version (DSM-V) of the bible for clinicians, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, it has been in the DSM in the past. In these past 
times, psychopathy, in the DSMZDVLQFOXGHGLQWKHJURXSRIµSHUVRQDOLW\ disorders (in § 6 I 
explain why psychopathy is not in the DSM now)7 
                                                          
6
 On the absence of cognitive defects, see e.g. also Cleckley (1988) and Mealey (1995). 
7




Secondly, the current use of words might (also) have to be explained by the fact that 
typically clinical psychological and psychiatric labels refer to mental conditions that much 
more uncontroversially8 FRXOGEHFDOOHGµGLVRUGHUV¶EHFDXVHW\SLFDOO\GLDJQRVWLFODEHOVRI
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
³Although this volume is titled the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the term mental 
disorder XQIRUWXQDWHO\LPSOLHVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµPHQWDO¶GLVRUGHUVDQGµSK\VLFDO¶GLVRUGHUVWKDWLVD
reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there is much 
µSK\VLFDO¶LQµPHQWDO¶GLVRUGHUVDQGPXFKµPHQWDO¶LQµSK\VLFDO¶GLVRUGHUV7KHWHUPUDLVHGE\WKHWHUPµPHQWDO¶
disorders has been much clearer than its solution, and, unfortunately, the term persists in the title of DSM-IV 
because we have not found an appropriate substitute.  
Moreover, although this manual provides a classification of mental disorders, it must be admitted that no 
GHILQLWLRQDGHTXDWHO\VSHFLILHVSUHFLVHERXQGDULHVIRUWKHFRQFHSWRIµPHQWDOGLVRUGHU¶7KHFRQFHSWRIPHQWDO
disorder, like many other concepts in medicine and science, lacks a consistent operational definition that covers 
all situations. All medical conditions are defined on various levels of abstraction-for example, structural 
pathology (e.g. ulcerative colitis), symptom presentation (e.g. migraine), deviance from a physical norm (e.g. 
hypertension), and etiology (e.g., pneumococcal pneumonia). Mental disorders have also been defined by a 
variety of concepts (e.g. distress, dysfunction, dyscontrol, disadvantage, disability, inflexibility, irrationality, 
syndromal pattern, etiology, and statistical deviation). Each is a useful indicator for a mental disorder, but none 
is equivalent to the concept, and different situations call for different definitions. 
Despite these caveats, the definition of mental disorder that was included in DSM-III and DSM-III-R is 
presented here because it is as useful as any other available condition and has helped to guide decisions 
regarding which conditions on the boundary between normality and pathology should be included in DSM-IV. 
In DSM-IV, each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or 
psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., 
a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a 
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability or an important loss of freedom. In addition, this 
syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, 
for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a 
manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant 
behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society 
are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, as 
described above. 
A common misconception is that a classification of mental disorders classifies people, when actually what 
are being classified are disorders that people have. For this reason, the text of DSM-IV (as did the text of DSM-
III-R) avoids the use of such expressions as µDVFKL]RSKUHQLF¶RUµDQDOFRKROLF¶DQGLQVWHDGXVHVWKHPRUH
DFFXUDWHEXWDGPLWWHGO\PRUHFXPEHUVRPHµDQLQGLYLGXDOZLWK6FKL]RSKUHQLD¶RUµDQLQGividual with Alcohol 
'HSHQGHQFH´ (DSM-IV-TR, 2000: xxxi).   
 
7KDWPXFKDERXWWKHWHUPµmental GLVRUGHU¶7he DSM-IV-TR VWDWHVWKHIROORZLQJDERXWWKHFRQFHSWµpersonality 
GLVRUGHU¶ as used in that work: 
 
³A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from 
WKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFXOWXUHLVServasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early 
adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment´'60-IV-TR, 2000: 685) 
 
8
 But thereby not uncontroversially; one only needs to look at cross-cultural variability in terms of evaluations of 
certain personality traits and behaviour to start wondering whether some at face value normatively abnormal trait, 
SDUWLFXODUELWRIKXPDQEHKDYLRURUFOXVWHURIWUDLWVDQGRWEHKDYLRXUVFDQUHDOO\EHFDOOHGµGHIHFWLYH¶RUFDQEH
regarded aVUHIOHFWLQJDµGLVRUGHU¶+DYLQJVDLGWKDWWKHUHDOVRVHHPWREHVRPHFOHDUFURVV-cultural convergence in 




mental illness are applied to psychological conditions that in one or more ways interfere 
with the well-being of the individual to whom the diagnostic label is ascribed. Psychopathy 
by contrast, typically is not a phenomenon where the personality traits of the agent have a 
significant negative impact on his (or her) well-EHLQJ$VWRµZHOO-EHLQJ¶WKHPHQWDO
condition/character of psychopaths typically does not cause them any mental distress (recall 
the quotation from Hare above). Apart from that, the character traits of a psychopath also 
have striking potential to be reaOO\DGYDQWDJHRXVWRKLP7DNHWKHWUDLWµPDQLSXODWLYH¶7KLV
trait allows the psychopaths to fulfill his (or her) desires for e.g. money and power very well. 
+DYLQJVDLGWKLVLWPXVWEHVDLGWKDWUHJXODUO\SV\FKRSDWKV¶FKDUDFWHUSXWVWKHPLQD





4.3. Different styles  
 
We have seen that Hare sees psychopathy as a distinct cluster of personality traits and 
behaviours. Hare and his colleague Paul Babiak have argued that this distinct cluster of traits 
and behaviours can present itself in three different guises, or styles. All of these three styles 
are for an importDQWSDUWFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\µD-W\SLFDO¶RUDVRIWHQVDLGµGHILFLHQW¶DIIHFWLYH
experience, i.e. a lack of empathy, a lack of guilt and remorse; and shallow emotions), but 
they differ somewhat on other dimensions. Below, I briefly discuss the three styles. 
7KHµFODVVLFVW\OH¶ consists of those who besides them being highly a-typical in 
affective experience, score high as well on three other dimensions that can be used to 
characterize the personality and behaviour of psychopaths. That is, classic style psychopaths 
also score high on (a) the dimension lifestyle, for example represented by a need for 
stimulation/proneness to boredom and a parasitic attitude. Furthermore (b) these 
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psychopaths score high on the dimension anti-social, represented for example by poor 
behaviour controls and juvenile delinquency. And finally (c) they score high on the 
dimension interpersonal, represented for example by glibness and demonstration of 
superficial charm.  
7KHµPDQLSXODWLYHVW\OH¶JURXSRISV\chopaths is made up by those with a high score 
on the interpersonal and affective dimensions, and somewhat lower scores on the lifestyle 
and antisocial dimensions. Rather than being very impulsive and violent, they manipulate, 
deceive and charm actively to reach self-gratification at the cost of other ±mostly human- 
beings.  
)LQDOO\WKHUHLVWKHµPDFKRVW\OH¶%DELDN	+DUH-186). Psychopaths who 
represent this style score high on the affective, lifestyle and antisocial dimension, but low on 
the interpersonal dimension. These psychopaths are aggressive, bullying, and abrasive beings. 
They are less charming and manipulative than the other types. 
 
 
4.4. One common tactic 
 
7KHUHLVDNLQGRIQDWXUDORXWJURZWKRISV\FKRSDWK¶VSHUVRQDOLW\WKDWPDQLIHVWVLWVHOILQVRPH
predator strategies and tactics. It is quite common for psychopaths to achieve their goal of 
self-gratification by a three step-strategy that in practice usually implies high emotional, 
financial or other practical trouble for other people. 
What psychopaths often do first is assessing the value of individuals to their needs, 
and identify their psychological strengths and weaknesses (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 44). Note 
that it is unlikely that for psychopaths people exist in any other way than objects, targets and 
obstacles (see Babiak & Hare, 2006: 46). Psychopaths then size up the potential usefulness of 
an individual as a source of money, power, sex or influence (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 44). 
Besides assessing the potential gain from others, psychopaths assess their emotional weak 
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points and psychological defences in order to work out a plan of attack. Individual 
psychopaths do this in different ways and to varying degrees because of their psychopathic 
style (see previous section), experience and preference (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 44). 
Secondly, psychopaths manipulate their future victims by feeding them carefully 
crafted messages, while constantly using feedback from them to build and maintain control. 
This is not only an effective approach to take with most people, it also allows psychopaths to 
talk their way around and out of any difficulty quickly and effectively when confronted or 
challenged (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 44). Many psychopaths are quite good at charming, a skill 
which they happily use to gain control over other people (e.g. Babiak & Hare, 2006: 48-50). 
Thirdly, once psychopaths are bored or otherwise through with their drained and 
bewildered objects of attention, psychopaths abandon them happily. They can do that very 
easily and in a callous and harmful manner, because their emotional and social attachments 
to others are poorly developed (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 54).  
  
 
4.5. On being emotionally blind  
 
As we have seen, one of the items measured by the PCL-5LVµODFNRIUHPRUVHDQGJXLOW¶
Verbal expression such as  ³,GRQ¶WUHJUHW>DQ\WKLQJ@´+DUHDUHQRWXQFRPPRQIRU
psychopaths, though even more often they pretend that they do feel remorse or some similar 
moral emotion in order to manipulate their victims. They often attempt to mimic emotions 
when necessary. Sometimes it is hard not to believe them, since for many psychopaths it is 
the case that their play-acting capacity is excellent. That is why they are so good at 
manipulation: they simply adapt themselves as a chameleon to the victim in front of them. 
Having said that, sometimes, when the topic of emotions and especially moral emotions is 
addressed, some psychopaths clearly show that at least sometimes they are B-grade rather 
than A-grade actors. What happens in these psychopaths is that they for example verbalize 
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remorse, but then contradict themselves in words when challenged. If, for example, a 
psychologist exercises a bit of pressure on a claim made by a psychopath that he feels 
remorse, the psychopath ±when further pressed-VXEVHTXHQWO\PD\VWDWHWKDWµKHGRHVQRWIHHO
EDGLQVLGH¶,WLVQRWWKHFDVHKRZHYHUWKDWZHFDQDVFULEHVXFKEDGDFWLQJWRDOOSV\FKRSDWKV
QRWHYHQZKHQZHRQO\IRFXVRQµHPRWLRQV¶6RPHSV\FKRSDWKVFOHDUO\VHHPWRGHVHUYHWKH
status of A-grade actors. 
2QHRWKHUFKDUDFWHULVWLFIHDWXUHRISV\FKRSDWKV¶HPRWLRQDOOLIHLVWKDWWKH\FDQWDON
about their malevolent actions in the same emotionally flat manner as most other people 
normally talk about their breakfast. This emotionally flat fact-talk is often accompanied by a 
UDWKHUUHPDUNDEOHVHQVHRIORJLF$VRQHRI5REHUW+DUH¶VREMHFWVRIUHVHDUFKH[SUHVVHG 
 
Anybody could have seen I was in a rotten mood that night. What did he want to go and bother 
PHIRU"«$Q\ZD\WKHJX\QHYHUVXIIHUHG.QLIHZRXQGVWRDQDrtery are the easiest way to go. 
(Hare, 1993, p.42)9 
 
Research has demonstrated that psychopathic individuals experience emotions differently, 
showing qualitative and/or quantitative differences in their ability to experience emotion 
(see Hastings, Tangney and Stuewig, 2008). When it comes to emotions, psychopaths seem to 
be subject to some sort of emotional peculiarity that limits both the range and depth of their 
feelings.  ³[W]ords do not have the same emotional or affective colouring for psychopaths as 
WKH\KDYHIRURWKHUSHRSOH«>3@V\FKRSDWKVODFNVRPHRIWKHµIHHODEOH¶FRPSRQHQWRI
language´ (Hare, 1993: 131)3V\FKRSDWK-DFN$EERWWPDGHWKLVUHYHDOLQJFRPPHQW³7KHUH
                                                          
9
 Here is one further example of the extraordinary logic of psychopaths: 
 
³Tyler has never been married, but has had several livings-in partners. In each case, he moved in with them 
DIWHUµVZHHSLQJWKHPRIIWKHLUIHHW¶DVKHSXWVLW7KHORQJHVWUHODWLRQVKLSODVWHGPRQWKVEXWHDFKZDVPDUNHG
by violence and instability. He speaks of countless instances where he was seeing other women while living 
with another. When asked whether he was ever monogamous Tyler says that he has always been monogamous. 
When his apparent inconsistency is brought out to hiPKHGHQLHVDQ\FRQWUDGLFWLRQ³,¶YHDOZD\VEHHQ
monogamous, because it is physically impossible for me to be in two different places at exactly the same time. 




are emotions- a whole spectrum of them-that I know only through words, through reading 
and in my immature imagination. I can imagine I feel these emotions (know, therefore, what 
they are), but I do not. ´(Hare, 1993: 53).  
While at times psychopaths are cold and unemotional, they are prone to dramatic, 
shallow and short-lived displays of feeling (see Hare, 1993: 52). These feelings may be no 
more than proto-emotions: primitive responses to immediate needs (see Hare, 1993: 53).  
Besides what Karpman (1948: 4FDOOVWKHµJHQHURXVHPRWLRQV¶V\PSDWK\JUDWLWXGH
appreciation or any binding affection, psychopaths seem to have a striking absence of fear. 
But it does not stop there; psychopaths also seem to have difficulties to experience sadness. 
As pointed out by Vuilleumier et al10, there are strong suggestions that the sadness (and also 
fear) of others activates an automatic aversive response in observers (cited in Blair et al. 2005: 
40). That does not seem to be at issue in the mind of psychopaths. Adults with psychopathy 
(and children with psychopathic tendencies) present with reduced autonomic responses to 
the sadness of other individuals. While psychopaths seem to have atypical responses to 
sadness and fear, it should be noted that psychopaths do not present with impaired 
responding to angry, happy or surprised facial or vocal expressions  (see Blair et al, 2005: 
chapter 4; cf Blair, 2005).   
 
 
4.6. A lack of moral/social conscience 
 
Psychopaths have no difficulty in making use of people whenever they think using others 
serves their interest. Their motives are to manipulate and take, ruthlessly and without 
remorse (Hare, 1993: 145).  Psychopaths also tend to see any social exchange as a µIHHGLQJ¶
                                                          
10
 Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J.L., Driver, J'RODQ5-µ'LVWLQFWVSDWLDOIUHTXHQF\VHQVLWLYLWLHVIRU




opportunity, a contest, or a test of wills, in which there can be only one winner (Hare, 1993: 
145).  
Psychopaths exercise their life style of self-JUDWLILFDWLRQDWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VH[SHQVHLQ
the absence of empathy and without a moral conscience. It is highly plausible to see a cause 
DQGHIIHFWUHODWLRQVKLSKHUH7KDWLVLWLVSODXVLEOHWRDVVXPHWKDWSV\FKRSDWKV¶UXWKOHVV
behaviour does takes place and can take place because psychopaths are not inhibited by 
empathy and a moral conscience.  As Hare argues, without the shackles of a nagging 
conscience, psychopaths feel free to satisfy their needs and wants and do whatever they 
think they can get away with. Any anti-social act, from petty theft to bloody murder, 






of the many external controls, such as laws, our perceptions of what others expect of us, and 
real-OLIHSROLFHPHQ´+DUH3V\FKRSDWKVE\FRQWUDVWGRQRWVHHPWRKDYHDQ
internal policeman of that kind.  In contrast to typical practical human agents, psychopaths 
carry out their evaluation of a situation - what they will get out of it and at what cost - 
without the usual anxieties, doubts, and concerns about being humiliated, causing pain, 
sabotaging future plans, in short, the infinite possibilities that people of conscience consider 





4.7. Irresponsive to treatment 
 
In contrast to what is the case with other mental conditions having to do with anti-sociality, 
the behaviour of psychopaths is notoriously resistant to change (see Hare, 1993: 94). Current 
treatment programs designed to change the character traits of psychopaths into something 
less anti-social are unsuccessful. And that obviously is a problem given the disastrous 
emotional and financial costs psychopaths typically bring to others. Let us have a look at 
what Hare - who was asked by the Canadian government to develop a new sort of treatment 
programme - says about matters psychopaths and treatment. Hare argues: 
 
Depressing though the evidence is, there are several things that we should consider before 
ZULWLQJSV\FKRSDWKVRIIDVXQWUHDWDEOHRUXQPDQDJHDEOH«5HFRJQL]LQJWKHXUJHQWQHHGIRUQHZ
ways to deal with criminal psychopaths, and aware of the prevailing pessimism about traditional 
treatment programs, the Canadian government recently challenged me to design an experimental 
WUHDWPHQWPDQDJHPHQWSURJUDPIRUWKHVHRIIHQGHUV«$OWKRXJKLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRSURYLGHD
GHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHSURJUDPLQWKLVERRN>LH+DUH¶VERRNWithout Conscience], some 
broad principles can be outlined. To a large extent, these principles are based on the view that the 
premise of most correctional programs-that most offenders have somehow gone off track and 
need only to be resocialized-LVIDXOW\ZKHQDSSOLHGWRSV\FKRSDWKV)URPVRFLHW\¶VSHUVSHFWLYH
psychopaths have never been on track; they dance to their own tune. This means that the 
program for psychopaths will be less concerned with attempts to develop empathy or conscience 
than with intensive efforts to convince them that their current attitudes and behavior are not in 
their own self-interest, and that they alone must bear responsibility for their behavior. (Hare, 
1993: 202-4) 
 
Time will tell us whether the abovementioned Hare-type treatment-programmes are more 




but possibly only if and when such change reflective of less anti-social behaviour reflects a 
real benefit for the psychopath. In any case, the emotional anomalies, in the form of an 
absence of a sense of remorse; a lack of empathy; and a lack of a moral conscience do not 
seem to be responsive to treatment at all. That is what clinical practice shows up until now. 
What this seems to mean is that the core of psychopathy might be untreatable, since many 
assume that it is emotional anomalies that exhaust or at least are part of the very core of 
SV\FKRSDWK\VHHHJ%ODLUHWDO3HUKDSVµDQWL-VRFLDOLW\¶DQGRUVRPHRWKHr (probably 
more peripheral) features of the syndrome are responsive to treatment - most likely only if 
and when change pays off for the psychopaths - but it may well be the case that all or at least 
some of the emotional anomalies are of such a nature that they will never respond to any 
kind of treatment. And that might be because there is a strong genetic component to these 
emotional anomalies, while environmental factors contribute more strongly to less essential 





Empirical scientists have made attempts to group together certain individual behavioural 
features (HJµSDWKRORJLFDOO\LQJ¶ and personality traits HJµPDQLSXODWLYH¶ on basis of 
correlations between data generated by items of the PCL-R. The statistical term for the 
SURFHVVWKDWUHVXOWVLQVXFKJURXSLQJVLVµIDFWRUDQDO\VLV¶When statistical analysis shows that 
a certain number of behavioural features and/or traits form a certain group, these features 
and traits seem to be conceptual aspects of the construct of psychopathy (that is typically 
conceived of as consisting of some combination of character traits and behaviours). Seem to 
be. That is unfortunately not entirely clear. ResearFKHUVXVHµIactor analysis¶ to determine 
how interrelated some referents of terms such as µSDWKRORJLFDOO\LQJ¶DQGµPDQLSXODWLYH¶DUH
but it is not entirely clear whether that actually means µKRZLQWerrelated some sort of 
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FRQFHSWXDOIHDWXUHVRISV\FKRSDWK\DUH¶. First, given that there is unclarity about the 
relationship between the construct of psychopathy and the items of the PCL-R (recall § 4.1). 
Secondly, also given that there is the problem in what realist, constructivist, anti-realist etc. 
way we should conceive of the ontological nature of some sort of syndrome called 
µpsychopathy¶ (this is a general problem for psychological disorders).11 That is, if psychopathy 
indeed should be regarded as some sort of amalgam of traits and behaviours. Factor analysis 
might suppose some sort of realist ontology of symptoms on basis of which then judgements 
about factors are made based on data generated by a measurement tool for the measurement 
of psychopathy.  
I have mentioned that factor analysis is used to determine how interrelated some 
refeUHQWVRIWHUPVVXFKDVµSDWKRORJLFDOO\LQJ¶DQGµPDQLSXODWLYH¶DUHAnother reason because 
of which researchers might use factor analysis is because they benefit from a reduction of the 
number of µvariables¶as to psychopathy, be they measurement tool items and/or some sort of 
conceptual attributes) by combining two or more variables into a single factor.  
In a nutshell, the practice of factor analysis works as follows. Researchers collect data 
in the form of PCL-R scores. Having these scores, they enter them into a computer program. 
Subsequently researchers then give the computer program certain commands to find out 
what on basis of the PCL-R scores one can say about any relationship between items and 
thereby (so the assumption seems to be) about the relationship between psychopathy 
symptoms that are supposed to be measured by the items. Roughly speaking, the computer 
SURJUDPUHVSRQGVWRWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VFRPPDQGVE\ILQGLQJRUQRWILQGLQJFRUUHODWLRQV
between items pointing to these items belonging together and thereby  reflecting a certain 
aspect of the psychopathic syndrome (so researchers seem to think). 
In 1988, the grouping of features started off with the efforts of Harpur, Hakstian and 
Hare. They came up with a 2-factor model of psychopathy (see also Harpur et al, 1989; Hare 
et al. 1990): the interpersonal/affective factor and the impulsive/antisocial lifestyle factor.  
                                                          
11
 For lack of a better general term. 5HFDOOP\FRPPHQWVRQZK\LWLVSUREOHPDWLFWRFDOOSV\FKRSDWK\Dµas laid out 
in § 4.2. 
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Some scientists nowadays work with a 3-IDFWRUPRGHOFRQVLVWLQJRIWKHIDFWRUVµDUURJDQWDQG
GHFHLWIXOLQWHUSHUVRQDOLWHPV¶WKHLQGLvidual items involved are: glibness/superficial charm; 
grandiose sense of self-ZRUWKSDWKRORJLFDOO\LQJFRQQLQJPDQLSXODWLYHµGHILFLHQWDIIHFWLYH
H[SHULHQFH¶LWHPVFDOORXVODFNRIHPSDWK\VKDOORZDIIHFWODFNRIUHPRUVHRUJXLOWIDLOXUHWR
accept UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRURZQDFWLRQVDQGµLPSXOVLYHDQGLUUHVSRQVLEOHLWHPV¶LWHPVQHHG
for stimulation/proneness to boredom; parasitic lifestyle; lack of realistic long-term goals, 
impulsivity; irresponsibility) (Cooke and Michie, 2001). There is also a 4-factor model 
consisting of the factors: interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and anti-social (Neumann, Hare & 
Newman, 2007 for findings pointing to four factors; for a short explanation of the 4-factor 
model see Babiak and Hare, 2006: 27).12  We have seen these four factors reflected in the 
description of the different psychopathic styles in § 4.3. 
 
 
6. The prevalence of psychopathy 
6.1. Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) 
 
In this section I focus on the prevalence rates of psychopathy. Below we will see that one can 




Although researchers frequently focus on different populations for reasons of 
academic interest, they sometimes do so as well for pragmatic reasons. When one ±as a 
researcher- is based at a university in the United Kingdom, it makes sense to investigate 
psychopathy populations in the UK rather than for example the United States, unless one has 
                                                          
12
 There are two items of the PCL-R, i.e. µSURPLVFXRXVVH[XDOEHKDYLRXU¶DQGµPDQ\VKRUW-term marital 
UHODWLRQVKLSV¶WKDWGR not load on any of the 4 factors of the 4-factor model  while these items do contribute to the 
total PCL-R score (Hare & Neumann, 2008: 220). 
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a specific and strong interest in gaining information about the United States population. And 
if one as a researcher is sufficiently satisfied with psychopathy information about which one 
can hypothesize that it may well be generalizable over the entire psychopathic population it 
makes sense to go to the prisons and forensic psychiatric settings rather than for example a 
big company. It does so, because it is in prisons and forensic psychiatric settings where one 
can reasonably expect to find a high number of psychopaths and it is there where one can 
investigate them rather easily.  
Below, before we come to specific prevalence rates for a variety of subpopulations, I 
comment first on several important differences and relationships between the syndrome 
µSV\FKRSDWK\¶WKDWLVFXUUently not in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders and AntiSocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), that currently is in the DSM.  An 
understanding of the differences and relationships between psychopathy and ASPD should 
help us to better understand the clinical practice surrounding psychopathy as well as to 
critically evaluate claims that are made about the prevalence rate of psychopathy. 
According to the DSM-V (2013: 659) (as well as the DSM-IV-TR (2000: 701)), the 
HVVHQWLDOIHDWXUHRI$63'LV³Dpervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights 
RIRWKHUVWKDWEHJLQVLQFKLOGKRRGRUHDUO\DGROHVFHQFHDQGFRQWLQXHVLQWRDGXOWKRRG´
According to the DSM ±V, for the diagnosis ASPD to be given, the individual must be at least 
18 years old, and must have had a history of conduct disorder before age 15 (on conduct 
disorder see § 9.3). Additionally, it is required that the anti-social behaviour does not occur 
exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or bipolar disorder (DSM-V, 2013: 659).13 On 
top of what I have just mentioned, the person must present with at least three of the 
following criteria:  
 
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly 
performing acts that are grounds for arrest 





(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal 
profit or pleasure 
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead 
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults 
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others 
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work 
behavior or honor financial obligations 
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, 
or stolen from another14 (DSM-V, 2013: 659) 
 
Let us recall that in contrast to ASPD, psychopathy is not now in the DSM- V (nor was it in 
any of the DSM-IV versions) as a separate diagnostic category and let us recall this while 
noting that when it comes to the list of criteria above belonging to an ASPD-diagnosis, there 
is some clear overlap with the PCL-R criteria for diagnosis of psychopathy. In what follows, I 
explain the reasons for the overlap in criteria. The same story will also offer reasons for why 
ASPD is in the DSM now, while psychopathy is not.  
Traditionally, affective and interpersonal traits such as egocentricity; deceit; shallow 
affect; manipulativeness; selfishness, a lack of empathy; and a lack of guilt and remorse have 
played a central role in the conceptualization of psychopathy. In 1980 however, this 
tradition was broken with the publication of the DSM III. In that now outdated version of 
the DSM psychopathy was renamed AntiSocial Personality Disorder and was now defined by 
persistent violations of social norms, including lying, stealing, truancy, inconsistent work 
behavior and traffic arrests (Hare, 1996). Amongst the reasons given for this shift away from 
the use of clinical inferences were that personality traits are difficult to measure reliably, and 
that ±on the side of behaviour- it is relatively easy  to agree on the behaviours that typify a 
disorder. This focus on behaviour rather than traits is a fundamental cause of the current fact 
                                                          
 
14
 These criteria are the same for the DSM-V and DSM-IV-TR. 
48 
 
that currently the clinical diagnostic label ASPD is applied to a very diverse class of people, 
in terms of personalities (and the etiology of the syndrome) rather than behaviour.  
A further cause of and no help at all for getting rid of the heterogeneity is the fact 
that in the DSM-IV and the DSM-V WKHGHVFULSWLRQRI$63',KDYHDOUHDG\SUHVHQWHGLH³D
pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in 
FKLOGKRRGRUHDUO\DGROHVFHQFHDQGFRQWLQXHVLQWRDGXOWKRRG´LQthe DSM-IV and the DSM-
V LVGLUHFWO\IROORZHGE\WKHIROORZLQJVHQWHQFH³7KLVSDWWHUQKDVDOVREHHQUHIHUUHGWRDV
SV\FKRSDWK\VRFLRSDWK\RUGLVVRFLDOSHUVRQDOLW\GLVRUGHU´DSM V, 2013: 659; DSM-IV-TR, 
2000: 701-2). Things become even more nasty and confusing given that a particular section 
of the DSM WKHµDVVRFLDWHGIHDWXUHVsupporting diagnosis-VHFWLRQ¶WKDWVXFFHHGVWKH$63'
description in the DSM-V, states the following: 
 
Individuals with antisocial personality disorder frequently lack empathy and tend to be callous, 
cynical, and contemptuous of the feelings, rights, and sufferings of others. They may have an 
inflated and arrogant self-appraisal (e.g., feel that ordinary work is beneath them or lack a 
realistic concern about their current problems or their future) and may be excessively 
opinionated, self-assured, or cocky. They may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite 
voluble and verbally facile (e.g., using technical terms or jargon that might impress someone who 
is unfamiliar with the topic). Lack of empathy, inflated self-appraisal, and superficial charm are 
features that have been commonly included in traditional conceptions of psychopathy that may 
be particularly distinguishing of the disorder and more predictive of recidivism in prison or 
forensic settings where criminal, delinquent, or aggressive acts are likely to be non-specific. 
These individuals may also be irresponsible and exploitative in their sexual relationships.  (DSM-
V: 660; see also the identical passage in the DSM-IV-TR, 2000: 703, my italics; cf Hare, 1996) 
 
In the passage above ones sees a clear reference to traditional features of psychopathy (as 
UHSUHVHQWHGE\5REHUW+DUH¶VFRQVWUXFWDQGPHDVXUHPHQWWRROEXWHYHQGRZQWR&OHFNOH\
All that is italicized represent traditional features of psychopathy.  
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Overall, it seems sensible to conclude that there is significant intermingling between 
WKHWHUPDQGFRQFHSWµSV\FKRSDWK\¶DQGWKHFRQFHSWµ$63'¶7KHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKLVVKRXOG
not be underestimated. It means that some significant number of people have been and 
continue to be mistakenly referred to as psychopaths on the basis of DSM-III, DSM-III-R 
(revision), and DSM-IV and DSM-V criteria for ASPD (adapted from Hare, 1996). In worst 
case scenarios, this can lead to a mistaken judgement that someone should be given the death 
penalty, a view that is probably indirectly expressed by this quotation from Robert Hare:  
 
:HGRQ¶WNQRZKRZPDQ\«LQKDELWDQWVRIGHDWKURZDFWXDOO\H[KLELWWKHSHUVRQDOLW\VWUucture 
of the psychopath, or how many individuals meet the criteria for ASPD, a disorder that applies to 
WKHPDMRULW\RIFULPLQDOV«,IDGLDJQRVLVRISV\FKRSDWK\KDVFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHGHDWKSHQDOW\- 
or for any other severe disposition, such as an indeterminate sentence or a civil commitment-
clinicians making the diagnosis should make certain they do not confuse ASPD with 
psychopathy. (Hare 1996) 
 
Note that when it comes to the relationship between psychopathy and the death penalty, as 
an outsider or lawyer, one sometimes cannot easily predict in advance whether a 
psychopathy diagnosis of an expert will prevent an offender from receiving the death penalty 
(rationale: he should not be given one because there is something wrong in his brain that is 







6.2. The general prevalence rate of psychopathy 
 
There is a lot one can say about the prevalence rate of psychopathy. A leading scientific 
opinion is that the general prevalence rate of psychopathy is around 1% (see primarily Hare, 
1993: 193; 2003). As it is general, it does not say anything specific about particular 
populations, but when one looks at the rate one needs to be aware of the fact that it heavily 
relies forensic populations for the very simple reason that most research has been done with 
this population. And that is the case because the base rate of psychopathy in forensic 
populations is high and the information needed for reliable assessments is readily available 
(see Babiak, Neumann & Hare, 2010). 
 
Wondering what type of evidence there is for this general prevalence rate of 1%, I 
have discussed this with a forensic psychologist. This discussion has led me to the tentative 
conclusion that in fact there is no hard scientific evidence for the prevalence rate of 1%. The 
expert with whom I have discussed matters tentatively suggests that the thought that leads 
Hare to the conclusion that the prevalence rate is 1% might be the following one. In the 
¶VDVWXG\ZLWKQRfewer than 20000 adults was carried out in the United States: the 
Epidemiological Catchment Area Study. This study found a general prevalence for ASPD of 
around 3-4%. In prisons in the United States ASPD is diagnosed in around 75% of prisoners 
and the rate of PCL-R psychopathy in prisons is around 20-25%. The expert suggests that the 
combination of all of these findings might have led Hare and others to the conclusion that 
the general prevalence rate of psychopathy is around 1%, since the 1% amounts to about a 
third of the ASPD prevalence rate found for the general population in the Epidemiological 






6.3 Psychopathy in the forensic population 
 
According to Blair, Mitchell & Blair (2005), studies reveal that 12-25 % of inmates in the 
United States meet criteria for psychopathy as laid down by the PCL-R. Hare (1996) claims a 
prevalence rate between 15 and 20% in offenders (no claim about countries included).  Vitale 
& Newman (2001) claim 15-30% for the offender population (no claim about countries 
included). Hobson and Shine (1998) found that 26% of their sample of UK prisoners qualified 
as a psychopath (based on the PCL-R). This is considerably higher than what previous 
research has shown about UK samples (Hobson & Shine, 1998; my italics). And it is also 
considerable higher than what Coid, Yang, Ullrich, Roberts, Moran and Bebbington found in 
their (2009) study that looked at 500 prisoners in different prisons in England and Wales. 
Using the standard cut-off score for psychopathy of 30, the researchers found that the 
prevalence rate was 7, 7% for men and 1, 9% for women. More about psychopathy in females 
in § 8. 
 
 
6.4. Psychopathy in the household population 
 
Research on psychopathy in the household population is very rare. It is almost limited to the 
following (2009) study in Great Britain. As a measurement tool this study used the PCL: SV 
(screening version; recall footnote 5). That is, the shorter variant of the PCL-R.  
In the (2009) study of Coid, Yang, Ullrich, Roberts and Hare, a two phase-survey was 
conducted with 8886 participants in the first phase and 638 in the second. In the first phase 
participants had to fill in a questionnaire on basis of which a smaller second sample was 
selected. Those included in the second sample were considered as serious candidates for 
people having psychological/psychiatric disorders. On basis of the information the latter 
group provided, i.e. in terms of outcomes of clinical questionnaires and further collateral 
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information as part of the PCL-R: SV, the researchers concluded that psychopathy is a rare 
condition in the general population.  Only a very small minority of individuals met common 
criteria for psychopathy or demonstrated elevated levels of psychopathic traits. The 
researchers concluded that ³WKHZHLJKHGSUHYDOHQFH>IRUSV\FKRSDWK\LQWKHKRXVHKROG
SRSXODWLRQ@LV´&RLG<DQJ8OOULFK5REHUWV+DUH, 2009).15  
The above study suggests that psychopathy prevalence rates in the normal population 
are low. This research claim on basis of empirical data may reflect the fact that there indeed 
are hardly any psychopaths in the community population. It theoretically could also mean 
however that this study has not managed to catch the psychopaths living in the community 
population, psychopaths who manage to escape prisons and perhaps even contact with the 
criminal justice system. If there are any psychopaths in the household population, the 
explanation why they have not contributed to the psychopathy rate found by researchers is 
readily available. Successful psychopaths will not be interested in participating in academic 
research, unless perhaps, on rare occasions, for reasons that can fulfill their extreme need for 
self-gratification, whatever those reasons might be.  
 
 




1996).  Of these domains, the one investigated most is business. In this section, I will explain 
                                                          
15
 At face value this conclusion means that this study shows that 1 out of 160 individuals presents with psychopathy. 
However, if one has a somewhat closer look at the results of the study, it turns out that a different cut-off point for 
the PCL-R: SV was used.  Instead of the W\SLFDOFXWRIIVFRUHRIµ¶ cut off points of 13 and 11 were used. The 
researchers offer some reasons for that that have to do with cut-off points used in other studies (see Coid et al., 2009 





a bit more about this phenomenon of corporate psychopathy that according to some 
researchers is clearly there. I will start off with an opening quotation of a recent article: 
 
³Not all psychopaths are in prison. Some are in the Boardroom´   
 
This assertion came in the guise of a rather casual response from Robert Hare to a question 
asked at the end of the 2002 Canadian Police Association meeting (Babiak, Neumann, Hare, 
2010). The authors subsequently comment:  
 
The questioner turned out to be a journalist, and over the next few days the international media 
picked up his newspaper article, treating the statement as somewhat of a revelation.  The media 
reports clearly reflected both the popular view that psychopathy equates to criminality and 
violence, and the public and media fascination with murder and mayhem, typically attributed to 
µSV\FKRSDWKV¶RUµVRFLRSDWKV¶8QIRUWXQDWHO\PHGLDKHDGOLQHVDQGSRSXODUWHOHYLVLRQFULPHVKRZV
are often the only exposure the public gets to the concept of psychopathy, resulting in 
considerable misinformation and misunderstanding. This is also the case with business 
professionals, who see even less relevance of such portrayals to their daily interactions with co-
workers. The problem is exacerbated by the paucity of research on the prevalence and 
implications of psychopathy for society in general, and by the heavy emphasis on research with 
offender and forensic psychiatric populations (where the base-rate for psychopathy is high and 




What this quotation reflects is the view that there are individuals who on basis of their 
personality characteristics and behaviour can be described as psychopaths, but despite that, 
generally are not violent in the sense of physically, or even, mentally, aggressive. Their 
psychopathic nature reveals itself in the fact that that they bring about financial and social-
emotional disasters for their work environment and the community in a wider sense by 
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acting as an intra-species predator16: by exploiting other human beings for the fulfillment of 
their desires (paradigmatically for power and money).  
As indicated by the above quotation, in contrast to psychopathy in forensic 
SRSXODWLRQVWKHUHLVUHODWLYHO\OLWWOHNQRZQDERXWµFRUSRUDWHSV\FKRSDWK\¶RUµLQGXVWULDORU
µZKLOH-FROODU¶SV\FKRSDWK\7KHUHKDVEHHQFRQGXFWHGIDUPRUHUHVHDUFKRQWKHFULPLQDO
populations than on the psychopaths or more careful, candidate psychopaths in the business 
world. As indicated by Babiak et al, an important reason for the rather huge quantitative 
difference in research is that for offender and criminal settings it is the case that the 
(expected) base-rate of psychopathy is high and the information needed for reliable 
assessment is readily available. A further reason that explains the quantitative difference in 
research is that it is very hard for scientists to obtain the active cooperation of business 
organizations and their personnel for research purposes. Hardly any employer is eager on 
letting researchers investigate their company just for the reason that it benefits science. 
Having said that, they may be sufficiently or even enormously happy to let empirical 
psychologists research their organizations in two cases: either when there is interpersonal 
trouble in a company around a particular individual or when there is another interest for the 
company in getting insight into the nature of its employees. 
So what does research indicate about prevalence rates of psychopathy in the business 
population? In their (2010) study, Babiak et al. found that of the 203 participants that 
consisted of managers and executives, the vast majority of PCL-R scores (80%) were between 
0-3. Having said that, at the other end of the spectrum, 8 participants (3.9%) had a score of 
30 or higher; two had a score of 33 and one had a score of 34. So, if the PCL-R is taken as a 
criterion for a rightful diagnosis of psychopathy, then this study suggests that there are 
psychopaths in the business world.      
 
                                                          
16
 I borrow this term from Meloy, J. R. & Meloy, M.J. (2002).  µAutonomic arousal in the presence of psychopathy: 
a survey of mental health and criminal justice professionals¶. Journal of Threat Assessment 2, pp. 21±33; referred to 




6.6. United States versus United Kingdom 
 
It looks like we can add something to the list of things that are bigger, higher, more extreme 
in the US: psychopathy scores. On basis of the data of their study, Cooke,  Michie, Hart and 
Clark conclude that (generally speaking) PCL-R rates are higher for North American than for 
European people (PCL-R total scores, factor scores as well as individual item scores (Cooke, 
Michie, Hart and Clark, 2005b).    
I have addressed the topic of factor analysis in § 5. As mentioned there, there exist 2-
factor, 3-factor and 4-factor models of psychopathy. The research I discuss below bases itself 
on the three-factor model. Recall that the three factor model distinguishes between the 
factor arrogant and deceitful interpersonal items (items: glibness/superficial charm; grandiose 
sense of self-worth; pathological lying; conning/ manipulative); deficient affective experience 
(items: callous/lack of empathy; shallow affect; lack of remorse or guilt; failure to accept 
responsibility for own actions),  and impulsive and irresponsible items (items: need for 
stimulation/proneness to boredom; parasitic lifestyle; lack of realistic long-term goals, 
impulsivity; irresponsibility).  
Starting off from their general discovery that North-Americans generally score higher 
on the PCL-R than European people do, Cooke et al discovered something more specific in 
their study. First, Cooke and colleagues found that for WKHILUVWIDFWRUµDUURJDQWDQGGHFHLWIXO
LQWHUSHUVRQDOLWHPV¶WKHUHDUHVXEVWDQWLDOGLIIHUHQFHV³SDUWLFXODUO\DWWKHKLJKHQGRIWKH
WUDLW´&RRNHHWal. 2005a). That is supposed to mean that on the upper end of the PCL-score 
dimension, North-American people score higher than people in the United Kingdom. 
Another finding that comes out of their research is that the difference between North-
$PHULFDQVDQG(XURSHDQSHRSOHZDVODUJHVWIRUIDFWRUVFRUHVDQGµarrogant and deceitful 
interpersonal items¶ anGµlife style¶respectively. As Cooke and Michie (2005b) suggest, this 
may well mean that character features related to items that fall under the second factor 
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µGHILFLHQWDIIHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH¶ form the core element of psychopathy. Note that the cultural 
difference observed was similar to that reported in previous research (Cooke & Michie, 
1999), although somewhat smaller (Cooke & Michie, 2005a). 
 
 
6.7. Psychopathy in primitive cultures 
 
There is evidence for the conclusion that psychopathy is not just some kind of Western 
phenomenon. Research points to the tentative conclusion that it may well be the case that 
ERWKDPRQJVW(VNLPRVLQ$ODVNDDQGDPRQJVWDSULPLWLYHJURXSFDOOHGµ<RUXEDV¶LQWKHMXQJOH
of Africa there exist such individuals.  




[This word] might be applied to a man who, for example, repeatedly lies and cheats and steals 
things and does not go hunting and, when the other men are out of the village, takes sexual 
advantage of many women-someone who does not pay attention to reprimands and who is always 
being brought to the elders for punishment. (Murphy, 1976: 1026) 
 
At the time of research, one Eskimo among the 499 on their island was given the 
TXDOLILFDWLRQµNXQODQJHWD¶When the Eskimos were asked by Murphy what would have 
happened to such a person traditionally, one Eskimo said that probably ³VRPHERG\ZRXOG
have SXVKHGKLPRIIWKHLFHZKHQQRERG\HOVHZDVORRNLQJ´0XUSK\ 
Murphy spotted something similar in the jungle of Africa. As noted by her, a group 
called the Yorubas use a word in their communication the meaning of which is quite close to 
the wRUGµkunlangeta¶XVHGE\WKH(VNLPRV7KH<RUXEDV¶ word µDUDQNDQ¶ refers to a similarly 
egocentric creature; more specifically someone who always goes his own way regardless of 
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others, who is uncooperative, full of malice, and bull-headed. Neither kunlangeta  nor 
arankan were thought to be curable by native healers (Murphy, 1976: 1026).   
 
 
7. More scientific approaches to psychopathy 
7.1 Five further conceptions  
 
As we have seen psychopathy is most frequently considered as a distinct cluster of 
personality traits and behaviours. There is more to be said however in terms of what 
scientists think about psychopathy. Looking at the scientific literature, it seems fair to say 
that one can find several more ideas about it. Below I explain five further conceptions. While 
I aim at presenting a representative sketch of the field, I may overlook one or the other 
conception. Furthermore, it needs to be said that while I distinguish five conceptions of -or 
perhaps better- µDSSURDFKHVWR¶SV\FKRSDWK\WKLVLVnot to say that a particular presented idea 
is incompatible with the others; I think it is better to consider them as accounts that have 
one or the other specific idea about the nature of psychopathy, an idea that however does not 
rule out a compatibility with other accounts. The five conceptions of/approaches to 
psychopathy I discuss below are: (i) psychopathy as a personality disorder, (ii) psychopathy 
as an extreme variation of normal personality traits, (iii) psychopathy as a neurological 
deficit, (iv) psychopathy as  a genetic deficit, (v) psychopathy as an inhibition problem, (vi) 
psychopathy as an adaptive reproductive strategy.  
  
 
7.2. Psychopathy as an extreme variation of normal personality traits 
 
It is possible to regard psychopathy as an extreme variation of normal personality traits.  One 




capture our personality traits. The second one relies heavily on research tied to the 
conception of psychopathy presented already above: the one that considers psychopathy as a 
distinct cluster of personality traits and behaviour. 
At the end of the 20th century, McCrae and John (1999; cf McCrae et al. 2000) argued 
that personality traits come down to an umbrella set of five. The following are the five core 
traits identified: 
  
1. openness to experience  








[social versus retiring; fun-loving versus sober; affectionate versus reserved] 
 
4. agreeableness 
[soft hearted versus ruthless; trusting versus suspicious; helpful versus uncooperative]  
 
5. neuroticism  
[worried versus calm; insecure versus secure; self-pitying versus self-satisfied]  
 
From the top downwards, the first letters of the five traits lead to the acronym OCEAN. 
(Gazzaniga & Heatherton, 2002: 485, 494-495).  
59 
 
There is a substantial amount of research on the relationship between µ7he Big Five¶ 
and different types of µVRFLDOO\PDOHYROHQWSHUVRQDOLWLHV¶See e.g. Paulhus & Williams (2002); 
Vernon, Villani, Vickers, Aitken, Harris, 2007.) Typically, researchers who investigate the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµ7KH%LJ)ive¶ and socially malevolent personalities separate three types 
of socially malevolent character: Machiavellianism, psychopathy and narcissism (together 
WKH\DUHRIWHQFDOOHGµWKH'DUN7ULDG¶. Machiavellianism is in particular associated with 
manipulative behaviour. Besides investigating what one can say about the presence of the Big 
Five character traits in these different sorts of socially malevolent character, researchers also 
investigate how these three types of socially malevolent character relate in term of the 
degree in which they incorporate the character traits of the Big Five.  Here, from an 
empirically informed conceptual perspective it is assumed that Machiavellianism, 
psychopathy and narcissism have something in common in that they refer a socially 
malevolent character with behavioural tendencies toward self-promotion, emotional 
coldness, duplicity, and aggressiveness (see Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Researchers then try 
to find out how this assumed similarity expresses itself in similarities and differences in terms 
of the degree to which psychopaths, Machiavellianists and narcissists are open, 
conscientious, extrovert, agreeable and neurotic.17  
7KHUHLVDVHFRQGYDULDQWRIWKHµH[WUHPHYDULDWLRQRIQRUPDOSHUVRQDOLW\¶-conception. 
Rather than being based on/in The Big 5, it relies heavily on the traits that are ascribed to 
psychopaths on the conception of psychopathy as advocated by Hare. On this second 
µH[WUHPHYDULDWLRQRIQRUPDOSHUVRQDOLW\YLHZ¶WKHLGHDLV that psychopathic features of an 
µDIIHFWLYH¶µLQWHUSHUVRQDO¶µOLIHVW\OH¶DQGµDQWL-VRFLDO¶NLQGUDQJHIURPQHDUQRWKLQJ to 
abnormally high (see Babiak & Hare, 2006: 29). Those at the upper end are referred to as 
psychopaths. As mentioned by Babiak & Hare, clearly most people fall between the extremes. 
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 :KHQLWFRPHVWRUHVHDUFKRQWKH'DUN7ULDGLQFOXGLQJµSV\FKRSDWK\¶DQGWKH%LJ)LYHLWPXVWEHPHQWLRQHG
that those who are referred to as psychopaths do not meet the standards of the PCL-R. Also, it is often self-report 
VFDOHVIRUµSV\FKRSDWK\¶UDWKHr than the PCL-5WKDWDUHXVHGWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµSV\FKRSDWK\¶




If we interpret this by means of the PCL-R that means that there is a psychopathy 
dimension, ranging from 0 to 40 on which -by far- most people score in between; and -
noteworthy-most do so towards the lower extreme (Hare & Babiak, 2006: 29).18 Those in the 
middle have a significant number of psychopathic features, but they are not psychopaths in 
the scientific strict PCL-R sense of the term (see Hare & Babiak, 2006: 29). These people 
clearly are not model citizens as most people would understand them, but lack any clinical 
IRUPRISV\FKRSDWK\VRPHWLPHVVFLHQWLVWVUHIHUWRWKHPDVµVXEFOLQLFDOSV\FKRSDWKV¶+DUH	
Babiak, 2006: 29). 
Now, Babiak & Hare mention: 
 
Whatever cut score is used [30 for the PCL-R], individuals who meet or exceed the score are 
different from those with lower scores. (Babiak & Hare, 2006: 28) 
. 
This comment is in clear need of some critical questions, partly provided by the authors of 
the assertion themselves. The initial questions about their remark seem to be: (a) is their 
claim correct and (b) in what way are individuals scoring minimally the cut-off score 
different from those who score below the cut-off point? 
Let us consider the following assumptions: 
 
a) there is a clear difference between people who meet or exceed the cut-off score of the 
PCL-R and those who do not 
b) whether this is a difference in kind or rather degree is yet to be firmly established, 
(Babiak & Hare, 2006: 28).  
 
Both assumptions seem compatible with an account of psychopathy as an extreme variation 
of normal personality traits, even though at face value the second assumption is not, for ±the 
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 Note that according to Hare (1996), the PCL-R mean score for non-criminals is 5.  
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idea would be- how can there be anything else than a difference in degree if one thinks of 
psychopathy as an extreme variation of normal personality traits? Well, there can be, I 
think. What one would have to do is thinking of psychopathy as a syndrome, i.e. a cluster of 
personality traits, (e.g. µbeing manipulative¶, µlacking empathy¶, µhaving a sense of 
grandiosity¶µODFNLQJJXLOWDQGUHPRUVH¶, while granting that these traits can exist in 
different degrees in an individual as milder or more severe variants of normal personality 
traits. Next one would have to conclude that when these traits are at the upper end of a 
continuum of normal personality traits, the sum total of these traits when they exist together 
in the psychology of an individual - dependent on what exactly the necessary and sufficient 
traits are for psychopathy ± could reflect a (pathological) syndrome that is qualitatively 
different from the case where these traits are found in the psychology of an individual in a 
mild variant. This view would consist in the idea that it is a falsehood that because certain 
particular milder variants of psychopathic traits (µbeing manipulative¶, µlacking empathy¶, 
µhaving a sense of grandiosity¶, µODFNLQJJXLOWDQGUHPRUVH¶) are milder variants of something 
more severe (the same traits, but more severe), that therefore the bunch of milder variants is 
DµPLOGHUYDULDQW¶RUµVXEFOLQLFDOIRUP¶RIWKHVHYHUHVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVOHJLWLPDWHO\UHIHUUHGWR
as psychopathy.   
 
 
7.3. Psychopathy as a neurological deficit 
7.3.1 On differences and defects 
 
In due course I will come to talk about the fact that some scientists think of or at least talk 
DERXWSV\FKRSDWKV¶EUDLQVWDWHVDVEHLQJµGHIHFWLYH¶RUµDEQRUPDO¶ZKLOHRWKHUVFLHQWLVWV
SUHIHUQRWWRUHIHUWRSV\FKRSDWKV¶EUDLQVE\PHDQVRIWKHVHWHUPVDQGUDWKHUWDONDERXWWKHP
DVMXVWEHLQJµGLIIHUHQW¶%HIRUHGRLQJVROHWPHSRLQWRXWWKDWissues about normalcy and 
abnormalcy look extremely conceptually difficult. The following list of descriptions from a 
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common dictionary shows clearly why it is one should not take conceptual talk about 
normalcy lightly. The dictionary gives the following sL[PHDQLQJVRIWKHWHUPµQRUPDO¶ 
 
1. conforming to the standard or the common type; usual; regular; natural; 
2. serving to fix a standard; 
3. of natural occurrence; 
4. approximately average in any psychological trait, as intelligence, personality, or emotional    
   adjustment 
5. free from any mental disorder; sane; 
6. free from disease or malformation (Costello, 199119, cited in Dupré, 1998: 225) 
 
A distinction one implicitly finds in this list is the one between statistical (nr 1 and 4) and 
normative notions of normalcy (nr 5 and 6). As mentioned, some scientists think of or at 
least talk DERXWSV\FKRSDWKV¶EUDLQVDVVXIIHULQJIURPDQRUPDWLYHGHIHct, while other 
VFLHQWLVWVSUHIHUQRWWRGRVRDQGUDWKHUWDONDERXWSV\FKRSDWKV¶EUDLQVWDWHVDVEHLQJ
µGLIIHUHQW¶FRPSDUHGWRVRPHRWKHUFODVVHVRIEUDLQV,WVHHPVWREHWKHFDVHWKDWWKHODWWHU
can be explained by neuroscientific uncertainty and unclarity as to what type(s) of brain 
states count as normal brain states; something from which uncertainty and unclarity as to 
what count as abnormal brain states follows organically and quickly.  When it comes to 
UHVHDUFKHUV¶XQZLOOLQJQHVVWRGHVFULEHSV\FKRSDWKV¶EUDLQVDVDEQRUPDOGXHWRXQFHUWDLQW\
and unclarity about what count as normal brains, the uncertainty and unclarity seems to 
apply to both statistical and normative notions of normalcy. This then seems to be due to the 
uncontroversial fact that there is an absence of large-VFDOHHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVRQµFDQGLGDWH
QRUPDOEUDLQV¶20 Without that it clearly cannot be settled what counts as statistically 
common neural make-up in certain (experimental) circumstances. And without that, on its 
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I attended (University of Kent, Canterbury, June, 22, 2010, led by Robert Hare; pre-conference workshop to the 
Division of Forensic Psychology Annual Conference 2010). 
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turn, it seems hard, if not utterly impossible, to determine what counts as a normatively 
abnormal brain.   
It must be noted that being a member of a brain population reflective of statistical 
normalcy might not be a necessary condition for being a member of a class of brains 
reflective of normative normalcy, i.e. at least when it comes to the issue whether 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶ brains are normatively abnormal. That is, it could be the case that both (a rare 
type) psychopathic brain and a common type of brain of other human beings can rightfully 
be classified as normatively normal. A plausible case for this verdict could be one in which 
both the brains of psychopaths and the brains of a large class of other human beings reflect 
neural correlates of evolutionary determined different genetic recipes for brain states, 
SHUVRQDOLW\DQGEHKDYLRXU7KHEUDLQVRIµRWKHUV¶FRXOGUHIOHFWVRPHDGYDQWDJHFRPLQJIURP
pro-social traits and behaviours, while the brains of psychopaths could be reflective of 
individuals that were genetically pre-supposed to certain exploitative behaviour and through 
evolutionary history have found and made use of some adaptive ecological niche for this 
behaviour (more on this in § 7.6 ). 
 
 
7.3.2. Some cautionary notes 
 
/HWXVQRZWXUQWRVRPHUHVHDUFKRQSV\FKRSDWKV¶brains. Neuroscientists have different ideas 
about differences/abnormalities in the brains of psychopaths. I will mention a few. Note that 
the neuroscience of psychopathy is a quickly growing and extensive field of research. It is 
beyond the purposes of this chapter to offer more than the introductory sketch below. 
When it comes to neuroscientific research on psychopathy, there is both research on 
structural (anatomical) and functional anomalies (how does a brain process certain 
information) in psychopaths. Having said that, one has to be careful with interpretation of 
the literature, especially when it comes to structural anomalies. Weber, Habel, Amunst and 
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Schneider (2008) provide a literature review on structural brain anomalies in psychopaths. 
They argue that:  
 
Data in the literature report a reduction in prefrontal gray matter volume, gray matter loss in the 
right superior temporal gyrus, amygdala volume loss, a decrease in posterior hippocampal volume, 
an exaggerated structural hippocampal asymmetry, and an increase in callosal white matter 
volume in psychopathic individuals. These findings suggest that psychopathy is associated with 
brain abnormalities in a prefrontal± temporo-limbic circuit²i.e. regions that are involved, among 




follows. It could very well be correct that those human beings who (for one reason or 
DQRWKHUFDQOHJLWLPDWHO\EHFDOOHGµSV\FKRSDWKV¶DUHLQVRPHVLJQLILFDQWZD\QRWD
completely homogeneous group, possibly also in terms of their brain architecture. We can 
think here for example of the different psychopathic styles advocated by Hare & Babiak 
(2006) that might come with somewhat different brain structures (cf Karpman, 1948 who 
separates out two real types of psychopaths amongst six ones that clinicians might want to 
call psychopaths). However, we should not automatically conclude that psychopaths are not 
a homogenous group on basis of the existing variety of research conclusions about the brains 
RIKXPDQEHLQJVGHVFULEHGE\WKHDXWKRUVRIWKHVWXGLHVDVµSV\FKRSDWKV¶:HVKRXOGQRWGR
so when there is an absence and given the absence of homogeneity in the neuroscientific 
literature on psychopathy as to what the construct of psychopathy amounts to. Sometimes, in 
QHXURVFLHQWLILFOLWHUDWXUHµSV\FKRSDWK\¶LVGHILQHGORRVHO\DQGDVVXFKLQFRUSRUDWHVRULV
identified with some VRUWRIUDWKHUVHYHUHµDQWL-VRFLDOLW\¶PRUHJHQHUDOO\$QLGHQWLILFDWLRQRI
psychopathy with some sort of broad construct of severe anti-sociality invites for unhelpful 
but accurate conclusions about heterogeneous brain structures (that would be the physical 
foundation corresponding to the anti-sociality reflecting (highly) significantly different 
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syndromes/cognitive anomalies). This problem of loose definitions one finds in the 
QHXURVFLHQWLILFOLWHUDWXUHRQµSV\FKRSDWK\¶LVDPHWKRGRORJLFDOSUREOHPWKDWLV different from 
another methodological problem any reader of neuroscientific literature on psychopathy 
should be alert on: the problem of researchers using a plausible and strict definition of 
psychopathy in their study, while working with research subjects (the alleged psychopaths) 
that fail to match the theoretical construct of psychopathy as advocated by the authors 
and/or fail to meet the strict demands of the (often and hopefully) very valid and reliable 
measurement instrument the neuroscientific researchers choose to identify a group of 
psychopaths whose brain they then subsequently investigate. Here is an example of this 
SUREOHP6XSSRVHDVDQDXWKRURIDQHXURVFLHQWLILFVWXG\RQHLQWHQGVWRLGHQWLI\RQH¶V
research objects by means of the PCL-R because (reasonably) to one that seems to be the best 
measurement instrument to identify psychopathy. As we have seen, the PCL-R demands a 
cut-off score of 30 (out of the possible 40). Unfortunately, occasionally, it does happen that 
researchers take this cut-off score somewhat loose and take psychopaths to be those research 
participants that score above 25 rather than 30 (or, incidentally, even lower than 25). This 
practice is helpful to/convenient for a researcher in the way that otherwise, as a researcher, 
one may end up with a (far) too low number of real PCL-R psychopaths to draw significant 
research conclusions. Be that as it is, researchers should not lower the cut-off score. This 
namely runs the risk of not investigating the nature of psychopathy, but rather some other 
severe anti-sociality syndrome. A difference of five points in terms of cut-off score may mean 
that one investigates too many other severally socially malevolent beings besides some real 
psychopaths. 
There is a further important methodological point that needs to be made in regard to 
neuroscientific research on psychopathy. Let us suppose that a particular neuroscientific 
study is conceptually reasonable (i.e. it works with a sufficiently conceptually plausible ±e.g. 
Cleckley or Hare- psychopathy construct that as such is not a loosely ±EURDGO\µDQWL-
VRFLDOLW\¶-construct) and reflects a match between the conceptualization of psychopathy and 
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the research participants. Suppose next that all research participants of this study are a 
sufficiently homogenous group for scientific purposes. That is, research participants are 
similar in intelligence, socio-economic background and some other features that could 
possibly lead to brain differences. Suppose furthermore, that on basis of research with their 
participants (the) researcher(s) of the study conclude that there is a widely shared or 
universal brain anomaly in their group of research subjects (compared to some control group 
of more statistically (and normatively) normal human agents). In this situation, the 
researcher(s) who conduct(s) the study (and their colleagues who read their published 
papers) still need to be alert on the possibility that a particular substantive research 
conclusion about a brain anomaly in psychopaths (say, the size of a  particular brain bit X is 
really different from the size of this particular brain part in typical human beings) reflects a 
IDFWRUWKDWLVZLGHO\VKDUHGE\RQH¶VUHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWVZKLOHLWGRHVQRWKDYHDQ\WKLQJ
whatsoever to do with the nature of the pHUVRQDOLW\V\QGURPHµSV\FKRSDWK\¶2QHWKLQJRQH
could think of e.g. is substance abuse of research participants. What could happen is that the 
brains of real psychopaths lead researchers to wrong conclusions about the neural correlates 
of psychopathy due to the fact that the homogeneity they find in their research populations 
UHIOHFWVDVKDUHGIDFWRUQRWKDYLQJDQ\WKLQJWRGRZLWKSV\FKRSDWK\¶VEUDLQHVVHQFHEXW
rather reflects something else, most probably something that often goes with criminal 
behaviour in general, say excessive use of alcohol or drugs. So, the brains of psychopaths 
could lead to conclusions about structural anomalies in psychopaths not because of some 
structural brain anomaly that is characteristic of the syndrome psychopathy, but rather as a 
result of ±in this case- the brain upshot of substance abuse.  I have pointed out the just 
mentioned issue in order to further support a general point I would like to make: the point 
that one needs to be careful with interpreting neuro-scientific research on anti-sociality. I 
have tried to support this point by means of what I observe in what at places looks like a 




good neuroscientific studies on psychopathy and ±as far as I can see- these studies that are 
conceptually sufficiently sound (and have their research participants matched accordingly) 
do not have research participants with a history of substance abuse which - on its turn- is in 
line with dominant ideas about the psychopathy construct. Typically, alcohol and drugs use 
are considered as unessential to the nature of psychopathy. Indeed, researchers typically do 
not even want to consider alcohol and drug use as some sort of peripheral feature of 
psychopathy. Alcohol and drugs use seem utterly irrelevant to the psychopathy construct.21 
In this section I have wanted to make the general point that one should be careful in 
terms of interpretation of neuroscientific research on anti-sociality syndromes, including 
psychopathy. I have done so by giving two examples of methodological trouble on may come 
across when having a look at the neuroscientific literature. I commented first on Weber et 
DO¶VFODLPLQWKHLUUHYLHZDUWLFOHWKDWSV\FKRSDWKVIRUPDKHWHURJHQHRXVSRSXODWLRQ,QVKRUW
P\UHVSRQVHKDVEHHQWKDWLIVWXG\DRQµSV\FKRSDWK\¶ZRUNVZLWKDQWL-social research 
participants that are very different from the participants in study (b) and (c) (either by 
GHILQLWLRQRURWKHUZLVHWKHQLWVKRXOGQRWFRPHDVDUHDOVXUSULVHWKDWµSV\FKRSDWKV¶IRUPD
heterogeneous population (NB:  (mistaken) conclusions about psychopaths being a 
heterogeneous population could also arise from some sort of in-group variation amongst the 
participants of one single study.) Secondly, I made the point that when interpreting the 
OLWHUDWXUHRQQHXURVFLHQFHRISV\FKRSDWK\RQHDOVRQHHGVWREHFDUHIXOWKDWWKHDXWKRUV¶
conclusions about charDFWHULVWLFIHDWXUHVRIµSV\FKRSDWKV¶¶EUDLQVFRQFOXVLRQVJURXQGHGLQD
particular spotted similarity in the brains of research participants that is markedly differently 
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 Granting for the sake of the argument and apparent reality, that the substance abuse problem I have laid out in the 
main text does not apply to the better neuroscientific studies on psychopathy, let me note three things, the first one 
being having been mentioned already. First, the neuroscientific literature on anti-sociality suggests that substance 
abuse is a clear candidate for misleading conclusions about the neural correlates of anti-sociality syndromes. 
Secondly, being informed by neuroscientific studies, I cannot think of any other factors that are such a very clear 
candidate for misleading conclusions about brain anomalies as substance abuse seems to be. Thirdly, having said 
that, it will not harm, indeed benefit the neuroscientific field of psychopathy and other anti-sociality syndromes 
(disorders) if, by default, scientists and others suppose that there may be other factors besides substance abuse that 
relatively homogenously characterize the brains of the research participants, while the neural correlates of these 
factors that lead researchers to the conclusion that there is a brain anomaly, are unreflective of the syndrome 




from what is found in the brains of a control group, do not reflect something else that has 





Neuroscientific literature on psychopathy shows that it is a widespread thought that 
amygdala dysfunction is one of the core problems that characterizes psychopathy. Note that 
the amygdala is a little brain part ±almond shaped-that as a core component belongs to the 
limbic system. The limbic system is the part of the brain that is related to 
drives/motivations/inclinations and emotions (see also footnote 30). One conclusion that 
seems to hold in terms of structural anomalies comes from research from Tiihonen et al.  
(200022, cited in Blair 2003). They conclude that high levels of psychopathy were associated 
with reduced volume of the amygdala.  
In terms of functional amygdala anomalies, research has demonstrated that 
psychopathic individuals experience emotions differently, showing qualitative and/or 
quantitative differences in their ability to experience emotion (Hare, 1993, 199823; 
Steuerwald & Kosson, 200024) and process affective language (Gillstrom & Hare, 198825; Hare 
& McPherson, 198426; Williamson, Harpur, & Hare, 199127). Significant abnormalities have 
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 Tiihonen, J.,Hodgins, S.,Vaurio,O., et al. µ$P\JGDORLGYROXPHORVVLQSV\FKRSDWK\¶Society for 
Neuroscience Abstracts, 2017. 
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 Hare, R.'µ3V\FKRSDWKVDQGWKHLUQature: implications for the mental health and criminal justice  
    6\VWHPV¶ In Millon, T., Simonsen, E., Birket-Smith, M., Davis, R. (eds.), Psychopathy: Antisocial, Criminal,  
    and Violent Behaviour (New York: Guilford Press), pp. 188-212. 
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 6WHXHUZDOG%/	.RVVRQ'6µ(PRWLRQDOH[SHULHQFHVRIWKHSV\FKRSDWK¶,Q Gacono, C.B. (ed.).  
   The Clinical and Forensic Assessment of Psychopathy (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
   Associates), pp. 111-135. 
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 Gillstrom, B.J. & Hare, R.D. (1988). µ/DQJXDJH-UHODWHGKDQGJHVWXUHVLQSV\FKRSDWKV¶Journal of Personality 
   Disorders. 2(1), pp. 21±27.  
 
26
 Hare, R.D. & McPherson, L0µPsychopathy and perceptual asymmetry during verbal dichotic    
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also been found in physiological responses to affective material (Hare, 197828; Patrick, 
Bradley, & Lang, 199329) and memory for emotional events (Christianson et al., 199630) (all 
cited in Hastings et al., 2008).  
One further study comes from Kiehl et al. (2001). Below I give a brief description of 
this study as an example of studies investigating functional anomalies in psychopaths. In 
their (2001) study, Kiehl et al. exposed three groups of people to an emotional memory word 
task, where the participants processed words of neutral and negative valence. One of those 
groups consisted of people scoring high and the other two groups of participants scoring 
considerable lower on the PCL-R. One of those groups consisted of criminal non-
psychopaths and the other of non-criminal control participants. Kiehl et al. found a reduced 
amygdala response in the high-scoring group during the processing of words of negative 
valence HJµGHDWK¶µUDSH¶. Their study resulted in the conclusion that (compared to 
criminal non-psychopaths and non-criminal control participants), criminal psychopaths 
showed significantly less affect-related activity in the limbic and paralymbic systems31 (NB: 
not just in the amygdala; also in the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, ventral striatum 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
    listening¶. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 93 (2), pp. 141±149.  
 
27
 Williamson, S., Harpur, T.J., Hare, 5'µ$EQRUPDOSURFHVVLQJRIDIIHFWLYHZRUGVE\pV\FKRSDWKV¶ 
    Psychophysiology, 28, pp. 260±273. 
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 Hare, R.D. (1978). µElectrodermal and cardiovascular correlates of psychopathy¶,QHare, R.D. & Schalling,  
    D. (eds). Psychopathic behavior: Approaches to research (Chichester, England: Wiley), pp. 107-144. 
 
29
 Patrick, C.J., Bradley, M.M. & Lang,  P.J. (1993). µ(PRWLRQLQWKHFULPLQDOSV\FKRSDWK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    PRGXODWLRQ¶Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102 (1), pp. 82±92.  
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communication between the two cerebral hemispheres); the limbic system is directly beneath the corpus callosum; 
the paralymbic system more or less embraces the limbic system spatially. Both the limbic and paralymbic system are 




and the anterior and posterior cingulated gyri.) 32 Kiehl et al. drew a few other conclusions on 
basis of the data of their study, amongst which the following one:  while there is clear 
underactivation in the limbic and paralymbic system of psychopaths while processing words 
OLNHµGHDWK¶WKDWLVHPRWLRQDOO\ORDGHGZRUGVRIQHJDWLYHYDOHQFHWKHUHLVH[WHQVLYHDFWLYLW\
elsewhere in the brains of psychopathic individuals while processing these words. What 
Kiehl and colleagues found is that psychopaths show greater activation for affective than for 
neutral stimuli in a number of brain regions, that are associated with semantics and decision-
making (Kiehl et al. 2001). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that criminal 
psychopaths employ nonlimbic cognitive strategies to process affective material (Williamson 
et al 199133, cited in Kiehl et al. 2001). This may mean that the absence of appropriate limbic 
input regarding the affective characteristics of stimuli forces psychopathic individuals to use 
alternative cognitive operations and/or strategies to process affective material (see Kiehl et al, 
2001).  
There is a fairly large number of other studies on psychopaths and affective 
processing of language (see Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 2005: chapter for a description of some 
studies). The objects of those studies sometimes differ a little, but quite a few of them offer 
support for the conclusion that while for most typical human agents language has the 
capacity to elicit powerful emotional feelings, for a psychopath a word is just a rather dry 
word. While in typical human agents, the word cancer  for example evokes not only a 
clinical description of a disease and its symptoms but a sense of fear, apprehension, or 
concern, and perhaps disturbing mental images of what it might be like to have it, for 
psychopaths it has no more than a dictionary meaning (see Hare, 1993: 131).  
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 As to paralimbic system dysfunction, compare Kiehl (2006), although see Blair (2005) for some critical remarks 
as to paralimbic system dysfunction.  
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71 
 
7.4. Psychopathy as a genetic deficit 
 
Many researchers and clinicians think of psychopathy as a disorder that has a genetic basis 
(see e.g. Blair, Mitchell and Blair, 2005; cf Hare, 1993). Researchers in behavioural genetics 
are increasingly using the tools of molecular genetics to extend upon discoveries from twin, 
family, and adoption studies when it comes to the genetic foundation of antisocial spectrum 
disorders and psychopathy (see Gunther, Vaughn, Philibert, 2010). Perhaps a few words 
about molecular genetics. Molecular genetics as a scientific domain studies the structure and 
function of genes at a molecular level. Their scientific results help to understand 
psychopathy and do so on top of twin, family and adoption studies that provide insight into 
whether certain character traits or behaviour are (primarily) caused by a genetic blueprint or 
by some environmental influence.   
There is one very important remark that needs to be made about any influence of 
genes on psychopathy ±or broader- anti-social spectrum disorders: it is extremely unlikely 
that there is a direct genetic contribution to specific anti-social behaviours (Ellis & Walsh 
1997; Blair, Mitchell and Blair, 2005: 29; Blair, Peschardt, Budhani, Mitchell and Pine, 2006). 
It is naïve to believe this. Nevertheless, there could still be numerous genes that influence 
how the brain works in ways that increase (or decrease) the probability of criminal 
behaviour (Ellis & Walsh, 1997). Where genetics are likely to play a role is in determining 
the probability that the individual will learn an anti-social strategy to achieve her goal (Blair, 
Mitchell and Blair 2005: 29; Blair, Peschardt, Budhani, Mitchell and Pine, 2006; Ellis & 
Walsh, 1997).  Many have argued that the particular emotional experience of psychopaths 
make them more likely to learn anti-social strategies to reach their goals (Blair, 1995; 
Eysenck, 196434; Trasler, 197335; Lykken 199536; cited in Blair et al, 2006).  
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Having this in mind, there is valuable information coming from molecular genetics on 
anti-social behaviour. Molecular geneticists have identified several genes relevant to anti-
social behaviour and (even) psychopathy in particular.  As explained by Gunter, Vaughn and 
Philibert (2010):  
 
Of particular interest to researchers examining antisocial spectrum disorders [that covers what we 
can call psychopathy from a perspective of clinical practice] have been genes related to 
serotonergic and dopaminergic activity. Examples of genes related to metabolism include 
catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT), monoamine oxidase (MAO-A), and dopamine beta 
hydroxylase (DBH); those related to receptor morphology include dopamine receptor D2 (DRD2), 
dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4), serotonin receptor 1B (5HTR1B), and serotonin receptor 2A 
(5HTR2A); and those related to transporter activity include the serotonin transporter (in 
particular a polymorphism in the promoter region of the gene referred to as the serotonin 
transporter linked polymorphic regions or 5HTTLPR) and dopamine transporter (DAT). 
 
As mentioned by Gunter et al. current scientific evidence seems to point to MAO-A and 
5HTT as the most promising sites for additional inquiry for antisocial spectrum disorders and 
psycKRSDWK\´*XQWHUHWDO37 It needs to be said that molecular genetics on 
psychopathy is still in its infancy. It is far from clear yet how to understand the development 
of psychopathy on the level of molecular genetics. That is, if psychopathy has indeed a 
genetic basis. Something which many researchers believe. More on this in § 9. 
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7.5. Psychopathy as an inhibition problem 
 
,PSXOVLYLW\UHODWHVWRµERWWRP-XS¶NLFNLQJRIWKHEUDLQLQWRHPRWLRQDOJHDUE\WKHOLPELFV\VWHP
%XWLWDOVRUHODWHVWRWKHDELOLW\WRH[HUWµWRS-down control over those emotions once they have 
been kicked into gear. (Oakley, 2007: 199) 
 
According to some researchers psychopathy should be understood as an inhibition problem 
rather than anything else. What these researchers propose is that psychopaths are not limited 
by the inhibitory mechanisms that restrain the behaviour of most people.  This account is 
perfectly compatible with the other mentioned conceptions, but it clearly puts the emphasis 
on the inhibition peculiarity. This inhibition peculiarity/problem is supposed to cause 
psychopaths to behave in an impulsive, irresponsible and reckless manner (see Barr & 
Quinsey, 2008). Before deepening this conception of psychopathy a little more, let me make 
the following two remarks.  
First, researchers advocating the Hare conception of psychopathy seem to think that 
WKHIHDWXUHµLPSXOVLYLW\¶LVPRGHVWO\UHOHYDQWWRWKHFRQVWUXFWRISV\FKRSDWK\. (Note that 
impulsivity is an item of the PCL-R.,WDNHWKHLGHDWREHWKDWWKLVIHDWXUHµLPSXOVLYLW\¶LV
relevant, though not part of the core of the psychopathy construct. As we have seen in § 6.6, 
typically emotional anomalies are considered as representative of the core of psychopathy. 
Many Hare advocates may want to see emotional anomalies (either one emotional anomaly 
or all of WKHPDVIXOO\H[KDXVWLQJSV\FKRSDWK\¶VFRUHZKLOHRWKHUVPD\ZDQWWRDGGRWKHU
features, e.g. manipulative behaviour and a grandiose sense of self to the core of the 
construct.  
Here is the second remark. A distinction of relevance when thinking about 
psychopathy as an impulsivity disorder is the distinction between reactive aggression and 
instrumental aggression. In reactive aggression (also referred to as impulsive or affective 




possessions or increasing status within the hierarchy). Reactive aggression is seen as the 
ultimate mammalian response to threat. The idea is this. When perceiving a threat, 
dependent on the distance of the threat, mammals show different types of responses. When 
the threat is at great distance mammals typically freeze. When the threat is somewhat closer 
they show a flight response. And when the threat is very near, mammals show reactive 
aggression (Blanchard et al., 1977; cited in Blair et al. 2005: 96). When it comes to human 
beings, reactive aggression shows up in many different types of anti-sociality. Reactive 
aggression is also seen in individuals exemplifying PCL-R- psychopathy.  
Instrumental aggression is different from reactive aggression in that it is not an 
immediate response to a frustrating or threatening event, but rather a form of aggression that 
is used as a means to achieve a specific desired goal. Instrumental aggression, unlike reactive 
aggression, is purposeful and goal-directed (Berckowitz, 199338; cited in Blair, Michel and 
Blair, 2005). Bullying is considered to be an example of instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 
2005). It seems to be instrumental rather reactive aggression that is a marked feature of 
psychopathy and it also seems to be instrumental aggression that separates psychopaths from 
a rather wide variety and large number of other severely anti-social human beings, many of 





But iWDOVRUHODWHVWRWKHDELOLW\WRH[HUWµWRS-down control over those emotions once they have 
been kicked into gear. (Oakley, 2007: 199) 
 
What would this mean in the case of psychopaths? Applied to an assumed deficiency in self-
regulation this idea means that we should conceptually separate strong inclinations 
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psychopaths have and a deficiency in their mind/brain that makes it exceptionally hard (up 
to impossible) to control them. We would think of impulsivity and self-regulation in 
psychopaths in terms of the dominance hierarchy of, on the one hand, a properly 
functioning or dysfunctioning prefrontal cortex (necessary to exercise control) and on the 
other hand, activity in brain parts responsible for conation. Strong bottom-up input would 
require a psychopath with a well-functioning prefrontal cortex to prevent impulsive 
behaviour.  
It seems reasonable to think that in psychopaths the sort of (dominance) relationship 
between certain brain parts responsible for bottom-up motivational input and the prefrontal 
cortex involved in top-down control can make a real difference in terms of being a successful 
psychopath who achieves his highly egoistic goals and one who fails to do so because of some 
sort of impulsivity. This hierarchy could also make a crucial difference when it comes to 




7.6. Psychopathy as an adaptive reproductive strategy 
 
What we can add to the current list of psychopathy conceptions - as a final idea - is the 
WKRXJKWWKDWSV\FKRSDWK\LVWKHRXWFRPHRIDµJHQHWLFDGDSWLYHUHSURGXFWLYHVWUDWHJ\¶ 
There are several closely related theories in the area of gene-based evolutionary 
theories. Such theories assume, centrally, that genetic factors predispose people to varying 
degrees to criminal/antisocial behaviour and that natural selection has operated on human 
populations and subpopulations to favour varying tendencies towards such behaviour. Below 
,GLVFXVVWKHµ&KHDWHU¶-WKHRU\DQGDOLWWOHPRUHEURDGO\WKHµ&DGYHUVXVGDGWKHRU\¶ 




that males have been naturally selected to make lower parental investment in their offspring 
than women. The theory assumes as well that women have been naturally selected for 
choosing mates who will make high parental investments. The theory subsequently supposes 
that one result of these competing natural selection forces has been to split males into two 
sub populations. One sub population more or less complies with female preferences for males 
who make high parental investments, (although still not as high as most women would 
SUHIHU7KHVHDUHWKHµGDGV¶7KHRWKHUVWKHµFDGV¶RUFKHDWHUVPHUHO\PLPLFKLJK-investing 
males and use devious tactics to opportunistically secure numerous sex partners. According 
to the cheater theory, these devious tactics often include the use of violence, chronic 
GHFHSWLRQDQGµJHWULFKTXLFN¶WDFWLFVDOODFWLRQVWKDWFDQEHYHU\KXUWIXOWRRWKHUV(OOLV	
Walsh, 1997).  
The Cad versus Dad theory with its room for creatures who deceive provides an 
explanation of cheating behaviour by assuming that it fits well with the dynamics of a 
population in terms of reciprocity and cooperation. Ellis and Walsh (1997) argue: 
 
If genes promoting altruistic and cooperative behaviour can evolve by natural selection (Rushton 
et al,, 198639), genes could also evolve that predispose organisms to take advantage of the altruistic 
and cooperative behaviour of others without reciprocating (Badcock, 198640; Thompson, 198041; 
Thornhill, 197942). Through this escalating set of social relationships may evolve reproductive 
strategies rooted in deception and cheating (Cosmides and Tooby, 199243(OOLV>µE¶
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detect and foil such tactics, may have given rice to the evolution of retaliatory tactics, which may 
exert pressures for the evolution of even more subtle forms of deception and cheating (Clutton-
Brock & Parker, 199545). (Ellis and Walsh, 1997: 233)  
 
Something similar is argued for by Linda Mealey (1995): 
 
Those who use a deceptive strategy and defect after signaling cooperation are usually referred to 
DVµFKHDWHUV¶ and, as many authors have pointed out«46 , the presence of cheaters can lead to a 
coevolutionary arms race in which potential cooperators evolve fine-tuned sensitivities to likely 
evidence or cues of deception, while potential cheaters evolve equally fine-tuned abilities to hide 
those cues. (Mealey, 1995: 525) 
 
In her (1995), Linda Mealey argues for two very different types of anti-social personalities. 
One is the outcome of frequency-dependent, genetically-based individual differences in use 
of a single (antisocial) strategy. To this type of personality she refers as µSULPDU\VRFLRSDWK\¶. 
The other type she argues for is the outcome of individual differences in developmental 
response to the environment, resulting in the differential use of cooperative or deceptive 
social strategies. She refers to this type as µVHFRQGDU\VRFLRSDWK\¶$ERXWµSULPDU\ VRFLRSDWK\¶ 
(a terms which seems to match a concept that fits rather well with the dominant conception 
of psychopathy) she argues: 
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To the extent that we understand it now, primary sociopaths come from one extreme of a 
polygenic genetic distribution and seem to have a genotype that disposes them "to acquire and be 
reinforced for displaying antisociality" (Rowe 1990: 12247). That genotype results in a certain 
inborn temperament or personality coupled with a particular pattern of autonomic arousal which, 
together, seem to design the individual (1) to be selectively unresponsive to those environmental 
cues necessary for normal socialization and moral development and (2) to actively seek the more 
deviant and arousing stimuli within the environment. (Mealey, 1995: 530) 
 
Mealey sees primary sociopaths as individuals that have a genotype that disposes them "to 
acquire and be reinforced for displaying antisociality"(Rowe 1990: 12248; cited in Mealey, 
1995: 536). Importantly, such individuals progress normally in terms of cognitive 
development and will acquire a theory of mind. Their theory of mind however, will be 
formulated purely in instrumental terms, without access to the empathic understanding that 
most of us rely on VRPXFKRIWKHWLPH:LWKRXWORYHWRµFRPPLW¶ them to cooperation, 
DQ[LHW\WRSUHYHQWµdefection¶ or guilt to inspire repentance, these people remain free to 
continuously play for the short-term benefit in the Prisoner's Dilemma (Mealey, 1995: 536). 
,QUHODWLRQWRµVHFRQGDU\sociRSDWK\¶0HDOH\DUJXHVWKDWLWLVH[SUHVVHGE\LQGLYLGXDOV
who are not extreme on the genetic sociopathy spectrum, but who, because of their exposure 
to environmental risk factors, pursue a life strategy that involves frequent, but not 
necessarily emotionless cheating. Unlike primary sociopaths, secondary sociopaths will not 
necessarily exhibit chronic antisocial behaviour, because their strategy choices will be more 
closely tied to age, fluctuation in hormone levels, their competitive status within their 
referent group, and changing environmental contingencies (Mealey, 1995: 536-7). 
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What can be derived from the current section on psychopathy as an adaptive 
reproductive strategy is that according to some researchers the process of natural selection 
has led to a creation of a niche for individuals who are deceitful, manipulative, lacking in 
empathy and remorse, and who are willing to exploit any and all opportunities to gratify 
their own needs and desires. This is a radical departure from the idea that psychopathy is a 
personality disorder in the sense that gene-based evolutionary theories conceive of 




8. Psychopathy in women 
 
Currently, literature on psychopathy in women is quite limited. The body of research is 
growing, but as a whole it is not a very mature field of research yet. Apart from the 
limitations in quantity, there are some limitations in quality, or at least there are research 
issues one should keep an eye one. Let me mention two important ones. First, different 
studies on psychopathy in females have used different populations of women (as research 
subjects). This makes it often impossible to legitimately generalize findings. Secondly, studies 
on female psychopathy have used different instruments for the measurement of 
psychopathy.  This also makes it hard to generalize findings. Apart from the issue of different 
PHDVXUHPHQWWRROVEHLQJXVHGLQGLIIHUHQWVWXGLHVRQµIHPDOHSV\FKRSDWK\¶WKHUHLVDQRWKHU
issue that needs to be addressed in regard to matters female psychopathy and measurement 
WRROV$QLVVXHKDYLQJWRGRZLWKWKHµYDOLGLW\¶RIPHDVXUHPHQWLQVWUXPHQWV 
A measurement instrument is valid, when, in case properly used (by a trained 
clinician and as the manual of the measurement instrument prescribes), it measures the thing 
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it is supposed to measure and not something else. Unless an instrument has been properly 
validated it should not be used in clinical settings. When it comes to the PCL-R, Hare, in the 
manual of the first edition of the PCL-R, states that the use of this instrument in clinical 
VHWWLQJVVKRXOGEHOLPLWHGWR³WKRVHSRSXODWLRQVLQwhich it has been fully validated. For the 
SUHVHQFHWKLVPHDQVDGXOWPDOHIRUHQVLFSRSXODWLRQV´+DUH50: 5, cited in Vitale & 
Newman, 2001). Note that in the manual of the second edition of the PCL-R Hare argues 
WKDW³standard PCL-R scores have much the same meaning, with respect to the construct of 
psychopathy, in several different groups [including female offenders] and settings" (2003: 
75). Be that what Hare argues, some researchers have responded to this claim of Hare by 
arguing that "the grounds for this assumption have yet to be demonstrated" (Logan, 200951: 3; 
cited in Kreis, 2009). These researchers propose that when it comes to measurement of 
psychopathy, PCL-R scores might not have the same meaning for different human 
subpopulations, e.g. women. Perhaps a score of 25 or 30 means something different for males 
compared to females.  
A related thought some researchers have is that it cannot be excluded that 
psychopathy manifests itself differently in males and females.52 On a broad abstract level, 
there are two ways in which psychopathy could manifest itself differently in males and 
females. First, it could be the case that both males and females share something highly 
characteristic that is the essence of the disorder (e.g. and plausibly a lack of empathy) while 
males and females differ on features that are somewhat up to significantly less important in 
terms of the intrinsic nature of the disorder. It could e.g. be the case that aggression and 
violence is more typical for/ in male psychopaths (this could have an evolutionary 
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explanation) while manipulation is more common in females (this could also have an 
evolutionary explanation). Secondly, it could be the case that a particular trait that is 
characteristic of both male and female psychopathy manifests itself differently at a 
behavioural level. Women e.g. might have different manipulation techniques compared to 
men.   
We can helpfully understand the above two points about different manifestations of 
psychopathy in males and females plus the concerns about the PCL-5¶VYDOLGLW\IRUWKH
female population by means of the following paragraph from Kreis & Cooke (2011).  
 
If psychopathic women generally use more subtle and relational ways of exploiting and 
dominating other people, and if they primarily use aggression in a domestic setting against close 
intimates and dependents, their harmful acts likely go more unnoticed by the authorities. In 
contrast, greater and more public use of physical aggression, and more overt dominance and 
status-seeking, would make psychopathic men and their harmful acts more noticeable, and more 
likely to be officially recorded. Measures (e.g., the PCL-R) that rely strongly on officially 
recorded criminality and antisocial behavior, and of more male typical presentations of it, are 
clearly going to miss a great proportion of psychopathic women. (Kreis & Cooke, 2011)  
 
Overall, the important take point to take home is that it could be the case that in the past, 
present and future clinicians (have) diagnose(d) some women illegitimately as presenting 
with psychopathy and/or failed to diagnose them as psychopaths, because the PCL-R in its 






9. The etiology of psychopathy 
   9.1. Introduction  
 
In this section I will comment on the ultimate cause of psychopathy. Is it nature or nurture? 
In most cases, this is a false dichotomy. Nature and nurture operate together and, as well-
IRUPXODWHGE\6WHYH&ROHLWLVHYHQWKHFDVHWKDW³social factors can play a significant role in 
regulating the activity of human genes. DNA encodes the potential for cellular behavior, but 
that potential is only realized if the gene is expressed - if its DNA is transcribed into RNA 
and translated into protein´&ROH  And it is social factors that can play a significant 
role in whether DNA gets to that point. But even leaving that more sophisticated level of 
thought aside many would agree that social and genetic factors operate together in the causal 
story of, say, a particular physical disease or say, introvert or extravert behaviour. But still, 
somehow there is this debate, and often a heated debate between nature and nurture 
advocates who know perfectly well that there is some truth in what the other camp 
advocates. As expressed by John Dupré: ´Almost everyone agrees that there is something 
profoundly wrong with the dichotomy between nature and nurture, and yet it seems 
stubbornly unwilling to go away´'XSUp, 2003). I think he is right.  
When it comes to psychopathy, there are both stronger suggestions and complexities 
as to its etiology. One complexity comes from the fact that the question as to what 
psychopathy is exactly, is open to conceptual discussion. Two other (possible) complexities 
come from the following two facts: (a) there may be core and more peripheral features to the 
disorder (a view that seems to be shared by many scientists) and (b) one feature may have 
different manifestations in traits and/or behaviour.  
While there are the abovementioned complexities, it seems to be the case that at least 
the emotional anomalies that characterize psychopathy are strongly a result of nature rather 
than environment. Before I focus on scientific views that advocate this, I first focus on 
83 
 
environmental causes of crime in general.  Many crimes, but probably not the ones 
committed by psychopaths, are primarily caused by environmental influences.  
 
 
9.2. Environmental causes of crime 
 
Criminals come to crime in a variety of ways. Here I identify three characteristic ways. First, 
some criminals learn to do crime by example because they are raised in families of social 
environments in which criminal behaviour, in one way or another and to one degree or 
another, is the accepted norm. Consider a criminal who had professional thieves as parents. 
2QHRI+DUH¶VUHVHDUFKREMHFWVZHQWDOUHDG\IURPDQHDUO\DJHµWRZRUN¶ZLWKKLVIDWKHU
3DUDGLJPDWLFH[DPSOHVRIWKHVHµVXEFXOWXUDOFULPLQDOV¶LQFOXGHWKHPDILDIDPLOLHV (Hare, 1993: 
84).  
Secondly, some criminals can be understood as largely the products of what is known 
DVµWKHF\FOHRIYLROHQFH¶(YLGHQFHLVHPHUJLQJWRVKRZWKDWYLFWLPVRIHDUO\VH[XDOSK\VLFDO
or emotional abuse frequently become perpetrators of the same as adults. It is not 
uncommon, for example, to find that child molestors were themselves sexually abused, or for 
wife assaulters to have witnessed domestic violence at an early age (Hare, 1993: 84).  In 
regard to this point. Blair HWDOKRZHYHUDUJXHWKDW³ZHdo not believe, on the basis of the 
available data, that physical/sexual abuse is a key factor in the genesis of SV\FKRSDWK\´%ODLU
et al. 2006: 264).  
Thirdly, some criminals run afoul of the law because of a powerful need they have. One 
can think of drug addicts here or about people with hardly any skills or resources who turn 
to robbery out of desperation (see Hare, 1993: 84). 
In short, for many criminals, negative social factors, i.e. e.g. poverty, family violence, 
child abuse, poor parenting, economic stress, alcohol and drug abuse, to name but a few ±
were contributors to, or even the cause of, their criminality. Indeed, had these factors not  
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been present, many of these criminals would not have turned to crime (Hare, 1993: 84). For 
psychopaths however crime seems to be less the result of adverse social conditions than of a 
character that has a strong genetic component. 
 
 
9.3. The childhood development of psychopaths 
 
Psychopathy does not suddenly spring, unannounced, into existence in adulthood. (Hare, 
1993: 157). In this section, I will approach this claim from the perspective of probable 
childhood development of a psychopath (NB: the diagnosis psychopathy must not be given to 
anyone under the age of 18).   
$V5REHUW+DUHDUJXHV³FHUWDLQFKLOGUHQUHPDLQVWXEERUQO\ immune to socializing 
SUHVVXUHV7KH\DUHLQH[SOLFDEO\µGLIIHUHQW¶IURPQRUPal children-more difficult, wilful, 
DJJUHVVLYHDQGGHFHLWIXOKDUGHUWRµUHODWHWR¶RUJHWFORVHWROHVVVXVFHSWLEOHWRLQIOXHQFHDQG
instruction; and always testing the limits of social tolerance´(Hare, 1993: 157-8). Many of 
WKHVHFKLOGUHQZLOOEHGLDJQRVHGDVFKLOGUHQZLWKµFRQGXFWGLVRUGHU¶DERXWZKLFKPRUHVRRQ 
Most psychopaths begin to exhibit serious behavioural problems at an early age. These 
might include persistent lying, cheating, theft, fire setting, truancy, class disruption, 
substance abuse, vandalism, violence, bullying, running away, and precocious sexuality. 
Because many children exhibit some of these behaviours at one time or another, especially 
children raised in violent neighbourhoods  or in disruptive or abusive families, it is important 
WRHPSKDVL]HWKDWWKHSV\FKRSDWK¶KLVWRU\RIVXFKEHKDYLRXUVLVPRUHH[WHQVLYHDQGVHULRXV
than that of most others, even when compared with those of siblings and friends raised in 
similar settings. An example of the psychopathic child is one who comes from an otherwise 
well-adjusted family and starts to steal, take drugs, cut school, and have sexual experiences 
by age ten or twelve. 
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Cruelty to animals is also something often seen in children with conduct disorder. 
When he was younger, psychopath Jeffrey Dahmer, for example, stunned classmates and 
neighbours by leaving a trail of grim clues to his preoccupations: the head of a dog impaled 
on a stick, frogs and cats staked to trees, and a group of animal skeletons kept as a collection 
(Hare, 1993: 66).  
Below I give an example of a case ± the case of John- where the child shows clear 
signs of the special group Hare refers to, signs that could be an indicator of adult 
psychopathy. For the sake of contrast, I will also present another case, the case of Bill.  On 
basis of criteria for conduct disorder presented in the DSM-V (2013: 469-476) (as well as the 
DSM-IV, 2000: 93-99) one would assume that both children present with conduct disorder, 
while it is the case that they present with significantly different traits and behaviours. 
Because of the type of behaviour and traits John exhibits, John ±unlike Bill- qualifies for a 
specifier for conduct disorder that is now present in the DSM-V (published in 2013), while 
not yet present in the DSM-,97KDWLV-RKQXQOLNH%LOOTXDOLILHVIRUWKHVSHFLILHUµFRQGXFW
GLVRUGHUµwith limited prosocial emotions¶7KLVLVWKHFDVHRI-RKQ 
 
John is an 11-year old boy from a middle-class family with two professional parents. He began to 
present with behavioural problems at an early age and was enrolled in a school for children with 
emotional and behavioural difficulties at the age of 5 years. John began running away from home 
and school at a young age. Now, he is frequently picked up by the police because he is roaming 
the streets of the local town late at night. He often spends time with local juvenile delinquents. 
He recently broke into a construction site and set fire to materials, causing $ 15,000 worth of 
damage. John is often cruel to animals. He once dangled his pet hamster over a hot stove and 
threatened to drop it if his parents did not give him money. He is also frequently violent towards 
his parents, teachers, and peers. On several occasions he has threatened to hurt his mother, and 
stashed knives are often retrieved from his bedroom. On one occasion he threw a kitchen knife at 
his mother. John does not have any genuine friends at school. Teachers often express that they 
have difficulty treating him kindly as they feel that nice behaviors displayed by him are not at all 
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sincere. He is very boastful about his abilities generally, and has an aflated perception of his 
intelligence. John sometimes tricks people into thinking that he is simply misunderstood. (Blair, 
Mitchell and Blair, 2005: 1-2) 
 
Then now for Bill.  
 
Bill is an 11-year old boy from a troubled working class background. His mother and father are 
both in jail, his farther for armed robbery and his mother for drug offenses. He is cared for by his 
older sister. Bill often presents with oppositional behavior at home and at school. He is rude to 
teachers, often refusing to complete assignments, and frequently truants. He has stolen 
merchandise from local shops. He often fights with classmates and has on occasion used a weapon 
(a brick) in these fights. However, he usually apologizes if he is genuinely to blame. He enjoys 
playing sports with his classmates. He also often expresses love towards his sister and is comforted 
when she is present. Bill¶VHPRWLRQVFDQEHWXUEXOHQW+HLVRIWHQVHOI-deprecating. (Blair, Mitchell 
and Blair, 2005: 2) 
 
$VVDLGERWKFKLOGUHQTXDOLI\IRUWKHGLDJQRVLVµFRQGXFWGLVRUGHU¶)RUWKLVdiagnosis to be 
given legitimately, the DSM V requires that the individual presents with at least three of the 
following 15 criteria. That is, in the past 12 months at the moment of diagnosis and with at 
least one criterion present in the past 6 months: 
 
1. Often bullies, threatens or intimidates others. 
2. Often initiates physical fights. 
3. Has used a weapon that can cause serious physical harm (e.g., a bat, brick, broken bottle, knife,    
    gun). 
4. Has been physically cruel to people. 
5. Has been physically cruel to animals. 
6. Has stolen while confronting a victim (e.g., mugging, purse snatching, extortion, armed  
    robbery). 
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7. Has forced someone into sexual activity. 




12. Has stolen items of nontrivial value without confronting a victim (e.g. shoplifting, but  
      without breaking and entering; forgery).  
13. Often stays out at night despite parental prohibitions, beginning before age 13 years. 
14. Has run away from home overnight at least twice while living in the parental or parental  
      surrogate home, or once without returning for a lengthy period. 
15. Is often truant from school, beginning before age 13 years (DSM-V: 469-70).  
 
Note that on top of the condition that an individual presents with three of the 
abovementioned characteristics, in order for the diagnosis conduct disorder to be given 
rightfully, it must be WKHFDVHWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vdisturbance in behaviour causes clinically 
significant impairment in social, academic or occupational setting. Finally, it must be the case 
that, if the individual is 18 years or older, criteria are not met for antisocial personality 
disorder (DSM-V: 470). 
Let us return to the cases of John and Bill. Both John and Bill have engaged in at least 
three of the diagnostic criteria for conduct disorder. Both Bill and John often engage in 
fights; have on occasion used weapons and have truanted. However while John presents with 






While in the previous section I have focused on the childhood development of psychopaths, 
in this section I will look at the relationship between psychopathy and nature as an ultimate 
cause of it. Let us first look at the following remark from Robert Hare:  
 
[P]erhaps the most popular generalization about psychopathy- [is] that it is the result of early 
psychological trauma or adverse experiences: poverty, emotional or physical deprivation or abuse, 
parental rejection, inconsistent disciplinary techniques, and so on. Unfortunately, the picture that 
emerges from clinical experience is far from clear on the matter. On balance, however, I can find 
no convincing evidence that psychopathy is the direct result of early social or environmental 
factors. (Hare, 1993: 170) 
 
Let us also look at the following longer statement from Hare: 
 
Evidence of the genetic and biological bases of temperament53, the ability of some forms of  brain 
damage to produce psychopathiclike symptoms, and the early appearance of psychopathic 
behaviours in children provide frameworks for several biological theories on the origins of 
psychopathy.  
The position I favour is that psychopathy emerges from a complex-and poorly understood-
interplay between biological factors and social factors. It is based on evidence that genetic factors 
contribute to the biological bases of brain function and to basic personality structure, which in 
turn influence the way the individual responds to, and interacts with, life experiences and the 
social environment. In effect, the elements needed for the development of psychopathy-including 
a profound inability to experience empathy and the complete range of emotions, including fear- 
are provided in part by nature and possibly by some unknown biological influences in the 
                                                          
53
 ͞Think about some relatives or friends you have known since childhood: the shy, inhibited girlfriend; the 
outgoing, gregarious brother; the fast-talking, sleazy cousin; the wild, hostile, aggressive neighbour. What were they 




developing fetus and neonate. As a result, the capacity for developing internal controls and 
FRQVFLHQFHDQGIRUPDNLQJHPRWLRQDOµFRQQHFWLRQV¶ZLWKRWKHUVLVJUHDWO\UHduced.  
7KLVGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWSV\FKRSDWKVDUHGHVWLQHGWRGHYHOop along a fixed track, born to play a 
socially deviant role in life. But it does mean that their biological endowment-the raw material 
that environmental, social, and learning experiences fashion into a unique individual-provides a 
SRRUEDVLVIRUVRFLDOL]DWLRQDQGFRQVFLHQFHIRUPDWLRQ« 
Although psychopathy is not primarily the result of poor parenting or adverse childhood 
experiences, I think they play an important role in shaping what nature has provided. Social 
factors and parenting practices influence the way the disorder develops and is expressed in 
behaviour. 
Thus, an individual with a mix of psychopathic personality traits who grows up in a stable 
family and has access to positive social and educational resources might become a con artist or 
white-collar criminal, or perhaps a somewhat shady entrepreneur, politician, or professional. 
Another individual, with much the same personality traits but from a deprived and disturbed 
background, might become a drifter, mercenary, or violent criminal.  
In each case, social factors and parenting practices help to shape the behavioural expression of 
WKHGLVRUGHUEXWKDYHOHVVHIIHFWRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQDELOLW\WRIHHOHPSDWK\RUWRGHYHORSD
conscience. No amount of social conditioning will by itself generate a capacity for caring about 
RWKHUVRUDSRZHUIXOVHQVHRIULJKWDQGZURQJ«>3@V\FKRSDWKLFµFOD\¶LVPXFKOHVVPDOOHDEOHWKDQ
LVWKHFOD\VRFLHW\¶VSRWWHUVXVXDOO\KDYHWRZRUNZLWK.  (Hare, 1993: 173-4; cf 178) 
 
 
What becomes clear from this passage is that according to Hare nature has a strong influence 
on the development of psychopathy. It is not fully clear however how we should understand 
this. This is so because it very much looks like Hare (in the above passage) wants to say that 
biological influences are vital to being able to perform social behaviour. Support for this view 
FRPHVIURP+DUH¶VFODLPWKDW³[n]o amount of social conditioning will by itself generate a 
capacity for caring about others or a powerful sense of right and wrong.´If Hare indeed 
holds the view that biological influences are vital to being able to perform social behaviour,  
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then he probably would also hold that in case those biological influences are absent this 
means that someone does not have the potential to perform social behaviour. And that seems 
to mean that the only option that is open is anti-social behaviour. And it is exactly that view 
Hare seemingly does not want to commit himself to, at least not in the passage above. After 
having said,  
 
[P]sychopathy emerges from a complex-and poorly understood-interplay between biological 
factors and social factors. It is based on evidence that genetic factors contribute to the biological 
bases of brain function and to basic personality structure, which in turn influence the way the 
individual responds to, and interacts with, life experiences and the social environment. In effect, 
the elements needed for the development of psychopathy-including a profound inability to 
experience empathy and the complete range of emotions, including fear- are provided in part by 
nature and possibly by some unknown biological influences in the developing fetus and neonate. 




born to play a socially deviant role in life´  
There seems to be something to explain for Hare as to how exactly psychopaths are 
contra-prepared for the performance of social behaviour and biologically prepared for the 
performance of anti-social behaviour. Not just in terms of what sort of biological bits and 
pieces fundamentally contribute to the performance of social and anti-social behaviour, but 
also in terms of what this means in regard to how plastic the mind of psychopaths is in terms 
of becoming social while now being a psychopath. Interpreting Hare generally rather than 
just from the perspective of the passage just discussed, it seems fair to say that Hare is not 
optimistic in terms of psychopaths being able to change from an anti-social human being into 
a social one UHFDOODOVR+DUH¶VUHPDUNVLQDERYHDERXWSV\FKRSDths being irresponsive 
to treatment) . What Hare might want to say is that for some or all psychopaths, there were 
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some early developmental possibilities to walk social pathways of life. If Hare would want to 
holds such a view, he would probably want to do that while also saying that despite the fact 
that there were some early developmental opportunities for psychopaths to live socially, it is 
still the case that they are contra-prepared for walking these pathways life. 
 Generally, there is still a lot of work to do for scientists to understand how 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQFDXVHVWKHPWREHZKRWKH\DUHDQGWREHKDYHKRZWKH\GR. A 
promising account comes from James Blair (2006, see esp. 434-5; cf Blair, Mitchell and Blair 
2006). Blair suggests that genetic anomalies reduce the salience of punishment information. 
Blair tentatively suggests that the reduced receptivity to punishment information might be a 
function of noradrenergic disturbance (caused by genetic anomalies). The suggestion Blair 
offers is that this noradrenergic disturbance has an effect on various aspects of amygdala 
function, most importantly the ability to form stimulus±punishment associations, including 
VWLPXOXVSXQLVKPHQWDVVRFLDWLRQVUHODWHGWRSXQLVKPHQWE\DYLFWLP¶VGLVWUHVV Blair assumes 
that children who socialize successfully form associations between representations of moral 
WUDQVJUHVVLRQVDFWVZKLFKKDUPRWKHUVDQGWKHDYHUVLYHµSXQLVKPHQW¶ FDXVHGE\WKHYLFWLP¶V
distress. This allows them to learn to avoid actions that will harm others. As individuals with 
psychopathy find the distress of the victim significantly less aversive, RUVR%ODLU¶VDVVXPSWLRQ
I find plausible goes, they are less likely to learn to avoid actions that will harm others.  
 
 
10. Looking ahead 
 
We have seen that the classification of psychopathy, unlike the diagnoses of conduct disorder 
or antisocial personality disorder, identifies a relatively homogeneous population. There is a  
 
unitary disorder upon which a causal account can be developed. And on the basis of current 
research, there is reason to think that there is a genetic and not a social ultimate cause to the 
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core of the syndrome (cf Blair et al., 2006). Clearly there is a lot of unclarity as to what it 
means that there is a strong genetic component to psychopathy, but nevertheless there seems 
to be such a thing. Given that psychopaths seem to form a relatively homogeneous 
population and given that the core of the syndrome seems to have an innate basis, do we 
have to conclude from that that all psychopaths DUHSHRSOHERUQZLWKDµEODFNKHDUW¶VD\
biologically determined to think and act anti-VRFLDOO\¶" 
In the final chapter, I suggest that all psychopaths are constitutionally 
µFRQWUDSUHSDUHG¶54 to take the interests of other people seriously in their practical judgements 
and actions. I furthermore suggests tentatively that a few and probably only a few 
psychopaths (as in line with the PCL-5GLDJQRVWLFFULWHULDDUHµFRQWUDSUHSDUHG¶ to such an 
extent that their constitution provides them with a phenomenological space of possibilities 
that excludes the mental possibility to take the interests of others seriously in practical 
thought. These views will form the basis the second and third out of three criteria I present 
in this study that speak in favour of there being an anti-realist component to moral 
REMHFWLYLW\7KHRWKHUILUVWFULWHULRQUHYROYHVDURXQG+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQ,WLVWR
+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\ZHnow turn.
                                                          
54
 I borrow this term from (Mealey, 1995: 533)  
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essential to the identification of one criterion for there being an anti-realist component to 
PRUDOREMHFWLYLW\7KHFKDSWHUVHWXSLVDVIROORZV,Q,H[SODLQ+XPH¶VRverall 
SKLORVRSKLFDOSURMHFW,H[SODLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDODFWLYLW\DVDFRJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJLVWDQG




µUHDVRQ¶LQUHODWLRQWRLWKHPHQWDOact and (ii) the mental product RIµMXGJHPHQW¶. In § 3.2, I 
GLVFXVVDQGHYDOXDWHWKHYLHZWKDWDFFRUGLQJWR+XPHµUHDVRQ¶LVDPHQWDOµIDFXOW\¶ 
,Q,IRFXVRQ+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWµUHDVRQ¶LQUHODWLRQWR+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXW
PDWKHPDWLFVDQGLQ,GLVFXVV+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶7KHGLVFXVsion in § 4 is 
PHDQWWRKHOSXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶DQGKLV
DQGRWKHUSKLORVRSKHUV¶WKRXJKWVDERXWWKHa priori. The discussion in § 5 is meant to aid 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµUHDVRQ¶DQGµLPSUHVVLRQV¶%RWKGLVFXVVLRQVVKRXOG
VHUYHDJRRGXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGVHQVLEOHHYDOXDWLRQRI+XPH¶VFODLPWKDWµUHDVRQFDQQRW
make moral distinctions ZLWKRXWFRQWULEXWLRQVRISDVVLRQV¶1 A good understanding and 
                                                          
1
 +XPHDOVRPDNHVWKHLQIDPRXVFODLPWKDW³UHDVRQDORQHFDQQHYHUEHDPRWLYHWRDQ\DFWLRQRIWKHwill´7
my italics). My focus in this chapter will mostly be on the claim pointed to in the main text however, because it is 
more relevant to my aim of identifying criteria for there being an anti-realist component to moral objectivity. I take 
LWWKDWWKHFODLPLQWKHPDLQWH[WLVDOVRPXFKKDUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDQ+XPH¶VFODLPDERXWWKHOLPLWVRIUHDVRQLQ
terms of its capacity to influence the will. Once we understand the claim pointed to in the main text, the extra bit 
UHTXLUHGWRH[SODLQ+XPH¶VFODLPDERXWUHDVRQDQGWKHZLOOVHHPVWRFRQVLVWLQWKHUDWKHUXQFRQWURYHUVLDO+XPHDQ
FODLPWKDW¶SDVVLRQV¶KDYHDQLQIOXHQFHRQWKHZLOO%HWKDW as it easy as it seems to be, on a more detailed level there 
LVDORWWRVD\DERXW+XPH¶VFODLPWKDWSDVVLRQVKDYHDQLQIOXHQFHRQWKHZLOO$OVRWKHUHLVDORWWRVD\DERXWKRZ
µSDVVLRQV¶RSHUDWHWRJHWKHUZLWKµUHDVRQ¶LQLQIOXHQFLQJWKHZLOO,HQJDJHwith the first matter (albeit often implicitly 
rather than explicitly) in § 7, 9 and 11ZKHUH,GLVFXVV+XPH¶VDFFRXQWRISDVVLRQVKLVDFFRXQWRIµV\PSDWK\¶DQG
his views about our innate constitution, respectively. I focus on the second matter in § 8, ZKHUH,GLVFXVV+XPH¶V
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evaluation of that particular claim then is crucial for determining the first criterion for there 
being an anti-realist component to moral objectivity.  
,Q,GLVFXVVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµUHDVRQ¶DQGµWUXWK¶LQ+XPH¶VZRUN,Q,




In § 9, I explain some further ideas WKDWDUHLPSRUWDQWWR+XPH¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\,Q
,H[SODLQ+XPH¶VWKRXJKWVRQµV\PSDWK\¶,Q,GLVFXVV+XPH¶VLGHDRIWKH
µFRPPRQ¶RUµJHQHUDO¶SRLQWRIYLHZ,Q,RIIHUDEULHIGLVFXVVLRQRI+XPH¶VLGHDVRQ
justice and the related noWLRQRIµXWLOLW\¶,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,DOVREULHIO\GLVFXVV+XPH¶VLGHDVRQ
self-LQWHUHVWODUJHO\E\FRPPHQWLQJRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VYLHZVRQµVHOI-
LQWHUHVW¶DQGµXWLOLW\¶,Q,GLVFXVV+XPH¶VDFFRXQWRIµEHOLHI¶$VZHZLOOFRPHWRVHe, 
Hume had an extremely rich account of belief and one that hardly shows any similarity with 
the dominant concept of belief operative in contemporary meta-ethics. Importantly, it is out 
of line with the idea that Hume held that beliefs are intrinsically motivationally inert. I focus 
RQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VDFFRXQWDQGWKHPHWD-ethical account of belief in the 
QH[WFKDSWHU,Q,GLVFXVV+XPH¶VWKRXJKWVRQKXPDQQDWXUH,SD\DWWHQWLRQWRKLV




                                                                                                                                                                                           







2.1. A general introduction 
 
Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that 
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or 
another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure 
dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of 
E\WKHLUSRZHUVDQGIDFXOWLHV«,IWKHUHIRUHWKHVFLHQFHVRIMathematics, Natural Philosophy and 
Natural Religion have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the 
other sciences, whose connectioQLVPRUHFORVHDQGLQWLPDWH"« There is no question of 
importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man: and there is none, which can 
be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending 
therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of 
the human sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which 









psychologist Hume aims at (sometimes detailed) descriptions of a variety of mental states. As 
a cognitive psychologist he also aims at typically detailed causal explanations of mental states 




psychologist.2 However, Hume also makes claims about the constitutional make-up (pre-
dispositions) fundamentally underlying what Hume typically analyzes: actual psychology.  
Furthermore, Hume offers views about the species-typicality of actual operative mental 
states and pre-dispositions of these states. Occasionally, Hume also talks about those states in 
the context of issues having to do with freedom. 
7KDWPXFKDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOSURMHFWDQGµKXPDQ
QDWXUH¶:KDWHOVHLVWKHUHWRVD\DERXW+XPH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOSURMHFW"7KHUHDUHVRPH
important remarks that need to be PDGHDERXWKLVµHPSLULFLVW¶SURJUDPZKLFKLVDSURJUDP
ZLWKDVWURQJOLQNWRWKHDFWLYLW\RIGRLQJµVFLHQFHRIPDQ¶LQWKHIRUPRIFRJQLWLYH
psychology. It will not come as a surprise to many readers that Hume was an empiricist. But 
what does that label mHDQLQUHJDUGWR+XPH"$QGKRZH[DFWO\GRHVWKLVµHPSLULFLVP¶UHODWH
WR+XPH¶VZKROHKHDUWHGO\HPEUDFHGDFWLYLW\RIGRLQJµVFLHQFHRIPHQ¶" 
As a philosopher, Hume wants to deliver some foundations RIµNQRZOHGJHFODLPV¶,
explain in a moment how to understand this). However Hume is also very much interested 
in the limitations of what we can know. Both of these aspects come under the form of a 
merely descriptive empirical science (see Michaud, 1987, esp. 375). The empirical science of 
the cognitive psychologiVW+XPHWKDWSHUPHDWHVKLVZRUNUHIOHFWV+XPH¶VDFNQRZOHGJHPHQW
of both the true import and limitations of the empiricist program (see Michaud, 1987: 367). 
As to the limitations, Hume realized that we philosophers can never go beyond experience 
and observation when attempting to get philosophical wisdom. We must restrict ourselves to 
sensory data in our search for philosophical search for foundational knowledge. Now, since 
we can never go beyond experience and observation, there are clear limitations to the kind 
of conclusions philosophers can legitimately draw. We cannot make existence claims about 
what transcends experience. According to Hume any principle that transcends what is 
strictly given in experience must be recognized as such. In regard to such principles we can 
                                                          
2
 Note that the activity I ascribe to Hume the cognitive psychologist for Hume counts as doing philosophy. 
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only state and describe our experience of its reality (see Michaud, 1987: 373). That is the 
most we can do (cf T: 218). 
Apart from the abovementioned methodologically limiting side of empiricism, there 
is a Humean interest in foundations of knowledge. While this is an accurate claim about 
+XPH¶VSURMHFWLWPXVWEHQRWHGWKDW+XPH¶VNQRZOHGJHFODLPVUHSUHVHQWOHVVRIDSRVLWLYH
approach in terms of active epistemological knowledge construction than a negative strategy 
for distinguishing between fictions and sensory data (see Michaud, 1987: 372-3)3. Hume is 
LQWHUHVWHGLQVHSDUDWLQJUHDOLW\IURPILFWLRQEXW+XPH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQFOXVLRQVDERXW
reality do not get beyond sense-data; they are not about some extra-mental world. Strictly 
speaking for Hume impressions do not have intentional objects (see Landy, 2006: 137).    
Here we encounter the problem as to what type of professional intellectual being is 
interested in separating reaOLW\IURPILFWLRQ:KHQLWFRPHVWR+XPH¶VLQWHUHVWVLQVHSDUDWLQJ
reality from fiction, these interests are certainly ones from the cognitive psychologist Hume. 
I take this to be rather uncontroversial. When it comes to him being an epistemologist, 
things are more controversial. In terms of normative views about knowledge, Hume 
certainly has views about what we cannot know, but it also looks like Hume has normative 
views about there being knowledge. The latter is controversial however.  
It is important to point out that while facing the interpretative task of determining in 
what intellectual guise(s) Hume comes when writing about subject matter X, Y and Z, 
different conclusions seem to hold for (i) different subject areas of his work and possibly also 
for (ii) different published works about the same subject matter. As to (i), it seems reasonable 
to think that Hume held some sort of normative views in the area of mathematics. If he 
indeed did have such normative views in the area of mathematics, I read Hume as saying that 
in the area of mathematics knowledge as scientia is possible. Assuming for the sake of the 
argument that normative evaluations can be made in both the area of mathematics and in 
RWKHUDUHDVRI+XPH¶VZRUNIRU+XPHNQRZOHGJHDVscientia is not possible in other areas, 
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this for the sake of the argument, this does not imply and in my reading of Hume does not 
imply that according to Hume no normative claims can be made in those areas where there is 





matters about causality Hume is primarily a cognitive scientist. He is also a cognitive scientist 
SDUDGLJPDWLFDOO\,IZHFRPSDUHDQGFRQWUDVW+XPH¶VZRUNRQFDXVDOLW\ZLWKHYHU\WKLQJHOVH
he ever wrote about, his intellectual guise as a cognitive psychologist shows up most 
prominently in the area of causality.  
There is reason to think that this intellectual attitude of a paradigmatic cognitive 
VFLHQWLVWWKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HV+XPH¶VZRUNDERXWFDXVDOLW\VWDQGVLQVLJQLILFDQWRSSRVLWLRQWR
what Hume writes in his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. This particular 
book on morality however, may stand in significant contrast with book III of his A Treatise 
of Human Nature. Note that part three of the Treatise is about morality too and note 
furthermore that EPM and book III of the Treatise share much in terms of specific subject 
matters that relate to morality. This highlights an important and also difficult exegetical 
point. It might be the case that in EPM Hume takes a stronger normative stance than in the 
part of the Treatise that is about morality. In the Treatise he may take more strongly the 
guise of a cognitive scientist interested in (anatomically) dissecting our psychological 
mechanisms in regard to moral matters. This is a hard exegetical matter for the following 
reason. The later published book EPM is meant to be less anatomical than the Treatise. In 
EPM (as well as in EHU DQGVRPHRWKHUSDUWVRI+XPH¶VZRUN, +XPH¶VIRFXVLVRQ 
practicality and/or readability. The challenge is to understand how this difference in 
Humean philosophical/writing intentions betwHHQµGHVFULELQJDQGGLVVHFWLQJ¶LQWKHTreatise 
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DQGµSUDFWLFDOLW\DQGRUUHDGDELOLW\¶LQEPM stands in relation to Hume holding more 
normative views in the latter than in the former. There may, but need not be a difference 
between the two works on more or OHVVWKHVDPHVXEMHFWPDWWHU7KHGLIIHUHQFHVLQ+XPH¶V
language could represent a difference in terms of him being more of a cognitive 
psychologist/normative philosopher in one work than in the other, but they might not do so.   
The opinion that Hume holds a more normative view in EPM ZKHUH+XPH¶VODQJXDJHLV
smooth and practically orientated) is an intelligible view given that Hume was seemingly 
interested in the question how practical life should be lived. That Hume does not hold more 
normative views in EPM compared to the Treatise (assuming for the sake of the argument 
that in the Treatise he is primarily, if not exclusively, a cognitive psychologist) is a view that 
should be taken seriously, because one needs a justification for thinking that Hume revised 
or in a major way developed his earlier thoughts. One should not assume this too quickly on 
basis of the change in language between the two works, if only (but probably not only) 
because of the following: Hume was disappointed by and dissatisfied with how pretty badly 
his (fairly dry) anatomical Treatise was received. There is good reason, although not 
conclusive reason, to think that therefore he changed his language while writing about 
roughly speaking the same subject matter. Assuming that this holds, the question then is 
ZKHWKHU+XPH¶VGHFLVLRQLQUHJDUGWREPM to come up with something his readers can digest 
better than the anatomical language of the Treatise does or does not represent a more 
normative Humean approach in EPM. Note finally that if there is no significant difference in 
terms of Hume taking a normative approach in the two works about morality, this could also 
mean that book III of the Treatise is significantly/primarily/exclusively characterized by 
normative views. This does not seem to be a good first exegetical move, however, both 
because of the language used in book III and also because the Treatise generally is a strongly 





2.2. Impressions and ideas: the atoms of the mind 
 
In the Treatise, +XPHDSSHDOVIUHTXHQWO\WRWZRVRUWVRIZKDWRQHFRXOGFDOOµPHQWDOLWHPV¶
7KDWLVODUJHSDUWVRI+XPH¶VZRUNDUHSHUPHDWHGE\+XPHDQWDONDERXWµLPSUHVVLRQV¶DQG
µLGHDV¶1RWHWKDW+XPHFDOOVDOOµPHQWDOLWHPV¶LHHYHU\WKLQJWKDWFRXld possibly (from a 
perspective of Humean psychological realism) pop up in the mind, µSHUFHSWLRQV¶ I point out 
that Hume had a general QRWLRQRIµSHUFHSWLRQV¶DQGKHOGD specific QRWLRQRIµLGHDV¶7KLVLQ
contrast to Locke for whom all mental items were µLGHDV¶DQGZKRKHOGDPRUHVSHFLILF
notion of perceptions. (Hume himself remarks on that on page 2 of the Treatise. 4) 
7KHPRUHDFFXUDWHYHUVLRQRIWKHFODLPµODUJHSDUWVRI+XPH¶VZRUNDUHSHUPHDWHGE\
+XPHDQWDONDERXWµLPSUHVVLRQV¶DQGµLGHDV¶¶LVWKDWIRU+XPHHDFKDQGHYHU\µSHUFHSWLRQRI
WKHPLQG¶UHVROYHVLWVHOILQWRRQHRIWKHWZRPHQWLRQHGW\SHVRIµPHQWDOLWHPV¶ every mental 
SHUFHSWLRQLVHLWKHUDQµLGHD¶RUDQµLPSUHVVLRQ¶7)RU+XPHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
µLPSUHVVLRQV¶DQGµLGHDV¶OLHVLQWKHGHJUHHRIµIRUFH¶DQGµOLYHOLQHVV¶ZLWKZKLFKWKH\³VWULNH
upon the mind and make their way into our thought and FRQVFLRXVQHVV´77KRVH




                                                          
4
 +DYLQJVDLGWKDW+XPHKDGDµVSHFLILF¶QRWLRQRIZKDWDQµLGHD¶LV,GRnot want to deny that Hume could have 
been a bit more clear as to his philosophical conception of an µLGHD¶. Generally and especially at specific places in 
his text it would have been helpful had Hume been a little more lucid as to the relationship between his conception 
of an µidea¶ DQGVRPHSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQFHSWLRQRIµLGHDV¶DVµPHQWDOLWHPVRIWKRXJKW¶DQGLGHDVDVµREMHFWVRI
PHQWDOLWHPVRIWKRXJKW¶:KHQ,VD\WKDW+XPHKDGDµVSHFLILF¶QRWLRQRIDQµLGHD¶I rather want to make clear that 
+XPH¶VQRWLRQRIDQµLGHD¶LVQRWDVDll-HQFRPSDVVLQJDVVRPHRWKHUSKLORVRSKHUV¶QRWLRQVRIµLGHD¶ and  ± positively 
phrased  - WKDW+XPH¶VQRWLRQUHSUHVHQWVMXVWRQHSDUWLFXODUW\SHRIPHQWDOLWHP 
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What is implied by this little story about impressions and ideas is the conclusion that it is 
impressions rather than ideas that are the most fundamental µSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHPLQG¶,Q
other words, they are our ultimate source of mental perceptions. This on its turn regarding 
+XPH¶VWZR-side empiricism, implies two things. First, that impressions form the limits of all 
our claims about knowledge. Secondly, that the impressions form the very evidential basis of 
all our philosophical inquiry and conclusions about knowledge.  So, for Hume all theoretical 
conclusions in some significant way can be reduced WRZKDW+XPHFDOOVµLPSUHVVLRQV¶ZKLOH
the same impressions are the foundation for separating reality from fiction. This, while all 
WKDWSKLORVRSKHUVFDQOHJLWLPDWHO\GHQRWHDVµUHDOLW\¶KDVLWVERXQGDULHVVHWE\H[SHULHQFH
from our internal and external senses delivering impressions. Note that for Hume 
impressions coming from our internal sense seem to have a fundamental and partial foothold 




3.1 A variety of descriptions 
 




x reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls (T: 179) 
x reason alone can never give rise to any original idea (T: 157) 
x reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood (T: 458) 
x UHDVRQDORQHFDQQHYHUEHDPRWLYHWRDQ\DFWLRQRIWKHZLOO«VHFRQGO\«it can never oppose 
passion in the direction of the will (T: 413) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
µVHFRQGDU\LPSUHVVLRQV¶7,PSUHVVLRQVRIVHQVDWLRQDULVHLQWKHVRXORULJLQDOO\ZKLOHWKHVHFRQGFODVVRI
LPSUHVVLRQVUHVXOW³LQDJUHDWPHDVXUH´IURPRXULGHDVVHH77). More about this distinction in § 7.1. 
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x Thus it appears, that the principle which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with 
reason, and is only called so in an improper sense (T: 415) 
x 5HDVRQDVGLVWLQJXLVK¶GIURPH[SHULHQFHFDQQHYHUPDNHXVFRQFOXGHWKDWDFDXVHRU
productive quality LVDEVROXWHO\UHTXLVLWHWRHYHU\EHJLQQLQJRIH[LVWHQFH´7:157) 
x We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and reason 
T: 415) 
x And as every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common life, 
allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of 
things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and 
false religion (EPM: 270) 
 
This list of rather different descriptions may make one wonder whether there is a single 
QRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶ LQ+XPH¶VZRUN:KHWKHURUQRW+XPH¶VYDULRXVGHVFULSWLRQVFDQILQDOO\
be captured in one single concept is a difficult exegetical matter. The explanation and 
justificatory reasons for this claim will be revealed gradually as we proceed. I present my 
own answer to the mentioned problem in § 6.  
:KHWKHURUQRW+XPH¶VYDULRXVGHVFULSWLRQVFDQILQDOO\EHFDSWXUHGLQRQHVLQJOH
FRQFHSWWKHUHDUHDQ\KRZDYDULHW\RIDVSHFWVUHOHYDQWWR+XPH¶s notion or notions of 
µUHDVRQ¶2QHHVVHQWLDOFRQFHSWDQGRUDVSHFWRIµUHDVRQ¶LQ+XPH¶VZRUNLVµUHDVRQ¶DVD





The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or 
probability: as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects, of which 
experience only gives us information. I believe it scarce will be asserted, that the first species of 
reasoning alone is never the cause of any action. As its proper province is the world of ideas, and 
as the will always places us in that of realities, demonstration and volition seem, upon that 
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account, to be totaOO\UHPRY¶GIURPHDFKRWKHU¶>7>LVQRWRIWKHPVHOYHV>PDWKHPDWLFVDQG 
arithmetic] have any influence. (Hume, T: 413; my italics) 
 
,QWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHGSDVVDJH,KDYHLWDOLFL]HGWKHZRUGµUHDVRQLQJ¶5DFKHO&RKRQVWDUWV
KHUH[SODQDWLRQRI+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQE\VD\LQJWKDW³It would not be amiss to 
substitute the gerund 'reasoning' almost everywhere Hume says 'reason'" (Cohon, 2008: 66). 
$FFRUGLQJWR&RKRQµUHDVRQ¶IRU+XPHLVµUHDVRQLQJ¶DµSURFHVV¶RUµPHQWDODFWLYLW\¶DV
applicable tRZKDWIRU+XPHLVµGHPRQVWUDWLYH¶DQGµFDXVDO¶UHDVRQLQJ$FFRUGLQJWR&RKRQ
the former refers to ³a process of comparing ideas and finding congruencies and 
incongruencies´&RKRQ This, however, is not the only description Cohon gives of 
µGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶Another description of that notion (or strictly speaking the notion 
RIµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶VKHVHHPVWRWUHDWWKHWZRDVLGHQWLFDO&RKRQJLYHVLV 
  
In demonstration we proceed step by step in linking related ideas in sequence, preserving our 
assent²or the degree to which the ideas are evident²at each step, so that in the end we find 
evident (indeed, we are necessarily determined to grasp) a relation between our starting and 
resulting ideas. (passim, e.g. T: 95) (Cohon, 2008: 66) 
 
µ&DXVDO UHDVRQLQJ¶ IRU&RKRQVHHPVWREHLGHQWLFDOZLWKµFDXVDOLQIHUHQFH¶. Cohon explicitly 
GHVFULEHVµFDXVDOLQIHUHQFH¶DVµLQIHUHQWLDOGLVFRYHU\RIWKHUHODWLRQRIFDXVHDQGHIIHFW¶
(Cohon, 2008: 51).    
:HKDYHVHHQ&RKRQ¶VFODLPWKDW³It would not be amiss to substitute the gerund 
'reasoning' almost everywhere Hume says 'reason" (Cohon, 2008:66). Related, we have seen 
WKDWIRU&RKRQ+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶LVYHU\PXFKDSURFHVVRIGLVFRYHULQJUHODWLRQVRI
ideas or the mental activity of comparing ideas. But we have also seen that she says that ³,Q
demonstration we proceed step by step in linking related ideas in sequence, preserving our 
assent²or the degree to which the ideas are evident²at each step, so that in the end we find 
evident (indeed, we are necessarily determined to grasp) a relation between our starting and 
104 
 
UHVXOWLQJLGHDV´passim, e.g. T: &RKRQ7KHSKUDVHLQLWDOLFVµSUHVHUYLQJRXU
DVVHQW¶VHHPVWRµEHQGLQWRWKHGLUHFWLRQ¶RIDjudgemental outcome rather than a mental 





[A]ll the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking fall under this 
denomination. The mind can never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend 
under the term of perception; and consequently that term is no less applicable to those 
judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every other operation of the 
mind. To approve one character, to condemn another, are only so many different perceptions. (T: 




strict sense just is a set of judgments, so that the very judgments themselves are identical 





judging process.6 And those acts of judgements, DFFRUGLQJWR&RKRQDUHµMXGJLQJV¶LQWKH
sense that they are mental acts of reasoning that take place to discover relations between 
LGHDV-XVWDVZKHQ+XPHVD\VWKDW³Here then reasoning takes place to discover this 
relation«´+XPH7/HWXVORRNDWZKDW&RKRQVD\VZKHQVKHDUJXHVIRUWKHYLHZ,
have just ascribed to her: 
                                                          
6
 While engaging with the passage mentioned above, Cohon argues that the string of gerunds one finds there points 




[For Hume] reasoning is the discovering RIWKHWUXWKRUIDOVHKRRGRIRXULGHDVµ5HDVRQ¶LQDVWULFW
sense means not each and every belief about truth and falsehood, but the judging of truth and 
IDOVHKRRGµ-XGJHPHQW¶FDQPHDQa judgement, or the process of judgement, and here it means the 
latter. (Cohon, 2008:70) 
 




she would have to make sure that if  WKHUHLVDQRWLRQRIµMXGJHPHQW¶LPSOLHGE\WKHSKUDVH
µSUHVHUYLQJDVVHQW¶ in the quotation from her we have seen before and that I present again 
EHORZWKLVQRWLRQLVFRQFHSWXDOO\FRPSDWLEOHZLWKKHUQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶DVUHDVRQing  and 
her thought that wKHQ+XPHXVHVWKHWHUPµMXGJHPHQW¶KHWDONVDERXWjudgings-acts of 
judgements. Here is the quotation again: 
 
In demonstration we proceed step by step in linking related ideas in sequence, preserving our 
assent²or the degree to which the ideas are evident²at each step, so that in the end we find 
evident (indeed, we are necessarily determined to grasp) a relation between our starting and 
resulting ideas. (passim, e.g. T: 95; Cohon, 2008:66)  
  
It seems plausible to assume that from a Cohon-independent perspective the concept 
µSUHVHUYLQJDVVHQW¶ somehow entails the notion of a µMXGJHPHQW¶,WPLJKWDOVRGRIRU&RKRQ
in the above passage (and similar ones). If it does for Cohon, that would mean the following, 
WDNLQJIRUJUDQWHG&RKRQ¶V view that for Hume µUHDVRQ¶HTXDWHVreasoning and the fact that 
IRU&RKRQµGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶LVDVXE-IRUPRIµUHDVRQDVUHDVRQLQJ¶PRUHJHQHUDOO\,W
would mean that this concept of judgement for Cohon (a) needs to be one that in the 
psychology of a human being operates ZLWKLQDZLGHUDFWLYLW\RIµUHDVRQLQJDVWKHGLVFRYHU\
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RIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQLGHDV¶ZKLOHEWKLVFRQFHSWRIµMXGJHPHQW¶LV a mental act (not 
product), MXVWDVDQ\RWKHUµMXGJHPHQW¶ is for Cohon. OWKHUZLVH&RKRQ¶VFODLP about the 
FRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶for Hume amounting to reasoning; her claims about what 
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶µGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶ is, her claim that for Hume µMXGJPHQWV¶DUH
necessarily mental acts and her idea that µSUHVHUYLQJDVVHQW¶ is something that happens in the 
process of demonstrative reasoning/demonstration would be inconsistent. I think it is 
possible for Cohon to meet (a). What Cohon apparently needs is an appeal to an intuitive 
form of assent -for example one from Locke. He indeed is a very plausible candidate for 
stepSLQJLQKHUHJLYHQWKDW+XPHVKDUHGVRPHDVSHFWVRIKLVQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶ZLWK/RFNH
Indeed, Locke seems to have influenced VRPHRI+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWµUHDVRQ¶/HWXVKDYHD
brief look at what David Owen says about this: 
 
Hume inherited from Descartes and Locke a conception of reasoning that had nothing to do with 
formal validity [footnote 12 omitted]. [Descartes and Locke] had sufficiently argued against the 
formal, syllogistic account of reason, the precursor to our notion of deduction, and had put in its 
place an account of reasoning, argument or inference in terms of a chain of ideas. An argument or 
inference is what gets you from one idea to another idea via a chain of intermediate ideas. Hume 






In demonstration we proceed step by step in linking related ideas in sequence, preserving our 
assent²or the degree to which the ideas are evident²at each step, so that in the end we find 
evident (indeed, we are necessarily determined to grasp) a relation between our starting and 




As mentioned, it seems to me that in order for Cohon to render her account consistent,  if 
&RKRQ¶VQRWLRQRIµSUHVHUYLQJDVVHQW¶ reflects a judgement, it must be a notion that 
psychologically takes place ZLWKLQDZLGHUDFWLYLW\RIµUHDVRQLQJDVWKHGLVFRYHU\RIUHODWLRQV
EHWZHHQLGHDV¶I have argued that this is possible and suggested that what she needs is an 
LQWXLWLYH/RFNHDQIRUPRIDVVHQWWKDWLQWKHRU\LVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶DV
µGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶RQLWVWXUQunderstood as  µWKHGLVFRYHU\RIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ
LGHDV¶2UUDWKHUZKDWVKHQHHGVLVDQLQWXLWLYHIRUPRIDVVHQW, for example of a Lockean 
kind, that need not equate WKH&RKRQHDQVHQVHRIGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJDVµWKHdiscovery 
RIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQLGHDV¶EHLQJDVXE-IRUPRIUHDVRQDVµUHDVRQing¶EXWLVDWOHDVW
FRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKDW6RKRZFRXOG/RFNHKHOSRXW"/RFNH¶VDFFRXQWRINQRZOHGJHDQG
FHUWDLQW\WKDWKDVDSURPLQHQWSODFHIRUµUHDVRQLQJ¶UHOLHVRQµLQWXLWLRQ¶ in the sense that 
LQWXLWLRQLVQHFHVVDU\LQ³DOOWKH&RQQH[LRQVRIWKHLQWHUPHGLDWHIdeas, without which we 
FDQQRWDWWDLQ.QRZOHGJHDQG&HUWDLQW\´/RFNH4.2.1; cited in Owen, 1992:188). I cannot 
ILQGDQ\GLUHFWHYLGHQFHLQ+XPH¶VZRUNWKDWLPPHGLDWHO\Dscribes this Lockean idea to 
Hume too (cf Meeker, 2007: 234). But, as far as I can see, there is no reason to think that this 
Lockean idea is not FRPSDWLEOHZLWK+XPH¶VZRUN,I,DPULJKWZKDWFRXOGKHOS&RKRQRXW
in terms of rendering her account of demonstrative reasoning consistent is the idea of 
µUHDVRQLQJ¶DVa chain of ideas needing intuitive judgemental assent at several places on the 
URXWHRIUHDVRQLQJZKHUHµDVVHQW¶LVXQGHUVWRRGDVDPHQWDOact. Note that from the 
perspective of Hume exegesis (as well as an independent psychological angle) it seems 
plausible to conclude that this reasoning process typically at last results in a judgemental 
outcome. This judgemental outcome then as the inferential product of a reasoning 
process/activity Cohon will want to exclude from her conception of reason as reasoning.  
In his (1988), A.T Nuyen uses two terms to describe something that refers to one and 





DOEHLWUDWKHURFFDVLRQDOO\LQ+XPH¶VZRUN:Ken explaining the terms, Nuyen argues that 
WKH\GHVFULEHWKHSURFHVV³LQZKLFKZHFRQVLGHUUHODWLRQVDQGFRPSDULVRQVRILGHDVDQG
argue UDWKHUWKDQLQIHUIURPFDXVHVWRHIIHFWV´1X\HQHPSKDVLVRULJLQDO7). 
Nuyen claims that in this type of rHDVRQLQJ³ZHDUHJXLGHGE\µWKHSRZHURIDEVWUDFWLRQRI
WKHPLQG¶DQGZHHPSOR\RXUµLQWHOOHFWXDOIDFXOWLHV¶´1X\HQ$VHFRQGFODLP
1X\HQPDNHVLVWKDWµDUJXPHQWDWLRQ¶DQGµUDWLRFLQDWLRQ¶JLYHULVHWRMXGJHPHQWVRISXUH
relations (Nuyen, 1988: 380). A third claim Nuyen argues for is the claim that the modern 
HTXLYDOHQWRIµDUJXPHQWDWLRQ¶¶UDWLRFLQDWLRQ¶³URXJKO\VSHDNLQJ´LVµGHGXFWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶
1X\HQ,QGXHFRXUVH,FRPPHQWRQ1X\HQ¶VRUUDWKHUDQ\RQH¶V conceptual 




Owen (1992, 1994) for an explanation of why this remark needs attention. However, while 
doing so and while agreeing with the major point Owen wants to make, I take a critical 
VWDQFHWRZDUGVVRPHRWKHUDVSHFWVRI2ZHQ¶VH[SODQDWLRQ 
As Owen (1994) points out, there is a conceptual discrepancy± indeed a major one - 
EHWZHHQRXUFRQWHPSRUDU\XVHRIWKHWHUPµGHGXFWLRQ¶DQG+XPH¶VXVHRILW 
 
One seventeenth and HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\VHQVHRIµGHGXFWLRQ¶FRPPRQO\XVHGby Locke and 
occasionally by Hume [footnote 10 omitted], is as a synonym for argument and inference, and I 
ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWZHVKRXOGQHYHUXVHLWDQ\RWKHUZD\ZKHQVSHDNLQJRI+XPHµ'HGXFWLYH¶LQ
our sense means formally valid. The only conception of formal validity available to Hume was 
syllogism. So LIWKHGHGXFWLYHFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQZDV+XPH¶VWDUJHWLQWKHDUJXPHQWVDERXW
UHDVRQRQHPLJKWKDYHH[SHFWHGKLPWRPHQWLRQµV\OORJLVP¶RULWVFRJQates. He never does in the 
Treatise [footnote 11 omitted], although there are occasional contemptuous references to 
                                                          
7
 Although what I have italicized in the quotation is underlined in the original article. 
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µVFKRODVWLFKHDGSLHFHVDQGORJLFLDQV¶7175). Scholastic logic, and its attendant conception of 
reason, was beneath contempt to Hume, and not the target of his arguments.  
Hume inherited from Descartes and Locke a conception of reasoning that had nothing to do 
with formal validity [footnote 12 omitted]. They had sufficiently argued against the formal, 
syllogistic account of reason, the precursor to our notion of deduction, and had put in its place an 
account of reasoning, argument or inference in terms of a chain of ideas. An argument or 
inference is what gets you from one idea to another idea via a chain of intermediate ideas. Hume 
took this notion on ERDUG«2ZHQ, 1994: 200; cf  Owen, 1992; my italics) 
 
,DJUHHZLWK2ZHQLQWKDW+XPH¶VQRWLRQRIGHGXFWLRQLVnot a formal one. Having said that, 
I wish I had a much better idea as to how Owen conceives of the relationship between 
+XPH¶VQRQ-IRUPDOQRWLRQRIµGHGXFWLRQ¶DQG+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶)LUVWLIWKHQRQ-
formal notion of deduction Owen intends to point to as embraced by Hume is a mental 
process of reasoning, does it include some sort of conclusion/a judgemental outcome? A 











RQLWVWXUQKDYLQJDQHVVHQWLDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKµUHDVRQLQJ¶ is, according to Owen, does 
this reasoning-related conception of deduction exhaust +XPH¶VDFFRXQWRIµUHDVRQ¶"%HORZ,
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will explain why the third and second question raised are relevant ones. I start with the third 
question which will organically lead us to the second one.  
As mentioned, Owen argues that foU+XPHµGHGXFWLRQ¶LVMXVWDgeneric term for 
µDUJXPHQW¶ 2ZHQ*LYHQ2ZHQ¶VLQWHQWLRQDQGJLYHQ+XPH¶VSULPDU\ZRUN,
XQGHUVWDQG2ZHQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRRSWIRUVRPHWKLQJ generic, but there is a problem with 
2ZHQ¶VFODLPWKDWµGHGXFWLRQLVMXVW DJHQHULFWHUPIRUDUJXPHQW¶7KHFRQFHSWµDUJXPHQW¶
seems to imply a process and/or outcome having something essential to do with proving 
and/or proof%XWZKLOHWKHFRQFHSWRISURRISOD\VDPDMRUUROHLQ+XPH¶VZRUNDERXW
mathematical reasoning (it might even be a dominant necessary condition of his concept of 
RIµGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶±I would say- WKDWLQ+XPH¶VZRUNWKLVDVSHFW
of proof is not a not a necessary condition of some sort of (maximally) generic form reasoning 
we find in +XPH¶VZRUNGHILQHGE\µLGHDVEHLQJPHQWDOO\FRQQHFWHG¶7RXQGHUVWDQGWKLV
more deeply, let us look at a thought from Christopher Belshaw.  
,QKLV%HOVKDZDUJXHVWKDW³it is thought that a proof is involved when 
something previously unknown LVVKRZQWREHWKHFDVHDQGLVWKHUHDIWHULQFRQWHVWDEOH´
(Belshaw 1989:156).8 I take it that WKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJKLJKO\LPSRUWDQWLQ%HOVKDZ¶VLGHD
DERXWWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQµGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶DQGRUµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶DQGµSURRI¶
which as an idea iVHVVHQWLDOO\DFODLPDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶DQGRU
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶DQGZKDWRQHcould call µknowledge-H[WHQVLRQ¶I take it that textual support 
for there being such a relationship comes from a claim Hume makes in the first book of his 
Treatise. There Hume seems to argue for the following:  
 
 
1. ³,QDOOdemonstrative sciences [exhausting or at least paradigmatically including the area of 
mathematics] the rules are certain and infallible´  (T: 180) 
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 1RWHWKDWWKLVSDSHUIURP%HOVKDZLVDQDUWLFOHRQ+XPHDQGRQHWKDWLQWHQGVWRHOXFLGDWH+XPH¶VDFFRXQWRI





2. What comes with that for us as human beings is the possibility of knowledge (see  
 (T: 180), a concept Hume wants to distinguish from probability.9 
3. %HWKDWDVLWLV³NQRZOHGJHGHJHQHUDWHVLQWRSUREDELOLW\´EHFDXVHRIGLVWXUELQJIDFWRUV
amongst other thiQJV³LQFRQVWDQF\RIRXUPHQWDOSRZHUV´T: 180) 
4. The more a mathematician and his colleagues run over a particular proof, the more 
(constitutive? Non-constitutive?) evidence there is for the certain and infallible truths there 
are (seemingly, according to Hume) in mathematics. (see T: 180)10 
5. The more evidence there is for certain and infallible truths, the higher the probability that 
can be assigned to a purported knowledge claim.  
6. It is by an increase in probability that we come closer to the maximal (constitutive? non-
constitutive?) evidence for the certain and infallible truth. 
7. By increasing the evidence and thereby increasing the probability that can be assigned to a 
purported knowledge claim, knowledge understood in a general way can be locally extended 
when (A) the subjective probability reflects 1. If not (A), the better reading will be (B): it is 
VXIILFLHQWWKDWWKHVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\µclosely approaches¶ 1 (whatever that exactly might 
KDYHWRPHDQZKHUHµ¶LV reflective of absolute certainty and objective truth (in whatever 
realist or constructivist way that needs to be understood11).  
 
Let me now ±by means of an example- explain my claim that we do not speak accurately 
ZKHQZHVD\WKDWDOOIRUPVRIUHDVRQLQJSUHVHQWLQ+XPH¶VZRUNDQGFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\
connecting ideas conceptually include something having to do with to proof/proving/to 
demonstrate/demonstration. What my example should make clear is that there are types of 
UHDVRQLQJLQ+XPH¶VZRUNLQZKLFKDWKHUHLVno such thing at issue as µNQRZOHGJH
                                                          
9
 As to the distinction, see HJ7+XPHDUJXHV³%XWNQRZOHGJHDQGSUREDELOLW\DUHRIVXFKFRQWUDU\DQG
GLVDJUHHLQJQDWXUHV«´/HWPHSRLQWRXWKRZHYHUWKDWRQWKHVame page, in a sentence directly preceding the one 
cited, Hume also makes a remark that points to anything but a sharp distinction between knowledge and probability. 




 As to point 4, on basis of a wider textual reading, I am interpreting Hume more from an epistemological angle, 
than the descriptive psychological talk on pages 180-1 of the Treatise allows for.  
 
11
 This is a very difficult exegetical problem. I say something more about it in § 4.  
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H[WHQVLRQ¶ and in which (b) an agent does not intentionally (nor unintentionally) prove 
something (if unintentionally proving something is possible). If -I suggest- (a) and (b) are not 
individually sufficient for theoretically rejecting an identification of a generic form of 
UHDVRQLQJZLWKµWRGHPRQVWUDWH¶GHPRQVWUDWLRQDVVXPLQJWKDWWKHVHKDYHDconceptual 
relationship with something related to µSURRI¶WKHQWKH\PLJKWEHMRLQWO\VXIILFLHQW 
Suppose you believe, in the form of an expectation, that this year between three and 
seven undergraduate students will fail their first assignment of the introductory course in 
philosophy you are teaching. As far as I can see, Hume would want to say that your 
reasoning that leads you to such a belief is (1) based on past experience; (2) need not have 
DQ\WKLQJWRGRZLWKµNQRZOHGJHH[WHQVLRQ¶DQGQHHGQRWLPSO\DQintention in you to 
prove VRPHWKLQJ,QP\YLHZLQWKHµWKUHHWRVHYHQVWXGHQWVZLOOIDLO¶FDVH+XPHZRXOG
want to say the following about your reasoning, i.e. in terms of a descriptive and causal story. 
First, earlier in your career, i.e. when you were quite a bit younger and when (in 
similar educational circumstances) you held the same belief in regard to the number of fails 
in the upcoming course, your belief was the result of a conscious effortful mental process of 
reasoning based on significant, although limited, past (teaching) experience. I assume that 
Hume wants to tell a different descriptive and causal story about your belief now. That is, 
while in the past your belief came about as a result of a conscious effortful mental process of 
reasoning, in your current or future stages of your life as a teacher ± having been subject to 
more experiential evidence ± your belief has/will become a non-effortful habitual belief.  
As far as I can see, in the abovementioned example your judgement about the number 
of fails does not seem to KDYHDQ\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKµSURYLQJ¶5HFDOOWKDW%HOVKDZDUJXHV




the latter case is not well understood in terms of the reasoning Owen talks about. 
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Aspect (b) ±as I have dissected it- RI%HOVKDZ¶VVWDWHPHQWFRQFHUQVWKHFRQFHSWRI
µsomething being shown to be the case¶,QWKHPHQWLRQHGH[DPSOH\RXUHDUO\ (and later) self 
seemingly did not have an intention to show something (nor, is there a deliverance of proof 
in an unintentional way).12 You could have had such an intention however. Consider the 
following. When having a disagreement with your Head of Department about how your 
students were doing last year, one can think of situations in which you have an intention to 
prove that his belief is wrong.  Suppose your Head of Department does not believe that you 
did not have more than seven fails last year, while you are sure that only five students failed 
their essay last year. You may collect all the data in order to systematically be able to point 
out to him that, contrary to what your Head of Section believes, you indeed do not have 
more than seven fails. He is wrong. 
This case about the disagreement between you and your Head of Department, departs 
IURP%HOVKDZ¶VGHVFULSWLRQLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKHUHVHHPVWREHDQREMHFWLYHHPSLULFDO
evidential fact that there aUHµQRPRUHWKDQVHYHQIDLOV¶$QGWKHUHE\WKHUHVHHPVWREH
VRPHWKLQJ+XPHZRXOGGHVFULEHDVµNQRZQ¶,QWKHH[DPSOHWKLVIDFWLVMXVWQRWNQRZQE\
your Head of Department. That it was already known then, considering aspect (a) of 
%HOVKDZ¶VGHVFULSWLRQ might well be a sufficient condition to say that the example does not 
ILWZLWK+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶7KLVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDW\RXDVWKHWHDFKHULQ
the example, make an attempt to show something (see aspect b as I have dissected it in 
BelshDZ¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRPHWKLQJWKDWVHHPVWREHDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRI+XPH¶VQRWLRQRI
µWRGHPRQVWUDWH¶$VVVXPLQJWKDWWKHUHLVDQREMHFWLYHIDFWRIWKHPDWWHUWKDWWKHUHDUHQR
more than seven fails, there would also be a FRPSDWLELOLW\EHWZHHQ%HOVKDZ¶V definition and 
the teaching case in that after your efforts, the evidence is incontestable (aspect d). On basis 
RIWH[WXDOHYLGHQFHRQHFDQGRXEWKRZHYHUWKDWHYHQIRUPDWKHPDWLFDOFDVHVZKHUH+XPH¶V
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 )RU+XPHKLPVHOIWKHUHVHHPVWREHDQµDFWLYHDWWHPSW¶-component to his notion of demonstrative 
reasoning/demonstration, meaning that for Hume it does not seem to be possible to¶ unintentionally prove 
something¶. From a Hume-independent perspective (rather than for Hume himself) it could be the case that it is 
possible for practical DJHQWVDQGRUIRULQDQLPDWHREMHFWVWRµXQLQWHQWLRQDOO\SURYHVRPHWKLQJ¶7KHRSWLRQWKDWLWLV




concept paradigmatically if not exclusively applies, Hume wants to work with the notion of 
µLQFRQWHVWDELOLW\¶:KLOH+XPHRIWHQOLQJXLVWLFDOO\UHODWHVPDWKHPDWLFDOMXGJHPHQWVWR
knowledge as scientia, knowledge as certainty, and indeed seems to think that some 
mathematical judgements can reflect certain knowledge, there is textual evidence that speaks 
DJDLQVW+XPHWKLQNLQJWKDWPDWKHPDWLFDOMXGJHPHQWVDUHµLQFRQWHVWDEOH¶7KLV,GLVFXVVLQ
12.4. Briefly, this seems to be a result of the apparent fact that Hume ±like the ancient 
Greeks- not just had an inclination to be sceptical about knowledge, but also about justified 
belief$VDUHVXOWZKDWZHVHHPWRJHWLQ+XPH¶VZRUNLVWKLV(YHQZLWKUHJDUGWRRXUPRVW
accurate judgements that for Hume represent certain knowledge, Hume forces the clever 
mathematician to consider the probable fact that he has reasoned incorrectly in the past. 
Therefore his seemingly correct judgement might be wrong on this very occasion where it 
seems to reflect certain knowledge. And at certain points in his work, this then leads Hume 
into surprising and difficult arguments that ask mathematicians to lower the probability 
DWWDFKHGWRWKHLUPRVWFHUWDLQPDWKHPDWLFDOFODLPV:KLOH+XPH¶VWKRXJKWVRQFRQWHVWDELOLW\
of the most accurate mathematical judgements deserve a real place in his account of 
PDWKHPDWLFV,DOVRWKLQNWKDWWKH\UHSUHVHQWDUHPDUNDEOHRXWOLHULQ+XPH¶VSULPDU\ZRUN







exclusively mental acts. I am not so sure about this. Hume every now and then seems to be 
talking about judgements as products. The trouble is that Hume does not have a very 
elaborate account of judgement.  
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7KHGLVFXVVLRQDERXWZKDWNLQGRIWKLQJVµMXGJHPHQWV¶DUH±we can restrict it here to 




partially or even exclusively a mental product rather than an act. I make an attempt to 





looks rather confusing to me. In her book Cohon says:  
 
Admittedly, Hume does not talk without exception of reason or the understanding as an activity 
rather than an entity. Nor is his notion of moral discrimination always sharply in view; in places 
he quite understandably slides into treating moral distinctions as outcomes rather than 




judgements we should interpret them as referring to judgings, as we have discussed above.  
What seems to me slightly confusing in the above-mentioned passage is the lack of an 
H[SOLFLWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHµMXGJHPHQWV-as-outcome-YLHZ¶DQGWKHµHQWLW\-cum-faculty-
YLHZ¶RIµUHDVRQ¶$FFRUGLQJWRWKHIRUPHUWKHFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶HLWKHUIXOO\FRQVLVWVLQRU
else at least entails µMXGJHPHQWVDVRXWFRPHV¶$FFRUGLQJWRWKHODWWHUWKHUHZRXOGEHD
µIDFXOW\RIUHDVRQ¶WKDWPDQLIHVWVLWVHOILQRQHZD\RUDQRWKHU7KDWFRXOGEHLQWHUPVRIWKe 




reasoning EHLQJDSURFHVVRUDFWLYLW\LVQRWRQO\DµQRQ-outcome-YLHZ¶, but also a non-
entity-cum-IDFXOW\YLHZ6RVKHVHHPLQJO\QRWRQO\ZDQWVWRGHQ\WKDWµUHDVRQ¶FRQVLVWs in 
µMXGJHPHQWDOoutcomes¶EXWDOVRWKDWµUHDVRQ¶FRQVLVWVLQVRPHNLQGRIHQWLW\-cum-faculty 
that manifests itself in something, be it the reasoning activity or processes she advocates or 
something else, most probably judgements as outcomes. What points to the fact that she also 
denies the faculty-cum-entity-view is her claim that: "If reason were an organ of the mind 
that could be identified apart from what happens when reasoning activity is going on, then it 
would be open to speculation, and to observation, what other things it might do or what its 
products might be. But as a thoroughgoing empiricist Hume cannot use such a notion of 
reason" (Cohon, 2008:72).  
&RKRQ¶VYLHZVHHPVFRUUHFWWRPHLQWKDW,WKLQNWKDW+XPH¶VHPSLULFLVPJLYHVKLPD
self-ascribed justification (if not also an objective justification) not to work with a notion of 
µUHDVRQ¶DVVRPHVRUWRIIDFXOW\RUWRXVH&RKRQ¶VWHUPVµRUJDQRIWKHPLQG¶WKDWcannot be 
identified by means of an appeal to experience, in this case by internal observation, i.e. by 
introspection. Having said that, there clearly is a fair bit of textual evidence for the faculty-
view. In the introduction of his Treatise Hume argues: 
 
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such 
a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose 
connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain 
the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and 
criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and 
dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is 
comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or 
which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind. (T: xv-xvi; italics 




And in book II of his Treatise for example +XPHVD\V³:KHQDQ\RIWKHVHSDVVLRQVDUHFDOP
and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of 
UHDVRQDQGDUHVXSSRV¶GWRSURFHHGIURPWKHVDPHfaculty, with that, which judges of truth 
DQGIDOVHKRRG´7P\LWDOLFVVHHDOVR713; T: 414; T: 415; T467; T: 610; T: 646).14  
/RRNLQJDWWKHW\SHDQGDOVRTXDQWLW\RI+XPHDQFODLPVDERXWUHDVRQDVDµIDFXOW\¶
DERXWTXDQWLW\HYHQWKRXJKQRWYHU\RIWHQ+XPHUHIHUVWRµUHDVRQ¶DVDµIDFXOW\¶RQD
significant number of occasions, including the introduction of the Treatise) there seems to be 
VXIILFLHQWJURXQGWRWDNHWKHIDFXOW\YLHZRIµUHDVRQ¶VHULRXVO\+DYLQJVDLGWKDWOHWXVORRNDW




amid all their disappointments and afflictions. This consolation principally consists in their 
invention of the words faculty and occult quality. For it being usual, after the frequent use of 
WHUPVZKLFKDUHUHDOO\VLJQLILFDQWDQGLQWHOOLJLEOHWRRPLWWKHLGHDZKLFKZHZRX¶GH[SUHVVE\
them, and to preserve only the custom, by which we recal the idea at pleasure; so it naturally 
happens, that after the frequent use of terms, which are wholly insignificant and unintelligible, 
we fancy them to be on the same footing with the precedent, and to have a secret meaning, 
which we might discover by reflection. The resemblance of their appearance deceives the mind, 
as is usual, and makes us imagine a thorough resemblance and conformity. By this means these 
philosophers set themselves at ease, and arrive at last, by an illusion, at the same indifference, 
which the people attain by their stupidity, and true philosophers by their moderate scepticism. 
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 Note that at leasWWHUPLQRORJLFDOO\VSHDNLQJKHUH+XPHWDONVQRWDERXWµUHDVRQ¶EXWDERXWµWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ 




definitely highly conceptually related for Hume. Having said that, Hume, more or less intentionally, may have used 
the first term less than the other two for an all-encompassing organ of the mind.  
 
14
 Note that +XPHGHVFULEHVPHPRU\DQGWKHLPDJLQDWLRQDVWZRRWKHUµIDFXOWLHV¶EHVLGHVUHDVRQ (see e.g. T: 23-




They need only say, that any phaenomenon, which puzzles them, arises from a faculty or an 
occult quality, and there is an end of all dispute and enquiry upon the matter. (T: 224) 
 




wanting to put too much metaphysical burden on this notion), while also having a concern 
about the use of the term faculty that reflects a concern about philosophers appealing to 
some hocus-pocus metaphysical faculty. 
  
 
4. Reason and mathematics 
 
According to Kant, Hume thought that all mathematical judgements are analytic.  +XPH¶V
account of mathematics gives no reason to think that this is true. Kant seems to have been 
mistaken there (see Atkinson, 1960, Gotterbarn 1974, Steiner, 1987).15  Hume did think 
however that mathematical judgements were of an a priori type.16 In EHU Hume argues: 
 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, 
Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, 
and Arithmetic: and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively 
certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a 
proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the 
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 That might be due to Kant not having read the Treatise. Donald Gotterbarn (1974) claims that Kant did not read 
the Treatise. I myself am insufficient confident to commit myself to any view on this matter.   
 
16
 Note that Hume himself indeed used the term a priori (see e.g. T: 247; EHU: 27), although much less frequently 




half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are 
discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere 
existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths 
demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. (EHU: 25) 
 
6RIRU+XPHPDWKHPDWLFDOµSURSRVLWLRQV¶, and most probably Hume also wants to say 
µMXGJHPHQWV¶, are a priori; WKH\³DUHGLVFRYHUDEOHE\WKHPHUHRSHUDWLRQRIWKRXJKW´%XWZKR
makes this claim? Is it Hume the cognitive psychologist and/or Hume the epistemologist? As 
I read Hume, he clearly is a cognitive psychologist throughout his work on mathematics. I 
also get the impression however that he has normative views about the presence and nature 
of knowledge in mathematics. He could be a constructivist or a realist. As to the former, 
+XPHDUJXHVWKDW³in an arithPHWLFDORSHUDWLRQ«ERWKWKHWUXWKDQGWKHDVVXUDQFHDUHRIWKH
VDPHQDWXUH´7 If and when Hume is an epistemological realist on mathematics he is 
one who does not believe in a mind-inGHSHQGHQWUHDOLVPIRUµREMHFWVRIJHRPHWU\¶+XPH
argues: 
 
[O]bjects of geometry, those surfaces, lines and points, whose proportions and positions it 
examines, are mere ideas in the mind; and not only never did, but never can exist in nature. They 
never did exist; for no one will pretend to draw a line or make a surface entirely conformable to 
the definition: They never can exist; for we may produce demonstrations from these very ideas to 
prove, that they are impossible. (T: 42-3; cf T: 52) 
 
This might be compatible with Hume being a realist about geometrical mathematical 
conclusions. We can leave this issue aside here. It certainly does seem to be compatible with 
Hume being a mind-independent realist on mathematical conclusions in the other two areas 
of mathematics Hume talks about besides geometry: arithmetic and algebra. That is, logically 
speaking such a compatibility seems possible. Furthermore, from a perspective of textual 
exegesis we cannot easily exclude Hume being a mind-independent about mathematical 
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conclusions in arithmetic and algebra. In order to understand this, I first need to lay out a lot 
PRUHDERXW+XPH¶VZULWLQJRQPDWKHPDWLFV 
As indicated earlier, for Hume mathematical judgements have something important 
WRGRZLWKµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶%XWZKDWH[DFWO\LVQRWDSDUWLFXODUO\HDV\PDWWHU7KLVLVVR
because there is an exegetical challenge that asks us to make sense of the following four 
HOHPHQWVWKDW+XPHVHHPVWRDVVRFLDWHZLWKµGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶DQGµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶
(note that these two terms may not reflect fully identical concepts): (a) something having to 
do with proof/proving 7DQGUHFDOOWKHDUJXPHQWDERXWµNQRZOHGJH-H[WHQVLRQ¶E
something that has to with an operation of the understanding that involves intermediate 
ideas UDWKHUWKDQLWEHLQJFRQFHUQHGZLWKµLQWXLWLRQ¶DQLPPHdiate grasp of something (T: 
70); (c) something having to do with certainty as opposed to probability (see e.g. T: 449); (d) 
something having to do with demonstrative reasoning/demonstration being incompatible 
ZLWKµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶7 cf EHU: 163-164). It is beyond the purposes of this chapter to 
VROYHWKHSUREOHPRIZKDWWKHWHUPVµGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶DQGµGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶UHIHUWR
EXWIRURXUSXUSRVHVRIJHWWLQJDJRRGJUDVSRQ+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQWRVXEVHTXHQWO\
use it in an argument to identify one criterion for there being a non-realist component to 
moral objectivity, it is important to dig a little deeper into the meanings of some of the 
aspects I have just mentioned. 
For a brief discussion about aspect (a) I refer to the previous section in combination 
ZLWK+XPH¶VFODLPWKDW³LQDQDULWKPHWLFDORSHUDWLRQ«ERWKWKHWUXWKDQGWKHDVVXUDQFHDUH
of the same nature´(T: 449). As to aspect/candidate (b) of the concepts belonging to the terms 
µGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶DQGGHPRQVWUDWLRQ+XPHVDys the following in the Treatise: 
 
It appears, therefore, that of these seven philosophical relations, there remain only four, which 
depending solely upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge and certainty. These four are 
resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number. Three of 
these relations are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of 
intuition than demonstration. When any objects resemble each other, the resemblance will at 
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first strike the eye, or rather the mind; and seldom requires a second examination. The case is the 
same with contrariety, and with the degrees of any quality. No one can once doubt but existence 
and non-existence destroy each other, and are perfectly incoPSDWLEOHDQGFRQWUDU\$QGWKR¶LWEH
impossible to judge exactly of the degrees of any quality, such as colour, taste, heat, cold, when 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZL[WWKHPLVYHU\VPDOO\HW¶WLVHDV\WRGHFLGHWKDWDQ\RIWKHPLVVXSHULRURU
inferior to another, when their difference is considerable. And this decision we always pronounce 





µWDNLQJLQWHUPHGLDWHVWHSVLQWKRXJKW¶ZKLOHWKHODWWHUKDVVRmething to do with 
immediacy/an immediate grasp.  
As to aspect (c), concerning the contrast between certainty and probability, as we 
have seen in the quotation at the top of this section, Hume argues:  
 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, 
Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, 
and Arithmetic: and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively 
certain. 
 
Here in fact we see a combination of aspect/candidate (a) and (b). Note furthermore that 
IURP+XPH¶VZRUNEHFRPHVFOHDUWKDWMXGJHPHQWVDERXWPDWWHUVRIIDFWIRU+XPHDUH
judgements about probability.   
Now, things get exegetically difficult because Hume seems to associate demonstrative 
knowledge with certainty as opposed to probability. Taking that for granted here, Hume 
argues that not all three areas of mathematics (Hume sees as jointly exhaustive of the subject 
area of mathematics): arithmetic, algebra and geometry can be associated with knowledge as 
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certainty or even knowledge at all17. In book 1 of the Treatise, Hume excludes geometry from 
knowledge as reflecting certainty and relates it to probability (T: 71). However, it is not so 
clear that geometry is exempt from µUHDVRQLQJ¶¶SURRIWKDWUHVXOWVIURPµLQWHUSRVLWLRQRILGHDV
LQWKRXJKW¶2EYLRXVO\WKURXJKKLVWRU\µJHRPHWU\¶GLGQRWDOZD\VUHIHUWRWKHVDPHFRQFHSW
It is not totally clear to me what it meant to Hume. In any case, one thing that speaks in 
favour of JHRPHWU\SULPDULO\LIQRWH[FOXVLYHO\EHLQJH[FOXGHGIURPµLQWHUSRVLWLRQRILGHDVLQ
WKRXJKW¶LQIDYRXURIEHLQJFRQFHUQHGZLWKµLQWXLWLRQ¶LVWKHUDWKHUYLVXDOQDWXUHRIJHRPHWU\
Hume explicitly points to this e.g. on page 71-2 of his Treatise. Taking that seriously, note 
that in terms of a solution to the problem it obviously matters whether geometry is only 
primarily or exclusively concerned with intuition.  
Having mentioned that for Hume there appears to be some sort of real contrast 
between µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶DQGµLQWXLWLRQ¶WKHH[HJHWLFDOFKDOOHQJHEHFRPHVHYHQPRUH
interesting and challenging once one keeps open the possibility that (i) demonstration and/or 
GHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJDQGRUGHPRQVWUDWLYHNQRZOHGJHDQGLLµLQWXLWLRQ¶DUHFRPSDWible. 
As indicated in § 3.2, they seem to have been for Locke and since Hume seems to have 
ZRUNHGDWOHDVWSDUWO\LQD/RFNHDQIUDPHZRUNZKHQLWFRPHVWR+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWµUHDVRQ¶
they might have been compatible for Hume as well.  As mentioned earlier, for Locke 
knowledge that requires reasoning always relies on intuition in the sense that this intuition is 
QHFHVVDU\LQ³DOOWKH&RQQH[LRQVRIWKHLQWHUPHGLDWHIdeas, without which we cannot attain 
.QRZOHGJHDQG&HUWDLQW\´/RFNH4.2.1; cited in Owen, 1992:188). 
$VWRDVSHFWGLH+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWµGHPRQVWUDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ¶DQG
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶DVUHODWHGWRD+XPHDQFODLPDERXWcontradiction, in book I of the Treatise 
Hume argues:  
 
:KDWHYHUFDQEHFRQFHLY¶GE\DFOHDUDQGGLVWLQFWLGHDQHFHVVDULO\LPplies the possibility of 
existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any argument 
                                                          
17
 $VWRµNQRZOHGJHDWDOO¶WKere are difficulties here as to how on behalf of Hume best to label judgements with a 





PLQG'LGLWLPSO\DQ\FRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶WLVLPSRVVLEOHLWFRX¶GHYHUEHFRQFHLY¶G. (T: 43) 
 
This is a passage that reflects the fact that when Hume explicitly talks about (note my remark 
ODWHURQLQWKLVSDUDJUDSKWKHFRQFHSWRIµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶KLVZRUGVUHIOHFWDQHQGRUVHPHQWRI
a psychological rather than logical notion of contradiction. The difficult exegetical puzzle is 
ZKHQLQ+XPH¶VZRUNWKLVpsychological notion of contradiction is a psychological notion 
related to FODLPVDERXWDµWUXWKDQGIDOVHKRRG¶EµQHFHVVLW\¶DQGFµFHUWDLQW\¶IRU+XPHDV
a cognitive psychologist and when this psychological notion of contradiction is a 
psychological notion for claims abRXWDµWUXWKDQGIDOVHKRRG¶EµQHFHVVLW\¶DQGF
certainty for the epistemologist Hume. The fact that for Hume the notion of contradiction in 
passages like the one presented is psychological rather than logical neither logically nor from 
a perspective of textual exegesis implies that it therefore can solely be a criterion of the 
cognitive psychologist Hume, i.e. it might be one of the epistemologist Hume as well. There 
is another remark to be made. The fact that for Hume the criterion of (non-)contradiction is 
psychological in passages like the one given, does not imply that Hume does not endorse the 
thesis that there are certain and necessary, possibly mind-independent, truths that have as a 
criterion the logical principle of non-contradiction. It is beyond the purposes this chapter to 
provide an extensive and deep explanation and justification of this claim. However, 
observing both a Humean tendency to sharply distinguish and to intentionally (and 
XQLQWHQWLRQDOO\EOXUWKHFRQFHSWVRIµNQRZOHGJH¶18 DQGµSUREDELOLW\¶1920, I want to make the 
following two tentative remarks about my own claim. First,  it does not seem implausible to 
me to read Hume as saying that there are objective truths in mathematics that have an 








 Hume argues that all knowledge degenerates into probability (see T: 181).  
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objective probability of 1 (cf Meeker, 2007). Secondly, such truth may be (partly or even 
exclusively) mind-independent ones. From a perspective of textual exegesis it seems possible, 
to ascribe both conclusions to Hume. Both conclusions however, and especially the latter, 
deserve only a modest status, i.e. they should be regarded as no more (and less) than tentative 
conclusions/hypotheses to be investigated further. 
 
 
5. µ0DWWHUVRIIDFW¶DQGHvaluative distinctions 
5.1. :KDWDUHµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶" 
 
At the top of the previous section I have presented the following statement from Hume: 
 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, 
Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, 
and Arithmetic: and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively 
certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a 
proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the 
half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are 
discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere 
existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths 
demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. (EHU: 25; cf EPM: 
287) 
 
I have closed the previous section by some thoughts about contradiction. Hume appeals to 
this notion as well in the following passage that succeeds his remark above.  More or less 




Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same 
manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. 
The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, 
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to 
reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no 
more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt 
to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and 
could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. (EHU: 25-6) 
 
So, just as Hume is concerned with contradiction in the area of relations of ideas expressed 
E\PDWKHPDWLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVKHLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKFRQWUDGLFWLRQLQWKHDUHDRIµPDWWHUVRI
IDFW¶$QGLQERWKFDVHVWKHQRWLRQRIFRQWUDGLFWLRQVHHPVWREHDSV\FKRORJLFDORQHUDWKHU
than a logical one. In what follows I concentratHRQ+XPH¶VQRWLRQRIDµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶,Q
WKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,FRQQHFW+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶ZLWKKLVQRWLRQRI
contradiction. An explanation of this latter relationship should help us understand the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµUHDVRQ¶DQGLPSUHVVLRQV¶LQ+XPH¶VZRUN7KDWRQLWVWXUQVKRXOGVHUYH
DJRRGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI+XPH¶VFODLPWKDWUHDVRQDORQHFDQQRWPDNHPRUDOGLVWLQFWLRQV
passions necessarily contribute. 
+XPHKLPVHOIVD\VWKHIROORZLQJDERXWZKDWDµPDWWHURIIDFW¶LV$FWXDOO\WKDWLV not 
TXLWHWUXH+XPHVD\VWKHIROORZLQJDERXWZKDWDQµinference FRQFHUQLQJDPDWWHURIIDFW¶LV
Hume argues:  
 
An inference concerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea of an object, that is frequently 




we both need to be careful and pay a lot of attention to ZKDWWKHWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFWPHDQV¶
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We need to be careful in the sense that the meanings Hume (according to me) ascribes to the 
WHUPGRQRWILWYHU\ZHOOZLWKPDLQVWUHDPFRQWHPSRUDU\YLHZVRIµIDFWV¶. First, as we can see 
in the above quotation, for HuPHWKHUHLVDUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµLQIHUHQFHVFRQFHUQLQJ
PDWWHUVRIIDFW¶DQGµREMHFWV¶ I take that in contemporary philosophy, rather than being 
µobjects¶, µIDFWV¶ are often conceived of as either the referents of true propositions, beliefs 
and/or statements or else the truth makers of true propositions, beliefs or statements. To 
LOOXVWUDWHWKHIRUPHUE\PHDQVRIDQH[DPSOHµ7KH*HUPDQIRRWEDOOWHDPZRQWKHZRUOGFXS
LQ¶LIWUXH>DVDSURSRVLWLRQEHOLHIRUVWDWHPHQW@UHIHUVWRWKHIDFWWKDWWKDW German 
football team won the world cup in 1954. To illustrate the latter by means of the example, 
the fact that Germany won the world cup in 1954 is what makes the proposition, belief or 
VHQWHQFHµ7KH*HUPDQIRRWEDOOWHDPZRQWKHZRUOGFXSLQ¶WUXH 
The second thing to watch out for is the following one. As we know, Hume thinks we 
cannot draw any philosophical conclusions that go beyond our experiences. This may well 
clash with contemporary mainstream thoughts that facts have something to do with an 
extra-mental world.  
Below, by means of a brief bullet point list consisting of a variety of likely uses of 
+XPH¶VWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶,SRLQWRXWKRZDFFRUGLQJWRPH+XPHXVHVWKHWHUPµPDWWHUV
RIIDFW¶LQKLVZRUN%URDGO\VSHDNLQJZKDWH[SODLQVWKHsignificant variety in the list is that 
LQKLVZRUNDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶+XPHVHHPVWRDGRSWERWKWKHJXLVHRIDVRFLDOVFLHQWLVW
and the guise of an epistemologist. As a social scientist, Hume is largely, but not exclusively a 
cognitive psychologist. As a social scientist who is not best said to come in the guise of a 
cognitive psychologist, Hume observes that ordinary people make factual statements about 
the world and draw epistemological conclusions about the world. In his typical sub-guise of a 
social scientist - the cognitive psychologist- then, Hume describes the psychological 
PHFKDQLVPVEHKLQGRUGLQDU\SHRSOH¶VOLQJXLVWLFFODLPVDQGSV\FKRORJLFDOFRQFOXVLRQV 
While Hume is very much a social scientist when he talks about matters of fact, he 
also seems to be an epistemologist. Here it should be pointed out that as an epistemologist 
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Hume seems to come in two guises. Hume certainly is a philosopher having clear and hard 
views about the limits of knowledge. However, Hume also seems to come in the guise of a 
more (i) positive (ii) down to earth practically orientated philosopher concerned with 
epistemological truths (or rather epistemological normativity not suffering from all kinds of 




1) 7KHWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶IRU+XPHGRHV never refer to any hard philosophical 
theoretical commitment about the existence of an extra-mental world and any objects 
therein (his empiricism prevents him from that).  
2) )RU+XPHWKHWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶LVRQHWKDWLVXVHGE\µWKHYXOJDU¶LQWKRXJKWDQG
language to refer to µVRPHWKLQJREMHFWLYH¶. Sometimes, but not necessarily the term is 
used that literally and explicitly. 
3) 2FFDVLRQDOO\IRU+XPHWKHWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶VRPHWLPHVVHHPVWRUHIHUWRextra-
mental objects, QDPHO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRI+XPHUHIHUULQJWRDPLVWDNHRIµWKHYXOJDU¶
when they have beliefs about objects and make claims about the nature of their 
perceptions. 
4) 7KHWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶VHHPVWREHDSDUWLFXODUNLQGRItruth-maker for the (a) 
practically oriented down-to-earth, (b) social scientist  Hume concerned with what 
ordinary people see as true beliefs. The truth-maker however comes from analyses of 
Hume as a moderate (rather than radically skeptical) epistemologist. The truth-maker 
seems to be a perceptually unflawed impression of sensation in the case of our beliefs 
in extra-mental objects.  In the case of causal relationships it is our frequent 
experience of two events, influenced by proper employment of our reasoning 
capacities and a healthy functioning of our imaginative faculty.   
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5) (Related to 4, but leaving the scientific guise out, i.e. keeping (4a) while leaving aside 
(4b)), the term µPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶VHHPVWREHDSDUWLFXODUNLQGRIWUXWK-maker of what 
for Hume as a moderate rather than radically skeptical epistemologist are true 
propositions, beliefs and statements. The truth-maker seems to be a perceptually 
unflawed impression of sensation in the case of our beliefs in extra-mental objects.  In 
the case of causal relationships it is our sufficiently frequent experience of two events, 
influenced by proper employment of our reasoning capacities and a healthy 
functioning of our imaginative faculty.  
6) 7KHWHUPµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶might also be a referent of epistemologically true 
propositions and statements for the epistemologist Hume.  
 
I am inclined to say that what Hume observes as a social scientist in terms of ordinary people 
making claims about there being facts and normative truths can be epistemologically 
HYDOXDWHGIRU+XPHE\PHDQVRIµVXIILFLHQWO\FDUHIXOSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQFOXVLRQV¶7KHVH
conclusions are couched in skeptical terms concerning the limitations of what we can know. 
They come in a hard-core form as a result of the epistemological truth/force of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism (see § 10).  
$OWKRXJK,WDNHWKLVWREHDOLWWOHPRUHFRQWURYHUVLDO+XPH¶VµVXIILFLHQWO\FDUHIXO
SKLORVRSKLFDOFRQFOXVLRQV¶IXUWKHUPRUHVHHPWRFRPHLQWKHJXLVHRIµHPSLULFDOO\LQIRUPHG
inductive conclusions about whose accuracy we as philosophers are confident and that do 
QRWVXIIHUIURPREYLRXVHSLVWHPRORJLFDOIODZV¶,QFRQWUDVWWRWKHILUVWW\SHRIµVXIILFLHQWO\
FDUHIXOSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQFOXVLRQV¶WKHVHconclusions, if they can be ascribed to Hume the 
epistemologist would come in a mitigated rather than hard-core form. A mitigated form that 
(a) is characterized by good reasoning and a healthy functioning of our imaginative faculty 
and (b) is compatible wiWK+XPH¶VFRQYLFWLRQWKDWDOOKXPDQEHLQJVLQFOXGLQJSKLORVRSKHUV
need to live their live effectively as practical agents. That latter feature (b) is incompatible 
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with hard-core Pyrrhonian scepticism, but leaves room for, indeed demands a mitigated form 








notion of contradiction. 
Let us first consider the following passage (I dub A):  
 
(A) It seems evident, that reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgement of truth and 
falsehood, can never, of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but so far 
as it touches some passion or affection. Abstract relations of ideas are the objects of curiosity, 
not of volition. And matters of fact, where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither 
excite desire nor aversion, are totally indifferent; and whether known or unknown, whether 
mistaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to action. (DP: 5.1; cited 
in Cohon, 2008: 50; cf.  69; italics original) 
 
/HWXVDOVRKDYHDORRNDWVRPHRWKHUXWWHUDQFHVRI+XPHRQµWUXWKDQGIDOVHKRRG¶,QWKH
Treatise Hume states: 
 
i. Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or 
disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. 
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible to this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of 




ii. Truth is of two NLQGVFRQVLVWLQJHLWKHULQWKHGLVFRYHU\RIWKHSURSRUWLRQVRILGHDVFRQVLGHU¶G
as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence. (T: 448) 
 
iii. What may at first occur on this head is that nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except 
what has a reference to it, and as the judgements of our understanding only has this 
reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are 
DFFRPSDQ\¶Gwith some judgement or opinion. (T: 415-416; the former two phrases have 
been italicized by me; the latter word is italicized by Hume) 
 
Cohon summarizes these ideas in the first three steps of what she calls the Representation 
Argument (the other three steps we can leave aside here): 
 
1. Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. (see T: 458) 
2. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of 
ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. (see T: 458) 
3. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being 
true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. (see T: 458; Cohon, 2008: 69) 
 
6RZKDWZHVHHKHUHLVWKDWDFFRUGLQJWR+XPHµWUXWK¶DQGµIDOVHKRRG¶FRQVLVWLQWKH
matching of our ideas with something else: reDOµUHODWLRQVRILGHDV¶RUµreal existence and 
PDWWHURIIDFW¶SUREDEO\+XPHLQWHQGVWRXVHWKHILQDOWZRDVV\QRQ\PVKHUH)RUWKH
SXUSRVHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶DVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHQRWLRQGRLQJ
justice to a variety of aspects and GHVFULSWLRQVLQ+XPH¶VZRUNLWVHHPVLPSRUWDQWWR
recognize the following difference between step 1 of the Representation Argument and the 
first sentence of passage (A) at the top of this section. In step 1 of the argument Hume talks 
about reason as the discovery of truth and falsehood while in the first sentence of passage (A) 
Hume talks about reason as the judgement of truth and falsehood. This difference could very 
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well reflect the double guise Hume takes in his work. The former would refer to the guise of 
an epistemologist claiming that there is such a thing as normative truth, while also making 
claims as to how we can know it, but while assuming all the way that there are limitations to 
what we can know. The latter dependent on the subject area may represent both guises. To 
restrict myself just to two areas here, in the domain of matters of fact it seems to be solely a 
cognitive psychologist who is speaking, while in the domain of mathematics, both guises 
might very well play a role.  
It seems to be the case that from a comprehensive point of view of the different areas 
of his work on truth and reason (at least this counts for the union of mathematics and 
matters of fact; perhaps also more widely), the two mentioned intellectual guises meet each 
other in certain Humean ideas about contradiction. To understand this, let us consider the 
IROORZLQJWZRSDVVDJHVIURP+XPH¶VZRUN 
 
I. When we infer the existence of an object from that of others, some object must always be 
present either to the memory or senses, in order to be the foundation of our reasoning; since 
the mind cannot run up with its inferences in infinitum.  Reason can never satisfy us that the 
existence of any object does ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the 
impression of one to WKHLGHDRUEHOLHIRIDQRWKHUZHDUHQRWGHWHUPLQ¶GE\UHDVRQEXWE\
custom or a principle of association. (Hume, T:97) 
 
II. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings 
would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with 
each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we 
ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence. If I ask, why you believe any 
particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will 
be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in 
infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or 
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senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation. (EHU: 46; cf  T: 82-3, 91, 
97, 517-8; DNR: 11.4 , 11.17) 
 
In ERWKSDVVDJHV+XPHDSSHDOVWRDQLQDELOLW\RIµUHDVRQLQJ¶WRUHVXOWLQWHUPLQDWLQJ
processes. But how exactly? It looks like first and foremost Hume is giving us a bit of 
psychological theory.  That is, he argues that whatever is going on in our minds in terms of 
some sort of inferential reasoning process must trace back to some kind of impression. 
Implicitly, Hume is also making an observation as a cognitive psychologist: us having an 
impression is what happens in our minds.  
As an instrument for understanding how the two Humean intellectual guises meet 
each othHULQ+XPH¶VZRUNRQUHDVRQtruth and contradiction, let me now present a passage 
IURP+XPH¶Vmoral philosophy that also reflects some Human view about an inability of 
reason to terminate a process of reasoning. In EPM Hume argues: 
 
It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted 
for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, 
without any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will 
answer, because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will 
readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason 
why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never 
referred to any other object.  
Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary 
for the exercise of his calling. If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he will answer, because 
he desires to get money. If you demand Why? It is the instrument of pleasure, says he. And 
beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in 
infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be 
desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human 





moral distinctions are not derived from reason. That is, in the form of a Humean claim about 
some impotence of reason in terms of it having an inability to result in something that 
terminates a reasoning process. Having said that, this seems to be one of the passages in 
+XPH¶VZRUNDERXWZKLFKRQHZRQGHUVVWURQJO\ZKHWKHU+XPH¶VSULPDU\DLPLs to give an 
account of the nature of moral distinctions or whether his primary aim is to present an 
empirical investigation of the mind of men by giving a descriptive analysis of human mental 
states. The first sentence of the passage seems compatible with both a descriptive and 
normative project. The focus on the mental states, or rather linguistic utterances of human 
agents that follows suggests the former. The penultimate sentence where he uses the term 
µGHVLUDEOH¶±an apparently normative term- suggests the latter. In any case, Hume concludes 
that it is pain and pleasure that stop an endless regress. He also concludes that our 
intellectual faculty of reason does not have the necessary features to stop an endless regress 
that functions as the ultimate foundation for our moral distinctions. It looks like there is no 
such thing for Hume as a long string of intuitions of assent being able to result in a normative 
conclusion. 
The similarity between the passages about matters of fact and the moral passage seems 
WREHRQHWKDWLVLPSRUWDQWWRXQGHUVWDQG+XPH¶VQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶DQGWRH[SODLQWKH




reason, truth and (non-) contradiction. 
All aspects considered, it seems best to arrive at the following tentative conclusions 
DERXWµUHDVRQ¶LQ+XPH¶VZRUN)RU+XPHµUHDVRQ¶LVHVVHQWLDOO\Dreasoning process/activity. 
Possibly (sometimes) for Hume this reasoning process is part of a faculty view of reason. 
Here then the notion of contradiction becomes important for both the area of mathematics 
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and the areas of matters of fact. I think Hume wants to argue that it is only when our faculty 
of reason cannot conceive of contrary instances that it can give us a priori knowledge as it 
can in mathematics. When reason does give us a priori knowledge the knowledge results 
from a priori reasoning processes that are terminated by our faculty of reason by means of an 
a priori act of judgement resulting in an a priori product of judgement reflecting a priori 
knowledge.  
In regard to the case of matters of fact and contradiction, I think Hume as a skeptical 
epistemologist wants to claim that reason as a chain of arguments is essentially incapable of 
giving us any certain truth about objects that seem to be part of the external world because it 
is always possible for the mind to conceive of contrary instances. As we have seen, Hume 
argues:  
 
The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, 
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to 
reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no 
more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt 
to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and 
could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. (EHU: 25-6) 
 
I take it that the final sentence of this passage at least is compatible with, if not exclusively 
DSSOLHVWR+XPH¶VLGHDVDERXWWUXHPDWKHPDWLFDOMXGJHPHQWV+HUHWKHQKLVWKRXJKWVDERXW
truth and non-contradiction will refer at least partly to a psychological criterion for a 
MXGJHPHQWRIDFRJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJLVW:KLOHWKH\UHIHUµDWOHDVWSDUWO\¶WRDSV\FKRORJLFDO
FULWHULRQUHIHUULQJWRDQGUHO\LQJRQZKDW,KDYHVDLGLQDQG+XPH¶VWKRXJKWVDERXW
(non-)contradiction may also represent an endorsement of a (mind-independent) logical 









7.1.  The unrepresentative character of impressions 
2QWKHFRQFHSWµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶LQ+XPH¶VZRUN 
 
One of the more important points established by Hume in the very first section of the 
Treatise is what Cohon and Owen (UM) call the Priority Principle³DOORXUVLPSOHLGHDVLQ
their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, 
and which they exactly represent." (T: 4, cited in Cohon & Owen, UM). As Cohon and Owen 
point out: 
 
Simple impressions and ideas come in resembling pairs, and as the former cause the latter, the 
latter represent the former. Ideas represent, and what they represent is impressions. Impressions 
GRQ¶WLWDSSHDUVUHSUHVHQWDWDOO$WOHDVWWKH\GRQ¶WUHSUHVHQWRWKHUSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHPLQG 
 
Note that to say that impressions are not copies of other, precedent perceptions is not to deny 
that they have no causes. Nor is it yet to deny that they might resemble, copy or represent 
their causes (Cohon & Owen, UM: 4). Hume just has no commitment to that because of the 
limiting side of his empiricism. Hume himself says the following about that: 
 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, 
SHUIHFWO\LQH[SOLFDEOHE\KXPDQUHDVRQDQGµWZLOODOZD\VEHLPSRVVLEOHWRGHFLGHZLWKFHUWDLQW\
ZKHWKHUWKH\DULVHLPPHGLDWHO\IURPWKHREMHFWVRUDUHSURGXF¶GE\WKHFUHDWLYHSRZHURIWKH




The Priority Principle UHIOHFWVWKHPDLQLGHDRIµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶LQ+XPH¶VZRUN*UDQWLQJ
WKDWDQGZKLOHWKHUHLVDQRWLRQRIµFRUUHVSRQGHQFH¶LQKHUHQWWRWKHPriority Principle, the 
conclusion should be drDZQWKDW+XPH¶VPDLQQRWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLVGLIIHUHQWIURP
(contemporary) correspondence theories of truth with a theoretical commitment to the 
existence of an extra-mental world. First, for Hume the notion of correspondence inherent to 
the Priority Principle is not one that is directly concerned with truth and falsehood. 
6HFRQGO\QRQHRI+XPH¶VPHQWDOLWHPVDUHPHQWDOVLJQVRUV\PEROVWKDWUHIOHFWH[WUD-mental 
reality.  
:KLOH+XPH¶VQRWLRQRIµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶GRHVnot refer to an extra-mental reality and 
ZKLOH+XPH¶Vprimary use of the term seems to refer to a particular relationship between 
ideas and impressions, there might be another use of the term that corresponds to what I 
have said in the previous section about truth and falsehood. By this I mean the following. If  
Hume draws indeed ±as I tentatively believe- positive epistemological conclusions in one or 
more subject areas he writes about then we might have to say that whatever for Hume can be 
QRUPDWLYHO\WUXHDQGIDOVHLVµUHSUHVHQWHG¶E\FHUWDLQPHQWDOLWHPVµSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHPLQG¶
as Hume calls them. There is textual evidence that speaks in favour of such a use of the term. 
Having said that, on basis of a comprehensive reading of his work, I am not entirely sure that 
such a use of the term µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶LVLQDVLJQLILFDQWVHQVHSDUWRI+XPH¶VZRUN$VWR
textual evidence, on page 84 of the Treatise Hume argues: 
 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, 
perfectly inexplicable by human UHDVRQDQG¶WZLOODOZD\VEHLPSRVVLEOHWRGHFLGHZLWKFHUWDLQW\
ZKHWKHUWKH\DULVHLPPHGLDWHO\IURPWKHREMHFWRUDUHSURGXF¶GE\WKHFUHDWLYHSRZHURIWKH
PLQGRUDUHGHULY¶GIURPWKHDXWKRURIRXUEHLQJ1RULVVXFKDTXHVWLRQDQ\ZD\material to our 
present purpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they 




In this passage one might even read Hume as a potential correspondence theorist of truth, 
with commitments to an extra-mental world. On basis of his work as a whole however one 
should not regard Hume in this way.  Indeed one should strongly and actively refrain from 
drawing such a conclusion, because of the natXUHRI+XPH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOSURMHFWDVODLGRXW






,SUHVHQWHGSDUWRI&RKRQ¶VRepresentation Argument:  
 
1. Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. 
2. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of 
ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. 
3. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being 
true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. (Cohon, 2008: 69) 
 
So, whatever corresponds either to real relations of ideas or to real matters of fact can be true 
and false according to &RKRQ¶V+XPHDFODLP,DJUHHZLWK1RZ+XPHDUJXHV 
 








So, what does Hume mean when he says that a passion does not contain any representative 
quality? What he seems to mean is that the passion produced is not a copy of its cause in the 
way an idea is a copy of the impression from which it is derived. Note that part of what it is 
to be an impression is to be an original, that from which copies are made. Passions, like all 
impressions, are not copies of anything else (see Cohon & Owen, UM: 9-10) In particular, 
they are not copies of other items, as ideas are copies of the impressions that cause them and 
WKDWWKH\FRQVHTXHQWO\UHSUHVHQW&RKRQ&RKRQDUJXHV³7KH\DUHQRWVLJQVRU
V\PEROVRIDUHDOLW\EH\RQGWKHP´&RKRQ; my italics). Now, there seems to be 
VRPHWKLQJDPELJXRXVLQFRPSOHWHRUHYHQZURQJDERXW&RKRQ¶VYLHZVLQLWDlics above. The 
SUREOHPZLWKWKHPILUVWRIDOOLVWKDWLWLVQRWFOHDUZKDW&RKRQPHDQVE\µUHDOLW\¶LQWKH
TXRWDWLRQDERYH,IWKHWHUPµUHDOLW\¶KHUHDOVRUHIHUVWRVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVRSSRVHGWRILFWLRQ
rather rather than simply to a feature of the natuUHRIDQLPSUHVVLRQEHLQJµUHDO¶WKH
SUREOHPZLWK&RKRQ¶VYLHZVcould already be that often a single impression for Hume does 
QRWHTXDOWKDWZKLFKIRU+XPHGHVHUYHVWKHWLWOHµUHDOLW\¶,IWKHZRUGµUHDOLW\¶UHIHUVWR
something that is opposed to fiction, there is certainly a problem ZLWK&RKRQ¶VYLHZVLQ
italics given that sometimes for Hume not even a complex of impressions equals that which 
IRU+XPHGHVHUYHVWKHWLWOHµUHDOLW\¶ &RKRQ¶VILUVWKDOIRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDUJXPHQWDERXW
truth and reason seems to argue that truth and falsehood are about agreement and 
disagreement between an idea (or complex of ideas) that is a copy of that which the copy 
represents. In regard to passLRQVWKHQ&RKRQ¶VDUJXPHQWVHHPVWREHWKDWDSDVVLRQLVQRWD
copy and does not refer and that contradicting reason and truth requires disagreement 
between an idea (or complex of ideas) that copies that real something which it is a copy of 
where this real something seems to be a truth-maker. Here then it should be noted that the 
µUHDOLW\¶WKHREMHFWWKDWIRU+XPHLVDWUXWKPDNHULVat least not always a single impression 
and at least not always a complex of impressions. It is certainly not a single impression if (a) 
we regard Hume as an epistemologist about (b) matters of causality. In the epistemological 
case of causal matters of fact, the truth-makers are repeated experiences of impressions of 
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sensation accompanied by proper reasoning activity and results of a healthy functioning 
imaginative faculty with its capacity for making a variety of types of associations. And in the 
cognitive psychological case of causal matters of fact the explanatory causal story also appeals 
to repeated impressions plus the principles of association. In the case of objects the 
epistemologist Hume might allow for a single impression having epistemological power by 
mean of some sort of trust in our natural constitution (see T: 183). If we regard Hume as a 
cognitive psychologist, probably the truth-maker sometimes is a single impression, while 








The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these 
VHQVDWLRQVDUHUHPRY¶GERWKIURPRXUWKRXJKWDQGIHHOLQJZHDUHLQDJUHDWPHDVXUHLQFDSDEOH








antecedent to their correspondent ideas, but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from 




An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, 
pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, 
which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, 
when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and 
fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again 
are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give 
rise to other impressions and ideas. (T: 7-8) 
 
In book II Hume engages with exactly the same subject matter21, although he uses different 
terms to refer to the distinction between impressions addressed in book I. Rather than about 
impressions of sensation and impressions of reflexion, Hume talks about original and 
secondary impressions. He argues: 
 
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception 
arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the 
application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as 
proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. 
Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the 
second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them. (T: 275; my italics) 
 
6RSDVVLRQVDQG³RWKHUHPRWLRQVUHVHPEOLQJWKHP´LWLVXQFOHDUWRPHKRZWRXQGHUVWDQG
WKLVDUHµLPSUHVVLRQVRIUHIOHFWLRQ¶ZKLOHERGLO\ pains and pleasures are impressions of 
sensation.22 About bodily pains and pleasures Hume makes the following further remark that 
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 +XPHKLPVHOIVD\V³This division of the impressions is the same with that which I formerly made use of when I 




since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any 
introduction make their appearance in WKHVRXO´7+XPHGRHVQRWFRQWLQXHWRVD\VRPHWKLQJDERXWWKHVH
LPSUHVVLRQV¶QDWXUDODQGSK\VLFDOFDXVHVWKH\KDYHDFFRUGLQJWR+XPH7-6). An examination (and exposition) 




will turn out to be if some indirect importance (to be explained later in this section) in regard 
to his moral philosophy. Hume argues that bodily pleasures and pains are:  
 
WKHVRXUFHRIPDQ\SDVVLRQVERWKZKHQIHOWDQGFRQVLGHU¶GE\WKHPLQGEXWDULVHRULJLQDOO\LQ
the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or 
perception. A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not 
GHULY¶GLPPHGLDWHO\IURPDny affection or idea. (T: 276)  
 
,QWKHDERYHTXRWDWLRQ+XPHPHQWLRQVWKDWERGLO\SOHDVXUHVDQGSDLQV³arise originally in 
the soul, or in the body, whiFKHYHU\RXSOHDVHWRFDOOLW´7KLVUHPDUNLVLPSRUWDQWLQUHODWLRQ
WRKLVPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGLWLVVREHFDXVHRIDFRQFHSWXDODPELJXLW\LQ+XPH¶VXVHRIWKH
WHUPµRULJLQDO¶ 
When Hume talks about pleasure and pain he does not always talk about the same 
thing. Sometimes that is more obvious than at other times. As we have seen there is talk 
about bodily SOHDVXUHVDQGSDLQ7KHUHLVKRZHYHUDOVRDODUJHDPRXQWRIWDONDERXWµPHQWDO¶
pleasures and pain, most prominently in the sense that when concerned with moral matters 
as a cognitive psychologist Hume argues that character traits and actions we human beings 
approve of are either those that produce pleasure for others (individuals or society) or for the 
possessor himself or else are action that are useful to the possessor himself or others. On the 
negative side, we disapprove of character traits23 and actions that yield pain 
(harm/uneasiness) to the person who has them or others.  
What is also included in the all-HQFRPSDVVLQJWDONDERXWµSOHDVXUH¶DQGµSDLQ¶DUH
+XPHDQFODLPVDERXWWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³QDWXUDOLPSXOVHV´DQG³QDWXUDOLQVWLQFWV´LQKXPDQ
beings. Below I give two quotations ±(A) and (B)- that are similar in content. The first 
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(A)Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise 
from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of 
punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily 
appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, 
like the other affections. (T: 439; my italics) 
 
(B) 1RZµWLVFHUWDLQWKDWWKHUHDUHFHUWDLQFDOPGHVLUHVDQGWHQGHQFLHVZKLFKWKR¶WKH\EHUHDO
passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects, than by the 
immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally 
implanted in our natures, such a benevolence and resentment, the love of life and kindness to 
children;  or WKHJHQHUDODSSHWLWHWRJRRGDQGDYHUVLRQWRHYLOFRQVLGHU¶GPHUHO\DVVXFKT: 
417; my italics)  
 
As mentioned these two passages are similar in content. We need them together in order to 
JHWP\FODLPRIIWKHJURXQGWKDWWKHUHLVDQDPELJXLW\LQ+XPH¶VWDONDERXWWKHWHUP
µRULJLQDO¶,QGHHGZHQHHGWKHWZRTXRWDWLRQVDERYHRQWKHRQHVLGHSOXV+XPH¶VFODLPWKDW
ERGLO\SOHDVXUHVDQGSDLQV³arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please 
WRFDOOLW´,ZLOOQRZRIIHUDQH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHDPELJXLW\ 
$VZHKDYHVHHQ+XPHUHJDUGVERGLO\SOHDVXUHVDQGSDLQVDVµLPSUHVVLRQVRI





what typically, if not standardly and necessarily, is implied for Hume is the view that the 
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impressions he talks about arise from unknown causes (see T: 7). That is, when it comes to 
WKHPHQWLRQHGXVHRIµLPSUHVVLRQ¶WKHUHLVno Humean commitment to the causes of the 
impressions. 





a cause is implied. Given that Hume links our mental discernment of good and evil to our 
natural constitution (in a variety of ways, see the quotations above), while he is mostly a 
moral psychologist (rather than biologist or aetiologist), one wonders ±at least I wonder- 
what exactly Hume wants to say about pleasure and pain as bits of our innate constitution (i. 
as actualized forms and ii. as pre-dispositions) necessarily involved in the mental 
discernment of moral distinctions, distinctions between good and evil. If there are such bits, 
the first question is how they are similar in terms of force with which they strike the soul as 
bodily impressions. There may be different things to say for different bits of our innate 
constitution. Secondly, the question is how they are conceptually similar to and different 
from bodily impressions of pleasure and pain.   
  
 
7.3. Reason and calm passions 
 
Space prevents me from discussing all Hume says about passion. In this section and the next I 
ZLOODGGUHVVWZRIXUWKHUVXEWRSLFV,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,GLVFXVV+XPH¶VQRWLRQRIFDOPSDVVLRQV




eye on the next chapter where I focus on the intellectual risks of misinterpreting Hume for 
contemporary meta-ethics. 
In the very beginning of book 2 of the Treatise Hume argues: 
 
The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent´2IWKH
first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition and external objects. Of the 
second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. (T: 276) 
 
Hume notes that the division is far from exact (T: 276). He also notes that the causes as well 
as the effects of both the violent and the calm SDVVLRQVDUH³SUHWW\YDULDEOH´DQG³GHSHQGLQD
great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual (T: 437).  
$VPHQWLRQHG+XPHUHJXODUO\OLQNVWKHFDOPSDVVLRQVWRDQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶:H
need to be very careful however as to how to interpret Hume here. I think we should not 
interpret him as Kenneth Westphal does. Westphal argues ³2IFRXUVH+XPHKHOGWKDW
µUHDVRQ¶LVQRWKLQJRWKHUWKDQµFDOP¶SDVVLRQRUSDVVLRQV´:HVWSKDOOne way, the 
UHOHYDQWZD\KHUHLQZKLFKWKLVFODLPVHHPVSUREOHPDWLFLVWKDWLWVHHPVWRFRQIODWH+XPH¶V
philosophical notion of reason with his critical utterances about what ordinary people think 
about their own mental states. It needs to be pointed out that Hume seduces us into thinking 
WKDW:HVWSKDO¶VYLHZLVWUXHIn his Treatise Hume argues: 
 
What we commonly understand by passion, is a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any 
good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted 
to excite an appetite. By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former; but 
such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquility leads us into 
a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual 
faculties. (T: 437) 
 




This language will be easily understood, if we consider what we formerly said concerning that 
reason, which is able to oppose our passion; and which we have found to be nothing but a general 




and one that might seduce one into thinking that Westphal is right. However, on basis of 
+XPH¶VZRUNDVDZKROHDQGRQEDVLVRIIXUWKHUSDUWLFXODUSDVVDJHVRQFDOPSDVVLRQV,
strongly believe we should not conclude from the above passages that Hume wants to equate 
µUHDVRQ¶ZLWKµFDOPSDVVLRQV¶:KHQ+XPHJLYHVXVWKHLPSUHVVLRn to equate reason with 
calm passions, he tells us something about our vulgar notion. What he tells us is that because 
the calm and tranquil action of the mind in reasoning is similar to the operation of calm 
GHVLUHVWKRVH³ZKRMXGJHRIWKLQJVIURPWKHILUVWYLHZDQGDSSHDUDQFH´FRQIRXQGWKHWZR
and conclude that reason has an influence on action (T: 417, cited in McIntyre, 2000; cf 419, 
EPM: 239). Hume wants to say that vulgarly FDOPSDVVLRQVDUHFDOOHGµUHDVRQ¶VHH7
because of their similar influence on the mind. He does not want to say that reason and calm 
passions are conceptually or metaphysically similar. They have some resemblance in 
psychology in that both are not violent. That much is true, but that is also where the 





For Hume a desire is a particular type of passion. Unfortunately, Hume is not clear on what 
exactly a desire is, partly through him not being precise about the concept (see IN: 11; T: 382, 
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417; cf T: 7).24 What we can JHWIURP+XPH¶VZRUNLVWKDWDGHVLUHLVDµGLUHFW¶SDVVLRQ+XPH
PDNHVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWSDVVLRQV)RU+XPHµGLUHFWSDVVLRQV¶DUH
SDVVLRQV³DVDULVHLPPHGLDWHO\IURPJRRGRUHYLOIURPSDLQRUSOHDVXUH´ (T: 276). Under the 
direct passions, Hume lists: desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security (T: 
277)µ,QGLUHFWSDVVLRQV¶E\FRQWUDVWDUHWKRVHWKDW³SURFHHGIURPWKHVDPHSULQFLSOHVEXWE\
WKHFRQMXQFWLRQRIRWKHUTXDOLWLHV´ (T: 276).  Passions that fall into this category are: pride, 
KXPLOLW\DPELWLRQYDQLW\ORYHKDWUHGHQY\SLW\PDOLFHJHQHURVLW\³ZLWKWKHLU
GHSHQGHQWV´7-+XPH¶VDFFRXQWRIGLUHFWSDVVLRQVDQGLQGLUHFWSDVVLRQVLVUDWKHU
complex. The complexity of the latter shines through the extensive complex explanation 
Hume provides of it in his work. Hume does not deal much with the former and gives some 
at face value clear descriptions of it. But there seems to be much more complexity behind 
+XPHµVDFFRXQWRIGLUHFWSDVVLRQVWKHQDILUst look at his work reveals. There is no easy and 
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGWKHRU\DERXW+XPH¶VDFFRXQWRIGLUHFWSDVVLRQVIRUDVXEVWDQWLYH
explanation and justification of this claim see McIntyre, 2000).  
2QHPRUHWKLQJWKDWFDQEHVDLGDERXW+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI desire is that he makes a 
distinction between principle and subordinate desires. Hume argues:  
 
any principal desire may be attended with subordinate ones, which are connected with it, and to 
which if other desires are parallel, they are by that means related to the principal one. Thus 
KXQJHUPD\RIWEHFRQVLGHU¶GDVWKHSULPDU\LQFOLQDWLRQRIWKHVRXODQGWKHGHVLUHRIDSSURDFKLQJ
WKHPHDWDVWKHVHFRQGDU\RQHVLQFH¶WLVDEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\WRWKHVDWLVI\LQJWKDWDSSHWLWH,IDQ
object, therefore, by any separate qualities, inclines us to approach the meat, it naturally 
encreases our appetite; as on the contrary, whatever inclines us to set our victuals at a distance, is 
                                                          
24
 Below are two Humean expressions that indicate a lack of precision:  
 
³We are, therefore, to look for instances of this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections, as are 
attended with a certain appetite or desire; such as those of love and hatred´(T: 382) 
 
³Benevolence or the appetite, which attends love, is a desire RIWKHKDSSLQHVVRIWKHSHUVRQEHORY¶GDQGDQ
aversion to his misery.´ (T: 382) 
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FRQWUDGLFWRU\WRKXQJHUDQGGLPLQLVKHVRXULQFOLQDWLRQWRWKHP1RZ¶WLVSODLQWKDt beauty has 
the first effect, and deformity the second: Which is the reason why the former gives us a keener 
appetite for our victuals, and the latter is sufficient to disgust us at the most savoury dish, that 
cookery has invented. All this is easily applicable to the appetite for generation. (T: 394-5) 
 
%HWKDWDFRQFHSWXDOGLVWLQFWLRQRQHILQGVLQ+XPH¶VZRUNDERXWGHVLUHWKLVFRQFHSWXDO
distinction is textually related to the lack of precision about the concept. In the 
abovementioned quotation, Hume VHHPLQJO\XVHVWKHZRUGµSULPDU\GHVLUH¶µLQFOLQDWLRQ¶DQG
µDSSHWLWH¶LQDQLQWHUFKDQJHDEOHZD\*HQHUDOO\LWKDVWREHFRQFOXGHGWKDW+XPHLVQRWYHU\




The act of the mind, exprest by a promise, is not a resolution to perform any thing: For that alone 
never imposes any obligation. Nor is it a desire of such a performance: For we may bind ourselves 
ZLWKRXWVXFKDGHVLUHRUHYHQZLWKDQDYHUVLRQGHFODU¶GDQGDYRZ¶G1HLWKHULVLWWKHwilling of 
that action, which we promise to perform: For a promise always regards some future time, and 
the will has an influence only on present actions (T: 516-7; cf EHU: 18). 
 
For Hume the type of distinction that applies to the noun µGHVLUH¶and to µZLOOLQJ¶DOVRVHHPV










With regards to reason as reasoning DQGWKHODWWHU¶VUHODWLRQWRµMXGJPHQW¶IRU+XPHWKH
PRUDOFDVHLQRQHZD\LVVLPLODUWRWKHFDVHDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶ZKLOHLWLVDOVRGLIIHUHQWLQ
some significant way. It is similar because Hume with regard to both the moral case and the 
matters of fact case wants to say that psychologically speaking and normatively speaking 
evaluative distinctions in both areas are constitutionally dependent on certain types of 
LPSUHVVLRQV7KHPRUDOFDVHDQGWKHFDVHDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶DUHGLIIHUHQWLQWKDWWhe 
QDWXUHRIQRUPDWLYHGLVWLQFWLRQVLVVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIRUWKHFDVHDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶
and the moral case. This counts both for the cognitive psychologist Hume and for the moral 
epistemologist Hume 
It is not an easy task to determine in what guises Hume shows up in his moral 
philosophy. Hume certainly is a cognitive moral psychologist. He certainly is also a sceptical 
and polemical philosopher uttering certain views about the limitations of reason. In contrast 
to other areas of his work, in the domain of morality Hume strongly works with a notion of 
µUHDVRQ¶WKDWLVDSKLORVRSKLFDOREMHFWRIFKDOOHQJHIRUKLP0RUHDERXWWKLVGLUHFWO\%HVLGHV
the two guises mentioned, Hume might also adopt the guise of a normative ethicist and/or 
constructive moral epistemologist about the nature of moral normativity. As to the latter, I 
assume here for the sake of the argument and possible reality that Hume thinks that there 
are real normative distinctions to be made in the moral area. 
Let me say something more DERXW+XPH¶VSROHPLFDOJXLVHLQUHJDUGWRPRUDOPDWWHUV
Hume aims to challenge ideas from his contemporaries, in particular Samuel Clarke. +XPH¶V
ideas about the limits of reason in regard to moral matters should be understood against the 
background of theories about the relationship between God and morality as endorsed in the 
17th and 18th century.  I will say something about that now, albeit only briefly.25   
In the 17th and 18th century the religious-cum moral environment in what is now 
called the United Kingdom was such that many people tried to save God from one horn of 
WKH(XWK\SKURGLOHPPD7KDWLVPDQ\WULHGWRPDNHVXUHWKDWµYROXQWDULVP¶RU-using 





another term for the same idea - µGLYLQHFRPPDQGWKHRU\¶GRHVQRWLPSO\DFRPSOHWHcarte 
blanche for God as an omnipotent being. It was felt that if God as the highest being with an 
omnipotent power determines morality then he could be a tyrant. It was felt that something 
QHHGHGWREHGRQHLQRUGHUWRSUHYHQWWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW*RG¶VRPQLSRWHQWZLOOFRuld be 
compatible with him being a tyrant. Some theory needed to be developed that prevented the 
possibility of God being a tyrant, a theory that somehow needed to be compatible with the 
RPQLSRWHQFHDQGJRRGQHVVRI*RG*RG¶VZLOOPXVWEHJRYHUQHGE\HWHUQal measures of right 
DQGZURQJEXWVRPHKRZZLWKRXWWKHPEHLQJLQFRQIOLFWZLWK*RG¶VHVVHQWLDOIHDWXUHV
especially also goodness and omnipotence. The view that then was put forward was the idea 
that there are necessary eternal truths, truths that would have to be recognized by any 
rational agent, no matter how situated, and so by God as well (see Schneewind, 2000). Let me 
QRZLOOXVWUDWHWKLVFRQWH[WXDOLQIRUPDWLRQE\PHDQVRIDSDVVDJHIURP+XPH¶V7UHDWLVH 
 
Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal 
fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers 
them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human 
creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, 
OLNHWUXWKLVGHVFHUQ¶GPHUHO\E\LGHDVDQGE\WKHLUMX[WDSRVLWLRQDQGFRPSDULVRQ. In order 
therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider, whether it is possible, from reason 
alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some other 
principles to enable us to make that distinction. 26 (T: 456-7; my italics)  
                                                          
26
 &RPSDUH³According to the principles of those who maintain an abstract rational difference betwixt moral good 
and evil, and a natural fitness, and unfitness of things, µWLVQRWRQO\VXSSRV¶GWKDWWKHVHUHODWLRQVEHLQJHWHUQDODQG
LPPXWDEOHDUHWKHVDPHZKHQFRQVLGHU¶GE\HYHU\UDWLRQDOFUHDWXUHEXWWKHLUeffects DUHDOVRVXSSRV¶GWREH
necessarily the same; DQGµWLVFRQFOXGHGWKH\KDYHQROHVVRUUDWKHUDJUHDWHULQIOXHQFHLQGLUHFWLQJWKHZLOORIWKH
deity, than in governing the rational and virtuous of our own species. These two particulars are evidently distinct. 
µ7LVRQHWKLQJWRNQRZYLUWXHDQGDQRWKHr to conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of 
right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory RQHYHU\UDWLRQDOPLQGµWLVQRWVXIILFLHQWWRVKHZWKHUHODWLRQVXSRQ
which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that 
this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it muVWWDNHSODFHDQGKDYHLWVLQIOXHQFHWKR¶WKH
difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite. Now besLGHVZKDW,KDYHDOUHDG\SURY¶G
that even in human nature no relation can ever alone produce any action; besides this, I say, is has been shewn, in 




So, what we should keep in mind LVWKDW+XPH¶VWKRXJKWVabout morality and from the angle 
of his writings on morality and reason, i.e. rather than from the angle of morality and 
sentimentDUHDWOHDVWSDUWO\LIQRWH[FOXVLYHO\SROHPLFDO$VSROHPLFDOWKRXJKWV+XPH¶V
thoughts are directed at 17th and 18th FHQWXU\LGHDVDERXW³HWHUQDOILWQHVVHVDQGXQILWQHVVHVRI
WKLQJV´DQG³LPPXWDEOHPHDVXUHVRIULJKWDQGZURQJ´+XPHprobably regarded these terms 
as interchangeable).    
 
 
8.2.  0RUDOLW\DQGWKHµIHDWXUHVWUXHDQGIDOVH¶ 
 






(1) There seems to be strong, indeed conclusive textual evidence that suggests that for 
Hume moral actions (as well as passions) cannot be true or false. It very much looks 
like for Hume actions cannot be truth-bearers.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discoverable otherwise than by experience, and of which we can pretend to have any security by the simple 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHREMHFWV$OOEHLQJVLQWKHXQLYHUVHFRQVLGHU¶GLQWKHPVHOYHVDSSHDUHQWLUHO\ORRVHDQG
independent of each other. µ7LVRQO\E\H[SHULHQFHZHOHDUQWKHLULQIOXHQFHDQGFRQQH[LRQDQGWKLVLQIOXHQFHZH
ought never to extend beyond experience. 
Thus it will be impossible to fulfill the first condition required to the system of eternal rational measures of 
right and wrong; because it is impossible to shew those relations, upon which such a distinction may be founded; 
$QGµWLVDVLPSRVVLEOHWRIXOILOOWKHsecond condition; because we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if they 
UHDOO\H[LVWHGDQGZHUHSHUFHLY¶GZRXOGEHXQLYHUVDOO\IRUFLEOHDQGREOLJDWRU\´7-LWDOLFVDUH+XPH¶V
embolding is mine; cf 413, 463; see also ST:9). 
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(2) Having said that, secondly, there is very limited, but some textual evidence that 
suggests that for Hume moral thought and/or language unlike actions can be true or 
false. 
 
(3) Thirdly, there seems to be conclusive textual evidence that suggests that mental 
judgements and language with moral content as well as moral actions all have moral 
qualities.  But, definitely in the case of actions (and probably in the case of mental 




To illustrate the thoughts above let XVORRNDWDORQJHUSDVVDJHIURP+XPH¶VTreatise:  
 
Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or 
disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. 
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being 
WUXHRUIDOVHDQGFDQQHYHUEHDQREMHFWRIRXUUHDVRQ1RZµWLVHYLGHQWRXUSDVVLRQVYROLWLRQVDQG
actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and 
realities compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions and 
DFWLRQVµ7LVLPSRVVLEOHWKHUHIRUHWKH\FDQEHSURQRXQFHGHLWKHUWUXHRUIDOVHDQGEHHLWKHU
contrary or conformable to reason. 
This argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. For it proves directly, that 
actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety 
to it; and it proves the same truth more indirectly, by shewing us, that as reason can never 
immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the 
source of the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence. 
Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable: Laudable 
or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable. The merit and demerit 
152 
 
of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes controul our natural propensities. But reason has 
no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly 





either to the real relations of ideas, or the real PDWWHUVRIIDFW´7KLUGO\SDVVLRQVYROLWLRQV










hand).27 28  
                                                          
27
 Having said that, in regard to the abovementioned points - especially 5 and 6 - I invite the reader to an exegetical 
FKDOOHQJHJHQHUDWHGE\WZRSDVVDJHVIURP+XPH¶VZRUNDQGVHHPLQJO\ only those passages (I have not found any 
VLPLODURQH¶VWKDWFRQWULEXWHWRWKHFKDOOHQJH7KHFKDOOHQJHFRPHVSDUWO\IURPWKHLQGLYLGXal passages and partly 
from the union of both. Below I present and compare and contrast a passage from EPM ZLWKRQHIURP+XPH¶Vµ$
GLVVHUWDWLRQRQWKHSDVVLRQV¶,QEPM, Hume argues: 
  
³The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper representations of the deformity of 
vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. 
But is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclusions of the understanding, which of themselves have 
no hold of the affections nor set in motion the active powers of men? They [inferences and conclusions of the 
understanding] discover truths: but where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and beget no desire or 
aversion, they can have no LQIOXHQFHRQFRQGXFWDQGEHKDYLRXU«What is intelligible, what is evident, what is 
probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the understanding; and gratifying a speculative curiosity, 








³It seems evident, that reason, in a strict sense . . . can never, of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have 
no influence but so far as it touches some passion or affection. Abstract relations of ideas are the objects of 
curiosity, not of volition. And matters of fact, where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither excite 
desire nor aversion, are totally indifferent; and whether known or unknown, whether mistaken or rightly 
apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to action´ (DP: 5.1) 
 
As to the similarities, we can conclude the following. First, in both passages Hume talks about something that seems 
to be relDWHGWRKLVQRWLRQRIµWUXWK¶6HFRQGO\LQERWKSDVVDJHVZHVHHDUHPDUNDSSHDULQJDERXWWKDWµWUXWKUHODWHG
VRPHWKLQJ¶not generating desire or aversion. The noteworthy difference however between these apparently very 
similar passages is that in the passage from EPM +XPHWDONVDERXWµWUXWKV¶ZKLOHLQWKHSDVVDJHIURPµWKH'RFWULQH
RI3DVVLRQV¶+XPHWDONVDERXWµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶LQVWHDGRIµWUXWKV¶7KHXQLRQRIERWKWKLVGLIIHUHQFHDQGWKH
similarity of the passages might have to invite us to consider and reconsider ZKDWWKHQRWLRQRIµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶
DPRXQWVWRIRU+XPHDQGKRZLWUHODWHVWRµWUXWKDQGIDOVHKRRG¶There is some reason to interpret those passages as 
saying that while some truths and matters of fact can have no influence on conduct and behaviour/do neither beget 
desire nor aversion, other truths and matters of fact can. And here then one could read those passages also as saying 
that such truth and fact can be of a moral kind (cf Cohon, 2008: 50).  
*LYHQWKHQWKDW+XPH¶VJHQHUDOLQFOLQDWLRQVHHPVWREHWRLGHQWLI\WKHµUHDVRQDEOH¶DQGµXQUHDVRQDEOH¶ZLWKWKH
µWUXH¶DQGWKHµIDOVH¶IRULQGLUHFWVXSSRUWVHH7WKLVVKRXOGDOVRPDNHXVKDYHVRPHIXUWKHUWKRXJKWVDERXWWKH
relationship between matters of fact and the reasonable and unreasonable. Here then we face the fact that Hume 
argues that truths are of two kinds: either they consist in matters of facts or relations of ideas. And these two 
categories seem to be exhaustive of truths. Now, throughout his work, Hume gives the impression that the former 
relates strongly, indeed exclusively to truth about objects we can discover by means of causal reasoning. Truths 
concerning relations of ideas fall within the province of mathematics by being demonstrable (note the complexities 
identified in §§ 3 and 4). This brings us to the following conclusion: if we stick to the two categories as being 
H[KDXVWLYHRIµWUXWKV¶DQGLIIRUWKHVDNHRIWKHDUJXPHQWZHDVVXPHWKDWWKHUHDUHVXFKWKLQJVDVmoral truths (and 
OHWXVDVVXPHWKDWWKH\FDQEHFDOOHGµPRUDOWUXWK¶DQGµPRUDOPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶WKHQVXFKWUXWKVmust join the truths 
about objects we discover by causal probabilistic reasoning ±that can never go beyond sense-data- in the category of 
matters of fact. It is excluded that for Hume moral truths fall within the province of the other category. He is at pains 
to argue against that.  
:KHQUHIOHFWLQJRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµPDWWHUVRIIDFW¶DQGPRUDOLW\LQ+XPH¶VZRUNWKHUHLVDIXUWKHU
matter to focus on in the form of the following famous passage:  
 
³Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; 
EXWLIH[DPLQ¶GZLOOSURYHZLWKHTXDOFHUWDLQW\WKDWLWFRQVLVWVQRWLQDQ\matter of fact, which can be 
GLVFRYHU¶GE\WKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ7Kis is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may 
conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue 
are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reasoQ"7DNHDQ\DFWLRQDOORZ¶GWREHYLFLRXV:LOIXO
murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which 
you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. 
There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. 
You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, 
which DULVHVLQ\RXWRZDUGVWKLVDFWLRQ+HUHLVDPDWWHURIIDFWEXW¶WLVWKHREMHFWRIIHHOLQJQRWRIUHDVRQ,W
lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean 
nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
FRQWHPSODWLRQRILW9LFHDQGYLUWXHWKHUHIRUHPD\EHFRPSDU¶GWRVRXQGVFRORXUVKHDWDQGFROGZKLFK
according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in 
morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; 
WKR¶OLNHWKDWWRRLWKDVOLWWOHRUQRLQIOXHQFHRQSUDFWLFH1RWKLQJFDQEHPRUHUHDORUFRQFHUQXVPRre, than 
our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, 





8.3. Reason as the subordinate guide of the passions 
 
Hume famously argued WKDW³Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and 
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and REH\WKHP´7-5). As to this 
famous metaphor, it can easily be misunderstood in the sense of ascribing to Hume an 
RYHUGRVHRILQWHQWLRQWRGHQLJUDWHRIUHDVRQ:KHQ+XPHDUJXHVWKDW³Reason is, and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and REH\WKHP´7-5), he indeed seemingly wants to be critical about the powers of 
reason and perhaps even denigrate reason. However, Hume is very well aware of the fact 
that rather than being of no noteworthy use, reason in the domain of morality is important 
in moral thought and (potentially) subsequently for moral action. This is helpfully elucidated 
by Nuyen.   
 
When Hume says that reason is the slave of passions, he does not say thereby that reason is 
unimportant. He is saying merely that reason alone does not move one to act, The force that 
propels one to action is the passion, whether it be love, or anger, or pride, or envy, or fear, or 
desire. Reason alone does not provide the motive. However, it is reason that does the 
groundwork, analyzing facts, perceiving relations, and drawing conclusions, all of which go to 
determine which action to perform, but the action will not be performed unless one of the 
passions is also present. Just because reason is the slave does not indicate that its work is not 
relevant. To extend the slavery metaphor, we may observe that slave owners supported slavery 
for the very reason that the slave's work was found indispensable; analogously, it must be 
observed that Hume is most unlikely to hold that reason plays no part in human action. To 
complete the analogy, we should say that while much could be achieved with slaves, it was the 





meta-ethics and that Hume does use, but only occasionally. My inclination is to thinNWKDW+XPH¶VXVHRIWKH
DGMHFWLYHV¶UDWLRQDO¶DQGµLUUDWLRQDO¶LVVLPLODUWRLIQRWLGHQWLFDOZLWK+XPH¶VXVHRIWKHDGMHFWLYHVµUHDVRQDEOH¶DQG
µXQUHDVRQDEOH¶,WLVEH\RQGWKHFRQILQHVRIP\VWXG\WRSURYLGHDPRUHLQ-depth account of this scholarly problem.   
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masters who conceived the plan, and the masters must rank higher in the causal order. (Nuyen, 
1984: 27) 
 
So what we see here is that Hume did not want to claim at all that reason does not do any 
work in the area of morality. Indeed, at places, Hume even gives the impression that it is a 
necessary condition for moral decision-making.  See for example the following passage from 
the Treatise: 
 
One principal foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or 
action; it is evident, that reason must enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; 
since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point 
out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor. (EPM: 285; cf 172-3) 
 
So for Hume reason, in the business of morality, has the role of a useful assistant.  
I think it is fair to approach the positive role of reason for morality also from the 
following angle: for Hume reason is important to avoid being subject to epistemic defects. 
Hume is unsympathetic to judgements and beliefs that result from a lack of proper 
employment of our capacities for deliberation and reflection. Superstition, prejudice and 
UHODWHGSUDFWLFHVDUHGLVDSSURYHGRIE\+XPHVHHHVSHFLDOO\KLVHVVD\µ2Qthe standard of 
7DVWH¶:HPXVWDYRLGKROGLQJEHOLHIVWKDWUHVXOWIURPVXFKSUDFWLFHV,QEHU he argues: 
 
,WPXVW«be confessed, that [a moderate form of Pyrrhonian skepticism] is a necessary preparative 
to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning 
our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. 
To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review 
frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these 
means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by 
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which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our 
determinations. (EHU: 150; more on Pyrrhonian skepticism in § 10) 
 
So proper employment of our reasoning faculties for Hume here seems to be a normatively 
mandatory source for getting rid of undesirable sources of belief such as superstition and 
prejudice. HaYLQJVDLGWKDWZKDWFRXQWVLQWKHFDVHRIUHDVRQEHLQJDµXVHIXOJXLGHSURYLGHU
of evidence for moral matters, counts here as well: it is not reason, but a passion that actually 
is and necessarily must be the ultimate mover of a moral action; reason is not such an 







sympathy. We need to be extremely careful however not to connect this too quickly to our 
IRONQRWLRQRIZKDWV\PSDWK\LV,WDNHLWWKDWZKDWZHLQGDLO\OLIHPHDQE\µV\PSDWK\¶LV
VRPHWKLQJOLNHDµZDUPORYLQJIHHOLQJRIFRPSDVVLRQ¶+XPHKDUGO\XVHVWKHWHUPLQWKLV
way in his Treatise however. Having said that, in EPM Hume seems to be turning more 
towards our folk notion of sympathy.  
+XPH¶VTreatise account of sympathy reflects the idea that passions are 
communicated from one mind to another, while the receiver comes to hold the passion of 
WKHRWKHULQVRPHVRUWRIYHULGLFDOZD\,QDQXWVKHOO+XPH¶VLGHDVHHPVWREHEDVHGLQWKUHH
components. First, the idea that humans fundamentally have a similar psychological make-
up. Secondly, the idea at all times each of us possesses a maximally vivid and forceful 
LPSUHVVLRQRIKLPVHOIVHH&RKRQ7KLUGO\+XPH¶VµDVVRFLDWLRQLVP¶KLV




about sympathy in the Treatise. 
As mentioned, for Hume human beings have a fundamentally similar psychological  
and bodily) make-up (T: 575-6; cf T: 318; OC: 429). This includes them being similar in their 
experience of passions. This similarity in psychological make-up makes it possible that the 
passions in the mind of any person I contemplate travel to my mind. For Hume there are 
three associative mechanisms in the human mind: resemblance, contiguity and cause and 
HIIHFW$FFRUGLQJWR+XPH¶VDVVRFLDWLRQLVPWKHOLYHOLQHVVRIRQHSHUFHSWLRQZLOOEH
automatically transferred to those other perceptions in the mind that are related to it by 
resemblance, contiguity, or cause and effect. There is so much liveliness transmission that 
the idea of the passion in my mind (the mere thought of it) becomes an impression and I 
actually experience a veridical form of the passion the other person is experiencing. This is 
WKHJHQHUDOLGHDRI+XPH¶VTreatise account of sympathy. Now, according to Hume, clearly 
some people resemble one more than others in some specific respect such as age or 
nationality. If the other person resembles me not only in being human but in some further 
respect, or is contiguous with me in space or time, or bears me any causal (that is, familial) 
relation, this will enhance the enlivening process, making my passion livelier (see Cohon, 
2008: 129-30). Because of the resemblance between us or alternatively my proximity to the 
observed person, some of the great liveliness of the impression of myself is transmitted to my 
idea of the other person's sentiment.  
In general we can say that in the Treatise, for HumHµV\PSDWK\¶LVDFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
mechanism, something that comes close to or even reflects what we would nowadays call 
µHPSDWK\¶$WVRPHSRLQWVLQKLVWH[W+XPHJLYHVWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWµV\PSDWK\¶LVQRWD
direct form of passion-communication. Hume argues:  
 
                                                          
29
 See page 170 of EPM for a view that at face value speaks against this.  
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No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes 
or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy. 30 




When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately 
passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently 
converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any emotion, my 
PLQGLVFRQYH\¶GWRWKHHIIHFWVDQGLVDFWXDWHGZLWKDOLNHHPRWLRQ:HUH,SUHVHQWDWDQ\RIWKH
PRUHWHUULEOHRSHUDWLRQVRIVXUJHU\¶WLVFHUWDLQWKDWHYHQEHIRUHLWEHJXQWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRIWKH
instruments, the laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of 
DQ[LHW\DQGFRQFHUQLQWKHSDWLHQWDQGDVVLVWDQWVZRX¶GKDYHDJUHDWHIIHFWXSRQP\PLQGDQG
excite the strongest sentiments of pity and terror. (T: 576) 
 
 
Having said that, there is also some te[WXDOHYLGHQFHWKDWVSHDNVDJDLQVWµV\PSDWK\¶not being 
a direct mechanism of passion-communication. Hume argues: 
 
¶Tis evident, that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less 
than among men. Fear, anger, courage and other affections are frequently communicated from 
RQHDQLPDOWRDQRWKHUZLWKRXWWKHLUNQRZOHGJHRIWKDWFDXVHZKLFKSURGXF¶GWKHRULJLQDO
SDVVLRQ*ULHIOLNHZLVHLVUHFHLY¶GE\V\PSDWK\DQGSURGXFHVDOPRVWDOOWKHVDPHFRQVHTXHQFHV
and excites the same emotions as in our species. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce 
DVHQVLEOHFRQFHUQLQKLVIHOORZV$QG¶WLVUHPDUNDEOHWKDWWKR¶DOPRVWDOODQLPDOVXVHLQSOD\WKH
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 &RPSDUH³When DQ\DIIHFWLRQLVLQIXV¶GE\sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external 
signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an 





same member, and nearly the same action as in fighting; a lion, a tyger, a cat their paws; an ox his 
horns; a dog his teeth; a horse his heels: Yet they most carefully avoid harming their companion, 
HYHQWKR¶WKH\KDYHQRWKLQJWRIHDUIURPKLVUHVHQWPHQWZKLFKLVDQHYLGHQWSURRIRIWKHVHQVH
brutes have of HDFKRWKHU¶VSDLQDQGSOHDVure. (T: 398) 
 
7KHDERYHPHQWLRQHGSDVVDJHVVHHPWREHLQFRQIOLFWDVWRZKHWKHURUQRWµV\PSDWK\¶LQWKH
Treatise is a direct form of passion-communication or not. The passage directly above about 
animals seems to provide evidence in favour of it being a direct form of passion-
communication, while the passage cited earlier in this section seems to provide evidence 
agDLQVWWKLVYLHZJLYHQWKDW+XPHDUJXHVWKDW³QRSDVVLRQRIDQRWKHUGLVFRYHUVLWVHOI
LPPHGLDWHO\WRWKHPLQG´DQGUHODWHGZKHUHKHVWDWHVWKDWLWLVRQO\YLDWKHFDXVHVDQG
effect that we feel the passion of another.  
The mechanism of emotional contagion WKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HV+XPH¶VTreatise account of 
sympathy is also visible in EPM. (A comparative example is in this footnote.31) But, when 
having a look at EMP, while every now and then one spots this similarity, one cannot but 
FRQFOXGHWKDW+XPH¶VXVHRIWKHWHUPµV\PSDWK\¶LVYHU\GLIIHUHQWLQKLVEPM compared to 
the Treatise. 32 In EPM one finds much more pro-social connotations of the term, every now 
and then mixed with the Treatise QRWLRQ)XUWKHUWRWKHVLPSOHWHUPµV\PSDWK\¶LQEPM 
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 Hume in the Treatise¶7LVHYLGHQWWKDWsympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, 
no less than among men. Fear, anger, courage and other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to 
another, without their knowledge of that cause, whiFKSURGXF¶GWKHRULJLQDOSDVVLRQ*ULHIOLNHZLVHLVUHFHLY¶GE\
sympathy; and produces almost all the same consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species. The 
howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows. And µWLVUHPDUNDEOHWKDWWKR¶DOPRVW
all animals use in play the same member, and nearly the same action as in fighting; a lion, a tyger, a cat their paws; 




Hume in EPM³+DYHZHDQ\GLIILFXOW\WRFRPSUHKHQGWKHIRUFHRIKXPDQLW\DQGEHQHYROHQFH"2UWRFRnceive, that 






 Occasionally, e.g. on page 604 of the Treatise one finds a pro-VRFLDOQRWLRQRIµV\PSDWK\¶RUDWOHDVWDVLJQRILW




Hume uses a variety of compound terms and phrases that also point to a pro-social 
FRQQRWDWLRQRIWKHWHUPµV\PSDWK\¶)RUH[DPSOH+XPHWDONVDERXW³VRFLDOV\PSDWK\´
(30DQG³WHQGHUV\PSDWK\´(30+XPHDOVRVD\V³7KHVDPHVRFLDOV\PSDWK\
we may observe, or fellow-IHHOLQJZLWKKXPDQKDSSLQHVVRUPLVHU\´(30³RXUKHDUWV
are immediately caught, our sympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into 
WKHZDUPHVWVHQWLPHQWVRIIULHQGVKLSDQGUHJDUG´(30³>7@KHQDWXUDOV\PSWRPV
tears and cries DQGJURDQVQHYHUIDLOWRLQIXVHFRPSDVVLRQDQGXQHDVLQHVV´(30 
+XPH¶VEPM DFFRXQWRIµV\PSDWK\¶LVTXLWHSX]]OLQJ,WLVFOHDUWKDWWKHUHLVPRUHRID
pro-social connotation to the term than in the Treatise, but the pro-social connotation is not 
always free from the Treatise meaning. This should be understood as saying that the two 
meanings get intertwined on one and the same occasion rather than Hume using sometimes 
the one meaning and at another time the other. The latter does happen, but only very rarely 
does a pure form of emotional contagion occur in the Treatise.  
$VWR+XPH¶VSX]]OLQJQRWLRQRIHPSDWK\LQEPM, I finally point out that things, at 
OHDVWIRUPHJHWSDUWLFXODUO\SX]]OLQJZKHQUHIOHFWLQJRQ+XPH¶VXVHRIWKHYHUEµWR
V\PSDWKL]H¶ (see e.g. EPM: 258; T: 316). When he uses this verb, it is often very ambiguous 
between passion-communication notion of the Treatise and pro-social notions. That raises 
the questions whether he means one of the two and if so which one or else, whether he 
wanted the term to cover a concept that embraces both the communication mechanism 
notion of the Treatise and the pro-social connotations prevalent in EPM.  
 
 









As to the common point of view, in book III of the Treatise Hume argues that when 
we maNHGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQPRUDOO\JRRGDQGHYLOZHGRQ¶WGRWKDWIURPRXURZQ
subjective idiosyncratic perspective (cf T: 581). Rather, Hume claims, "we fix on some steady 
and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever 
may be our present situation" (T: 581-2).  He argues: 
 
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable according to our situation of nearness or 
UHPRWHQHVVZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHSHUVRQEODP¶GRUSUDLV¶GDQGDFFRUGLQJWRSUHVHQWGLVSRVLWLRQof 
our mind. But these variations we regard not in our general decisions « We consider not 
ZKHWKHUWKHSHUVRQ«EHRXUDFTXDLQWDQFHRUVWUDQJHUVFRXQWU\PHQRUIRUHLJQHUV1D\ZHRYHU-
look our own interest in those general judgements; and blame not a man for opposing us in any of 
RXUSUHWHQVLRQVZKHQKLVRZQLQWHUHVWLVSDUWLFXODUO\FRQFHUQ¶G:HPDNHDOORZDQFHIRUD
certain degree of selfishness in men; because we know it to be inseparable from human nature, 
and inherent in our frame and constitution. By this reflection we correct those sentiments of 
blame, which so naturally arise upon any opposition. (T: 582-83; cf T: 586-7, 591; EPM: 228-9: 
272-3, 308-309)  
 
 
Hume introduces the common point of view in order to account for the fact that our moral 
judgments tend to remain constant, to converge with those of other people, and not to vary 
as idiosyncratically as one might expect given that they are manifestations of our individual 
feelings (Cohon, 1997, 2008).   
,WLVDOVRZLWKUHJDUGWRWKLVDVSHFWRI+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\WKDWWKHH[HJHWLFDOTXHVWLRQ
DULVHVDVWRZKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVLVEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VZRUGVRQWKHPDWWHUDQGDD





views on the common point of view. Does he really just want to be the cognitive 
psychologist? Or does he, primarily or in a secondary way, want to say that the general point 
of view is something mandatory we should adopt to correct our own idiosyncratic moral 
perspective? How exactly to make up the balance between cognitive psychology and 
normativity is a hard scholarly problem. Offering a conclusive answer to this question is 
outside the confines of this study.   
  
 





ZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIµWKHXVHIXO¶RUSXEOLFµXWLOLW\¶WKHVHWZREHLQJWHUPVWKDW refer to a 
concept that fulfils DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\+XPHDUJXHVWKDWXVHIXOQHVVLV
agreeable to us and engages our approbation. He takes this to be a matter of fact, confirmed 




For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who 
are served by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, 
are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one great source 




This idea then of our approbation of utility stretching farther than that of our own interest, 
LQFRPELQDWLRQZLWK+XPH¶VYLHZDERXWMXVWLFHPDNHV+XPHUHJDUGWKHUHODWLRQVKLS
between justice and utility in the following way:  
 
Thus we seem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force of [the principle of 
SXEOLFXWLOLW\@«DQGFDQGHWHUPLQH what degree of esteem or moral approbation may result from 
reflections on public interest and utility. The necessity of justice to the support of society is the 
sole foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, we may 
conclude that this circumstance of usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and most 
entire command over our sentiments.33 (EPM: 203-04) 
 
)RU+XPHXWLOLW\LV³WKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKHFKLHISDUWRIPRUDOVZKLFKKDVDUHIHUHQFHWR
mankind and our fellow-FUHDWXUHV´(30)RU+XPHXWLOLW\VHHPVWREHDQLQQDWH
sentiment. I think Hume should be read as saying that this sentiment, together with the 
QDWXUDOVHQWLPHQWRIEHQHYROHQFHDQGVRPHWKLQJ+XPHFDOOVWKHIHHOLQJRIµKXPDQLW\¶D
notion he hardly uses in the Treatise, but quite frequently in EPM) engages us to pay to the 




10.1. An introduction 
 
                                                          
33
 7KHUHLVPXFKPRUHWRVD\DERXW+XPH¶VDFFRXQWRIMXVWLFHIRUZKLFK,GRQRWKDYHVSDFHLQWKLVFKDSWHU2QH
IXUWKHUDVSHFWRI+XPH¶V DFFRXQWRIMXVWLFHLVUHSUHVHQWHGE\+XPH¶VVSHFXODWLRQVDERXWMXVWLFHDQGpossible worlds. 
+XPHDUJXHVWKDW³7KHUXOHVRIHTXLW\RUMXVWLFHGHSHQGHQWLUHO\RQWKHSDUWLFXODUVWDWHDQGFRQGLWLRQLQZKLFKPHQ
are placed (EPM: 188). Hume imagines both worlds in which we have a different psychological constitution and 
worlds in which there are changes in external circumstances and argues that justice in these circumstances is 
VRPHWKLQJXVHOHVV$QGZLWKUHJDUGWRWKDWKHVD\V³%\UHQGHULQJMXVWLFHWRWDOO\useless, you thereby totally destroy 
its essence, and suspend its obliJDWLRQXSRQPDQNLQG´(30). In relation to the topic of justice, Hume also 
offers a specific quite extensive account of property )RUDPRUHH[WHQVLYHWUHDWPHQWRI+XPH¶VLGHDVRQMXVtice see 
e.g. Flew (1976), Whelan, (1994), Cohon (1997), Taylor (1998), Watkins Tate 2005, Westphal (2010). 
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Michael Gorman (1993: 92) has helpfully drawn up the following list of types of descriptions 
of beliefs Hume offers in the Treatise and EHU: 
 
1. An idea conceived in a certain manner. (e.g., EHU: 49, T: 96)  
2. That certain manner of conception itself. (e.g., EHU 49, T: 97)  
3. An idea that feels a certain way. (e.g., EHU: 48, T:103)  
4. That certain feeling itself. (e.g., EHU: 49, T: 62434, T: 629)  
5. An idea that has a great influence on the mind. (e.g., T: 118-20)  
6. An act of mind rendering realities influential on the mind. (e.g., EHU: 49, T: 629)  
7. A lively idea related to an impression. (e.g., T: 96)  
8. A lively manner of conceiving an idea, which manner arises from an impression. (e.g., EHU: 
50); something that makes ideas forceful and vivacious. (e.g., T: 101, T: 627)  
9. Something that makes ideas forceful and vivacious. (e.g., T: 101, T: 627) 
 
FXUWKHUWRWKLVEHORZ,JLYHIRXUYHUEDWLPGHVFULSWLRQVDERXWEHOLHIRQHILQGVLQ+XPH¶V
work. In appendix I of the Treatise Hume says:  
 
When I would explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am 
obliged to have recourse to everyone's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this 
operation of the mind. An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea that the fancy 
alone presents to us; And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior 
force, or vivacity, or solidity or firmness or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so 
unphilosophical is intended only to express that act of the mind which renders realities more 
present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought and gives them a superior 
influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to 
dispute about the terms. ... I confess that 'tis impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner 
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  "Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise 




of conception. We may make use of words that express something near it. But its true and proper 
name is belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life. And in 
philosophy we can go no farther than assert that it is something felt by the mind, which 
distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more 
force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and 
renders them the governing principles of all our actions. (T: 629)  
 
Here is another description from book I of the Treatise:  
 
Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the 




And one more: 
 
I am able to conclude from this idea, that such an impression did once exist; and as this 
FRQFOXVLRQLVDWWHQGHGZLWKEHOLHILWPD\EHDVN¶GIURPZKHQFHDUHWKHTXDOLWLHVRIIRUFHDQG
YLYDFLW\GHULY¶GZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHWKLVEHOLHI"$QGWRWKLV,DQVZHUYHU\UHDGLO\from the present 
idea. For as this idea is not here FRQVLGHU¶GDVWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDQ\DEVHQWREMHFWEXWDVDUHDO
perception in the mind, of which we are intimately conscious, it must be able to bestow on 
whatever is related to it the same quality, call it firmness, or solidity, or force, or vivacity, with 
ZKLFKWKHPLQGUHIOHFWVXSRQLWDQGLVDVVXU¶GRILWVSUHVHQWH[LVWHQFH7KHLGHDKHUHVXSSOLHVWKH
place of an impression, and is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose. (T: 106) 
 
And finally one from EHU: 
 
The difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to 
the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at 




,IRQHORRNVDWWKHGHVFULSWLRQVLHERWK*RUPDQ¶VEULHIHUGHVFULSWLons and the verbatim 
passages above, there are two things that become very clear. First, that for Hume there is a 




10.2. Mental states with a strong conviction coefficient 
 






³It seems evident, that reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgement of truth and falsehood, can never, of 
itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but so far as it touches some passion or affection. 
Abstract relations  of ideas are the objects of curiosity, not of volition. And matters of fact, where they are 
neither good nor evil, where they neither excite desire nor aversion, are totally indifferent; and whether known 
or unknown, whether mistaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to action´ (DP: 5.1; 
Cohon, 2008: 50) 
 
&RKRQWKHQFRPPHQWVRQWKLVSDVVDJHE\VD\LQJWKDW³7KLVZRUGLQJVWURQJO\VXJJHVWVDQLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIUHDVRQ
with judgments or beliefs: it makes it seem that for Hume reason in a strict sense just is a set of judgments, so that 
the very judgments themselves²the beliefs²DUHLGHQWLFDOZLWKRUDUHSDUWVRIRULQVWDQFHVRIUHDVRQ´&RKRQ




I do not quite understand (at least not from a justificatory point of view) why it is Cohon and Persson 
HTXDWHµMXGJHPHQWV¶ZLWKµEHOLHIV¶LIWKDWLVLQGHHGZKDWWKH\GR3HUVVRQUDWKHUFOHDUO\VHHPVWRGRDQG,DP
inclined to think that Cohon does so as well (if she does this is something that repeats itself throughout her book). 
Assuming that they do, I think they should not. In my opinion, there is no good reason to think, let alone conclusive 
UHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWIRU+XPHµMXGJHPHQW¶DQGµEHOLHIV¶FRQFHSWXDOly are similar things. Neither does there seem to 
EHFRQFOXVLYHUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWDVSV\FKRORJLFDOVWDWHVµMXGJHPHQWV¶DQGµEHOLHIV¶DUHQHFHVVDULO\VLPLODUWKLQJV
+XPHFRXQWVERWKµEHOLHIV¶DQGµMXGJHPHQWV¶DVSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHPLQG%HWKDWDVLWVHems to be, it could very well 
be the case that some judgements, but not all of them, count as beliefs. And it may also be the case that some beliefs 
or even all beliefs are judgements. It may also be the case that there is no mental perception that can be called a 
µEHOLHI¶DQGWKDWFDQDOVREHFDOOHGDµMXGJHPHQW¶6ROYLQJWKLVLVVXHLVEH\RQGWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVFKDSWHUDQGQRW
DQHDV\PDWWHUHVSHFLDOO\DOVRJLYHQWKDWWKHUHLVQRHODERUDWHDFFRXQWRIµMXGJHPHQWLQ+XPH¶VZRUN¶ZKLOHWKHUH




Gorman concludes that inherent to his list of eight different descriptions are two main ways 
in which Hume lays out his account of belief;36 two ways that correspond to the two essential 
features I have pointed to above. The first way Gorman calls the Manner of Conception 
Theory. The Manner of Conception Theory LVVXSSRVHGWRUHIOHFWWKHYLHZWKDWDµEHOLHI¶LVD
particular sort of idea that is characterized by the fact that it is conceived in a lively way. The 
second way is the Feeling Theory. In contrast to the MCT-GHVFULSWLRQV+XPH¶VFT-
GHVFULSWLRQVUHIOHFWWKHLGHDWKDWDµEHOLHI¶LVHLWKHUDQLGHDWKDWIHHOVDFHUWDLQZD\RUHOVHWKDW
belief is that feeling itself.   
,WKLQN*RUPDQ¶VGLYLVLRQLVVHQVLEOHDQGDFFXUDWH,QZKDWIROORZV,DWWHPSWWRPDNH
sense of the relationship between the two types of descriptions in terms of the idea of the 
nature of beliefs Hume had in mind. Possibly we should not say that the two descriptions 
refer to the same concepts, but they seem to be two different ways of describing (almost?) the 
same phenomenological state. 
That phenomenological state can probably be best described by means of an appeal to 
what I WDNHWREHDKHOSIXOWHUPIURP/DLUG/DLUGWDONVDERXW+XPH¶VEHOLHIVKDYLQJD
VWURQJµFRQYLFWLRQ-FRHIILFLHQW¶)RU+XPHµEHOLHIV¶DUHDVXEVSHFLHVRIWKHJHQXVµLGHDV¶EXW
their nature seems to be very close to impressions. Recall that about impressions Hume says 
that they "always actuate the soul and that in the highest degree" (T: 118). For Hume this 
claim seems to imply that impressions have a high conviction coefficient. Indeed it must be 
said that for Hume impressions are the type of atomic mental items that have the highest 
conviction coefficient (see Laird, 1939: 429).  
$VDVSHFLHVRIWKHJHQXVµLGHD¶ZKDW+XPHFDOOVµEHOLHIV¶DUHQRGU\IODWFROGLGHDV
WKDWSRSXSLQRQH¶VPLQG5DWKHUZKLOHEHLQJSDUWRIWKHJHQXVFDWHJRU\µLGHDV¶beliefs as a 
species of ideas have a strong intensity resembling the intension of impressions and they also 
                                                          
36
 2UUDWKHU*RUPDQDUJXHVWKDWWKHILUVWIRXUIRUPXODWLRQVDGGUHVVWKHTXHVWLRQµZKDWLVDEHOLHI"¶ZKLOHWKHVH
formulations can be reduced to two theories. Gorman argues that the second formulation is a poor version of the first 
formulation, while the fourth is a poor version of the third formulation. As to description 5-8, Gorman argues that 
GHVFULSWLRQDQGDGGUHVVWKHTXHVWLRQµ:KDWGRHVDEHOLHIGR"¶ZKLOHGHVFULSWLRQDQGWDNHIRUJUDQWHGWKH
statements in the first and second categories respectively and address the further question, What causes beliefs? 
Gorman argues that description 9 is probably a case of bad writing.  
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have a particular experiential flavour. Note that about this experiential flavour Hume says, 
DQGVD\VQRPRUHWKDQWKDWLWLVD³je-ne-scai-quoi, oIZKLFK¶WLVLPSRVVLEOHWRJLYHDQ\
GHILQLWLRQRUGHVFULSWLRQ´7+XPHKLPVHOIWKLQNVWKDWHYHU\RQHVXIILFLHQWO\
understands this experiential feeling that cannot be well described (T: 106). Whether he is 
right on that I leave up to the reader, informed by his own (belief) experience. 
8SXQWLOQRZ,KDYHIRFXVHGRQWZRGHVFULSWLRQVRQHILQGVLQ*RUPDQ¶VOLVWRIHLJKW
belief as a particular feeling and belief as a particular manner of conception. I would like to 
pick out one more, namely description 7, that occurs in book I of the Treatise. Hume offers 
this description in capital letters, most probably indicating that it was of some sort of special 
LPSRUWDQFHWRKLP³$QRSLQLRQ«RUEHOLHIPD\EHPRVWDFFXUDWHO\GHILQ¶G$/,9(/<,'($
RELATED TO OR A662&,$7(':,7+$35(6(17,035(66,21´+XPH76RKRZ
is it we should understand this claim? Probably as follows. Our faculty of imagination can 
SURGXFHLGHDV$OVRP\&-¶VIDFXOW\RILPDJLQDWLRQFDQGRWKDWHYHQZKLOHZULWLQJWKLVELW
RIWH[W/HW¶s say that my imagination does this right now and that the idea produced is that a 
house is on fire. Right now this idea is pretty cold and without much vivacity. Not much is 
happening in my mind right now. Now, it could be the case that once I look out of the 
window, I see smoke. If that happens, my mental state will change quickly, because of some 
relevant past experience. The smoke will remind me of the time I, with my eyes, really saw a 
house on fire. Memories pop up and while they do, I (most probably) automatically associate 
the smoke I see now with the thought that there is a house on fire. By that time, I will have a 
vivid idea in my mind about a house being on fire that dependent on further circumstances 
may reflect a belief that it is on fire (example adapted from Nuyen: 1988: 376). As to the 
TXDOLILHUµGHSHQGHQWRQIXUWKHUFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶IRU+XPHLWLVQRWWKHFDVHWKDWHYHU\YLYLG
LGHDLQDSHUVRQ¶VPLQGLVQHFHVVDULO\DEHOLHI,IWKHUHLVHQRXJKPDWHULDOLQVRPHRQH¶VPLQG
that in combination with her current sense-impressions can and do eliminate the immediate 
association then the person will not come to believe that a house is on fire (or if she was 
convinced for a short moment that a house is on fire, she will stop believing that it is). 
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10.3. Belief-producing causes 
 
For Hume beliefs can arise from a wide variety of different causes. One way to organize 
beliefs from a perspective of their causal history is by seeing them arising from one of the 
three following causes: (1) abstract reasoning, (2) association and (3) education. Below I offer 
an introduction into the nature of the beliefs that fall in these three categories.  
For Hume reasoning DVDSURFHVVDFWLYLW\RIµLQWHUSRVLWLRQRILGHDV¶LVDnatural cause 
of belief. Note however that if Hume can also be seen as an epistemologist, besides a natural 
cause, abstract reasoning, in one or more areas could also possibly be a justifying ground for 
belief.  In any case, whatever guise(s) we ascribe to Hume, for Hume, the outcomes of 
abstract reasoning as we use it in mathematics FDQLPSUHVVXVZLWKWKHµHYLGHQFH¶RUHYHQ
µFHUWDLQW\¶RIZKDWKDVEHHQGLVFRYHUHGSURYHG7-71; EHU: 25-26, 163-164; cited in 
Falkenstein, 1997). Hume remarks that the strength of the belief generated by reasoning 
correctly about mathematical matters ordinarily equals the vivacity of memory, and exceeds 
the strength of the beliefs induced by causal association: 
 
This force and this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory; and therefore our confidence in 
the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance 
RIDGHPRQVWUDWLRQ7KHQH[WGHJUHHRIWKHVHTXDOLWLHVLVWKDWGHULYµGIURPWKHUHODWLRQRIFDXVH
and effect; and this too is very great, especially when the conjunction is found by experience to 
be perfectly constant, and when the object, which is present to us, exactly resembles those, of 
which we have had experience. (T: 153) 
  
Let us now turn to the second category of causes: beliefs arising from association. 
As Falkenstein argues, by far the most important object of investigation for Hume in 
terms of belief-forming mechanisms is association. The associative belief-forming 
mechanisms relate an imagined idea with some presently-had impression or memory. In the 
process of belief-formation, associative mechanisms inflict a portion of the vivacity of our 
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impressions or memories onto the imagined idea. If enough vivacity is injected into the idea, 
we come to believe it, with a degree of conviction that is proportioned to the quantity of 
vivacity (Falkenstein, 1997: 34). For Hume there are three sorts of associative relations. First, 
resemblance. Secondly, contiguity. Thirdly, constant conjunction. Hume maintains that 
associative relations of resemblance and contiguity do not reflect enough vivacity to induce 
belief. 37 Constant conjunction however does have this capacity. Noteworthy is that it can 
reflect varying quantities of vivacity, depending on how often the events are associated in 
experience, and whether there are ever any exceptions to their conjunction. Events that are 
IUHTXHQWO\DQGLQYDULDEO\REVHUYHGWRRFFXULQVXFFHVVLRQSURGXFHD³SHUIHFWKDELW´RI
association and, where this habit is in place, a great deal of vivacity can be reflected to the 
associated idea.  
Space prevents me from giving an exhaustive account of beliefs by association. For 
more detail I refer to Falkenstein (1997). Having said that, in what follows directly I 
FRPPHQWEULHIO\RQRQHSDUWLFXODUVXEW\SHRIµEHOLHIE\DVVRFLDWLRQ¶QDPHO\EHOief as arising 
from associations with passions.  
Besides being induced by the transmission of vivacity from a previous sensory 
impression or memory, belief can also be induced by the transmission of vivacity from a 
subsequently produced sentiment or emotion (see Falkenstein, 1997). This is what happens 
in the case of the person suspended over an abyss in an iron cage (T: 148-149). The idea of an 
abyss is naturally associated with that of falling, and the impression of an abyss naturally 
transfers some vivacity to this associated idea, so that falling is believed to be a possibility. 
Ordinarily, this inference would be tempered by the contrary realization that falling is not 
possible through the solid bars of the cage; however, in the first instant, when the idea of 
falling is enhanced, it arouses a feeling of fear. That feeling increases our sensitivity to the 
                                                          
37
 Although the mechanisrns of resemblance and contiguity do not normally transmit enough vivacity to induce 
belief, Hume takes it that they do have some effect, and as a result can enhance or mitigate the strength of beliefs 
formed by other mechanisms, or even modify their content. The most striking instances of this occur in the case of 
resemblance (Falkenstein, 1997: 37). 
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danger and makes us enhance the idea of falling (Falkenstein, 1997: 39). Hume himself 
describes this in the following way: 
 
[The] passion returns back upon the imagination and inlivens the idea; which lively idea has a 
new influence on the passion, and in its turn augments its force and violence; and both [the] 
fancy and affections, thus mutually supporting each other, cause the whole to have a very great 
influence. (T: 148-149) 
 
7KDWPXFKDERXWµEHOLHIVDULVLQJIURPDVVRFLDWLRQ¶,QRZWXUQWRWKHWKLUGFDWHJRU\RIEHOLHI-
generating causes. A third cause for belief-formation is education. Hume takes it that beliefs 
induced in the student through education can take such deep root, that ³tis impossible for us, 
by all the powers of reason and experience, to eradicate them; and this habit not only 
approaches in its influence, but even on many occasions prevails over that which arises from 
the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects´7Reflected by the idea that 
µEHOLHIVDERXWHGXFDWLRQ¶PDNHXSWKHLURZQFODVVEHOLHIVIRUPHGE\HGXFDWLRQDUHQRW
produced by association mechanisms (and neither are they produced by abstract reasoning).  
Hume thinks that the human mind is so constituted that the mere repetition of an 
idea can enhance the vivacity with which it is entertained to the point where it comes to be 
EHOLHYHG7KLVSKHQRPHQRQLVZLWQHVVHGLQHJOLDUV³ZKRE\WKHIUHTXHQWUHSHWLWLon of their 
OLHVFRPHDWODVWWREHOLHYHDQGUHPHPEHUWKHPDVUHDOLWLHV´786). Its most common 
manifestation however is in education.  
When Hume talks about beliefs arising from education, he compares it to the case of 
belief induced by causal inference. Causal inference is based on two factors: (a) the repeated 
experience of a conjunction between one object and another, which leads us to associate the 
one with the other and (b) the tendency of the mind to readily think of associated objects, so 
that when an impression of the one occurs, an idea of the other readily takes its place, in the 
process taking on a good deal of the vivacity possessed by the former (see Falkenstein, 1997). 
But what, Hume asks ±in the context of writing about beliefs that arise from education -, if 
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this process were short-FLUFXLWHGDQGWKHDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKDVHFRQGREMHFWOHIWRXWVRWKDW³D
PHUHLGHDDORQHZLWKRXWDQ\RIWKLVFXULRXVDQGDOPRVWDUWLILFLDOSUHSDUDWLRQVKRX¶G
IUHTXHQWO\PDNHLWVDSSHDUDQFHLQWKHPLQG"´+XPHDnswers his own question by saying 
WKDW³WKLVLGHDPXVWE\GHJUHHVDFTXLUHDIDFLOLW\DQGIRUFHDQGERWKE\LWVILUPKROGDQG
HDV\LQWURGXFWLRQGLVWLQJXLVKLWVHOIIURPDQ\QHZDQGXQXVXDOLGHD´7+HUHQR
association with some other object or transfer of vivacity from an impression of this object 
onto the idea is envisioned. The mere repetition of the idea serves to enliven it (Falkenstein, 
1997). 





explain why the belief in a causal relation could not be induced by having just one 
experience and then voluntarily recalling it a number of times. When he offers his 
qualification, Hume argues that the belief induced by education does not arise through any 
sort of repetition of the idea, but through its ³undesigneG³repetition at frequent intervals 
RYHUDORQJWUDFWRIWLPH7+XPH¶VLWDOLFV7KLVVHHPVWRPHDn that the student needs 
to come across the idea in a way that is unintended by him, as when hearing it from a 
number of others or coming across it in different books, not merely repeat it as an exercise or 
a response to questioning (see Falkenstein, 1997).  The conclusion that follows from what I 
have just explained is that for Hume the case of the student who acquires a belief by 
education is different from the case of the liar who comes to be1ieve his own lies through 
voluntary frequent repetition. That is, in terms of the psychological mechanisms that are 
involved.  Besides the two cases for Hume being different in this way, for Hume the two 
cases also seem to be different in terms of pathological psychology. For Hume. the case of the 
liar is a pathological case-arising from some defect in our cognitive constitution. A non-
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pathological healthy mind is aware of its volition in producing the repetition as characteristic 
of the mental state of the liar. This realization then leads it to consider the idea to be its own 
invention, regardless of how much the idea may be enlivened by repetition (see Falkenstein, 
1997). This type of awareness is absent in the student who acquires beliefs through 
education. Be that the case, this particular absence of what Hume regards as a case of healthy 





10.4.1. Reason as a provider of evidence 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that beliefs can arise from abstract mathematical 
reasoning. In this section, I say something different and more generally about the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶DQGKLVDFFRXQWRIµEHOLHI¶ 
Sometimes, but only very occasionally, Hume gives his readers some reason to think 
WKDWµEHOLHI¶KDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKUHDVRQ+XPHIRUH[DPSOHVD\V³:KHQWKHPLQG«passes 
from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd 
by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and 
unite them in the imagination" (T: 92). And a little later in the Treatise, Hume tells us that 
we can easily "discover by experiments" that belief "arises immediately, without any new 
operation of the reason or imagination" (T: 102). 7KDWµUHDVRQ¶KDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKµEHOLHI¶
however is not what Hume wants to argue for however. Below I elucidate and defend this 
claim. 
As discovered by Nuyen (1988), on page 102 of the Treatise +XPHDUJXHV³EHOLHI... 
arises immediately, without any new operation of the reason or imagination" (emphasis 
original). As Nuyen (1988) argues, this gives an indication that Hume does not say that belief 
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involves no operation reason at all; rather his claim seems to be that it involves no new 
operation of reason. We need our capacity to reason to draw the inference that p, but from p 
to the belief that p, no new UHDVRQLQJLVUHTXLUHGVHH1X\HQµ5HDVRQ¶DVDPHQWDO
activity of reasoning will not suffice to turn p into a belief that p, but without the work of 
µUHDVRQ¶, there is no possibility to have the belief that p. In terms of an example, unless I infer 
that the house is on fire (on seeing smoke), I cannot believe that the house is on fire. Reason 
has to do its work for there to be beliefs. Reason has to make a causal inference. The 
inference in question is not simply a transition from one thought to another, but a causal 
inference which is the work of reason. However, all that reason as reasoning38 does is putting 
the inferences before the mind. What happens next in terms of belief-formation is none of its 
doing (see Nuyen, 2008: 378). And what happens is that towards the inference, there arises 
WKLV³MH-ne-scai-quoi-QRQ´-IHHOLQJRIZKLFK³
WLVLPSRVVLEOHWRJLYHDQ\GHILQLWLRQRU
description" (T: 629). Reason presents the possibilities to the mind, and then we are subject 
to a feeling that is part of what a belief is and results from past experience, associate 
mechanisms and the influence of nature. As Hume argues: ³Nature, by an absolute and 
XQFRQWURXODEOHQHFHVVLW\KDVGHWHUPLQ¶GXVWRMXGJHDVZHOODVWREUHDWKHand feel´ (T: 183). 
0RUHRQQDWXUH¶VUROHLQEHOLHIIRUPDWLRQLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ 
Above I have argued for the view that reasoning plays a clear role in belief-formation. 
Having said that, it must be pointed out that in a number of passages in the Treatise Hume 
argues that the inference from impressions to ideas can be automatic, and escape our 
attention altogether (see Nuyen, 1988). Sometimes we do not catch ourselves making the 
inference. Thus, Hume makes the observation that "the past experience, on which all our 
judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate on our mind in such an 
insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some measure be 
unknown to us" (T: 103). Hume writes that a non-swimmer does not stop at the water's edge 
and "reflects on any past experience, and calls to remembrance instances, that he has seen or 
                                                          
38
 Be or be it not also a µfaculty.¶ 
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heard of, in order to discover the effects of water on animal bodies" (T: 103-4). Hume 
concludes that "custom operates before we have time for reflexion." (cited in Nuyen, 1988: 
381).  
Now, as Nuyen (1988: 382) argues, the fact that there are cases involving automatic 
decisions does not mean that reason is not important to belief-formation. Automatic 
inferences as the one in the swimming case show that some previously consciously drawn 
inferences have become habitual and thereby automatic.  They do not show that (reason as) 
reasoning is superfluous. Indeed reasoning often is effortful for a long time; often we need to 
do a lot of reasoning before our actions can become habitual: 
 
 
When I see an object moving in front of my car, I apply the brakes automatically. But this action, 
or rather reaction, was not automatic when I first started learning how to drive. It took a -lot of 
inferences from the general behaviour of the car to the effects of applying the brakes. What we 
seem to do automatically is actually the result of countless past experiences. A grown-up may stop 
at the water's edge without first making the necessary inferences, but a child who has less 
experience and has not formed the habit of reasoning under similar circumstances may have to 
check his or her steps, and make whatever inferences he or she can. The failure to do so has 
resulted in many drowning accidents. (Nuyen, 1988: 382) 
 
 
To sum up, reason as reasoning  plays an indispensable role in belief formation by presenting 
the mind with causal inferences from impressions to ideas which we may or may not believe; 
it is only after having been placed in a certain situation, or set of circumstances, that a belief-
feeling arises, or fails to arise. A feeling that (a) is an essential feature of a belief and (b) does 
not seem to be under the control of reason as reasoning nor ±most fundamentally- under the 
control of the agent. The relationship between reason and belief is one that consists in the 
fact that reason presents to the mind all the evidence there is. What happens next, when one 
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feels the force of assent or conviction, is not for reason or the agent to determine. Reason is 
impotent in this final stage (see Nuyen, 1988: 380-1), but often does and can do a lot of work 
before that.  
 
 
10.4.2. Belief and the limits of reason 
 
Here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning; and perhaps even this was not 




account of belief. In this section, I focus on what beliefs have to do with the limits of reason. 
 Hume argues WKDW³the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most 
general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in 
DQ\SURSRVLWLRQHLWKHULQSKLORVRSK\RUFRPPRQOLIH´7-8). It is not entirely clear to 
what exactly this statement means. That is, in the sense that I do not know what Hume 
LQWHQGVWRVD\ZKHQWDONLQJDERXWWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶V³PRVWJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHV´,QDQ\FDVH
as reflected by the quotation just presented, Hume has a clear and strong sympathy for 
Pyrrhonian scepticism. To understand this claim better, let us recall the following passage: 
 
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same 
manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. 
The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, 
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to 
reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no 
more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt 
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to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and 
could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. (EHU: 25-6). 
 
As Hume sees things, the less reflective people amongst us humans, people Hume calls the 
µYXOJDU¶will not normally get to the point of seriously believing that it is a real possibility 
that the sun does not rise tomorrow. Philosophers by contrast will do.39 And as a result they 
DUHVXEMHFWWRDVFHSWLFDOGRXEW+XPHUHJDUGVDVD³PDODG\´DQGRQHWKDW³FDQQHYHUEH
UDGLFDOO\FXU¶G´(T: 218)'HVSLWHLWEHLQJDµPDODG\¶QRWin the least for Hume himself as a 
philosopher subject to sceptical doubt), it does not seem to be a normative option for Hume 
to advocate a philosophical view recommending that we abstain from/give up on refined 




Consider well the consequences of such a principle. By this means you cut off entirely all science 
and philosophy: You proceed upon one singular quality of the imagination, and by a parity of 
reason must embrace all of them: And you expresly contradict yourself; since this maxim must be 
EXLOWRQWKHSUHFHGLQJUHDVRQLQJZKLFKZLOOEHDOORZ¶GWREHVXIILFLHQWO\UHILQ¶GDQG
metaphysical. What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we embrace this 
SULQFLSOHDQGFRQGHPQDOOUHILQ¶GUHDVRQLQJ, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we 
reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding (T: 
«For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe 
what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even 
where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression 
                                                          
39
 That is, when exercising academic activity. Outside their office, dependent on their personality, they might be no 
PRUHLQFOLQHGWKDQµWKHYXOJDU¶WRWDNHWKLVSRVVLELOLW\VRPHVRUWRIVHULRXVO\+XPHZRXOGFHUWDLQO\ZDQWWRVD\WKDW
philosophers no more WKDQ³WKHYXOJDU´DUHLQFOLQHGWRbelieve in the possibility that the sun may not rise tomorrow. 






FDQQRWHVWDEOLVKLWIRUDUXOHWKDWWKH\RXJKWQRWWRKDYHDQ\LQIOXHQFH«7KHintense view of 
these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and 
heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion 
HYHQDVPRUHSUREDEOHRUOLNHO\WKDQDQRWKHU«Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is 
incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this 
philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a 
game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four 
KRXUV¶ aPXVHPHQW,ZRX¶GUHWXUQWRWKHVHVSHFXODWLRQVWKH\DSSHDUVRFROGDQGVWUDLQ¶GDQd 
ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.  
+HUHWKHQ,ILQGP\VHOIDEVROXWHO\DQGQHFHVVDULO\GHWHUPLQ¶GWROLYHDQGWDONDQGDFWOLNH
other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and 
the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general 
maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw 
all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for 
the sake of reasoning and philosophy. For those are my sentiments in that splenetic humour, 
which governs me at present. I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting to 
my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical 
disposition and principles. But does it follow, that I must strive against the current of nature, 
which leads me to indolence and pleasure; that I must seclude myself, in some measure, from the 
commerce and society of men, which is so agreeable; and that I must torture my brain with 
subtilities and sophistries, at the very time that I cannot satisfy myself concerning the 
reasonableness of so painful an application, nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its 
means at truth and certainty. Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? 
And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? 
No: If I must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall 
at least be natural and agreeable. Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have a good reason 
for my resistance; and will no more be led a wandering into such dreary solitudes, and rough 




So what Hume argues for here is that a good philosopher who exercises his imagination and 
understanding properly should become utterly confused, not knowing anymore what to 
believe.40 However, according to Hume, even good philosophers will continue to believe, say, 
that the sun rises tomorrow (just as it did today). The epistemological force from Pyrrhonian 
skepticism will not get a foothold in the real world. The experiential evidence the skeptical 
philosopher has is too strong for that in order to prevent him from that belief. It is here that 
according to Hume, nature's innate constitution plays a role (see also T: 162, 187; EHU: 41-
2). The philosophical confusion does not last as a violent phenomenon. It does not because 
we have plenty of counterevidence that together with some help of nature prevents us from 
being dominated by philosophical skepticism as a result of subjecting ourselves to forms of 
Pyrrhonian skepticism. Nature steps in and brings us back41 to a state that enables us to 
function as practical agents in a world about which the experienced philosopher knows that 
we cannot be sure about what appears to be. This is apparently a matter of physical necessity. 
(see T: 183, Lynch, 1996) 
 )RU+XPHQDWXUH¶VUROHDVVRPHWKLQJWKDWPDNHVXSIRUWKHVLWXDWLRQZKHUHUHDVRQ
JLYHVXVµULJKWO\¶WKHIHHOLQJWREHWRWDOO\ORVWLVDcausal one. In the italicized bit in the longer 
quotation above however, Hume seems to ask a normative question when he asks what 
stance to take towards the doubt arising from Pyrrhonism. And his answer seems to be that, 
while it should influence our lives, this extreme form of scepticism should not take over our 
lives. So what should we make of WKLVQRUPDWLYHFODLPWKDWLVDSSDUHQWO\SUHVHQWLQ+XPH¶V
ZRUN"&RQVLGHULQJ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOSURMHFWDVDZKROHLWVHHPVDZNZDUGWRDVVXPH
that for Hume there could be a justifying reason for continuing to believe that does not have 
its roots in some sort of naturalistic explanation. Possibly Hume would want to say that it is a 
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 My hunch is that we should say that for Hume Pyrrhonism is epistemologically true. 
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fortunate coincidence that nature helps us out and that we should do everything not to 
interfere. Perhaps the (apparent) combination of a normative aspect and a causal one in 
HXPH¶VZRUNDERXW3\UUKRQLDQVNHSWLFLVPLVEHVWXQGHUVWRRGDVVD\LQJWKDWDVDUHVXOWRI
natural forces we continue to go on trusting our judgments any-way and we have to live our 
life in some sort of doable way, so we have an obligation not to get in the grip of our 
philosophical reasoning that is allowed to take place in the closet and in a mitigated form 
should be part of the psychological dispositions of every human creature. We should not let 
our lives be ruined by extreme forms of skepticism, but Pyrrhonian skepticism as a modest 
form that should be adopted by all human beings so that our beliefs have an appropriate 
GHJUHHRIZDUUDQW7H[WXDOHYLGHQFHIRU+XPH¶VHQGRUVHPHQWRIPLWLJDWHG3\UUKRQLVP±or at 
OHDVWWH[WXDOHYLGHQFHIRUµQRUPDWLYHHQGRUVHPHQW about careful reasoning and belief-
IRUPDWLRQ¶- FRPHVLQWKHIRUPRI+XPH¶VFODLPWKDW³
WLVIUHTXHQWO\IRXQGWKDWREVHUYDWLRQ
is contrary to another, and that causes and effects follow not in the same order, of which we 
have had experience, we are oblig'd to vary our reasoning on account of this uncertainty, and 
take into consideration the contrariety of events" (T: 131). And in EHU he mentions that "a 
wise man (should proportion) his belief to the evidence (EHU: 110). Probably we can say 
that for Hume as a cognitive psychologist concerned with describing our psychology as well 
as for Hume the epistemologist concerned with the normative problem of warrant, the 
warrant for beliefs results from Pyrrhonian scepticism checked by the influence of our more 
permanent and constant natural belief-forming mechanisms (see Falkenstein, 1997: 31-2; see 
also Neto, 1991, esp. 48). 
Above I have focused on scepticism with regard to matters of fact. And in § 4 and 6 I 
have argued that probably for Hume there is knowledge as certainty in the mathematical 
area. Interestingly however and relevant to our present discussion is the fact that there is 
VRPHLGHDDERXWGLVWUXVWRIUHDVRQLQJIDFXOWLHVLQ+XPH¶VZRUNDERXWPDWKHPDWLFV7R





argues, this means that Hume takes it that when we perform arithmetic - during which we 
are surely reasoning - we can and do form judgments in which we are not only 
psychologically, but most probably also rightly confident. Let us also recall a quotation I 
presented earlier: 
 
In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our 
fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error. (T: 180) 
 
The argument about sceptical distrust Hume has when it comes to the area of mathematics is 
summarized by Lynch in the following way:  
 
In performing any set of calculations, no matter how simple, we are susceptible to error. This we 
know from past experience. We will, of course, be more confident in our conclusions if we 
recheck our calculations, or allow others to check them for us. But while these methods can 
increase the subjective probability that we are right, they can never increase it all the way to 1. 
For the possibility that we have made a mistake always remains. Therefore, we should never be 
completely certain of any of our beliefs, even of those concerning rudimentary mathematics, and 
KHQFH³DOONQRZOHGge degenerates into probability. (Lynch, 1996: 89-90) 
 
How is it that Hume is providing such an argument while probably arguing for the claim that 
there is knowledge (in the form of scientia) in mathematics? There is reason to think that 
this is due to a particular sympathy Hume shared with the ancient sceptics. As Julia Annas 




The ancient sceptics did not [just] attack knowledge: they attacked belief. They argued that, 
under sceptical pressure, our beliefs turn out to be groundless and that we have no more reason to 
believe than to disbe1ieve. (Annas & Barnes42, cited in Lynch, 1996 : 95) 
 
According to Lynch, Hume, like the ancient sceptics, was not content with showing that 
scepticism undermines knowledge while leaving justified belief intact (Lynch, 1996: 95). 
  
 
10.5. Beliefs and representation 
 
+XPHKDUGO\XVHVWKHWHUPµEHOLHI¶LQKLVmoral work. In Book III of the Treatise (about 
morality) there are only eight passages that contain the term. In EPM, Hume uses the term 
only once. And in none of those passages, the term seems to carry any special importance. 
That seems something noteworthy, especially also given the way some meta-ethicists 
interpret Hume. 
Recalling and elaborating on what I have said earlier, let me briefly mention a few 
WKLQJVDERXWEHOLHIVDQGµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶LQ +XPH¶VZRUN,ZRXOGOLNHWRGRVREHFDXVHWKHUH
is a highly dominant belief concept in the meta-ethical debate at large, one that holds that a 
moral belief is a mental state that reflects the way the world is morally. This concept is there 
and dominates, while many meta-ethicists ascribe a mistaken belief conception to Hume. 
When Hume is interpreted in a mistaken way, this mistake most of the time comes down to a 
PLVWDNHDERXW+XPH¶VYLHZVDVWRWKHPRWLYDWLRQDOSRZHURIEHOLHIV+DYLQJVDLGWKDWWKH
current meta-ethical debate gives the impression that there is quite a bit of room for 
LPSURYHPHQWLQWHUPVRIDFRUUHFWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI+XPH¶VLGHDVRQEHOLHI*LYHQWKDW+XPH
seems rather badly understood, given the nature of the dominant conception of belief in 
meta-ethics and given the fact that some meta-ethicists explicitly argue that according to 
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Hume beliefs represent moral aspects of the world, it seems a good idea to put forward some 
explicit words on Hume and representation, even though I have already dealt with this topic 
rather extensively.43  
,WLVRQO\YHU\RFFDVLRQDOO\+XPHWDONIDLUO\H[SOLFLWO\DERXWµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶,QKLV
HVVD\µ2IWKHVWDQGDUGRIWDVWH¶DQGLQUHJDUGWRDOOµGHWHUPLQDWLRQVRIWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶
+XPHDUJXHV³%XWDOOGHWHUminations of the understanding are not right; because they have a 
reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are not always 
FRQIRUPDEOHWRWKDWVWDQGDUG67+XPHGRHVVD\WKLQJVOLNH³,VD\WKHQWKDWEHOLHILV
nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object´(+8P\
LWDOLFV%XW+XPH¶VDWWHQWLRQVHHPVWRJRWRWKHPDQQHURIFRQFHSWLRQDQGWKH
phenomenological experience rather than to the object. And if we then want to start talking 
about representation, we should keep in mind that this notion for Hume can never mean 
WKDWZHRXUOLYHO\EHOLHILGHDVUHSUHVHQWREMHFWVWKDWDUHUHDOO\WKHUHLQWKHZRUOG+XPH¶V
philosophy is fully focused on the items of the mind called impressions and ideas with no 
commitment as to the cause of sensory impressions. Furthermore, we should keep in mind 
WKDWIRU+XPHWKHYHUEµUHSUHVHQW¶DQGWKHQRXQµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶±as explained- typically are 
UHODWHGWRWKHWKHRUHWLFDOWKRXJKWVWKDWµLGHDV¶LQFOXGLQJWKHOLYHO\µLGHDV¶FDOOHGEHOLHIVDUH
copies of impressions. 
 
 
10.6. Beliefs and motivational power 
 
As Nuyen (1988) points out, the power of association and transfer that so often takes place in 
our minds, is the work of nature which enables us to anticipate dangers and avoid them, 
without actually seeing them coming. Without it, "we should every moment of our lives be 
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subject to the greatest calamities" (T: 119, cited in Nuyen 1988). So having impressions and 
ideas with some sort of high degree of conviction component serves a real purpose. But if we 
were to experience only impressions and/or ideas with a high degree of conviction 
coefficient, we would ³QHYHUHQMR\DPRPHQW
VSHDFHDQGWUDQTXLOLW\VHH7119). Having 
pretty liveliness ideas prevents us from having a (useless) restless psychology. 
2XWRIDQLQGHSHQGHQWLQWHUHVWWRSUHVHQW+XPH¶VLQWHUHVWLQJDQGYDOXDEOH
philosophical ideas, but also very much in anticipation and support of my claim about there 
being a misreading in contemporary meta-ethLFVZKHQLWFRPHVWR+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIEHOLHI
let me say a few explicit words about what Hume seems to think about beliefs and 
motivation. Let us start with two quotations from secondary literature followed by a primary 
one from Hume himself. 
 
We can imagine that the house is on fire. Being only in the imagination, this idea is, as Hume 
would say, cold and lifeless. By contrast, if we have impressions of smoke, i.e. seeing and smelling 
smoke, the same idea will arise in the mind through inference, but it is an idea with force and 
vividness, qualities that come from the idea's being associated with the sense impressions of 
smoke. If we then believe that the house is on fire, we will be moved to take actions as if we see 
that the house is actually on fire. (Nuyen, 1988: 376)  
 
[A] careful and charitable interpretation [there is some significant variety in the descriptive list 
we have seen; see footnote 15 above] shows that, for Hume, a belief is a perception that has a 
certain feeling to the mind, which is the same as saying that it is a perception that is conceived in 
a certain manner. Furthermore, beliefs are those perceptions that most affect the will, and they 
are able to do this either by virtue of being impressions themselves or by virtue of their relations 
to the impressions or memories that give rise to them. (Gorman, 1993: 99) 
 
But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in 
common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that it is something felt by the 
mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives 
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them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the 
mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions. (T: 629) 
.    
What does this mean in the light of the contemporary neo-Humean conviction that beliefs 
are motivationally inert? I think the following answers apply. First, there is no textual 
evidence that suggests that according to Hume beliefs typically, let alone always and 
necessarily, are motivationally inert. Secondly, there seems to be positive evidence that 
beliefs are motivationally powerful because of their intense and special phenomenological 
nature. And some sort of movement of the will may be implied for every belief. Before I 
move on, let us have a look at a remark from Michael Smith: 
 
According to the standard picture of Hume (1888) ± there are two main kinds of psychological 
state. On the one hand there are beliefs, states that purport to represent the way the world is. 
Since our beliefs purports to represent the world, they are assessable in terms of truth and 
falsehood, depending on whether or not they succeed in representing the world to be the way it 
really is. And on the other hand there are desires, states that represent how the world is to be. 
Desires are unlike beliefs in that they do not even purport to represent the way the world is. They 
are therefore not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood. Hume concludes that belief and 
desire are therefore distinct existences: that is, we can always pull belief and desire apart, at least 
modally. For any belief and desire pair we imagine, we can always imagine someone having the 
desire but lacking the belief, and vice versa. (Smith, 1994: 7) 
 
6PLWK¶s belief concept here can be taken as representative of a dominant conception in meta-
ethics. I think we should me more careful as to it being representative of a misreading of 
Hume, but that is a complex story we come to in the next chapter. Knowing what we know 
about Hume and taking Smith¶V belief concept as representative of a dominant meta-ethical 
concept, we (thirdly) can conclude that WKHUHLVDZRUOGRIGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ+XPH¶V
concept of belief and the concept of belief operative in neo-Humeanism.  
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Fourthly, approaching the concept of belief from as much of a neutral perspective as 
possible, while keeping the meta-ethical conception LQWKHEDFNRIRQH¶VPLQGLWVHHPV
plausible to hold the view that at least some beliefs do not necessarily motivate, e.g. the 
belief that Paris is the capital of France. Fifthly, assuming for the sake of argument that 
someone has a bit of knowledge in his mind when it comes to Paris being the capital of 
France, unless such bits of knowledge have this special intense phenomenological nature that 
FKDUDFWHUL]HG+XPH¶VEHOLHIVLQOLNHOLKRRGZHPXVWFRQFOXGHWKDWZKDWFRQWHPSRUDU\
SKLORVRSKHUVFDOOµEHOLHIV¶are not beliefs for Hume. Positively speaking we may have to 
FRQFOXGHWKDWIRU+XPHWKHUHDUHVXFKELWVRINQRZOHGJHFDOOHGµMXGJHPHQWV¶UHFDOOWKDW
+XPHGRHVQRWKDYHDYHU\GHYHORSHGDFFRXQWRIµMXGJHPHQWV¶DOWKRXJKWKHUHDUHDFOHDU
number of occasions where he uses the word- also occasions that point more to a mental 
product than a mental act2UHOVHRUDGGLWLRQDOO\RFFDVLRQVRIµDVVHQW¶,IVRPHRQHKDVDELW
of knowledge in his mind with the special experiential nature of belief, it seems plausible to 
DVVXPHWKDWVRPHVRUWRIPRWLYDWLRQZLOOJRZLWKLW6XSSRVHµ3DULVLVWKHFDSLWDORI)UDQFH¶LV
a belief held by an Asian man who has never been to Europe and has just heard this from a 
trustworthy friend who never wants to go back to Paris, because it does not seem to be a 
pleasant city at all and despite that somehow gets to the point of having a lively conception 
of Paris in his mind with the special belief feeling Hume thinks we cannot really describe. 
7KH$VLDQPDQ¶VZLOOPD\WKHQGHVSLWHWKHHxperience of his friend, being influenced by his 
belief, say by going to the library to find out more about what the city is like or by saving a 
particular amount of money every month that will finally enable him to buy a ticket to Paris. 
 
 
11. Hume on human nature 
 
To begin with vice and virtueZKLFKDUHWKHPRVWREYLRXVFDXVHVRIWKHVHSDVVLRQV¶WZRX¶GEH
entirely foreign to my present purpose to enter upon the controversy, which of late years has so 
much excited the curiosity of the publick, whether these moral distinctions be founded on 
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natural and original principles, or arise from interest and education. The examination of this I 
reserve for the following book; and in the mean time shall endeavour to show, that my system 
maintains its ground upon either of these hypotheses; which will be a strong proof of its solidity. 
44 (T: 295; italics original) 
 
2QHZD\DSDUDGLJPDWLFRQHLQZKLFK+XPHLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKµKXPDQQDWXUH¶LVE\KLP
being a cognitive psychologist: someone interested in describing our actual mental states and 
the cognitive mechanisms that bring them about. Be that the dominant way in which Hume 
LVFRQFHUQHGZLWKµKXPDQQDWXUH¶+XPHDOVRSXWVIRUZDUGYLHZVDERXWRXULQQDWH




11.1. Hume on human nature: innate constitution 
 
It will not come as a surprise to many that the empiricist Hume believes that that are no such 
things as innate ideas. In book I of the Treatise, Hume clearly argues against their existence 
VHH7%HWKDWDVLWLV+XPH¶VZRUNLVQRWIUHHIURPFODLPVDERXWµVRPHWKLQJJLYHn to 
us when we come to enter the world; something given to us by the world by the author of 
QDWXUH¶,QEPM IRUH[DPSOH+XPHDUJXHV³>1@RSDVVLRQZKHQZHOOUHSUHVHQWHGFDQEH
entirely indifferent to us; because there is none, of which every man has not, within him, at 
OHDVWWKHVHHGVDQGILUVWSULQFLSOHV´(30$QGLQERRN,,RIWKHTreatise, Hume argues:    
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Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise 
from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of 
punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily 
appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, 
like the other affections. (T: 439) 45   
 
And Hume also says: 
 
1RZµWLVFHUWDLQWKDWWKHUHDUHFHUWDLQFDOPGHVLUHVDQGWHQGHQFLHVZKLFKWKR¶WKH\EHUHDO
passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects, than by the 
immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally 
implanted in our natures, such a benevolence and resentment, the love of life and kindness to 
children;  or WKHJHQHUDODSSHWLWHWRJRRGDQGDYHUVLRQWRHYLOFRQVLGHU¶GPHUHO\DVVXFKT: 417; 
my italics)  
 
As to the passage directly above, in his (2007), Peter Kail argues that the emboldened µRU¶
DERYHLVDQH[FOXVLYHµRU¶,IKHLVULJKWDERXWWKDWWKHQWKLVZRXOGPHDQWKDWWKHµRU¶
functions to express the idea that the general appetites but not the instincts are acquired 
from encounters with particular instances of good and evil. This may very well be the correct 
interpretation. I find it plausible. Having said that, I am not entirely sure that this is the 
correct interpretation given that Hume somewhat later in his Treatise DUJXHVWKDW³7KH
PLQGE\DQRULJLQDOLQVWLQFWWHQGVWRXQLWHLWVHOIZLWKWKHJRRGDQGWRDYRLGWKHHYLO´7
7KHDOWHUQDWLYHWR.DLO¶VSURSRVDOZRXOGEHWRUHDG+XPHDVVD\LQJWKDWERWKWKH
instincts and the general appetites mentioned are calm passions originally implanted in our 
QDWXUHV,QWKLVFDVHWKHµRU¶ZRXOGUHIHUWRDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQspecific instincts and 
general appetites. 
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Note that at certain places in his work Hume relates views about affect to matters 
having to do with freedom. In his Treatise IRUH[DPSOH+XPHVWDWHV³>¶7LV@FHUWDLQZHFDQ
QDWXUDOO\QRPRUHFKDQJHRXURZQVHQWLPHQWVWKDQWKHPRWLRQVRIWKHKHDYHQV´7
$QGLQKLVHVVD\µ7KH6FHSWLF¶+XPHDUJXHV7KHIDEULFDQGFRQVWLWXWLRQRf our mind no more 
depends on our choice, than that of our body (SC: 28).46. If and when Hume talks about a 
relationship between passions and freedom, sometimes, if not always, these views are views 
about our innate affective constitution. Hume thinks that the mind is plastic (see SC: 31; cf 
CL: 1; cf EHU: 105) and that we can exercise some volitional influence on our passions, 
though he also seems to think that on a fundamental level the influence of passions on our 
minds is not within our volitional control.  
Assuming for the sake of the argument that there are occasions where Hume talks 
about the relationship between affect and freedom where no view, at least no explicit view, 
is expressed about our natural constitution, then it still seems to be the case that also in these 
occasions Hume argues for some sort of lack of power for volitional control over emotions.   
 
 
11.2. Hume on culture and education 
 
That many of the natural virtues have this tendency to the good of society, no one can doubt of. 
Meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity, bear the greatest 
figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark 
their tendency to the good of society. This goes so far, that some philosophers have represented 
all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and educationZKHQVNLOIXOSROLWLFLDQVHQGHDYRXU¶G
to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the 
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notions of honour and shame. This system, however, is not consistent with experience. For, first, 
there are other virtues and vices beside those which have this tendency to the public advantage 
and loss. SecondlyKDGQRWPHQDQDWXUDOVHQWLPHQWRIDSSUREDWLRQDQGEODPHLWFRX¶GQHYHUEH
H[FLWHGE\SROLWLFLDQVQRUZRX¶GWKHZRUGVlaudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious, be 
any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us, as we have already 
REVHUY¶G%XWWKR¶WKLVV\VWHPEHHUURQHRXVLWPD\WHDFKXVWKDWPRUDOGLVWLQFWLRQVDULVHLQD
great measure, from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interest of society, and that 
¶WLVRXUFRQFHUQIRUWKDWLQWHUHVWZKLFh makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have 
QRVXFKH[WHQVLYHFRQFHUQIRUVRFLHW\EXWIURPV\PSDWK\DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\¶WLVWKDWSULQFLSOH
which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the 
characters of others which are useful or pernicious to society as if they had a tendency to our own 
advantage or loss. (T: 578-9) 
 
In his Treatise +XPHFODLPV³,DPSHUVXDGHGWKDWXSRQH[DPLQDWLRQZHVKDOOILQGPRUH
than one half of those opinions, that prevail among PDQNLQGWREHRZLQJWRHGXFDWLRQ´7
117). Hume ascribes an important role to education too when it comes to moral 
discriminations. However, just as the passage at the top of this section indicates, from the 
passage below it becomes clear that when it comes to moral discriminations an appeal to 
culture cannot do the whole trick.  
 
From the apparent usefulness of the social virtues, it has readily been inferred by sceptics, both 
ancient and modern, that all moral distinctions arise from education, and were, at first, invented, 
and afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and subdue 
their natural ferocity and selfishness, which incapacitated them for society. This principle, 
indeed, of precept and education, must so far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it may 
frequently increase or diminish, beyond their natural standard, the sentiments of approbation or 
dislike; and may even, in particular instances, create, without any natural principle, a new 
sentiment of this kind; as is evident in all superstitious practices and observances: But that all 
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moral affection or dislike arises from this origin, will never surely be allowed by any judicious 
enquirer... 
The social virtues must, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableness, 
which, at first, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the esteem of 
uninstructed mankind, and engages their affections. And as the public utility of these virtues is 
the chief circumstance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have 
a tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural 
affection. It must please, either from considerations of self-interest, or from more generous 
motives and regards. (EPM: 214-5) 
 
So what we see (at least indirectly) in this passage is that according to Hume our innate 
nature matters too in regard to our moral thoughts and deeds.  Indeed, Hume sees it as 
something crucial and fundamental without which no cultural influence can operate. Be that 
DVLWLVIRU+XPHMXVWLFHLVDQ³DUWLILFLDO´YLUWXHPHDQLQJWKDWLWarises out of the efforts of 
human beings. Hume argues: 
 
Unless we will allow that Nature has established a Sophistry, and rendered it necessary and 
unavoidable; we must allow that the Sense of Justice and Injustice is not derived from Nature, but 
DULVHVDUWLILFLDOO\WKR¶QHFHVVDULO\IURPEducation and human Conventions. Here is a Proposition 
which I think may be regarded as certain, That it is only from the Selfishness and confined 
Generosity of Men, along with the scanty Provision Nature has made for his Wants, that Justice 
derives its Origin. These Impressions, which give Rise to this Sense of Justice, are not natural to 
the Mind of Man, but arise from Artifice and human Conventions. Without such a Convention, 
no one would ever have dreamed that there was such a Virtue as Justice, or have been induced to 
conform his Actions to it. (LG: 10; cf T: 483) 
 
Let me make one final comment in regard to Hume, education and the practice of morality. 
AV,KDYHDUJXHGWKHµFRPPRQSRLQWRIYLHZ¶SOD\VDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQ+XPH¶VZRUN+LV
thought seems to be that human beings do not do well when they favour their untutored 
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impulses over their tutored ones. And education for Hume is a tool to make sure that people 
get beyond their primitive impulses of passions that pull one away from an impartial 
judgement (cf RP: 11).47 
                                                          
47Let me finally say a few words aboXW+XPH¶VWKRXJKWVDERXWPDOLFLRXVKXPDQEHLQJVSome of +XPH¶V ideas 
about malicious human beings map relatively well on contemporary scientific ideas about psychopathy. Consider the 
IROORZLQJSDVVDJHVIURP+XPH¶VZRUN 
 
³Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let private interest have engrossed every so much his attention; 
yet in instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel some propensity to the good of mankind, 




³All mankind so far resemble the good principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our 
disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of 
society, and consequently to virtue above its opposite. Absolute, unprovoked, disinterested malice has never 
perhaps place in any human breast; or if it had, must there pervert all the sentiments of morals, as well as the 
feelings of humanity´(30 
 
³[W]here one is born of so perverse a frame of mind, of so callous and insensible a disposition, as to have no 
relish for virtue or humanity, no sympathy for his fellow creatures, no desire of esteem and applause, such a one 
must be allowed entirely incurable; nor is there any remedy in philosophy. [...] For my part, I know not how I 
should address myself to such a one, or by what arguments I should endeavour to reform him. Should I tell him 
of the inward satisfaction which results from laudable and humane actions, the delicate pleasure of disinterested 
love and friendship, the lasting enjoyment of a good name and an established character, he might still reply, that 
these were, perhaps, pleasures to such as were susceptible of them; but that, for his part, he finds himself of a 
quite different turn and disposition. I must repeat it, my philosophy affords no remedy in such a case; nor could 
,GRDQ\WKLQJEXWODPHQWWKLVSHUVRQ¶VXQKDSS\FRQGLWLRQV%XWWKHQ,DVNLIDQ\RWKHUSKLORVRSK\FDQDIIRUGD
remedy´ (SC: 29) 
 
My overall impression is that Hume was in doubt as to whether there actually exist, have ever existed and will ever 
exist such beings as described by him above. Explicit textual evidence for the view that Hume was in doubt about 
their actual existence comes from EPMSDJHZKHUH+XPHDUJXHV³$EVROXWHXQSURYRNHGGLVLQWHUHVWHGPDOLFH











In the previous chapter, I discussed +XPH¶VYLHZVRQUHDVRQEHOLHIDQGPRUDOLW\LQGHWDLO. In 
this chapter I focus on the relationship between misreading Hume (especially on belief) and 
the theories of contemporary meta-ethical authors. I do this to explore unfruitful 
consequences of misinterpreting Hume for contemporary meta-ethical theories. While 
exploring the relationship in a variety of ways, I focus in particular on those theories and 
authors referred WRDVµQHR-+XPHDQ¶DQGµDQWL-+XPHDQ¶,SURFHHGDVIROORZV 
,Q,EULHIO\VXPPDUL]H+XPH¶VYLHZVRQµUHDVRQ¶DQGµEHOLHI¶DV,KDYHSUHVHQWHG
them in the previous chapter and in such a way as is relevant to this chapter. In § 3, I focus 
on the nature RIµmeta-ethical neo-+XPHDQLVP¶. (NB: in this chapter I focus exclusively on 
neo-Humeanism as it appears in meta-ethics; i.e. I leave aside neo-Humean theories as they 
appear in the philosophy of action and other areas.1) In § 4, I explain the following three 
relationships. First, the connection between the theoretical nature of neo-Humeanism and 
true claims about the philosophy of Hume. Secondly, the relationship between the 
theoretical nature of neo-Humeanism and any claims about the philosophy of Hume, be they 
accurate or not. Thirdly, the relationship between published claims of authors defending or 
challenging meta-ethical neo-Humeanism DQGWKHVHDXWKRUV¶FODLPVDERXW+XPHEHLQJWKH
historical father of neo-Humeanism.  





                                                          
1
 On the relationship between neo-Humeanism in meta-ethics and neo-Humeanism in other areas see my footnote at 
the very end of this chapter. 
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interconnectivity of the three core meta-ethical debates: the one about the nature of and 
status of moral judgements (the debate about the correctness of cognitivism and non-
cognitivism); the debate about the nature and status of moral objectivity; and the debate 
about moral motivation. In this section I offer hypotheses about possible far-reaching 
consequences for the debate about cognitivism and non-cognitivism and realism and anti-
realism once it is (mistakenly) assumed that Hume held that beliefs are motivationally inert.  
In § 5.3, I focus on what perhaps is the worst possible intellectual upshot of misinterpreting 
Hume. I explore the possibility that meta-ethical authors X and Y, can be criticised on their 
own terms by arguments that derive from Hume7KDWLVLQWKHVHQVHWKDW+XPH¶VZRUN
surpasses the work of X and Y in theoretical substance when taking as a starting point certain 
intellectual aims X and Y have (e.g., providing a theory about moral motivation); aims Hume 
has written about in the form of substantive views. This phenomenon seems to exist. If it 
exists, then there seems to be reason to be concerned. And if and when the phenomenon 
exists because UHOHYDQWSDUWVRI+XPH¶VZRUNDUHPLVUHDG, then the strong recommendation 




2. Hume on reason and belief: recalling some essential thoughts 
 
Let me recall very briefly some important conclusions from the last chapter. For our purposes 
RIWKLVFKDSWHUWZRVHQWHQFHVZLOOVXIILFHDERXW+XPH¶VYLHZRIµreason¶. First, for Hume 
reason alone cannot make moral distinctions. Secondly, according to Hume, reason alone 
³FDQQHYHUEHDPRWLYHWRDQ\DFWLRQRIWKHZLOO´7 
,QRZVXPPDUL]H+XPH¶VYLHZVRQµEHOLHI¶)LUVWLQUHJDUGWRWKHWRSLFRIPRWLYDWLRQ
In order to be accurate, it needs to be said that Hume does not talk very often explicitly 




Whilst Hume rarely expresses views about the relation between belief and what we may call 
µPRWLYDWLRQ¶WKRVHWKDWKHGRHVH[SUHVVLPSO\VWURQJO\WKDWEHOLHIVKDYHWKHLQWULQVLFFDSDFLW\
to motivate. Let us for example recall the following claim: 
 
But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in 
common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that it is something felt by the 
mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives 
them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the 
mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions. (T: 629) 
.    
I take it that overall, i.e.  taNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWDOO+XPH¶VOHVVDQGPRUHH[SOLFLWFODLPVRQ
µEHOLHIV¶µLPSUHVVLRQV¶DVZHOODVWKHµZLOO¶WKHUHLVVWURQJWH[WXDOHYLGHQFHIRUWKHYLHZWKDW
IRU+XPHDWOHDVWVRPHEHOLHIVLQFRQWUDVWWRZKDW+XPHFDOOVµUHDVRQ¶can and do motivate 
on their own. They do so because all beliefs have a phenomenological nature that has a 
particular impact on the mind. That is, for Hume beliefs are highly lively ideas. They are 
LGHDVZLWKDVWURQJµFRQYLFWLRQ-FRHIILFLHQW¶UHFDOO/DLUG%HFDXVHRIWKHspecial 
phenomenological nature that comes with this conviction coefficient ±a nature that includes 
a special feeling- for Hume beliefs can and do regularly influence our will. Not all beliefs will 
influence our will, but in the absence of counter-acting beliefs they clearly have the 
possibility to do so (without any help from an additional passion) because of the 
phenomenological nature and impact of a belief on our minds that resembles the nature and 
impact of an impression.  
Anticipating upcoming remarks about neo-+XPHDQLVPZKLOHFRQVLGHULQJ+XPH¶V
writings on beliefs comprehensively, I take it that the following conclusion should be drawn. 




say that not all beliefs affect the will, there is no textual evidence that supports the view that 
for Hume beliefs are typically or even necessarily motivationally inert.  
Above, I have talked about motivation. Given meta-HWKLFLVWV¶ general, i.e. Hume-
independent and also µ+XPH-UHODWHG¶ DVVRFLDWLRQRIµEHOLHIV¶ZLWKµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶(see §§ 3, 
5.1, 5.2 below), I now briefly summarize what I have said in chapter 2 about the relationship 
EHWZHHQEHOLHIVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\0RVWSUREDEO\+XPH¶VEHOLHIVFDQ
EHVDLGWRµUHSUHVHQW¶LHWRUHSUHVHQWREMHFWVOLNHWUHHVDQGFhairs. The following should be 
kept in mind however, especially in order not to associate Hume with correspondence 
theories about an extra-PHQWDOZRUOG,QUHJDUGWRH[WHUQDOREMHFWV+XPH¶VQRWLRQRI
µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶LVnot one that reflects a theoretical commitment to the existence of an extra-
mental world. That does not mean that we can draw the theoretical conclusion that for 
Hume there are no extra-mental objects. We cannot. It only means that Hume (highly 
actively and intentionally) avoids a theoretical commitment to their existence. We cannot 
know more than our senses deliver us and therefore we need to be neutral on whether there 
actually are such (extra-mental) things as trees and chairs. 
In regard to moral matters, the following remarks should be mDGHDERXWµEHOLHI¶DQG
µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶)LUVW+XPHXVHVWKHWHUPµEHOLHI¶RQO\RQFHLQEPM and in no more than 
eight passages in the part of the Treatise ± book III- that is about morality. Secondly, the fact 
that although Hume seems to be a truth-cognitivist about morality and perhaps can even be 
referred to as a realist DERXWPRUDOLW\QRWHHVSDOVR+XPH¶VRZQUHPDUNRQWKLVLQEPM: 
169-KHPLJKWKDYHEHHQKLJKO\XQV\PSDWKHWLFWRVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKHFODLPWKDWµtrue 
moral judgements represent moral aspects of the world¶DGRPLQDQWFODLPLQPHWD-ethics (i.e. 
in the discussions about cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and between realism and anti-
realism). This, both (A) because of his actively intended opposition to those of his 
contemporaries who clDLPWKDWWKHUHDUHHWHUQDODQGWLPHOHVVWUXWKVRIµUHDVRQ¶DQG%
because of his thoughts about the contribution of passions to moral discriminations. 







3. Meta-ethical neo-Humeanism 
 
,QRZSURFHHGE\JLYLQJDVXPPDU\RIWKHSRVLWLRQµQHR-+XPHDQLVP¶DVLWH[LVWVLQPHWD-
ethics. In his 2003, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that neo-Humeanism2 is widely accepted 
amongst philosophers (Shafer-Landau, 2003: 161; cf Rosati, 2006)3. Connie Rosati notes that 
³>D@FFRUGLQJWRWKHQHR-Humean view, belief is insufficient for motivation, which always 
requires, in addition to belief, the presence of a desire or conative state. Moral motivation 
thus cannot arise from moral belief alone but must depend as well upon a preexisting desire 
RURWKHUFRQDWLYHRULQWULQVLFDOO\PRWLYDWLQJVWDWH´5RVDWL 
Two ideas that permeate contemporary neo-Humeanism are the neo-Humean split 
and the Inertia of belief thesis (for the latter term, see Cohon, 2008). The former consists in a 
claim about a modal division between beliefs and desires. The latter consist in the claim that 
beliefs cannot motivate on their own. In terms of the neo-Humean split, typically if not 
standardly, neo-Humeanism in meta-ethics understands the strict distinction between beliefs 
and desires as a functional distinction: beliefs and desires are mental states with very 
different functional roles. The functional role of desires is to motivate. Here they stand in 
opposition to a negative feature neo-Humeanism attaches to beliefs: beliefs do not motivate.4   
                                                          
2
 Russ Shafer-/DQGDXOHDYHVRXWWKHSUHIL[µQHR¶DQGMXVWFDOOVWKHSRVLWLRQ,DPWDONLQJDERXWµ+XPHDQLVP¶ 
 
3
 From informal correspondence  it has become clear that this is a claim about meta-ethical philosophers rather than 
philosophers in general (across the board of disciplines) (Jansen/Shafer-Landau 30/10/2013). 
 
4
.The neo-Humean split reflects either the claim (i) that there are no variations LQWKHµEHOLHI-VWDWHVµDQGWKHµGHVLUH-
VWDWHV¶at all or (ii) that there are some variations in either or both of the two types of  states (most probably the 
µGHVLUH-VWDWHV¶,I(ii), these minor differences are considered to be insignificant from the point of view of the 




The belief part of neo-+XPHDQLVP¶VVWULFWGLVtinction between beliefs and desires 
typically has one more essential feature in meta-ethics. This feature is that beliefs are 
representational states. 
`All things considered, the neo-Humeanist idea as it appears in meta-ethics is the 
following one: beliefs represent moral aspects of the world. That is their functional role. As 
mental states that represent moral aspects of the world they are motivationally inert. Desires 
by contrast are intrinsically motivational states and stand in opposition to the functional role 
of beliefs in that desires are not representational states.  
When it comes to misinterpreting Hume, from a perspective of textual exegesis, the 
desire part of the neo-Humean Split is much less problematic than the belief part of the neo-
Humean Split. Much less problematic, but not entirely free from problems. The desire part is 
somewhat problematic in the sense that for neo-Humeanists typically if not standardly it 
FDUULHVDKLJKGRVDJHRIZKDWLVNQRZQDVWKHµGLUHFWLRQRIILWPHWDSKRU¶MXVWDVWKHEHOLHI
part does in neo-Humeanism). This metaphor is a specific way to express the functional 
distinction between beliefs and desires that characterizes neo-Humeanism. It is one 
employed by many meta-ethicists.5 The idea of the directions of fit metaphor is to explain 






                                                          
5
 It is common to attribute the notion of directions of fit to Elizabeth Anscombe (1957, section 32), although it 
seems to have been John Searle who coined the term µGLUHFWLRQVRIILW¶ cf 1983). Searle (1979) applies the 
distinction to effect a taxonomy of speech acts rather than mental states. For this application, Searle uses the term 
µZRUGV-to-world-GLUHFWLRQ¶for statements, SUHGLFWLRQVHWFDQGWKHWHUPµZRUOG-to-words-GLUHFWLRQ¶FRPPDQGV
SURPLVHVHWF,QKLV6HDUOHXVHVWKHWHUPVµZRUOG-to-PLQG¶DQGµPLQG-to-ZRUOG¶WRPDUNDYHUVLRQRIWKH




Returning to (any actual or possible claims about) the relationship between the desire 
part of the neo-Humean split and the work of the historical Hume on desire, the desire part 
of the neo-Humean split is problematic from an exegetical perspective in the sense that the 
GLUHFWLRQRIILWPHWDSKRURUVRPHWKLQJVXIILFLHQWO\FORVHWRLWFDQQRWEHIRXQGLQ+XPH¶V
work.  As I have explained in the previous chapter, generally, it has to be concluded that 
Hume is not very precise and clear about what a desire is. Granting that, the following 
remark can nevertheless be made. The direction of fit metaphor ±indeed seemingly any 
functionalist account of desire- does not map in any sufficient sense onto what Hume argues 
IRULQUHODWLRQWRµGHVLUHV¶7KDWREYLRXVO\GRHVQRWPHDQWKDWIRU+XPHGHVLUHVGRQRW
motivate. It means that Hume does not think about them in functionalist terms.  
 
 
4. On the relationship between neo-Humeanism and Hume 
 
The relationship between neo-Humeanism and Hume is one that needs to be approached 
carefully. The first thing one can say about this relationship is that the neo-Humean doctrine 
in theory in all likelihood does not have a necessary relationship with some of the ideas 
Hume put forward. That is, neo-Humeanism as a contemporary position is not theoretically 
dependent on the historical Hume. As a contemporary position neo-Humeanism has a nature 
WKDWGRHVQRWLQFOXGHDQHFHVVDU\DSSHDOWR+XPH¶VYLHZVas he held them (as would have to 
be judged by the standard of careful textual exegesis).   
Secondly, in all likelihood neo-Humeanism is not theoretically dependent on any 
theoretical claim about what (with or without careful exegesis) is taken to be +XPH¶VYLHZ
be VXFKDFODLPUHIOHFWLYHRI+XPH¶VYLHZRUQRW 
Thirdly, currently not every meta-ethicist who subscribes to neo-Humeanism 
subscribes to the claim that Hume is the intellectual father of neo-Humeanism in some 
important way(s) (nor does every meta-ethicist who wishes to challenge the neo-Humean 
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doctrine). This claim I spell out in the remainder of this section. I start with the following 
tentative belief/observation: the number of meta-ethicists who make an explicit appeal to 
Hume in their contemporary work is rather small. Having said that, there clearly are people 
who do so. Below I provide a list of such people. This list may be fairly or fully exhaustive or 
else may have room for being longer than it is (implying that I have failed to spot passages of 
authors that could be added to the list). Here then is the list: 
 
According to the standard picture of Hume (1888) ± there are two main kinds of psychological 
state. On the one hand there are beliefs, states that purport to represent the way the world is. 
Since our beliefs purport to represent the world, they are assessable in terms of truth and 
falsehood, depending on whether or not they succeed in representing the world to be the way it 
really is. And on the other hand there are desires, states that represent how the world is to be. 
Desires are unlike beliefs in that they do not even purport to represent the way the world is. They 
are therefore not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood. Hume concludes that belief and 
desire are therefore distinct existences: that is, we can always pull belief and desire apart, at least 
modally. For any belief and desire pair we imagine, we can always imagine someone having the 
desire but lacking the belief, and vice versa.  (Smith, 1994: 7) 6   
 
Yet according to the most common view of motivation, taken from David Hume, our beliefs alone 
are unable to motivate. Desires are the ultimate source of motivation; beliefs play only the limited 
role of informing us about how best to satisfy the desires we already have. (Shafer-Landau 2003: 
4)  
 
If an agent is to be moved to action, then two requirements have to be fulfilled: first, the agent 
must possess beliefs about the way things actually are, about the actions possible given the way 
things are, and about the likely effects of those actions on how things are; and, second, the agent 
                                                          
6
 Compare Smith (1991: 400)³According to the standard picture of human psychology- a picture we owe to David 
Hume-there are two main kinds of psychological state. On the one hand there are beliefs, states that purport to 
represent the way the world is. Since our beliefs purport to represent the world, they are subject to rational criticism: 




must have or form desires to change the way things are by resorting to this or that course of 
action. The beliefs tell the agent about how things are and about how they can be altered; the 
desires attract the agent to how things are not but can be made to be. 
This rough sketch of beliefs and desires is widely endorsed in contemporary philosophy; it 
derives in many ways from the seminal work of the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher 
David Hume. The striking thing about it, from the point of view of desire, is that it characterizes 
desire by the job desire does in collaborating with belief and thereby generating action: it 
characterizes desire by function, not by the presence of any particular feeling. (Pettit, 1998) 
 
But now things get complicated, and this drags us back to the metaphysical issues from above. 
The specific question here is: What sort of mental state is expressed by our moral judgements? So 
far we have considered only two options: a representing belief state, or a desiring attitudinative 
state. The former is a picture of the world, whilst the other is a want to change the world in some 
way. Crucially it is assumed that this is a mutually exclusive division. A mental state can be one 
or the other but not both. This classic conception of matters is due to the eighteenth-century 
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume. Hume himself thought that moral judgements 
were, in our terminology, desire-like states. (Fisher & Kirchin, 2006: 17-18) 
 
The picture that I have just sketched, according to which some mental states are like maps of the 
world, and other mental states are like goals about which destination we are headed for, is 
sometimes called the Humean Theory of Motivation¶,WLVFDOOHGWKDWEHFDXVHLQWKHHLJKWHHQWK
century, David Hume drew this picture in a very compelling way. 7 (Schroeder, 2010: 11)  
 
What strikes these quotations is the fact that than rather than (just) some modest claim about 
the essence of (neo-)Humeanism, all authors above make a hard claim ±to me they really 
                                                          
7
 In footnote 9 on page 231 KHDGGV³7KRXJKWKLVYLHZLVRIWHQFDOOHGWKH+XPHDQ7KHRU\RI0RWLYDWLRQQRW
HYHU\RQHDJUHHGWKDW+XPHUHDOO\EHOLHYHGLW´,DPQRWVXUHZKHWKHUVXFKDVHQWence is of much help as a 




read as truths beyond dispute- about what Hume thought.8 And most of them are inaccurate 
so we have to conclude on basis of the previous chapter. Only the last sentence of the passage 
by Fisher and Kirchin could reasonably be perceived as (very roughly speaking) sufficiently 
accurate.   
Let us now suppose for the sake of the argument that we find no more hardcore 
claims about Hume in print than those listed above. One then might want to say that given 
the quantity of published misreferrals, there is no reason to be overly concerned. About these 
five passages, one might want to say, just these five passages, that present Hume incorrectly, 
one should not make too much fuss. I would want to disagree with such a response. The 
reason is that those passages come from widely read books.9 And perhaps not unimportantly, 
these passages are written by established scholars. The first and probably also the second are 
facts that should be given their due attention. It seems dangerous to have many frequently 
read meta-ethical books (some might want to say that some of these books exhaust the class 
RIµGRPLQDQWERRNV¶RQthe market telling one that Hume thought something that he did not 
think (at all). Being an unexperienced second year or third year undergraduate interested in 
meta-ethics, one would need a very autonomous and critical mind to not have at least some 
sort of prima facie conviction that Hume indeed claimed what the (established) authors 
argue Hume claimed.   
I have just explained why we should take the list of five seriously, even if no more 
hard-core claims about Hume can be found in print. There is a different related point that 
should be made. The fact that not very many meta-ethicists invoke +XPH¶VWH[WLQWKHLU
printed publications ±which I take to be the case- by no means implies that other meta-
ethicists, be they neo-Humeanists, anti-Humeanists or others, do not have the same mistaken 
views about Hume as advocated by the authors of the list I have provided above. Let me add 
                                                          
8Note that in four out of the five passages cited, the author(s) provide(s) no reference at all to back up the hard claim 
about Hume. In one case (the first passage from Smith) a book year is offered.  In none of the fives passages, the 
author(s) cite(s) page numbers to back up their claim. 
 
9




two remarks to that. First, whether or not a smaller or bigger contribution to that is made by 
(the) explicit hard and published claims about Hume (cited) most probably differs for 
individual cases. Secondly, I take it that there is/are some good reason(s) to not make hard 
claims about Hume if one does not have the exegetical competence to do so. Such objective 
good reason could be intellectual humility/modesty or self-interest for example. In any case, 
such reasons and/or else simple common sense might (have) cause(d) a significant number of 
meta-ethicists to refrain from publishing hard claims about Hume.  
 
 
5. Intellectual drawbacks and hindrances as a result of misreading Hume 
5.1. The conceptual poverty problem 
 
It is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of truth, while it keeps wholly in 
generals, makes use of undefined terms, and employs comparisons, instead of instances. This is 
particularly remarkable in that philosophy, which ascribes the discernment of all moral 
distinctions to reason alone without the concurrence of sentiment. (Hume, EPM: 287) 
 
In this fifth section, I focus on possible negative consequences of misreading Hume. That is, 
possible negative intellectual consequences for contemporary meta-ethics.  
Meta-ethics seems to be an intellectual domain that belongs paradigmatically to the 
µDQDO\WLF¶SKLORVRSKLFDOWUDGLWLRQ*LYHQWKDWRQHZRXOGH[SHFWFRllective intellectual activity 
that includes the pursuit of conceptual accuracy and precision. However, in my considered 
opinion, some practices in meta-ethics when it comes to conceptual specification are 
extremely loose. That is, not much is happening in term of precision of and reflection on 
PDQ\FRQFHSWVRQHFRXOGUHIHUWRDVµPHQWDOVWDWHVLWHPVIDFXOWLHV¶10 That is, not much 
                                                          
10
 Generally, there are two big meta-HWKLFDOER[HVRQHHQFRPSDVVLQJµUHDVRQ¶DQGµEHOLHI¶DQGRQHHQFRPSDVVLQJ
µGHVLUHHPRWLRQVHQWLPHQWDWWLWXGHDQGIHHOLQJ¶ZKLOHWKHUHLVYHU\OLWWle reflection on differences between the 
things in those big boxes. Having said that, I point out that in meta-ethics, there is quite a bit of reflection on the 




µIHHOLQJ¶7KHUHVHHPVWREHDQXnfortunate cultural trend here. Assuming for the sake of 
argument that this is true, I do not want to go so far as to conclude that this definitely is 
caused by (even just partially) a misreading of Hume. But I certainly cannot exclude that this 
problem has some relationship with a misreading of Hume. Misreading Hume on belief 
seems to cause and nourish the fact that meta-ethicists think a lot in terms of a dichotomy 
between beliefs and desires, taking it as a theoretically important one. This, then, in 
combination with other facts, that could paradigmatically include the fact that there is a 
long-lasting intense camp battle between cognitivists and non-cognitivists, may cause the 
conceptual looseness that looks seems rather remarkable for an analytic discipline as meta-
ethics wants to be. Because there is a cultural trend in dichotomy thinking with reason and 
belief on the one side and sentiments, desires, feelings, emotions on the other side  
(paradigmatically reflected by the debate about cognitivism and non-cognitivism) there is 
not only no trigger for conceptual reflection; there is even a positive motivation in the form 
of a dialectical atmosphere not to reflect.  
In the remainder of this section I give one example of conceptual looseness and the 
problems that come with it. Below I distinguish seven different guises in which the notion 
µUHDVRQ¶FDQEHIRXQGLQWKHPHWD-ethical debate, but that do not always seem to be clearly 
recognized as different guises and sometimes seem to be conflated. For the first four 
conceptions I present, I have invented related terms to make clear about what conception of 
µUHDVRQ¶DV,VHHLWLQWKHPHWD-ethical debate I am talking. The latter three conceptions carry 
terms one actually finds regularly in the meta-ethical debate. 
7KHILUVWFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶ZHFDQILQGLQWKHPHWD-HWKLFDOGHEDWHLVµPRUDOO\
DXWKRULWDWLYHUHDVRQ¶0RUDOO\DXWKRULWDWLYHUHDVRQZHFDQWDNHEURDGO\KHUHLQWHUPVRI
moral principles as well as underlying justifications. Morally authoritative reason comes in 
all kinds of substantive forms.  
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Secondly, epistemic intellectual reason. Epistemic intellectual reason covers the 
epistemological part that either detects, is constitutive of, or plays some other significant role 
in terms of knowledge of substantive authoritative reason. Epistemic intellectual reason 
typically comes either in the form of intellectual intuition or else in the form of reasoning 
processes.  
Thirdly, reason close-to-logos. This conception refers to some kind of all-
encompassing faculty of knowledge that is rather ambiguous between the role of intellect 
and the role of morality as an authoritative power. Because it is all-encompassing it has some 
similarity with the ancient Greek conception of reason as a power to make sense of the 
world. It might be somewhat more narrow; the focus might be more on knowledge than on 
µPDNLQJVHQVHRIWKHZRUOG¶ 
Fourthly, there is a reason notion that relates to rationality; therefore let us call it 
reason-rationality. This conception refers to an optimal option under a set of constraints.  
Fifthly, there is a reason as something that counts in favour of some judgement 
VHQVLWLYHDWWLWXGH6FDQORQDUJXHVWKDW³>W@KHTXHVWLRQµ:KDWLVDUHDVRQ"¶LVPLVOHDGLQJLQVRIDU
it suggests that reasons are a special ontological class. What is special about reasons is not the 
ontological category of things that can be reasons, but rather the status of being a reason, that 
is to say, of counting in favour of some judgement sensitive attitude (Scanlon, 1998: 56).  
Sixthly, there is a normative/justificatory/justifying reason, generally understood as a 
thing that provides normative grounds for action (and belief). At places in The Moral 
Problem Smith engages heavily with the notion of normative reasons (see esp. Smith 1994, 
chapter 5). Perhaps it is correctly said that this sixth conception is a mixture of conception 
one and five while it always has a strong ontological (normative) nature. Conception five 
seems to have less of a normative nature and seems to be less normatively demanding than 
conception six.  
Seventhly, in the meta-ethical debate one finds the concept of a motivating reason. 
This thing equals a motive for action. It signifies why a particular action was performed. 
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In what follows I concentrate on the first, second and third conception mentioned, 
EXWOHWPHEHJLQE\DGPLWWLQJWKDWLWLVQRWHDV\WRSLQGRZQZKDWµUHDVRQ¶LV+DYLQJVDLG
that, in meta-ethics there seems to be room for a lot more conceptual clarity. 
I believe that when talking about 'reason' in the context of the debate about 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism we meta-ethicists should be a lot clearer on the 
relationship between a psychological and a factualist claim.11 As to the latter, at the very least 
it should become clear whether or not we are talking about a mental process/activity of 
reasoning, or an outcome of that: a judgment. And then a claim about its relationship with 
DIIHFWVKRXOGEHPDGH,IWKHFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶GRHVQRWDOORZDQ\UROHIRUDIIHFWDWDOOWKHQ
that is a very good thing to know for our inquiries having to do with the nature and status of 
moral objectivity. Having said that, we may just have caught a paradigmatic piece of 
philosophical mythology that can be demolished by a sharp sentimentalist account and/or 
some bit of current or future empirical science.  
Now, why exactly is it moral rationalists and realists should be interested in offering 
WKHLURSSRQHQWVORWVRISUHFLVLRQZKHQLWFRPHVWRRXUQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶LQWKHPHWD-ethical 
debate, especially as being ambiguous between an authoritative institution of morality and an 
intellectual notion and in terms of a detailed specification of the latter? A first answer and a 
good starting point for others seems to be that the debate about the status of moral 
objectivity has an awful lot to do with the role sentiment plays in the metaphysics and 
epistemology of moral distinctions and that philosophical and scientific literature suggests 
that it is hard to prevent sentiments from coming onto the stage here in matters metaphysics 
and epistemology. Therefore, as theorists in the meta-ethical debate, we cannot afford being 
                                                          
11
 In the main text I have opted for much more clarity about a psychological and a factualist claim as part of the 
µFRJQLWLYLVW¶SRVLWLRQ7KLVFODLPFRQFHUQVLQGLYLGXDODXWKRUVSXEOLVKLQJLQGLYLGXDOSDSHUVDVZHOODVFRJQLWLYLVPDV
some VRUWRIJHQHUDORYHUDUFKLQJSRVLWLRQWKDWLVRSSRVHGWRµQRQ-FRJQLWLYLVP¶+DYLQJVDLGWKDWZKDWPHWD-ethics 
may first and foremost need is the awareness that cognitivism as some sort of general position is probably as much 
an involuntary blur as a voluntary conjunction of the following three types of claims: (i) some sort of robust 
metaphysical claim about moral objectivity (some sort of factualist claim), (ii) a claim about moral judgments being 
essentially representational, (iii) a claim about moral judgements being essentially intellectual. These are clearly 
three different claims and their connection (if figuring in a conjunction) should be maximally clearly put onto the 




conceptually liberal. General (and multi-interpretable) use of terms makes it very difficult to 
challenge an (influential global) position as the moral rationalist one12. General and multi-
interpretable terms prevent people such as Hume who are critical towards something called 
µUHDVRQ¶ make good on their overarching worries.  Such terms also prevent empirical 
scientists (either with a similar critical attitude or not) and whoever else to be usefully 
                                                          
12
 Meta-ethics has several intellectual realms in which one finds a bewildering variety of different positions about 
ZKLFKDQLQWHOOLJHQWRXWVLGHUFDQUHDVRQDEO\DVNZKDWWKH\KDYHLQFRPPRQµ0RUDOUHDOLVP¶Ls such a realm. For 
µPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVP¶WKHYDULHW\LVQRWTXLWHDVELJDVLQWKHUHDOPRIPRUDOUHDOLVPEXWLWLVVWLOOYHU\VLJQLILFDQW$QG
the variety may be more nasty than in the domain of realism. In the domain of realism participants in the debate 
seem to be aware of the extreme variety and see it largely as a term of art for some sort of substantive position. I am 
inclined to think that meta-HWKLFDOSDUWLFLSDQWVVHHµPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVP¶IDUOHVVDVDWHUPRIDUW3HUKDSVHYHQDVD
clearly defined SRVLWLRQWKDWLVRSSRVHGWRµPRUDOVHQWLPHQWDOLVP¶%XWDORRNDWWKHOLWHUDWXUHFOHDUO\VKRZVWKDW
there are very different GHVFULSWLRQVRIµPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVP¶DVVRPHVRUWRIJHQHUDOSRVLWLRQ) operative in the meta-
ethical debate as well as wildly different substantive views. Below I offer some different descriptions of the general 
SRVLWLRQµPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVP¶DVRQHILQGVit in contemporary meta-ethical literature. I start with a statement from 
Shaun Nichols: 
 
³Over the last 20 years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral 
UDWLRQDOLVPWKHLGHDWKDWPRUDOLW\LVEDVHGRQUHDVRQRUUDWLRQDOLW\«$FFRUGLQJWRUDWLRQDOLVPPRUDOLW\LV
based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies, and this has seemed to many 




rationalism can be roughly characterized as the idea that the requirements of ethics are requirements of practical 
UHDVRQ´9DQ5RRLMHQ: 495).  
Probably if one takes all substantive views DERXWµPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVP¶DVVHOI-ascribed by the author and 
ascribed by  colleagues) together and tries to make a view out of it as to what the moral rationalist position amounts 
to, one gets something of the kind Russ-Shafer Landau offers. In this (2006), Shafer-Landau argues that moral 
rationalism is an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Shafer-Landau suggests that the central claims that have 
EHHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVP¶DUH 
 
(1) The metaphysical thesis: basic moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of sound practical 
reason 
7KHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOWKHVLVKXPDQNLQG¶VEDVLFPRUDOUHTXLUHPHQWVDUHNQRZDEOHDSULRUL 
(3) The normative thesis: moral requirements entail excellent reasons for action 
 
I point out that Shafer-Landau argues that not all moral rationalists endorse all of these claims. Let me finally note a 
description from Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. It needs to be noted however that Horgan and Timmons make 
clear that the rationalism about morality they talk about is a rationalism that concerns the psychology of moral 
judgement. 
 
³According to rationalism regarding the ps\FKRORJ\RIPRUDOMXGJPHQWSHRSOH¶VPRUDOMXGJPHQWVDUHJHQHUDOO\
the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of 
moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of 
gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on 






moral realists and moral rationalists. And the upshot of that may be that we miss out on some 
thoughts from people like Hume, or empirical scientists, or others, that plausibly reflect the 
idea that there is a significant role passions play when it comes to the nature of moral 
distinctions, whatever that role exactly may be.  
Let us go back to Hume to illustrate the point I have just been making. As we have 
seen in chapter 2, Hume has a concern about reason ±as an intellectual notion- being 
incapable oIWHUPLQDWLQJDWKLQNLQJSURFHVVFRQVLVWLQJLQµLQWHUSRVLWLRQRILGHDV¶$QGDVZH
know as well, Hume also thinks that only impressions ± recall that for Hume passions are one 
type of impression- can help reason out here. That is, by being a crucial component for that 
which can terminate a reasoning process: a judgement.  




work, when Hume writes about reason in his moral philosophy, Hume, in an oppositional 
ZD\UHVSRQGVRIWHQWRWKHYLHZVRIKLVPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVWFRQWHPSRUDULHV¶ZKRDGYRFDWHWKH
existence of timeless and eternal truths of reason. Another complexity - a related one 
however- comes from the fact that Hume, just as in other areas of his work, in his moral 
SKLORVRSK\LVRIWHQDµFRJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJLVW¶$VVXFKKHWDNHVDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRU
description actual moral judgements made by human beings. These sorts of (subjective) 
moral evaluations however are not the primary objects of attention of his rationalist 
contemporaries whose views Hume rejects and tries to reject by means of his own 
sentimentalist theory of morality.  
Granting and admitting WKDWWKHUHDUHSUREOHPDWLFDVSHFWVLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\DV
laid out in a detailed way in the previous chapter and as summarized above, I would say that 
given (a) the prima facie implausibility of theories that consist in a claim about the existence 
209 
 
of mind-independent (timeless and eternal) truth of reason and given (b) the power of 
+XPH¶VLGHDWhat a process of interposition of ideas without help of impressions can never 
result in some sort of evaluative distinction, it is extremely relevant that any contemporary 
moral realist and rationalist makes clear the exact relationship between an authoritative and 
intellectual notion of reason in his theory. Furthermore, moral realists and rationalists should 
spell out into detail any conceptual claims they want to defend about an intellectual notion 
of reason. That is, in a maximally informative way that includes the absence of any 
ambiguities about reason as a reasoning process and reason as judgment. 
Below I present a quotation from Rachel Cohon. As I hope to have made clear in the 
SUHYLRXVFKDSWHU,GRQRWFRPSOHWHO\DJUHHZLWK&RKRQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRf Hume. That is, I 
WKLQN+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶LVLQGHHG- in line with what Cohon argues for) largely a 
FRQFHSWRIWKHSURFHVVRIUHDVRQLQJEXWWKLVDFFRUGLQJWRPHGRHVQRWH[KDXVW+XPH¶V
FRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶$FFRUGLQJWRPH+XPH¶VFRQFHSWRIUHason cannot completely be 
captured by the process/activity view of Cohon. For the sake of clarity, I would like to recall 
this little, but significant disagreement between Cohon and me before presenting the, 
following statement from Cohon I take to be useful as a stimulus for conceptual specification 
of the contemporary moral rationalist position.  
 
While Hume's conception of reason as reasoning may not satisfy us today, it is not unwarranted 
or tendentiously narrow (though it may still be too narrow), and it raises what remains a very 
good question: If there is something more to reason than [the process of reasoning], what is it, 
and how is that further factor related to the activity of inference? This sort of question must have 
concerned Kant, who was at pains to demonstrate the unity of theoretical and practical reason. If 
the essence of immorality lies in an action or trait's unreasonableness, then we must be made to 
see why this is rightly called by the same name that is applied to the outcome of incorrect 







LGHDVRQµUHDVRQ¶%XWWKDWLVQRSUREOHPIRUQRZ1DPHO\WKLVFULWLcal note from me that 
FRPHVIURPDQH[HJHWLFDOSRLQWRIYLHZGRHVQRWSUHYHQW&RKRQ¶VSDVVDJHIURPEHLQJ
independently plausible as a methodological suggestion for (improvement of) the concept of 
µUHDVRQ¶ 
Generally speaking, my concern as expressed in this section comes down to the 
following. I think that in meta-ethics there is some sort of phenomenon of conceptual 
underdetermination in terms of the concept 'reason' that clouds what deep down is 
theoretical vulnerability, a vulnerability that comes to the surface (and perhaps only then) 
with better (more detailed) specification of the popular realist and rationalist notion 'reason'. 
This needs to happen so that sentimentalist and scientists have a maximally well-specified 
potential object of refutation in terms of the psychological notion of reason. Importantly, this 
on its turn may very well have an effect on the normative claims of realists and rationalists. 
7KDWLVRQFHVRPHDPELJXRXVQRWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶LVVXSSRVHGWRSOD\DFRQVWLWXWLYHUROHLQ
moral discriminations and once there are arguments to believe that there are limits to an 
intellectual power of reason, an appeal to sentiments may be needed to make up for 
intellectual reason¶s limitations. This is indeed what seems to happen LQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRShy 
(albeit partly in an undesirable ambiguous implicit way). This fact then that sentiments enter 
the constitutive scene of moral discriminations (however much we might wish something 
HOVHPD\WKHQLPSO\WKHUHEHLQJOLPLWVWRWKHVWDWXVRIµDXWKRULWDWLYHPRUDOUHDVRQ¶ZKDWHYHU
those limits might be. 
 
5.2. The interconnection problem 
There are close connections between three of the core debates on meta-ethics, i.e. the debate 
about the nature and status of moral objectivity, the debate about the nature and status of 
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moral judgements and the debate about moral motivation. Not only are there theoretically 
intelligible connections between those debates, many meta-ethicists also reason in an 
interconnected way about the debates mentioned. Before I give an example of this, let me 
first mention something about the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.  
If one asks an advanced undergraduate student who has just completed a course in 
meta-ethics to describe in rough terms the debate between moral cognitivists and non-
cognitivists most probably he or she will not offer a story about moral knowledge (which one 
would probably expect given the terms), but will tell (perhaps not exclusively, but probably  
as a first thing) a particular story about the nature of moral judgements. Most probably, the 
student will mention that according to cognitivists, moral judgements are beliefs, mental 
states that purport to reflect the way the world is morally. And she will note that while 
cognitivist-type moral judgemHQWVWKDWVKRXOGEHFDOOHGµEHOLHIV¶DUHDSWIRUWUXWKDQGIDOVLW\
non-cognitivist-type moral judgments are not. Probably the student will mention that 
(paradigmatic) non-cognitivist-type moral judgements are not beliefs and that they are not 
because they are not in the business of stating something true or false about the moral world 
and thereby they are not mental states that represent anything that is part of the world. And 
the student most probably will add in the same breath that this is implied by the passion-like 
nature of non-cognitivist moral judgements.   
 When it comes to problematic belief-concepts, the problem with the cognitivism 
versus non-cognitivism debate seems to be that the belief-concept that is operative in this 
debate is really dogmatic. In my perception, in the cognitivism versus non-cognitivism 
debate proponents as well as opponents allow cognitivists to work en masse with the concept 
RIDPRUDOEHOLHIPHQWLRQHGDERYH7KDWLVLWLVVWDQGDUGO\UHJDUGHGDVDµPHQWDOVWDWHWKDW
purporWVWRUHIOHFWWKHZD\WKHZRUOGLVPRUDOO\¶%RWKSDUWLHVQHYHUVHHPWRTXHVWLRQWKLV
concept. And that seems a problem as well as a rather awkward phenomenon. It is a problem 
JLYHQWKDWWKHWHUPµPRUDOEHOLHIµPD\YHU\ZHOOGHVHUYHDPRUHVXLWDEOHFRQFHSW, one that 
reflects better what a moral belief is and/or helps us better to understand the problems of 
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meta-ethics. It seems rather awkward because one of the core tasks and obligations of 
philosophers seems to be critical towards concepts. Very critical, if intellectual purposes 
demand. But there does not seem to be any significant critical reflection13 on the concept 
µEHOLHI¶LQWKHGHEDWHDERXWFRJQLWLYLVPDQGQRQ-cognitivism. It is a standard concept and one 
employed dogmatically. And that seems to be a real problem in terms of intellectual progress, 
especially so given neo-+XPHDQLVP¶VEHOLHIFRQFHSW+HUHP\VXJJHVWLRQLVWKDWLIWKHGHEDWH
about the truth of neo-Humeanism is run relatively independently from the debate between 
cognitivists and non-cognitivists, there is a danger that two operative beliefs concepts find 
each other and feed each other.14  
For the sake of the argument having considered the debate about the truth of neo-
Humeanism as independent from the debate about cognitivism and non-cognitivism, I now 
point out that there is an indirect connection between these two debates. To see this, let us 
assume that neo-Humeanism reflects some sort of theory about the relationship moral 
judgement and moral motivation. Not any type of moral judgement however. The 
relationship between moral judgement and motivation concerns a particular type of moral 
MXGJHPHQWFDOOHGµEHOLHI¶6LQFHLWLVDVVXPHGWKDWEHOLHIVDUHµFRJQLWLYH¶VWDWHVVHH
above) and since it is assumed that such belief-type cognitive states contrast with non-
cognitivist moral judgement that have a sentimentalist component in them, it is assumed that 
there arises a puzzle: 
 
                                                          
13
 ,WVHHPVIDLUWRPDNHDQH[FHSWLRQIRU7HUU\+RUJDQDQG0DUN7LPPRQVµ1RQGHVFULSWLYLVW&RJQLWLYLVP
Framework for a New Metaethic¶ Philosophical Papers, 29, pp. 121±153; cf Timmons, M. (1999). Morality 
Without Foundations. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
14
 Here is another possible effect of the dogmatic belief conception in contemporary meta-ethics. Once (i) it is 
DVVXPHGWKDWWKHRQO\PHQWDOVWDWHWKDWFDQUHIOHFWPRUDONQRZOHGJHLVDµEHOLHI¶WKDWLVVXSSRVHGWREHµD mental 
VWDWHWKDWUHIOHFWVWKHZD\WKHZRUOGLVPRUDOO\¶DQGRQFHLLVRPHPHWD-ethical psychological FRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶
fully or at least primarily comes in a non-emotional guise, one probably sneakily smuggles in notions of 
representation/detection and pushes aside notions like 'projection'. This may well result in preventing ourselves from 
WKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRVHHKRZDXWKRULWDWLYHFRQFHSWLRQVRIµUHDVRQ¶DUHFUXFLDOO\GHSHQGHQWRQHPRWLRQDIIHFW




The real puzzle as to how moral judgments can motivate arises for those who maintain that moral 
judgments express moral beliefs, for the connection between belief, a cognitive state, and 
motivation is uncertain. (Rosati, 2006: § 3.1) 
 
Let us take up this quotation in a wider literal context so that it becomes clear that and how 
there are direct links between the debate about neo-Humeanism and the debate between 
cognitivists and non-cognitivists.15  
 
[O]ne way in which moral judgments could motivate, and, indeed, motivate on their own, would 
be if moral judgments were not representational after all. Suppose moral judgments did not 
ascribe properties and express moral beliefs about what things have those properties. Suppose 
instead, as moral noncognitivism maintains, that moral judgments express desires or other 
conative states²ZKDWSKLORVRSKHUVVRPHWLPHVFDOOµSUR-DWWLWXGHV¶7KHQLWZRXOGEHFOHDUKRZ
moral judgments connect to motivation. They simply express a motivating state that the 
individual already has; to make a moral judgment is already to be motivated, at least to some 
degree. The real puzzle as to how moral judgments can motivate arises for those who maintain 
that moral judgments express moral beliefs, for the connection between belief, a cognitive state, 
and motivation is uncertain. (Rosati, 2006: § 3.1) 
 
Let us now have a look at the following argument: 
 
1. Necessarily, if one sincerely judges an action right, then one is motivated to some extent to 
act in accordance with that judgement (Motivational Judgement Internalism) 
2. When taken by themselves, beliefs neither motivate nor generate any motivationally 
efficacious states (Motivational Humeanism) 
3. Therefore moral judgements are not beliefs (Moral Non-cognitivism) (2003: 121) 
 
                                                          
15
 NB: the quotation below may also make plausible my claim that if the debate about the truth of neo-Humeanism is 
run relatively independently from the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists, there is a danger that two 
operative beliefs concepts find each other and feed each other. 
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4. Beliefs are our mental vehicles for representing facts 
5. Therefore moral judgements are not essentially fact-stating 
6. Moral realism is false16 17 18 (Shafer-Landau, 2003: 121; cf  22, 120) 
 
Let us assume that there is indeed such a train of thought in meta-ethics (possibly up until (3) 
and possibly only up until (3) the train of thought can be seen as a cultural trend). This 
means that the idea that beliefs do not motivate can have extremely far reaching 
consequences. If that is true, then it is not clear yet that this is primarily or exclusively due to 




5.3. Intellectually surpassed by the misread philosopher? 
 
                                                          
16
 Note that Shafer-Landau, as someone who presents this argument , believes that there is good reason to be 
suspicious of thesis 1 and 2 of the above argument. Shafer-Landau tries to show that it is false to think that beliefs 
can never be sufficient for motivation and that it is at best questionable that desires are necessary for motivation.  
 
17
 In a footnote, Shafer-Landau explains that no one lays out the argument quite as baldly as he does above, but that 
LWQHYHUWKHOHVVGRHVVHHPWREH³DQDFFXUDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDQDUJXPHQWDWLYHVWUDWHJ\´ endorsed by: 
 
x 6WHYHQVRQ&/µ7KHHPRWLYHPHDQLQJRIHWKLFDOWHUPV¶,n Stevenson, C.L. (1963). Facts and 
Values. New Haven: Yale University Press 
x $LNHQ+µ(YDOXDWLRQDQGREOLJDWLRQ¶Journal of Philosophy, 47, pp. 5-22. 
x Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79-9.  
x Nowell-Smith, P.H. (1954). Ethics. London: Penguin Books, pp. 36-43. 
x +DUPDQ*µ0RUDOUHODWLYLVPGHIHQGHG¶Philosophical Review, 85, pp. 3-22.  
x Mackie, J.L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin, pp. 27-42.  
 
Shafer-/DQGDXDUJXHVILQDOO\WKDW³6LPRQ%ODFNEXUQDOVRDGYDQFHVWKLVDUJXPHQWEXWZLWKVRPHUHVHUYDWLRQV´
(Shafer-Landau, 2003:121). See Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
188-9. 
   
18
 Note that that the first three steps of the presented argument/train of thought are explicitly laid out in the way I do 
above: they reflect a quotation.  Step 4-6 follow from running main text of Shafer-Landau¶VERRNtext on the same 




In this section I explore the possibility that Hume as an author misread by contemporary 
meta-HWKLFLVWVLQWHOOHFWXDOO\VXUSDVVHVKLVPLVUHDGHUVLQWHUPRIWKHPLVUHDGHUV¶RZQ
intellectual goals. In order to make a claim as to whether or not this happens, we must make 
DFRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQVRPHDVSHFWVRI+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOTXDOLW\RI
meta-ethical theories aiming at a particular intellectual aim X. This is difficult, partly because 
it is not always very clear what the intellectual aim of meta-ethical theories and/or their 
authors is. What does neo-Humeanism in meta-ethics aim at? Is it:  
 
x The explanation of moral motivation and/or action. 
x A mildly comprehensive theory about objective justification of our beliefs and  
actions (with or without special attention to something (whatever it may be) having 
WRGRZLWKµIRONSV\FKRORJLFDOSUDFWLFHV¶19 
                                                          
19
 Some philosophers, Michael Smith for example, connect their defence of or challenge to neo-Humeanism to 
something they call folk psychology (see e.g. Smith, 1987; 1988, 1994; Pettit, 1987). In his (1987) Smith claims that 
philosophers have the task to formulate a philosophical conception of folk psychological states (1987a; cf 1987b; 
1994). His (1994) sheds a little more light on what this means. Namely, in that work Smith argues that there are two 
GLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHVRIPRUDOLW\³WKDWDUHPDQLIHVWLQRUGLQDU\PRUDOSUDFWLFH DVLWLVHQJDJHGLQE\RUGLQDU\IRON´
(1994: 5). The first distinctive feature concerns the objectivity of moral judgement. The second distinctive feature is 
the practicality of moral judgement. The first amounts to the idea that ³>P@RUDOMXGJHPHQWVRIWKHIRUPµ,WLVULJKW
WKDW,ĭH[SUHVVHVDVXEMHFW¶VEHOLHIVDERXWDQREMHFWLYHPDWWHURIIDFWDIDFWDERXWZKDWLWLVULJKWIRUKHUWRGR´7KH
VHFRQGUHIOHFWVWKHLGHDWKDW³,IVRPHRQHMXGJHVWKDWLWLVULJKWWKDWVKHĭVWKHQceteris paribus, she is motivated to 
;´ 6PLWKPRUHRQWKHVHIHDWXUHVLQ6PLWKDUJXHVWKDWLWLV³W@KHSKLORVRSKHU¶VWDVNLVWRPDNHVHQVH
RIDSUDFWLFHKDYLQJWKHVHIHDWXUHV´ 
Although Smith states something as to what his conception of folk psychology refers to, it is rather unclear 
to me what exactly he means thereby. The explanation in his (1994) is more informative than the one he gives in his 
(1987) in that it becomes clear from the former work that sense must be made of the objectivity and practicality of 
moral judgement that are supposed to be features of ordinary practice. But a detailed specification of the concept 
µIRONSV\FKRORJLFDOVWDWHV¶LVQRWDYDLODEOH The same FRXQWVIRUWKHWDVNDVFULEHGWRWKHSKLORVRSKHUµWRPDNHVHQVH
of ordinary moral pUDFWLFH¶ 
For a helpful article about ambiguity of the concept folk psychology, see Stich & Ravenscroft (1994). Stich 
and Ravenscroft distinguish between external and internal accounts of folk psychology. On an external reading folk 
SV\FKRORJ\³DLQ¶WLQWKHKHDG´6WLFK	5DYHQVFURIW([WHUQDOaccounts either collect or systematize the 
intuitively recognizable generalizations of folk psychology, while internal accounts focus on the cognitive 
mechanism that underlies our ability to have those intuitions, to predict behaviour and so on.  
Apart from making the distinction mentioned, Stich and Ravenscroft helpfully present five ways in which 
folk psychology can be an internally represented theory of human psychology exploited in e.g. the explanation or 




x A heavily comprehensive theory about objective justifications of our beliefs and 
actions and explanation of our actions (with or without special attention to something 
KDYLQJWRGRZLWKµIRONSV\FKRORJLFDOSUDFWLFHV¶ 
x $FRPSUHKHQVLYHMXVWLILFDWRU\DQGH[SODQDWRU\WKHRU\DERXWµUHDVRQVIRUDFWLRQ20¶LQ
the moral domain. 
 
What plays a role in the uncertainty ±or at least my uncertainty- as to what exactly neo-
+XPHDQLVPDLPVDWLVWKHWKHRU\¶VRUDWOHDVWWKHDXWKRUV¶DWWDFKPHQWWRWKHneo-Humean 
Split as something of utmost importance that needs to be upheld. What comes with that is 
the concept of a belief. In meta-ethics belief is the bearer of objectivity. So that intellectual 
concern enters the scene. One question I have is what remains of neo-Humeanism and its 
purposes once the strict distinction between beliefs and desires is not anymore taken as one 
that is essential input for neo-Humeanism. I do not know the answer. 
The (presumed) fact that it is not very clear what the intellectual aim is of meta-
ethical neo-Humeanism and or its authors, makes it difficult to say whether or not (core) 
DVSHFWVRI+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\VXUSDVVWKHSKLORVophy of meta-ethical authors defending (or 
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 In meta-ethics, neo-Humeanism is characterized either as a theory about µPRUDOPRWLYDWLRQ¶ or as a theory about 
µUHDVRQVIRUDFWLRQ¶. Tim Schroeder describes the latter in the following way: 
 
 
³[In meta-ethics there exists a vibrant debate] over the relation of desires to reasons to act. According to one 
WUDGLWLRQW\SLFDOO\FDOOHGµ+XPHDQ¶RUµ1HR-+XPHDQ¶WKHH[LVWHQFHRIUHDVRQVWRDFWGHSHQGVRQWKHH[LVWHQFH
of desires possessed by the agent who would act. Thus, my reason to drink hot chocolate depends on my 




The former conception might well result from a mistaken reading of Hume on beliefs. At least the explanatory (if 
not also some justificatory) seeds for the latter meta-HWKLFDOFRQFHSWLRQPLJKWOLHLQ'RQDOG'DYLGVRQ¶VD
work that has been very influential in especially the philosophy of action. An alternative or further cause for the 
µUHDVRQVIRUDFWLRQ-FRQFHSWLRQV¶RIQHR-Humeanism in meta-HWKLFVPLJKWEH%HUQDUG:LOOLDPV¶VWKRXJKWVRQ
µLQWHUQDOUHDVRQV¶DVDGYRFDWHGLQKLV,QDQ\FDVHWKHQHR-+XPHDQLVWµUHDVRQVIRUDFWLRQ¶-conception as it 
appears in contemporary meta-ethics seems to be strongly associated with the debate about internal and external 
reasons for action that ±as a contemporary meta-ethical debate- is still very much about and has its roots in the 





else challenging) meta-ethical neo-+XPHDQLVPLQWKHVHQVHRIWKH+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\EHLQJ
more argumentatively rich than the neo-Humean doctrine, while neo-Humeanist authors 
might well adopt an unnecessarily simplistic conceptual dictionary, and therefore possibly 
end up with suboptimal theory construction, because of a misreading of Hume. 21 
$IWHUWKLVHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHµVXUSDVVLQJ-SUREOHP¶LQUHODWLRQWRneo-Humeanism, 
in the remainder of this final section I engage with the same problem while addressing more 
broad meta-ethical aims. That is, I now assume that three primary aim of meta-ethics and its 
authors are (1) offering the best possible account of the nature and status of moral 
judgements; (2) offering the best possible account of the nature and status of moral 
objectivity; (3) offering the best possible account about the relationship between moral 
judgements and motivation. It is difficult to say in what way and to what extent we can 
justifiedly say that Hume shared these assumed meta-ethical core aims. Here, let me say first 
that I think it uncomfortable and anachronistic WRVRPHKRZVTXHH]H+XPH¶VKROLVWLFDQG
rich philosophy into these three goals. Having said that, I would also want to say that one 
cannot reasonably deny that Hume wanted to say something about all three. Assuming for 
the sake of argument and reality that Hume not only says, but indeed intended to say 
something about these three (broad) meta-ethical goals (and intentionally), what I think 
should be avoided in contemporary meta-ethics is the following. A situation characterized by 
the fact that meta-ethicists misread Hume as a result of which there is some sort of obsessive 
engagement with a distinction between beliefs and desires that prevents intellectual progress 
and/or an insight into the theoretical philosophy of Hume that has the intellectual substance 
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 The concern I have raised will also apply to and may especially also apply to that part of the meta-ethical 
literDWXUHWKDWLVDERXWµEHVLUHV¶VHHHJ=DQJZLOO%HVLUHVDUHFRQFHLYHGRIDVXQLWDU\VWDWHVWKDWKDYHERWK
the representational characteristics of beliefs and the motivational characteristics of desires (Smith, 1994, p. 119). 
Matthew Bedke (2009: 207; cf Bedke, UM) points out that the most forceful arguments against besire theory depend 
upon the separability of cognitive and non-cognitive functional roles (cf. Smith 1994, chapter  4). He also points out 
that these arguments fail to refute the claim that these separable roles are actually realized by one and the same 
mental state token in our moral judgments. Dependent on what the (different?) aims of besire theorists are, Bedke 
may be right on the first. Bedke seems anyhow right on the second. Whether or not Bedke is right on the first (and if 
so probably, therefore on the second), one may still have the concern ±and I have it- WKDW+XPH¶VRULJLQDO





to account for a satisfactory theory in regard to one or more of the three broad contemporary 
meta-ethical intellectual goals of I have mentioned above.22
                                                          
22
 In this chapter I have been concerned with neo-Humeanism in meta-ethics and have not been concerned with neo-
Humeanism in other intellectual areas. This partly for reasons of space. The space argument becomes more pertinent 
given that an enormous amount of complexity follows from properly descriptively and evaluatively comparing and 
contrasting meta-ethical Humeanism with neo-Humeanism in other areas, e.g. the philosophy of action. Below I 
very briefly compare and contrast an aspect of neo-Humeanism in the philosophy of action with meta-ethical neo-
Humeanism. 
 ,WVRXQGVSODXVLEOHWRPHWRVD\WKDWWKHUHLVVXFKDWKLQJDVDµWUDGLWLRQDO¶+XPHDQSLFWXUHLQZKLFKGHVLUHV
initiate action and are coupled with means-end beliefs to yield action (see Shafer-Landau, 2003). Compare: 
 
³One debate over the status of explanations of human action turns on how we should 
interpret the following principle of folk psychology (Roth, 2012): 
 
[L] If any person, agent, individual, wants some outcome, d, and believes that 
an action, a, is a means to attain d under the circumstances, then x does a´ (Rosenberg, 2012, cited in Roth, 
2012; my italics). 
 
 
7KHµWUDGLWLRQDO+XPHDQSLFWXUH¶PD\IROORZIURPDQLQVWUumentalist reading of Hume (possibly since a few decades 
VRPHKRZDFFRPSDQLHGE\VRPHLQIOXHQFHIURP'DYLGVRQ¶V,WORRNVOLNHWKLVµWUDGLWLRQDOSLFWXUH¶maps 
incredibly accurately onto a big part of our daily practical life. Imagine e.g. a hot summer evening when you are 
craving for an ice-cold bottle of beer that lies in the fridge. You will be concerned with how to get the beer from the 
fridge into your hands. You may consider getting up from your comfy garden chair and walk to the fridge. You 
believe that this is a way to achieve your goal.  Or else you might believe that begging your partner will do the trick. 
Life really seems to be full of such examples of ±intentional-psychological belief-desire combinations. Also, from 
an externalist perspective it seems rather plausible to assume that your action can be explained by a combination of 
beliefs and desires. Therefore there is (prima facie) reason to think that neo-Humeanism (in its mentioned 
µWUDGLWLRQDOIRUP¶LV not misplaced (and probably even really useful) for the philosophy of action and some wider 
DUHDRISUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\VLPLODUFODLPVFDQEHPDGHDERXWµIRONSV\FKRORJ\¶ 
So in regard to the abovementioned example (supposed to represent a non-moral subclass of practical 
DFWLRQLWVHHPVKLJKO\SODXVLEOHWRVHHWKHµWUDGLWLRQDOQHR-+XPHDQLVWSLFWXUH¶DVDSSOLFDEOH%XWWKLQJVVHHPWREH
different for moral matters. While a large part of our daily practical life seems to work in the belief-desire way 
reflective of the example given, it does not seem be a plausible way to sketch our moral life, unless one has a very 
broad conception of what our moral life amounts to (a picture that encompasses everything or more or less 
everything practical). In regard to a psychological internal point of view, I would argue that a paradigmatic and 
substantial part of our moral SUDFWLFDOOLIHLVQRWYHU\ZHOOFDSWXUHGE\µPRUDOLQVWUXPHQWDOLVP¶:KDWRQHGHVLUHV
or aims at is generally not an intentional guiding force when it comes to the area of morality. When it comes to 
morality, we typically do not intend to fulfill our desires. Our daily life practices and experiences of morality most 
of the time do not start with aims and desires for which we need beliefs as means to realize them. In a particular 
situation that demands our moral attention we generally start with some sort of moral conviction (or else plain doubt 
and deliberation) and act in the light of what (after deliberation) we think should happen. Typically it does not seem 
WREHWKHFDVHWKDWDFRQDWLYHVWDWHVWDUWVRIIVRPHNLQGRIµLQVWUXPHQWDOLVPDERXWPRUDOLW\¶LQRXUPLQGV)URPDQ
externalist point of view it seems plausible enough to say that a typical moral case was performed because the agent 
had a desiUHDQGDEHOLHI%XW,EHW+XPH¶VH[WHQVLYHSKLORVRSK\FDQGRDORWPRUHSODXVLEOHH[SODQDWRU\ZRUNKHUH
than any account of beliefs or besires in meta-ethics.  
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Chapter 4: .DQW¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHOLPLWVRIPRUDOREMHFWLYLW\ 
 




Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is a strikingly a priori form of moral justification. In this 
chapter I discuss FUL and other DVSHFWVRI.DQW¶PRUDOSKLORVRSK\LQWRGHWDLOThere seems 
something special and important about FUL from the perspective of the problem of the status 
of objective morality. That is, what seems to characterize FUL is that it is a mind-
independent justification. While that seems true, at the same time FUL seems to be grounded 
in the reasoning capacities of practical agents. Generally, such a subjective constructivist 
aspect avoids the problem of how authoritative bits of moral objectivity gain their place in 
the universe. Another thing to mention about the alleged mind-dependent aspect of FUL, is 
that it does not seem to be constructively dependent on sentiments in any sense.  
7KHUHDUHWZRUHDVRQVIRUIRFXVLQJRQ.DQW¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\JLYHQDQLQWHUHVWLQ
the status of moral objectivity. First, given the alleged completely empirical-free nature of 
FUL (a. mind-independent, b. grounded in pure intellect), an investigation of FUL might tell 
something about the possibility for FUL and/or about a more general possibility for certain or 
all objective moral justifications to have a really hard objectivity status.  Secondly 
DOWHUQDWLYHO\RUDGGLWLRQDOO\DQLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI.DQW¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\PLJKWRSHQXS
possibilities to put limits on the objectivity status of FUL and/or other sorts of alleged 
objective justifications because of some philosophical-cum-empirical issues having to do with 
IUHHGRPDQGRUHPERGLHGDJHQF\7KHVHLVVXHVDUHSHUWLQHQWWR.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\ODUJHO\DV
underexplained (mysterious) views about the relationship between some sort of intelligible 
DVSHFWRIWKHVHOIDQGDQDWXUDODVSHFWRIWKHVHOIWKDWERWKVHHPWREHSDUWRI.DQW¶V
conception of a human being. Issues about intelligible and natural aspects of the self also 
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have a strong relationship with FUL. In the guise of pertinent but underexplained views, 
.DQW¶VLGHDVDERXWLQWHOOLJLEOHDQGQDWXUDOVHOYHVPD\EHRIKHOSWRGHWHUPLQHFULWHULDIRU
RYHUDPELWLRXVFODLPVDERXWPRUDOREMHFWLYLW\$IRFXVRQ.DQW¶VYLHZVPLJKWGUDZRXU
attention to issues having to do with limited judgemental freedom (as a result of some form 
of embodied agency). Such issues, on their turn, might stand in some relationship with a less 
than die-hard factual status of moral objectivity. Indeed this is a view I will propose in the 
conclusion. 
:KLOH,EHOLHYH.DQW¶VZRUNFDQGRDORWLQWHUPVRIGUDZLQJRXUDWWHQWLRQWRLVVXHV
having to do with limited judgemental freedom (as a result of some form of embodied 
agency) as of relevance to the problem of moral objectivity, in this study, an investigation of 
.DQW¶VZRUNZLOODOVRWXUQRXWWREHRIXVHLQWHUPVRIFRPSUHKHQGLQJWKHVWUHQJWKRI+XPH¶V
claim that reason alone cannot make moral distinctions.  
This chapter is one that is exclusively concerned with Kant exegesis. It is in the next 
FKDSWHUDQGWKHJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQ,FRQQHFW.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\WRP\PHWD-ethical project.  
7KLVFKDSWHULVVHWXSDVIROORZV,Q,JLYHDEULHILQWURGXFWLRQWR.DQW¶V
philosophical project as exemplified by his first and second Critique. In § 3.1, I briefly focus 





In § ,IRFXVRQµWKH DSULRUL¶DQGµWKHHPSLULFDO¶LQ.DQW¶Vpractical philosophy. In § 
,IRFXVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµWKHa priori¶ DQGµWKHHPSLULFDO¶DVUHIOHFWLQJDVKDUS 
distinction between the two with a superior role for µWKHDSULRUL¶.  In § 4.2, I explain and 
LOOXVWUDWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHHPSLULFDOLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\E\GLVFXVVLQJRQH





offer a first discussion of .DQW¶VFUL. In this section, my focus will be primarily on the 
relationship between FUL and reasoning.  In § 7,IRFXVRQ.DQW¶VLGHDVDERXWIUHHGRPDQG
embodied agency. In § 8, I try to make comprehensive sense of FUL by combining 
information we have gained thus far and adding several different types of thought to it based 
on some striking remarks Kant makes in this theoretical and practical work. In § 9, I offer 
some final Kant exegesis. I focus on his account of the mind of the evil person and present his 







Critique of Pure Reason compared to the Critique of Practical Reason. In the preface to the 
first edition of KrV Kant describes his project as follows:  
 
[By a critique RISXUHUHDVRQ@,«PHDQ«DFULWLTXH«RIWKHIDFXOW\RIUHDVRQLQJHQHUDOLQ
respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will 
therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its 
sources, its extent, and its limits- all in accordance with principles. (CpR-KS: 9/ A: 9) 
 
Slightly later in the same preface Kant explains his project by saying that the question around 
ZKLFKKLVSURMHFWUHYROYHVLVWKHTXHVWLRQ³ZKat and how much can the understanding and 




the first Critique has a very important role for the limits of both reason and metaphysics.1  
This focus on limits in the first Critique has a strong relationship with Kant being all in 
favour of doing philosophy in a non-preposterous and careful way. This partly, but not 
exclusively, because of the need to ground any philosophical conclusions about knowledge 
on extremely stable foundations (see e.g. B: 13, 21). For the remaining one seemingly can say 
WKDW.DQWKDGDQDYHUVLRQWRSUHSRVWHURXVSKLORVRSKLFDOFODLPVLHµGRQ¶WSUHWHQGWKDW\RX
can claim more than you can reasonabl\FODLP¶GRJPDWLFSKLORVRSK\µORRNIRUWKHSDWKZD\
RIPRVWUHVLVWDQFHDFWLYHO\H[SRVH\RXUVHOIWRSUREOHPVWKDWGRQRWVXLW\RX¶DQG
insufficiently careful philosophical inquiry. 
Kant does not see it as important to focus essentially on the limits of metaphysics and 
reason in his practical philosophy. In the context of explaining and justifying the title of his 
second Critique Kant argues:  
 
Why this critique is called simply Critique of Practical Reason and not Critique of Pure Practical 
Reason, though the parallelism between it and the critique of speculative reason seems to demand 
the latter title, will be sufficiently shown in the treatise itself. Its task is merely to show that there 
is a pure practical reason, and, in order to do this, it criWLFDOO\H[DPLQHVUHDVRQ¶VHQWLUHSUDFWLFDO
faculty. If it succeeds in this task, there is no need to examine the pure faculty itself to see 
whether it, like speculative reason, presumptuously overreaches itself. For if pure reason is 
actually practical, it will show its reality and that of its concepts in actions, and all disputations 
which aim to prove its impossibility will be in vain. (CprR-LWB: 118 / KpV: 3)  
 
7KHUHFOHDUO\LVPXFKOHVVRIDIRFXVRQWKHOLPLWVRIUHDVRQLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOZRUN
although incidentally one find some remarks that point into that direction. As to there being 
UHPDUNVDOEHLWLQFLGHQWDORQHVDERXWµUHDVRQ¶DQGµOLPLWV¶LQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOZRUNWKDW
                                                          
1
 see also e.g. A:238 / B:297. 
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seems fortunate DVVXPLQJWKDW.DQWEHOLHYHGWKDWµUHDVRQ¶LVLQWKHHQGRQHand the same 
thing in the theoretical and practical domain, which he did (see G: 391). 
$VLQGLFDWHGWKHIRFXVRQWKHOLPLWVRIUHDVRQWKDWHVVHQWLDOO\FKDUDFWHUL]HV.DQW¶V
project in the first Critique has a strong relationship with Kant being sympathetic to 
pathways of philosophical enquiry that are conducted in a secure way and rest on extremely 
stable foundations (see e.g. B: 13, 21). This FDXWLRQMXVWDVWKHFDXWLRQZLWKµOLPLWV¶,WDNHLW
is less present in his practical work.  And that seems to be well-reflected by his often 





3.1. The concept of the noumenon in the first Critique 
 
.DQW¶Vaccount of the µnoumenon¶ is puzzling, at least to me. What is important about this for 
this chapter is that I think some problematic puzzling aspect of this concept as we find it in 
.DQW¶V theoretical work LVDOVRUHIOHFWHGE\KLVDFFRXQWRIWKHµhomo noumenon¶DVZHVHHLW
LQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOZRUN%HIRUH,FRPPHQWRQWKLVSX]]OLQJDVSHFWRIWKHµKRPRQRXPHQRQ¶
LQGHHGEHIRUH,LQDQ\ZD\GLVFXVV.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHµhomo noumenon¶, I first discuss 
.DQW¶VQRWLRQRIWKHµnoumenon¶DVLWDSSHDUVLQKLVCritique of Pure Reason. Below I present 
a long quotation from the section of noumena and phaenomena LQ.DQW¶VILUVWCritique. This 
I do because I would like Kant to speak for himself on this difficult topic (in a sufficiently 
extensive way), also largely so as to see clearly and have the textual evidence for an 
DPELJXLW\LQ.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHnoumenon. This then is the longer quotation: 
 
Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are 
called phaenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding, and which, 
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nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible ± given 
therefore coram intuit intellectuali ± such things would be entitled noumena (intelligibilia).  
 Now, we must bear in mind that the concept of appearances, as limited by  the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, already of itself establishes the objective reality of noumena and 
justifies the division of objects into phaenomena and noumena, and so of the world into a world 
of the senses and a world of the understanding (mundus sensibilis et intelligiblis), and indeed  in 
such manner that the distinction does not refer merely to the logical form of one and the same 
thing, according to which as it is indistinct or distinct, but to the difference in the manner in 
which the two worlds can be first given to our knowledge, and in conformity with this 
difference, to the manner in which they are in themselves generically distinct from one another. 
For if the senses represent to us something merely as it appears this something must also in itself 
be a thing, and an object of a non-sensible intuition, that is, of the understanding. In other words, 
a [kind of] knowledge must be possible, in which there is no sensibility, and which alone has 
reality that is absolutely objective. Through it objects will be presented as they are, whereas in 
the empirical employment of our understanding things will be known only as they appear. If this 
be so, it would seem to follow that we cannot assert, what we have hitherto maintained, that the 
pure modes of knowledge yielded by our understanding are never anything more than principles 
of the exposition of appearance, and that even in their a priori application they relate only to the 
formal possibility of experience. On the contrary, we should have to recognise that in addition to 
the empirical employment of the categories, which is limited to sensible conditions, there is 
likewise a pure and yet objectively valid employment. For a field quite different from that of the 
senses would here lie open to us, a world which is thought as it were in the spirit (or even 
perhaps intuited), and which would therefore be for the understanding a far nobler, not a less 
QREOHREMHFWRIFRQWHPSODWLRQ« 
 The cause of our not being satisfied with the substrate of sensibility, and of our therefore 
adding to the phenomena noumena which only the pure understanding can think, is simply as 
follows. The sensibility (and its field, that of the appearances) is itself limited by the 
understanding in such fashion that it does not have to do with things in themselves but only with 
the mode in which, owing to our subjective constitution, they appear. The Transcendental 
Aesthetic, in all its teachings, has led to this conclusion; and the same conclusion also, of course, 
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follows from the concept of an appearance in general; namely, that something which is not in 
itself appearance must correspond to it. For appearance can be nothing by itself, outside our mode 
of representation. Unless, therefore, we are to move constantly in a circle, the word appearance 
must be recognized already indicating a relation to something, the immediate representation of 
which is, indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the constitution of our sensibility (upon 
which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something in itself, that is, an object 
independent sensibility.  
 There thus results the concept of a noumenon. It is not indeed in any way positive, and is not 
a determinate knowledge of anything, but signifies only the thought of something in general, in 
which I abstract from everything that belongs to the form of sensible intuition. But in order that 
a noumenon may signify a true object, distinguishable from all phenomena, it is not enough that I 
free my thought from all conditions of sensible intuition; I must likewise have ground for 
assuming  another kind of intuition, different from the sensible, in which such an object may be 
given. For otherwise my thought, while indeed without contradictions, is none the less empty. 
We have not, indeed, been able to prove that sensible intuition is the only possible intuition, but 
only that it is so for us. But neither have we been able to prove that another kind of intuition is 
possible. Consequently, although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, it is still an open 
question whether the notion of a noumenon be not a mere form of a concept, and whether, when 
this separation has been made, any object whatsoever is left. (CpR-KS: 265-271 / A: 162-5)2 
 
I have underlined Kantian claims that I take to be of special importance for understanding 
.DQW¶VQRWLRn of the noumenon. Or rather, or in addition, they are underlined to show an 
LPSRUWDQWDPELJXLW\LQ.DQW¶VZULWLQJVDERXWWKHQRXPHQRQ,QOLQHZLWKSRSXODUDFDGHPLF
thought, Kant gives the impression that a noumenon is a thing in itself. However, when Kant 
talks about the noumenon, at times, he also gives the impression that it ±probably partially 
rather than exclusively ± is a concept that is about a particular kind of intuitive perception: 
an intellectual rather than a sensuous one. I take it to be an unsettled scholarly issue as to 
KRZWREDODQFHWKHµWKLQJLQLWVHOI¶DVSHFW¶DQGWKHµSDUWLFXODUNLQGRILQWXLWLYHSHUFHSWLRQ¶
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 Kant prominently associates the term µintellektuelle Anschauung¶ with the concept of 
a µnoumenon¶. There is something important about the two German terms µLQWHOOHNWXHOOH
$QVFKDXXQJ¶DQGµVLQQOLFKH$QVFKDXXQJ¶, (potentially generally and as Kant uses them). 
TKH\DUHDPELJXRXVEHWZHHQDµa particular kind of intuitive perception by means of which 
DQREMHFWRIWKRXJKWLVJHQHUDWHG¶DQGEµa particular object of thought generated by a 
SDUWLFXODUIRUPRILQWXLWLYHSHUFHSWLRQ¶This ambiguity, together with two other types of 
influences might explain the fact that there is ambiguity in .DQW¶VFRQFHSWof the 
µnoumenon¶. The first further LQIOXHQFHZRXOGEH3ODWR¶s writings about Ideas, writings that 
have a relationship with things as they really are and with an intellectual realm. The second 
inIOXHQFHZRXOGEH.DQW¶VDLPWRnot make any overambitious claims about what we can 
know. I assume that because Kant supposes that there is  some sort of necessary metaphysical 
link between purely intellectual forms of intuitive perception and the existence of things in 
themselves, while at the same time he has as a highest philosophical priority not to make 
overambitious philosophical claims about what we can know, a fuzzy concept of a 
noumenon arises LQ.DQW¶VZRUN; a fuzzy concept that, when used by Kant, sometimes is 
bound up with explicit Kantian claims and often implicitly seems to be bound up with the 
idea that there is a noumenal world of things as they are in themselves.  
 
 
3.2 The homo noumenon 
 
I think problematic aspects about the concept of a noumenon as they appear LQ.DQW¶V
theoretical philosophy are visible in those parts of his practical philosophy where Kant talks 
about the homo noumenon. For Kant the homo noumenon stands in contrast to the homo 
phenomenon. That could be so in three different senses that are all intelligible from a 
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perspective of exegesis. First, in the sense that they are two perspectives a practical agent can 
take towards himself (see e.g. G: 456-8; KpV: 114). Secondly, in the sense that the two terms 
reflect concepts that provide a different outsider perspective on what a human being is. 
Thirdly, in the sense that they refer to two different aspects of the human being.  
$V.DQWUHJDUGVWKHKXPDQEHLQJµIURPRQHSHUVSHFWLYH¶DQGRUµSDUWO\¶KHLVFDQ
regard himself as a µKRPRSKDHQRPHQRQ¶ (see MS: 293, 295, 418, 420, 423, 434). In some way 
the human being is/can be regarded as a physical being (MS: 430) that belongs to the natural 
world; a natural world where appearances are the most we can have knowledge of. To the 
µhomo phaenomon¶.DQWW\SLFDOO\DVFULEHVDFDSDFLW\IRUµ9HUVWDQG¶VRPHIRUPRILQWHOOHFW
WKDWLVQRWWKHSXUHVWRISXUHDQGFDQEHDVFULEHGWRDSK\VLFDOEHLQJ7KHµhomo noumenon¶ 
(for the term see MS: 239, 295, 335, 418, 423, 430, 434, 439; Ende: 334; Handschriftlicher 
1DFKODVV;;,,,LVDµ9HUQXQIWZHVHQ¶DEHLQJRISXUHUHDVRQ,PSRUWDQWO\WKLV
µ9HUQXQIWZHVHQ¶QHHGVWREHGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPDµYHUQQIWLJHV1DWXU:HVHQ¶VHHHJ06
7KHKXPDQEHLQJLVDµKRPRQRXPHQRQ¶LQVRIDU he is a completely intellectual being 





/HWPHQRZUHWXUQWRWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµhomo noumenon¶. In my opinion, there are 
similar ambiguities to this notion as used in his practical work as there are to the notion 
µnoumenon¶LQWKHILUVW Critique. As Kant sees things, the human being who typically 
recognizes all of nature just through his sensibility, recognizes himself through mere 
apperception in actions and inner ends that cannot fall under the impressions of sense (see 
(LVOHUHQWU\µ0HQVFK¶)RU.DQWWKHVWRU\GRHVQRWVHHPWRHQGZLWKthe human being 
recognizing himself as such. Kant seems to think that there actually is such an intra-human 
entity that is purely intellectual, although we human beings as members of the world of 
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sensibility cannot know its existence. For Kant the homo noumenon has an intrinsic capacity 
to be free (see e.g. MS: 418). The idea seems to be that there is a free God-like intellectual 
part in our soul that we are in touch with somehow and can exercise, although as members 
of the world of sense we cannot know that there is such a part of us, except perhaps ± I 
tentatively suggest- through the moral law. At least, Kant gives the impression, it is through 
the moral law we really know that we are free (KpV: 4). Having said that, I would suggest 
that Kant wants to deny that thereby we can also be said to know ourselves as a homo 
noumenon. So for Kant we can think of ourselves as a homo noumenon. We even seem to 
µUHFRJQL]H¶ourselves as such through some sort of supersensible experience that although 
supersensible in some way is nevertheless part of us comprehensive human being with two 
intra-personal components. And in that supersensible experience we have encounters with 
the moral law through which we know that we are free. But this for Kant does not lead to 
the conclusion that we can know ourselves as a homo noumenon.  
Issues about knowledge of the homo noumenon are epistemological issues. As to the 
metaphysical issue whether there is a purely intellectual self, this problem is one that is 
difficult in a similar way and to a similar degree as the question whether there are noumenal 
objects as things in themselves. Given the textual support for and the plausibility of the 
µSHUVSHFWLYH¶interpretation of the homo noumenon, there are reasons to deny that for Kant 
there is such a thing as a purely intellectual self. Having said that, there is also support that 
for Kant there is a purely intellectual self. A type of support that is on the boundary between 
GLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWVXSSRUWFRPHVIURP.DQW¶VUHPDUNWKDWWKHUHLVDµUHDOVHOI¶HLQ
eigentliches Selbst) (see G: 457, 458, 461). Having said that, in his first Critique Kant 
explicitly denies that there is such a thing (KrV: 339). Related, in his first Critique Kant 
GHQLHVWKDWWKHUHLVDUHDOµLFK¶DUHDOµ,¶.DQWGHQLHVLWLQWKHVHQVHWKDWKHDGYRFDWHVWKH
YLHZWKDWWKHµ,¶UDWKHUWKDQDWKLQJLQLWVHOILVDµYHKLFOHIRUDOORXUWKRXJKW¶:KHWKHURUQRW
there is a real self for Kant, it seems beyond reasonable dispute that if Kant wants to make 
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the metaphysical claim that there is an essential self, this self for Kant is of an intellectual 
kind.  
:KHQ,UHDG.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOZRUN,VHQVHDVXEVWDQWLDOLPSOLFLWFRPPLWPHQWWRZDUGV
there being an essential self of an intellectual kind, an essential non-animalistic self that can 
set laws for himself. As such it seems to be metaphysically connected to a strong-willed 
autonomous self who can be in control over his inclinations. This interpretation of mine is 
KDUGO\FRPSDWLEOHZLWK.DQW¶VGHQLDOLQWKHILUVWCritique that there is a real self, but is also 
GRHVQRWVHHPJRRGWROHW.DQW¶VUHPDUNLQKLVWKHoretical work simply overrule all he 
implicitly and explicitly says in his practical work that points to the existence of an essential 
self. I think the best one can do is trying to render the two mildly compatible by recognizing 
the different contexts of his practical work and his theoretical work when he implicitly and 
LPSOLFLWO\WDONVDERXWHVVHQWLDODQGUHDOVHOYHVDQGµ,¶V 
0\VXJJHVWLRQZRXOGEHWRVHHWKHWHUPµHLJHQWOLFK¶DVLQµHLJHQWOLFKHV6HOEVW¶DV





then would designate that the self is not a thing in itself, no simple substance or power, but 
just some union of consciousness that must accompany all we can think of. A vehicle of all 
concepts that has merely a formal nature. A presupposition of all thought (Eisler, 1930: entry 
µ,FK¶$JDLQDIXOO-IOHGJHGFRPSDWLELOLW\EHWZHHQP\UHDGLQJRI.DQW¶VSUDFWLcal work and 
.DQW¶VUHPDUNVLQKLVWKHRUHWLFDOZRUNVHHPVLPSRVVLEOHEXWLIP\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI.DQW¶V
work about essential selves in his practically philosophy needs to be upheld (for which there 








empirical. In some important sense this is true. In an essential way for Kant there is an 
extremely strict division between the µDSULRUL¶ and the µHPSLULFDO¶LQWKe sense that empirical 
moral principles are inferior to ones arrived at a priori (see esp. G: 388). Having said that, it is 
LPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWTXLWHDELWRIZKDW.DQWVD\VDERXWµWKHHPSLULFDO¶LQKLVSUDFWLFDO





understanding of this predominant bit in which the empirical plays a non-inferior role in 
.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\ZHJHWDORQJZD\DVWRDSRVLWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQRQ-
LQIHULRUUROHRIWKHHPSLULFDOLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOZRUN,PSRUWDQWO\ZKDWFRPHVZLWKWKLV
understanding is a non-exhaustive but sufficient bit of counterevidence to the view that 
.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\ODFNVDFRQQHFWLRQWRGDLO\OLIHDQGWKHUHODWHGYLHZWKDWIRU.DQWDVD
moral philosopher only an empty a priori formalism mattered.  
 
 
4.1. A strict division 
 
Kant argued that only that those sciences whose certainty is apodictic can be rightfully called 




XVIII: 290) and that their claims are arrived at by means of pure reason (see Prol: 275, 284) 3. 
As Kant sees things, ethics and physics pass the litmus test of apodicity: chemistry and 
biology (not to mention the biological sciences) all fail to pass this test (G: 388-9; MAN: 468, 
471; cf KrV B: 152; A: 343; A: 848 / B: 876; cited in Louden, 2000: 20). According to Kant, 
apodictic certainty required by true science cannot be achieved via empirical principles.  
Kant believes that moral discriminations must ³KDYHWKHLUVRXUFHFRPSOHWHO\DSULRUL 
in puUHEXWSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQ´*VHHDOVR389, 452; KrV: B4, B: 124; A: 112: A547 / B575; 
cited in Louden, 2000: 20). .DQW¶VSRLQWLVWKDWDWRWDOO\SXUHHWKLFVZRXOGFRQWDLQQR
empirical content whatsoever. As Kant sees things, in constructing scientific as well as 
HWKLFDOWKHRULHVWKHUHH[LVWVDQ³LQGLVSHQVDEOHGXW\´WRH[SRXQGWKHSXUHSDUWVHSDUDWHO\DQG
HQWLUHO\XQPL[HG>JDQ]XQEHPHQJW@ZLWKWKHHPSLULFDOSDUW´LQRUGHUWKDWWKH³DSRGHLFWLF
FHUWDLQW\VRXJKWE\UHDVRQ´FDQEHDFKLHYHG0$19; cf G: 389, see Louden, 2000: 10). 
The principle of action must be "free from all influence by contingent grounds, the only kind 
that experience can supply" (G: 426; see Louden, 2000: 10). 
What I have explained above counts as a first motivation for Kant to argue for a sharp 
division between the a priori DQGµWKHHPSLULFDO¶7KDWLV.DQWLVLQWHUHVWHGLQRIIHULQJ
something that is completely necessary and certain. Granting that as a first motivation, there 
is a second motivation. Here I can only mention it in a nutshell. I will unpack it throughout 
WKLVFKDSWHU7KHVHFRQGPRWLYDWLRQIRUDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµWKHa priori µDQGµWKH
HPSLULFDO¶LV.DQW¶VEHOLHIWKDWa practical agent with some sort of core identity of Vernunft 
should be in control over his sentimentalist-animalistic nature.4 5 
                                                          
3
 Compare his expression in the Groundwork³$FDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHZKLFKGHFODUHVDQDFWLRQWREHREMHFWLYHO\
necessary in itself without reference to some purpose-that is, even without any further end-ranks as an apodeictic 




speculates about the very beginnings of human life. Kant suggests that a crucial turning point in human development 
occurred when our distant ancestors first became aware of their capacities to make free choices. At some point in the 
distant past the human being discovered in himself a faculty of choosing for himself a way of living and not being 
bound to a single one as other animals are. At this junctXUHWKHKXPDQEHLQJ³VWRRGDVLWZHUHRQWKHEULQNRIDQ
abyss; for instead of the single objects of desire to which instinct had up to now directed him, there opened up an 
LQILQLW\RIWKHP´$QIDQJFLWHGLQVHH/RXGHQ[[LL:LWKWKLVFDSacity the human being can create its 
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 I take it to be important to be clear on how there is a difference between (i) the a 
priori DVUHIHUULQJWR.DQW¶VFormula of Universal Law as a highest principle of morality with 
just µform¶ and (ii) the a priori as obligatory (forbidden) or permissible substantive moral 
principles that pass the test of FUL.  As explained, Kant wanted his highest principle of 
morality to be necessary and thereby free from all contingent elements. This thought is 
UHIOHFWHGE\.DQW¶VFormula of Universal Law. FUL states:  
 
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law. (G-Paton: 88 / G: 421) 
 
In the way presented, FUL is completely devoid of substantive (material, empirical) content. 
$WWKLVKLJKOHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQRI.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHDOHYHOWKDWUHIOHFWV.DQW¶V
outcomes of a quest for a necessary and maximally empirically free principle, no 
substantive/empirical/material content is allowed in by Kant.  
 In an important sense FUL is a (prospective) daily life test for action that determines 
which maxims are forbidden and permissible (see e.g. G: 402-3, 422; see also § 6 below). FUL 
is a test for which maxims can go through as practical principles and which ones cannot. FUL 
is a practical test for an agent in daily life faced with choices for prospective actions. A test 
that (i) starts with subjective principles for action, principles I as a practical agent want to act 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
RZQHQGVZLOODQGFKDUDFWHUHLWKHULQOLQHRURXWRIOLQHZLWKQDWXUH¶VGHVWLQ\IRUWKHKXPDQVSHFLHVVHOI-realization 
through self-FRQWUROE\PHDQVRIKLVFDSDFLW\WREHDµ9HUQXQIWZHVHQ¶EHLQJRIUHDVRQ6HHDOVR .DQW¶VHVVD\Idee. 
 
5
 %RWKPRWLYDWLRQV,KDYHMXVWDVFULEHGWR.DQWFDQEHIRXQGLQWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJHIURP.DQW¶VCollins lectures 
where he argues: 
 
³(WKLFVFDQSURSRXQGODZVRIPRUDOLW\WKDWDUHOHQLHQWDQGDGMXVWHGWRWKHZHDNQHVVRIKXPDQQDWXUHIt can 
make itself comfortable to the human being, so that it demands of people only so much as they can perform. But 
RQWKHRWKHUKDQGHWKLFVFDQDOVREHULJRURXVDQGGHPDQGWKHKLJKHVWPRUDOSHUIHFWLRQ7KHPRUDOODZ«PXVW
not be lenient and accommodate itself to human weakness; for it contains the norm of moral perfection. But the 
norm must be exact and rigorous ± geometry, for example, lays down rules that are strict: it pays no heed to 
whether a human being can observe them in practice or not; the center point of a circle, for example, is too thick 
to be a mathematical point. Now since ethics also proposes rules, which are meant to be the guideline for our 
actions, they must not be adjusted to human capacity, but have to show what is morally necessary. An indulgent 




on. A test that furthermore (ii) consists in FUL as a SULQFLSOHZLWKMXVWµIRUP¶$QGDWHVWWKDW
(iii) delivers substantive practical principles for obligatory, (forbidden) and permissible 
actions. These principles are free from contingent content. That however does not seem to 
mean that thereby the µSXUH¶ SDUWRI.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\LVµQRW WRWDOO\HPSW\RIFRQWHQW¶RU 
µnot PHUHO\IRUPDO¶DV5REHUW/RXGHQFODLPVEHORZ7KHUHVHHPVWREHVRPHWKLQJZURQJ
DERXW5REHUW/RXGHQ¶VFODLPLQLWDOLFVLQWKHTXRWDWLRQEHORZ$WEHVWWKLVFODLPVHHPVWREH
partly accurate. At worst this claim seems to be fully mistaken.   
 
Although Kant occasionally seems to equate the pure part of moral philosophy with the form 
of knowledge and the empirical part with the matter of knowledge obtained by the senses 
(e.g. G: 400; KpV: 25-27)6, it is a mistake to view the pure part as totally empty of content or 
"merely formal." The pure part of ethics, on Kant's view, is not "completely separated from 
reality," and practical reason on his view does not involve "the complete abstraction from all 
content."«7 However, any information or content gleaned from the pure part of moral 
philosophy will always concern universal and necessary aspects (aspects which on Kant's 
view are more than merely human) of moral reality rather than particular and contingent 
ones. (Louden, 2000: 5) 
 
I agree with Louden that there is a non-HPSLULFDOSDUWWR.DQW¶VHWKLFVDQGWKDWWKDWLVDSDUW
WKDW³LVQRWFRPSOHWHO\VHSDUDWHGIURPUHDOLW\´0\FODLPZRXOGEH±Louden will agree- that 
this part concerns moral SULQFLSOHVWKDWDUHQHFHVVDU\UDWKHUWKDQFRQWLQJHQWRQRQH¶V
motivational make-up. They also are universally binding ±in a cosmopolitan way- across the 
entire range of beings with a capacity for reason. 
Louden seems to assume that the µpure¶ SDUWRI.DQW¶VHWKLFVLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\HPSW\
And he thereby presumably also wants to say that the µDSULRUL¶ part of ethics is not 
                                                          
6I have adjusted this reference slightly to the referencing format I use. Works and page numbers are the same ones as 
used by Louden. 
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necessarily empty. Below I show why and how we should be rather reluctant to assume the 
former and very tentative in assuming the latter.  
,QFRQWHPSRUDU\PRUDOSKLORVRSK\GLVFXVVLRQVDERXWµWKHDSULRUL¶ are typically either 
discussions about the nature of justification for epistemic beliefs or about a priori knowledge. 
%HORZ,YHU\EULHIO\VD\VRPHWKLQJDERXW.DQW¶VYLHZVon a priori knowledge as expressed in 
his theoretical work. I do so in order to require useful intellectual material for the question 
whether or not and if so how the substantive moral outcomes that pass the test of FUL can be 
said to be (a) a priori and/or (b) pure. 
In the introduction to his first Critique Kant describes a priori knowledge as 
NQRZOHGJH³DEVROXWHO\LQGHSHQGHQWRIDOOH[SHULHQFH´ (K-S: 43/ B: 28). This Kantian 
understanding of the a priori seems rather narrow, both from the perspective of textual 
H[HJHVLVDQGLQGHSHQGHQWO\,WORRNVOLNHLI.DQW¶VGHVFULSWLRQZHUH correct, all a priori 
knowledge would have to rest on innate ideas. That is a pretty strong position from an 
independent perspective and not quite what one wants from a perspective of Kant exegesis, 
either, for a variety of reasons. A more plausible suggestion is that a priori knowledge (and 
that will count for justification as well) must be independent of experience beyond that 
needed to acquire the concepts required to understand the proposition at issue (Russell, 2010: 
§ 1).  
One reason why from a perspective of Kant exegesis the above suggestion seems 
EHWWHUWKDQ.DQW¶VFODLPWKDWa priori knowledge iVNQRZOHGJH³DEVROXWHO\LQGHSHQGHQWRIDOO
H[SHULHQFH´ is the following one. Kant himself allows for empirically affected forms of 
apriority$VVXPLQJWKDWDQGLIZHH[SUHVVWKDWFODLPZLWKDQDSSHDOWRWKHFRQFHSWRIµWKH
SXUH¶WKHQZHFDQVD\WKDW.DQWZDQWVWRVD\WKDWa priori knowledge is not necessarily pure. 
In the introduction of his first Critique Kant explicitly allows for empirically affected forms 
RIDSULRULW\ZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHQRWDOORZLQJIRUµWKHSXUH¶WREHPL[HGZLWKDQ\WKLQJ
HPSLULFDO.DQWDUJXHVWKDW³a priori modes of knowledge are entitled pure when there is no 
DGPL[WXUHRIDQ\WKLQJHPSLULFDO´.-S: 43 / B: 28). This remark pointing to a subclass of the 
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pure within the class of µWKHDSULRUL¶ explains itself and shows itself as relevant once Kant 
explains by example. Kant illustratHVKLVDEVWUDFWUHPDUNVKHUHE\VD\LQJWKDWZKLOHµHYHU\
DOWHUDWLRQKDVLWVFDXVH¶LVDQa priori proposition, it is not a pure proposition because 
alteration is a concept that can be derived only from experience (K-S: 43 / B: 28).  
Useful explicit descripWLRQVRQWKHFRQFHSWXDOQDWXUHRIµWKHDSULRUL¶ DQGµWKHSXUH¶LQ
.DQW¶Vpractical philosophy seem to be absent. Therefore, on basis of the above remarks from 
Kant as they appear in his theoretical work, let us assume that in order for the substantive 
moral outcomes that pass the test of FUL and in order to count as a priori they must not 
GHSHQGRQH[SHULHQFHDQ\PRUHWKDQWKHSURSRVLWLRQµHYHU\DOWHUDWLRQKDVLWVFDXVH¶GHSHQGV
on experience. Now, it seems correct to say that substantive principles cannot be there as 
such, without them being subject to the test of FUL.  There are no such things as 
independent substantive moral principles that have not been subject to FUL (and survived its 
test). Granting that, while going one step down the ladder, unless there are subjective 
principles for action ±principles I want/intend to act on without having bothered about FUL- 
that should be tested, there is no input for FUL.  That seems to imply that the outcomes of 
FUL somehow rely on subjective principles for action. Having said that, it sounds awkward 
to say that they rely on them. But in some sense they do, albeit clearly not in the sense that 
the subjective principles of action have any decisive influence on the outcomes of FUL. In 
any case, in order to arrive at a successful answer to the question whether or not the 
outcomes of FUL count as a priori one would seemingly need to take into account the nature 
of acquisition of the concepts of the subjective principles for action plus the reasoning 
procedure that is inherent to FUL (see § 6), because it is FUL that is crucial to the acquisition 
of pieces of moral knowledge.  +HUHWKHQZHIDFH.DQW¶VDFFRXQWDERXWWKHLQWHOOLJLEOHQDWXUH
of human beings that stands in some relationship with the human being in the empirical 
world. Since Kant leaves the relationship between the intelligible and natural nature of 
human beings underexplained, it is a tricky and hard thing to say whether the substantive 
principles passing FUL¶VWHVWFRXQWDVa priori.  
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As to the a priori nature of FUL, there are further issues that require attention. As we 
will see in § 6, there are two variants of FUL:  the Contradiction in Conception test (CCT) 
and the Contradiction in the Will test (CWT). In his Groundwork Kant argues: 
 
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action becomes a universal law: this is the canon of 
moral appraisal of action in general. Some actions are so constituted that their maxims cannot 
even be thought ZLWKRXWFRQWUDGLFWLRQDVDXQLYHUVDOODZRIQDWXUH«,QWKHFDVHRIRWKHUVWKDW
inner possibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be 
raised to the universalizability of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself. (G-
Paton: 91 / G: 424) 
 
When it comes to CWT and from a perspective of textual exegesis, there is a problem when 
DVLQWHUSUHWHUVRI.DQW¶VWH[WVZHKDYHWRPDNHDMXGJHPHQWDERXWLWVa priori nature. This is 
tricky and hard given that Kant leaves the relationship between the intelligible and empirical 
nature of human beings underexplained.  
Now for CCT. From an independent (non-exegetical) perspective CCT  seems most 
plausibly considered as a priori if we take as defining the idea that the a priori must be 
independent of experience beyond that needed to acquire the concepts required to 
understand the proposition at issue  (Russell, 2010). That is, this idea seems to be a better 
accurate reflection of reality of how knowledge can be a priori WKDQ.DQW¶VRZQexplicit 
claim that the a priori LV³DEVROXWHO\LQGHSHQGHQWRIDOOH[SHULHQFH´ (K-S: 43 / B: 28). Having 
VDLGWKDWQRWHWKDW,DVVXPH.DQWZRXOGKDYHEHHQV\PSDWKHWLFWRZDUGV5XVVHOO¶VSURSRVDO
(which I follow) too.8 Note also that I assume that in the (slightly more liberal) Russellian-
                                                          
8
 However, things become rather complicated once we connect his phrase to SDVVDJHVLQ.DQW¶V work that indicate 
that (a) the intelligible world where there is freedom and where an intelligible self operates  and (b) the concept of 
experience are incompatible. *HQHUDOO\DFURVVKLVWKHRUHWLFDODQGSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\LQ.DQW¶V work, the concept 
RIDQGPHQWDOSRVVLELOLW\IRUµexperience¶ applies to the empirical world, a world that is one in which the homo 
noumenon does not operate and in which freedom exists$QGLWYHU\PXFKORRNVOLNHIRU.DQWµH[SHULHQFH¶FDQQRW
apply to any other areas than the empirical world. One way WRUHQGHU.DQW¶VUHPDUNVDERXWWKHLQFRPSDWLELOLW\
EHWZHHQ¶WKHQRXPHQDO¶LQDEURDGHUVHQVHDQGµWKHHPSLULFDOZRUOG¶VRPHZKDWFRPSDWLEOHwould be to opt for 
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way proposed, FUL¶VCCT is a serious candidate, and probably the only one to counter 
+XPH¶VFODLPWKDWUHDVRQDORQHFDQQRWJHQHUDWHPRUDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQV0RUHDERXWWKLVLQ
the next chapter.  
 Above I have addressed the question whether we can or cannot say that the 
substantive moral principles that pass FUL¶VWHVWFRXQWDVa priori. I take it that this question 
is relevantly different from the question whether or not we can say that the substantive 
moral principles that survive the test of FUL FDQEHVDLGWREHµSXUH¶,QUHJDUGWRWKLVODWWHU
question, I would like to say the following.  First, I have a modest preference for thinking 
WKDW.DQW¶VLQWHQWLRQZDVRQO\WRUHIHUWRFUL ±and not its substantive outcomes- DVµSXUH¶
Kant searched for a highest moral principle, a principle free from all non-contingent content 
DQGWKHUHE\µSXUH¶+HIRXQGLWLQFUL.   
For the remaining, the question whether or not we can say that the substantive moral 
principles that survive the test of FUL FDQEHVDLGWREHµSXUH¶LVRne that can and should be 
answered from two different perspectives. A split should be made between (i) what is 
plausible from a perspective of Kant-exegesis and (ii) what is plausible from an independent 
(non-exegetical perspective). For both, the contradiction in conception variant of FUL seems 
WREHµSXUH¶ (see § 6 and chapter 5) (if we take the Russellian definition of the a priori I 
proposed above). From an exegetical perspective, complications arise as to CWT for reasons 
of an underdetermined relationship between the intelligible and natural self. From an 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
WKHH[LVWHQFHRIµVXSHUVHQVRXV (extra-sensible) H[SHULHQFH¶DVVRPHWKLQJDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHPHQtal life of the 





.DQW¶VSURMHFWLQSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\LVRQHWKDWexplicitly seeks both to construct the 
foundational principles of theory from non-HPSLULFDOVRXUFHVDQGWREULQJLQµWKHHPSLULFDO9 
for purposes of application to human life (Louden 2000: 11). In his Groundwork Kant argues 
that ³PRUDOSKLORVRSK\FDQ«KDYHDQHPSLULFDOSDUWVLQFH«>LW@KDVWRIRUPXODWHLWVODZV
«IRUWKHZLOORIPDQVRIDUDVDIIHFWHGE\QDWXUH-WKH«ODZVEHLQJ« in accordance with 
ZKLFKHYHU\WKLQJRXJKWWRKDSSHQ«´. (G-Paton: 56 / G: 387). Kant then goes on to argue 
that ³WKHHPSLULFDOSDUW>RIPRUDOSKLORVRSK\@PLJKWEHFDOOHGVSHFLILFDOO\practical 
anthropology, while the rational part might properly be called morals (G-Paton: 56 / G: 388).  
$WVHYHUDOSODFHVLQKLVZRUN.DQWJLYHVGHVFULSWLRQVRIZKDWµSUDFWLFDODQWKURSRORJ\¶ (or 
µPRUDODQWKURSRORJ\¶WHUPVZKLFK.DQWXVHVLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ 10 amounts to. In his 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant states:  
 
The counterpart [das Gegenstuck] of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the division of 
practical philosophy as a whole, would be moral anthropology, which, however, would deal only 
with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder human beings or help them in the 
carrying out [die Ausfuhrung] of the laws of the first part [namely, the metaphysics of morals]. It 
would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education 
in schools and in popular instruction), and with similar teachings and precepts based on 
experience´ [auf Erfahrung grundende Lehren und Vorschriften]. (MS : 217; cited in Louden, 
2000:14) 
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As Robert Louden makes clear, similar descriptions occur throughout his various lectures on 
ethics. In the Praktische Philosophie Powalski lectures, for instance, Kant argues: 
 
 
One must not merely study the object (that is, moral conduct), but also the subject (that is, the 
human being). This is necessary because one must see what sorts of hindrances to virtue are 
present in the human being. The first part of ethics contains the criteria of discrimination of that 
which is practically good and evil. . . . The second [part of ethics] contains the rules and means of 
execution²the means by which it is possible for a will to act according to rules. This second part 
is the most difficult, because one must study the human being. (Powalski lectures: 97-98; cited in 
Louden, 2000: 14) 
 
And in the Moralphilosophie Collins lectures we are told that consideration of rules "is 
useless [unnutz] if one cannot make human beings willing to follow them" (27: 244). If one 
chooses unwisely to pursue practical philosophy "without anthropology, or without 
knowledge of the subject, then it is merely speculative, or an idea; the human being must 
therefore at least be studied later on [hernach]" (Collins lectures: 244; cf. Moral Mrongovius : 
1398; cited in Louden 2000: 14). 
,QVXPPDU\RQHFDQVD\WKDWWKHUHLVDQHVVHQWLDOHPSLULFDOFRPSRQHQWWR.DQW¶V
SUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\.DQWFDOOV¶SUDFWLFDODQWKURSRORJ\¶7KLVFRPSRQHQWFRQVLVWVLQD
information necessary and (b) methods useful for achieving implementation of action in 
concordance with the highest principle of morality in the lives of practical agents. An 
essential empirical component that by Kant is not considered as something inferior to the 







5.1. Introductory comments 
 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,IRFXVRQ.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRIUHDVRQµ9HUQXQIW¶%HIRUH,IRFXVRQ.DQW¶V
FRQFHSWLRQRIµ9HUQXQIW¶however, I first say something on the topic from a wider (i.e. not 
specifically Kantian) perspective. 
According to the frequently used German-English/English-German Collins dictionary  
µVerstand¶LVWKHULJKW*HUPDQWHUPIRUWKH(QJOLVKWHUPFRQFHSWµUHDVRQ¶XQGHUVWRRGDVD




Overall, it seems that across German dictionaries we find different senses of 
µ9HUQXQIW¶7KDWOHDYHVXVZLWKD variety of questions. What exactly does the concept 
µ9HUQXQIW¶PHDQ"+RZPDQ\PHDQLQJVDFWXDOO\DUHWKHUHLIPRUHWKDQRQH",QZKDWZD\
does the concept include a normative aspect? Is this exclusively an aspect having to do with 
getting things intellectually right or is there also a normative component in the sense of 
there being a requirement to act in line with what intellectual reason judges? In what way is 
it a psychological-intellectual concept in the sense of it being a capacity? Note that these 
questions/concerns about the contemporary concept map well onWR.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\DERXW
which more now.11  




adds to these troubles certain etymological considerations DERXWWKH*HUPDQFRQFHSWµ9HUQXQIW¶WKLQJVEHFRPH
HYHQPRUHFRPSOH[7KDWLVERWKIRUWKHFRQFHSWµ9HUQXQIW¶LQLWVFRQWHPSRUDU\*HUPDQPHDQLQJDQGIRU.DQW¶V
conception. As to both, but especially the latter, amongst other things since the concept might have been 
VLJQLILFDQWO\XQGHUGHYHORSPHQWZKHQ.DQWZURWHKLVSKLORVRSK\$VWRµPLJKW¶,GRQRWKDYHWKHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKLV
LQGHHGZDVWKHFDVHEXWLWVHHPVDIDFWWKDWWKHUDWKHUFORVHO\UHODWHGFRQFHSWµ9HUVWDQG¶was under development 
then (see Drosdowski & Greber, 1963). (YHQLIWKHFRQFHSWVµ9HUQXQIW¶DQG9HUVWDQGZHUHXQGHUGHYHORSPHQW
then, this could but need not mean that this developments somehow had an LPSDFWRQ.DQW¶VZRUN.  
My investigations in the form of an exploration of both frequently XVHGµQRUPDO¶*HUPDQGLFWLRQDULHVDQG





.DQWW\SLFDOO\VSHDNVDERXWµ9HUQXQIW¶DVDµ9HUP|JHQ¶VHHHJB: 237; KU: 167; KpV: 119). 
Kant used the term Vermögen in an 18th century Latin meaning of µIDFXOWDV¶. 12 Because it is 
the case that the Latin term facultas JURXQGV.DQW¶VFRQFHSW, the English translation 'faculty' 
for Kant's term 'Vernunft' can sensibly be used. From a neutral (i.e. Kant-independent) 
semantical perspective, the term 'faculty' could reasonably be used for some kind of 
overarching mental or soul-like thing (with certain functional capacities/powers). That fits 
well with a possible interpretation of HXPH¶VFRQFHSWRIUHDVRQ as explained in chapter 2. In 
this sense, WKHWUDQVODWLRQµIDFXOW\¶ILWVDOVRTXLWHZHOOZLWKRQH.DQWLDQXVHRIWKHWHUP
Vernunft as a power of the soul. )RUWUDQVODWLRQVRIµ9HUP|JHQ¶LQWRWKHWHUPIDFXOW\VHHHJ
K-S: 301 / B:237 and LWB: 223 / KpV: 119). 
One could also quite sensibly translate Kant's term 'Vermögen' by the term 'capacity'. 
And it is indeed done in the literature (see e.g. KU-GM: 55). From a perspective of Kant 
exegesis, 'capacity' as a translation of 'Vermögen' is nevertheless something tricky because 
from an independent semantical perspective the term µFDSDFLW\¶VHHPVWREH ambiguous 
between predispositions (nature has given us) and actualized manifestations of them (that 
can fail to manifest themselves over an entire human life span).13 Both seem to play a role in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
following results as to the development of the concept µ9HUQXQIW¶µ9HUQXQIW¶is a noun derived from the verb 
µYHUQHKPHQ¶,QLWLDOO\WKHPHDQLQJRIµ9HUQXQIW¶ZDVµZDKUQHPHQ¶HUIDVVHQ,PSRUWDQWO\WKLVLQLWLDOPHDQLQJVHHP
to have been purely descriptive. By the time of the influential German philosopher Christian Wolf the term Vernunft 
had normative meaning. Taking into account information from all non-etymological and etymological dictionaries, 
the assumption seemingly has to be that over time, one or more normative element have sunk into the concept and 
the intellectual aspects sHHPWRKDYHFKDQJHGµ9HUQXQIW¶seems to have become exclusively or else partly an 
appropriate RUµKHDOWK\¶IXQFWLRQLQJH[HUFLVHRIDQLQWHOOHFWXDOµIDFXOW\¶RUµFDSDFLW\¶. Apart from that, it may also 
have a normative action component in the sense of WKHUHEHLQJDUHTXLUHPHQWRIµFRQJUXHQFHLQOLQHZLWKZKDWVRPH
inWHOOHFWXDO9HUQXQIWSUHVFULEHV¶The reason why this is important is because there is some evidence, albeit limited, 
to think WKDWIRU.DQWVXFKDQDVSHFWZDVSDUWRIWKHFRQFHSWµ9HUQXQIW¶ What speaks in favour of that is his work as 
a whole, but also the following somewhat ambiguous explicit claim he makes in the introduction of his Critique of 
Practical reason. There Kant argues: ³For if pure reason is actually practical, it will show its reality and that of its 




 I am grateful to Michael Franz for this information. 
 
13
 Thanks to John Fischer here.   
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Kant's work and Kant seems to stress (more specific variations of these) two different things 
in different parts of his theoretical and practical work. Note that one can see both meanings 
RIµFDSDFLW\¶,KDYHMXVWJLYHQUHIOHFWHGLQ.DQW¶VLGHDRIWKHKXPDQVSHFLHVKDYLQJSUH-
dispositions (Anlagen), things that are present in an animal rationabile who can develop 
himself by his own powers into an animal rationale: a being who uses his faculty of intellect 
optimally by acting in line with the right principles (see Antr: 321; MS: 434). 
7KHUHLVPRUHWREHVDLGRQ.DQW¶VQRWLRQRIµ9HUP|JHQ¶DVWUDQVODWHGE\WKH(QJOLVK
ZRUGµFDSDFLW\¶&DSDFLWLHVDUHRIWHQWKRXJKWRIDVWKLQJVWKDWDUHquantitatively extendable. 
.DQW¶VQRWLRQRI9HUP|JHQPXVWnot be understood as such. Kant¶VQRWLRQRI9HUQXQIWDVD
µ9HUP|JHQ¶ is not something that is quantitatively extendable. It is an all or nothing, black or 
white affair and does not come in degrees. 14 This would both reasonably and at most mean 
that the use  of Vernunft (usus rationis) comes in degrees.  
I have just argued that the 18th FHQWXU\/DWLQPHDQLQJRIWKHWHUPµ9HUQXQIW¶VHHPVWR
require that Vernunft is an all or nothing, black or white affair and does not come in degrees. 
Below I present my view on Vernunft being (and not being) a black and white affair in 
.DQW¶VZRUNI cannot do that however before having explicitly mentioned the fact that 
besides a component of the soul there is a normative component WR.DQW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI
µ9HUQXQIW¶ 
0\SUHIHUUHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRI9HUQXQIWLVDUDWKHUFRPSUHKHQVLYH
one and looks like DQH[WHQVLYHYHUVLRQRIDGHVFULSWLRQ.DQWJLYHVLQKLVHVVD\µ,GHH¶7KHUH
he presents a description of the concept that covers a variety of uses throughout his work 
that I include in my description. In µ,GHH¶.DQWDUJXHVWKDW³9HUQXQIWLQDFUHDWXUHLVD
µ9HUP|JHQ¶WRH[WHQGIXUWKHUHUZHLWHUQWKHUXOHVDQGSXUSRVHVRIWKHXVHRIDOOKLVSRZHUV
far beyond the instincts of nature and does not know any boundaries of her plans 
(QWZUIH´,GHH-9). 
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is that I do believe that we must not VD\WKDW9HUQXQIWDVDµ9HUP|JHQ¶= µFDSDFLW\¶LV
quantitatively extendable. But from here onwards I hold a very specific view about Vernunft 
being and not being something black or white, and not grey. I would suggest that for Kant 
Vernunft is a capacity of the soul (µ9HUP|JHQGHU6HHOH¶) that reflects a potentiality the 
boundaries of which are fixed IXOILOOVWKHµQRWTXDQWLWDWLYHO\H[WHQGDEOHUHTXLUHPHQW¶1H[W
then, I would argue that one can actualize that capacity of the soul to a greater or lesser 
extent. I would then hold that Vernunft is intrinsically connected to its µpotential objects of 
acquired knowledge¶PHDQLQJSRWHQWLDOREMHFWVWKDWUHIOHFWDQHIILFDFLRXVXVHRIWKHSRZHURI
Vernunft as a potentiality of the soul.  
%HIRUH,PRYHRQZLWKDGLVFXVVLRQRI.DQW¶VFUL let me make one further remark 
DERXW.DQW¶VYLHZVDERXWµ9HUQXQIW¶15 According to Kant, practical Vernunft has primacy 
over its theoretical brother. By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, 
Kant understands the prerogative of one by virtue of which it is the prime ground of 
determination of the combination with all the others. Kant notes that in a narrower practical 
VHQVHµSULPDF\¶UHIHUVWRWKHSUHURJDWLYHRIWKHLQWHUHVWRIRQHVRIDUDVWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKH
others is subordinated to it and it is not itself inferior to any other (KpV: 119). According to 
Kant, if practical reason (Vernunft) may not assume and think as given anything further than 
what speculative reason (Vernunft) affords from its own insight, the latter has primacy. But 
assuming that the former has of itself original a priori principles with which certain 
theoretical positions are inseparably bound but which are beyond any possible insight of the 
speculative reason (although not contradictory to it), then according to Kant we need to ask 
ourselves which interest is superior: practical or theoretical? (see KpV:120). And then it turns 
RXWWREHWKHFDVHWKDWWKHDQVZHULVµSUDFWLFDO¶:K\"%HFDXVH³HYHU\LQWHUHVWLVXOWLPDWHO\
                                                          
15
  7KHUHLVPRUHWKDWFDQEHVDLGDERXW.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRI9HUQXQIW,WLVEH\RQGWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVFKDSWHUWR
provide a fuller account and a textually more thoroughly supported suggestion of what the concept of Vernunft 
amounts to for Kant. That would really require a study in itself. 
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practical, even that of speculative reason (Vernunft) being only conditional and reaching 
perfection only in practicaOXVH´&SU5-LWB: 225 / KpV: 121). 
 
 
6. The Formula of Universal Law   
 
.DQW¶VGRFWULQHRIa priori knowledge rests mainly on the assumption that mind- or reason, as he 
calls it-functions actively in accordance with principles which it can know and understand. He 
holds that such rational principles can be manifested, not only in thinking as such (which is 
studied in logic), but also in scientific knowledge and moral action. We can separate out these 
rational principles, and we can understand how they are necessary for any rational being so far as 
he seeks to think rationally about the world and to act rationally in the world. (Paton, 1948: 14) 
 
I take this to be a helpful description as to how to understand the role of something psycho-
intellectual anGVRPHWKLQJQRUPDWLYHLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\2QHWKLQJWKDW
characterizes this passage is that it does not contain any big mysteries that somehow have a 
relationship with the noumenal. On a related note, the passage reads as perfectly compatible 
with daily life.  
$VWRWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ.DQW¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGGDLO\OLIHUHJXODUO\.DQW
connects his moral philosophy to the morality of the ordinary person. At several places in his 
work he expresses the idea that the task of the philosopher is to set out clearly, correctly and 
SUHFLVHO\ZKDWDOUHDG\LV³LQKHUHQWLQWKHVWUXFWXUHRIHYHU\PDQ¶VUHDVRQ´0M: 376; see also 
A: 730 / B:758, A: 807 / B: 835, A:831 / B:859; G: /389, 8/397, 17/402, 20-24/403-5, 34/411; 
KpV 8n, 30, 36, 87, 91-2, 126; MM 206; mostly cited in: Sullivan, 1989: 4-5).16 Kant believed 
that everyone must have a fundamentally correct pre-philosophical understanding of 
morality, even if that understanding lacks clarity and adequate expression (Sullivan, 1989: 4). 
                                                          
16
 .DQWDOVRZURWH³:KRZRXOGZDQWWRLQWURGXFHDQHZSULQFLSOHRIPRUDOLW\DQGDVLWZHUHEHLWVLQYHQWRUDVLI
WKHZRUOGKDGKLWKHUWREHHQLJQRUDQWRIZKDWGXW\LVRUKDGEHHQWKRURXJKO\ZURQJDERXWLW"´KpV: 8n, cited in: 
Sullivan, 1989: 5). 
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Generally, whatever Kant argues about freedom and morality seems to have a connection to 
ordinary moral life. Having said that, in .DQW¶VZRUNWKHVHYLHZVDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ.DQW¶VPRUDOSULQFLSOHVDQGYLHZVDERXWIUHHGRPRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGRUGLQDU\OLIH
RQWKHRWKHUKDQGJHWFORXGHGE\DQGVHHPWREHLQVRPHVRUWRIWHQVLRQZLWK.DQW¶V
underexplained and sometimes rather mysterious and awkward remarks about noumenal 
selves. In § 8, I put forward a proposal as to how to render the noumenal self and ordinary 
OLIHDVSHFWRI.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\DWOHDVWVRPHZKDWFRPSDWLEOH 
Below I investigate the relationship between FUL and something psycho-intellectual 
WKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HVµ9HUQXQIW¶$VDVWDUWLQJSRLQW,WDNHWKHFRQQHFWLRQRI.DQW¶VPRUDOLW\WR
RUGLQDU\OLIHWKDWLVFOHDUO\YLVLEOHLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\HVSHFLDOO\KLVGroundwork. 
But I do this while sugJHVWLQJWKDWZHNHHSLQWKHEDFNRIRXUPLQGV.DQW¶VUDWKHUSX]]OLQJ
remarks about the homo noumenon as explained in section 3 and about which more in the 
next two sections.   
.DQW¶VµKLJKHVWSULQFLSOHRIPRUDOLW\¶LQIDFWWXUQVRXWWREHGLIIHUHQWSULQFLSles or at 
least one principle that comes in different guises.  FUL LVRQHJXLVHRI.DQW¶VKLJKHVW
principle(s) of morality. For reasons of purpose and space, in this chapter, I focus almost 
exclusively on this version (I point to some others in the next chapter). I assume it is FUL 
that is most helpful in connection to the aim of understanding the limits of the power of 
moral objectivity. Let us recall what FUL states: 
 
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law (G-Paton: 88 / G: 421). 
 
As indicated earlier, there are two applications of FUL. The Contradiction in Conception-test 
(CCT) and the Contradiction in the Will-test (CWT). In his Groundwork Kant argues:  
 
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action becomes a universal law: this is the canon of 
moral appraisal of action in general. Some actions are so constituted that their maxims cannot 
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even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of natuUH«,QWKHFDVHRIRWKHUVWKDW
inner possibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be 
raised to the universalizability of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself. (G-
Paton: 91 / G: 424) 
 
It is CCT I will spell out here, because it is CCT that is first and foremost important with an 
H\HRQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHGLVDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQKLPDQG.DQWDVWRWKH
involvement of passions in moral discriminations. In order to understand CCT let us consider 
WKHIROORZLQJKHOSIXOUHPDUNVIURP2QRUD2¶1HLOO 
 
A maxim of promising falsely commits an agent to supporting means to promising falsely, hence 
WRPDLQWDLQLQJHQRXJKSXEOLFWUXVWIRUSURPLVHVWRJDLQDFFHSWDQFH%XWZLOOLQJIDOVHSURPLVLQJµDV
a XQLYHUVDOODZ¶per impossible) commits an agent to willing the consequence of universal false 
promising, which include the destruction of trust, hence it is incompatible with willing any 
reliable means to false promising-IRURQHVHOIRUIRURWKHUV2¶1HLll, 2004: 99) 
 
So this is why Kant thinks that practical agents cannot will false promising.  
$VZHFDQVHHIURPWKHH[SODQDWLRQRI2¶1HLOODUHDVRQLQJSURFHGXUHLVLQKHUHQWWR
FUL. In a spelled-out version of FUL, it is part of FUL¶VPHWDSK\VLFDOQDWXUH$VVXPLQJWKDW
the question is whether this reasoning procedure must be necessarily seen as a theoretical 
one that can be disconnected from the supersensuous nature and/or whether it has 
necessarily a relationship with the minds of intelligible agents.  
)RUPDOL]LQJ2¶1HLOO¶VH[SODQDWLRQRIFUL (as a test for prospective action), FUL can be 
constructed as a practical syllogism (that in a deformalized way takes place in the mind of 
practical agents).  
 
x Major Premise: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at 
WKHVDPHWLPHZLOOWKDWLWEHFRPHDXQLYHUVDOODZ´FUL) (G: 421) 
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x Minor Premise: A subjective principle (maxim) reflecting an intended action/an 
DFWLRQXQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUH[DPSOHµ,ZDQWWREUHDNDSURPLVH¶ 
(Implied reasoning process: if everyone did that, there would be no background of 
trust which is necessary for promises to be broken [recall the explanation from 
2¶1HLOODERYH@ 
x Conclusion:  I should not break a promise17 
 
Generally, what should be concluded about FUL is that the theoretical reasoning procedure 
implied by FUL as a test for the moral acceptability of maxims is also the epistemological 
means in practical agents for acknowledgement of FUL¶VMXGJHPHQWDORXWFRPHV. And most 
probably FUL is also a constructive constitutive means in practical agents for rightful 
judgements about obligatory, permissive and forbidden actions. Making a reference to the 
VWURQJFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ.DQW¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGRUGLQDU\OLIH it seems as if we have 
to say that human practical agents can follow in their thought the reasoning procedure that 
is implied by FUL when it tests for the moral acceptability of certain subjective principles of 
actions an agent has. And this capacity practical agents have, has an epistemological 
character, but seemingly also a constructive constitutive one in terms of the identification of 
moral objectivity.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 In the following passage Kant paradigmatically presents an example of a deformalized version of a practical 
syllogism. Although deformalized, it still emphasizes the abstract reasoning process constitutive of FUL. Kant 
argues: 
 
³What form of a maxim makes it suitable for universal law-giving and what form does not do so can be 
distinguished without instruction by the most common understanding. I have, for example, made it my maxim 
to increase my property by every safe means. Now I have in my possession a deposit, the owner of which has 
died without leaving any record of it. Naturally, this case falls under my maxim. Now I want to know whether 
this maxim can hold as a universal practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case and ask if it could take 
the form of a law, and consequently whether I could, by my maxim, make the law that every man is allowed to 
deny that a deposit has been made when no one can prove the contrary. I immediately realize that taking such a 
principle as a law would annihilate itself, because its result would be thDWQRRQHZRXOGPDNHDGHSRVLW´&SrR-




7.  FUL, Kant and the embodied nature of the rational judge 
 
While Kant is very much a daily life/commonsensical philosopher in the ways mentioned, 
WKHUHLVWKLVDVSHFWRIKLVSKLORVRSK\WKDWLVUDWKHUSHFXOLDUWKHVSOLWEHWZHHQµWKHµKRPR
SKDHQRPHQRQ¶as part of the empirical world and the µhRPRQRXPHQRQ¶ as part of the 
intelligible world. Insofar as human beings are a part of nature, they have empirical 
characters, "the causality of which must stand under empirical laws" (KrV: A: 546 / B: 574). 
And in respect to this empirical character there is "no freedom" (A: 550 / B: 578) (cited in/see 
Louden, 2000: 17). On the other hand, as rational beings who have the power to determine 
their own actions through efforts of will, human beings also follow "a rule and order 
altogether different from the order of nature" (A: 550 / B: 578). In respect to this intelligible 
character the agent "stands under no conditions of time, for time is only the condition of 
appearances, not of things in themselves" (A: 539 / B: 567) (cited in/see Louden 2000: 17). 
And when Kant says no conditions of time, he really means no conditions of time at all.  
Kant even argues:  
 
To look for the temporal origin of free acts as such (as though they were natural effects) is ... a 
contradiction: hence it is also a contradiction to seek the temporal origin of the human being's 
moral character . . . since this character signifies the ground of the exercise of freedom; which 
(like the determining ground of the free will generally) must be sought in representations of 
reason alone. (Rel: 40; cited in Louden, 2000: 17) 
 
On basis of his theoretical philosophy we have to conclude that for Kant there is some sort of 
hard gap between the sensible world ZKHUHDQDWXUDOEHLQJZLWKµ9HUVWDQG¶DQGµ9HUQXQIW¶
operates (on the one hand) and the supersensible world (on the other hand). That is, in the 
VHQVHWKDWµ9HUVWDQG¶DQGWKHRUHWLFDOUHDVRQFDQ never have knowledge of noumenal objects. 
2UDWOHDVWRQEDVLVRIWKHQDWXUHRIµ9HUVWDQG¶DQGWKHRUHWLFDOUHDVRQ9HUQXQIWRQHFDQQRW
make rightful claims about knowledge of objects beyond those claims that concern 
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appearances (recall the problems abouWWKHFRQFHSWµQRXPHQRQ¶DVH[SODLQHGLQ
Anticipating some comments in the next paragraph, it furthermore is the case that neither 
µ9HUVWDQG¶QRUDQ\WKLQJHOVHWKDWLVSDUWRIWKHQDWXUDOZRUOGFDQLQIOXHQFHWKHH[LVWHQFHRI
noumenal objects. This is another way in which there is some sort of gulf between the world 
of sense and the noumenal world. 
For Kant, the supersensible world is the world where a practical sense of freedom 
operates. In connection with this idea of the existence of freedom in the noumenal world, 
Kant says some striking things about the influence of the supersensible world on the natural 
world. He argues:  
 
Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as 
the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, so that from the 
former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible, just 
as if there were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second; 
yet the latter should have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom should 
make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature must consequently 
also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement 
with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of 
freedom. ±Thus there must still be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that grounds nature 
with that which the concept of freedom contains practically, the concept of which, even it does 
not suffice for cognition of it either theoretically or practically, and thus has no proper domain of 
its own, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the manner of thinking in accordance 
with the principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other. (CPJ-GM: 63 
/ KU: 176; cf MS: 418) 
 
 





rather remarkable/awkward views on the relationship between morality, freedom and the 
HPSLULFDOZRUOG¶%HORZ,H[SODLQKRZWRXQGHUVWDQGWKLV 
I have already argued that for Kant there is an important connection between his 
moral philosophy and daily life. As mentioned, this comes very much in the guise of Kant 
believing that FUL is accessible to the ordinary practical agent. Indeed, FUL seems to 
SHUPHDWHWKHOLYHVRIRUGLQDU\SHRSOH1RZZKHQLWFRPHVWR.DQW¶VYLHZVDERXWPRUDOLW\
freedom, intelligible and natural selves, there is a particular aspect to our daily lives ± or 
perhaps it is better called a commonsensical aspect - WR.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\WKDWPXVWEHQRWHG
That is, this aspect must be noted while it can be granted that Kant has underexplained, 
rather mysterious if not also awkward views about the intelligible and the natural world. The 
point is this. While stating rather puzzling things about intelligible selves and while not 
explaining how the intelligible world can have an influence on the natural world, Kant 
believed that there are certain aspects to a human being which make it possible for him to be 
affected by the principles of duty.  Furthermore, this is something that his intelligible self 
recognizes and that might be part of the intelligible world in some way, a mind-independent 
way. Said slightly differently, Kant was aware that there are aspects to a human being due to 
which it is possible for him to be affected by legislations µFRPLQJIURPWKHQRXPHQDOZRUOG¶
1RWHWKDWWKHLQWHUHVWLQJWKLQJDERXWWKHWHUPµOHJLVODWLRQ¶here is that it potentially fits 
something mind-inGHSHQGHQWDOVRLQ.DQW¶VZRUNEXWWKDWIRU.DQWLWRIWHQLIQRWDOZD\V
signifies a law that is determined by the noumenal self of some sort of comprehensive 
creature called human being. I come back to that in the next section. For now, I mention 
that Kant calls these aspects (because of which it is possible for a practical agent to be 
affected by legislations coming from the noumenal world) (in a natural mind-dependent 
and/or extra-natural mind-dependent wD\µVXEMHFWLYHFRQGLWLRQVRIVXVFHSWLELOLW\IRUWKH




These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them, he is not bound to acquire 
WKHP7KH\DUHWKHPRUDOIHHOLQJFRQVFLHQFHORYHRIRQH¶VQHLJKbor, and respect for ourselves 
(self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these, since they are subjective conditions of 
susceptibility for the notion of duty, not objective conditions of morality. They are all sensitive 
and antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (praedispositio) to be affected by notions of duty; 
capacities which it cannot be regarded as a duty to have, but which every man has, and by virtue 
of which he can be brought about under obligation. Consciousness of them is not of an empirical 
origin, but FDQRQO\IROORZRQWKDWRIDPRUDOODZDVDQHIIHFWRIWKHVDPHRQWKHPLQG«(MM-
Gregor: 59 / MM: 399) 
 
Because of thoughts of the kind expressed in the passage above, there is some reason to think 
that Kant is a weak naturalist. Someone who HQGRUVHVWKHLGHDWKDW³HPSLULFDOIDFWVDERXW
human nature, though they cannot in themselves establish or justify normative moral 
principles, also cannot contradict such principles´ (Louden, 2000: 8). 
+DYLQJUHPDUNHGRQ.DQW¶VUHIHUHQFHWRFRQGLWLRQVIRUUHFHSWLYLW\RIGXW\DQGKDYLQJ
said that therefore there is some reason to regard Kant as a naturalist, Kant himself does not 
categorize the receptivity conditions as naturalistic. He does not qualify them as 
unnaturalistic either however.  What he does state is that consciousness of these conditions is 
not of an empirical origin, but that does not seem to tell us anything about the nature of 
these conditions themselves. In short, he leaves their nature unclear and that is unfortunate. 
Nevertheless, he seems to have been aware that it is not the case that some principle from 
the intelligible world can be acknowledged by an agent and move an agent without there 






8. A comprehensive understanding of FUL 
 
In this section I build to a comprehensive understanding of FUL. We have seen that FUL 
states: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law (G: 421). In the upcoming §§ 8.1-8.5, I discuss several 
elements that are meant to enlighten the nature of FUL in a holistic comprehensive way. 
That is, as a moral principle that has a positive UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHLGHDRIµQHFHVVLW\¶ZLWK
something psycho-intellectual and with freedom to judge and act as well as a two-fold 




practical agents and independence from the empirical¶ In § ,GLVFXVV.DQW¶VWKRXJKWV







Experiences teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise (K-S: 43 / B: 
28; cf B: 30/ K-S: 45) 
 
Necessity and strict [generality]18 are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable 
from one another (K-S: 44 / B: 29) 
 
                                                          
18
 The original translation by Norman Kemp-6PLWKVD\VµXQLYHUVDOLW\¶,DGGUHVVWKHUHDVRQVIRUVXEVWLWXWLRQGLUHFWly 
in the main text of this section. 
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These two quotations reflect claims Kant makes in the introduction of his first Critique. In 
RUGHUWRDFFXUDWHO\UHIOHFWZKDW.DQWPHDQWE\µXQLYHUVDO¶LQKLVILUVWCritique we should 
UHVRUWWRWZR*HUPDQWHUPVµ1RWZHQGLJNHLW¶QHFHVVLW\DQGµVWUHQJH$OOJHPHLQKHLW¶VWULFW
generality). Kant appeals to both as necessary conditions and essential characteristics of 
synthetic a priori MXGJHPHQWV.DQWFODLPVWKDWµ1RWZHQGLJNHLW¶DQGµVWUHQJH$OOJHPHLQKHLW¶
somehow cannot be metaphysically separated, but nevertheless he seems to think they are 
conceptually different. Both notions are a response to a concern Kant has about an inductive 
IRUPRIJHQHUDOLW\DVLWILJXUHVLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\,WLVDUHVSRQVHLQWKHVHQVHWKDWIRU
Kant such a form of generality can never give us knowledge because it cannot appeal to more 
WKDQSRVVLEOHH[SHULHQFHVDQGWKDWLVWRROLWWOHIRU.DQW,WGRHVQ¶WPHHW.DQW¶VFULWHULRQIRU
knowledge. Rather than inductive generality, there must be some sort of higher criterion, in 
order for our scientific judgements to count as knowledge. This criterion is that they must be 
able to count as knowledge without being dependent on possible experience. If our scientific 
MXGJHPHQWVGRWKH\DUHERWKQHFHVVDU\DQGPHHWWKHFULWHULRQRIµVWUHQJH$OOJHPHLQKHLW¶
(strict generality). And as such they functions as a requirement for what Kant is after: certain 
knowledge. Note that for Kant this knowledge necessarily comes in the form of synthetic 
MXGJHPHQWV$QDO\WLFMXGJHPHQWVGRQRWSDVVWKHµFDQGLGDWH for a priori NQRZOHGJHWHVW¶
because they do not add something new to what we already have when operating with a 
certain concept).   
In the practical area, Kant sometimes points to reasons for it being important that 
practical rules are necessary in a way that resembles his talk about necessity (rather than 
some weaker form of generality) in the first Critique. In KpV Kant argues: 
 
It is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an object and therefore a material; but the 
material cannot be supposed for this reason to be the determining cause of the choice, the 
dependence of the faculty of desire on the existence of some thing would have to be made basic 
to volition, and this dependence would have to be thought out in empirical conditions and 
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therefore never could be a foundation of a necessary and universal rule. (CprR-LWB: 145 / KpV: 
32; cf  CprR-LWB: 140, 147-8) 
 
In passages of the above type that occur in his practical work, Kant approaches FUL from the 
perspective of the importance of necessity as a maximally hard form of generality.  
 
 
8.2. The further away from the empirical, the more lofty 
 
$VLQGLFDWHGZKHQZHJHWWRWKHUHDOPRIIUHHGRPLQ.DQW¶VSUDFWLFDOphilosophy, there is 
this puzzling mysterious talk about intelligible selves operating in a supersensible realm. The 
reason we might get this puzzling talk from Kant might be well reflected by the following 
passage from the introduction of his first Critique. Kant argues: 
 
,WLVSUHFLVHO\«LQDUHDOPEH\RQGWKHZRUOGRIVHQVHVZKHUHH[SHULHQFHFDQ\LHOGQHLWKHU
guidance nor correction, that our reason carries on those enquiries which owing to their 
importance we consider to be far more excellent [vorzüglich], and in their purpose far more lofty 
[erhaben], than all that the understanding can learn in the field of experience. (K-S: 45-46, A: 18; 
cf e.g. A: 250, B: 30-1) 
 
It is not entirely clear to me whether this is a statement that carries any normative force. It 
seems primarily, if not exclusively descriptive. Having said that, on basis of his work as a 








8.3  Reason in logic 
 
In the earliest times to which the history of human reason extends, mathematics, among that 
wonderful people, the Greeks, had already entered upon the sure path of science. But it must 
not be supposed that it was as easy for mathematics as it was for logic ± in which reason has to 
deal with itself alone ± to light upon, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road. (KS-19 / 
B: 9; cf B: 15) 
 
That logic should have been thus successful is an advantage which it owes entirely to its 
limitations, whereby it is justified in abstracting ± indeed, it is under obligation to do so- from 
all objects of knowledge and their differences, leaving the understanding nothing to deal with 
save itself and its form. (K-S: 18/B: 8; cf A: 10) 
 
The very foundation of all laws of reason seems to be the law of non-contradiction. It is this 
logical law that is core to FUL.  What we have then in regard to the nature of FUL is an 
intellectual reasoning process focused on consistency in thought via the law of contradiction. 
What more could one go for when being an author as Kant was who tried to get as far as 
possible away from the empirical while somehow also trying to keep a connection to 
ordinary people?  
 
 
8.4. Moral laws, moral agents and independence from the empirical 
8.4.1.The supersensuous nature of rational beings 
 
>7@KHPRUDOODZ«GRHVSURYLGHDIDFWDEVROXWHO\LQH[SOLFDEOHIURPDQ\GDWDRIWKHZRUOGRIVHQVH
or from the whole compass of the theoretical use of reason, and this fact points to a pure 
intelligible world-indeed, it defines it positively and enables us to know something of it, namely, 





independent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to the autonomy of pure 
reason. And since the laws, according to which the existence of things depends on cognition, are 
practical, supersensuous nature, so far as we can form a conception of it, is nothing else than 
nature under the autonomy of the19 pure practical reason. The law of this autonomy is the moral 
law, and it, therefore, is the fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of the 
understanding.... (CprR: 153-4 / KpV: 43-4; my italics)  
 
Since the material of the practical law, i.e. an object of the maxim, cannot be given empirically, 
and since a free will must be independent of all empirical conditions (i.e., those belonging to the 
world of sense) and yet be determinable, a free will must find its ground of determination in the 
law, but independently of the law. But besides the latter, there is nothing in a law except the 
legislative form. Therefore, the legislative form, in so far as it is contained in the maxim, is the 
RQO\WKLQJZKLFKFDQFRQVWLWXWHDGHWHUPLQLQJJURXQGRIWKHIUHHZLOO«7KXVIUHHGRPand 
unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other. (CprR-LWB: 140 / KpV: 29) 
 
As we already knew and as becomes explicitly clear from the second quotation above, as 
intelligible (or supersensuous) beings, human beings have a nature that is free from all 
                                                          
19
 ,GRXEWWKDWWKHFRPSRXQGWHUPµWKHSXUHSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQ¶KHUHLVDFRUUHFWWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHWHUPµ9HUQXQIW¶LQ
WKLVVHQWHQFH,WKLQNWKHDUWLFOHµWKH¶VKRXOGKDYHEHHQOHIWRXW&RPSDWLEOHZLWKEHLQJJHQHUDOO\YHry happy with 
Lewis White Beck-s translations of KpV, I am in a similar way concerned about some further translations of the 
*HUPDQWHUPµ9HUQXQIW¶LQ:KLWH-%HFN¶VWUDQVODWLRQRIKpV. (pages: 167, 172, 176, 180, 187, 209, 219, 222). If the 
translations are indeed suboptimal in terms of inappropriate copying of articles where they should be left out, a 
recognition of this may also be somehow important for creating a good meta-ethical practice as to the use and 
reflection on the multi-LQWHUSUHWDEOHWHUPµUHDVRQ¶5HPRYLQJLQDSSURSULDWHFRS\LQJRIDUWLFOHVIURPPDWHULDO
SXEOLVKHGLQ(QJOLVKPD\KHOS.DQW¶VRZQLGHDVDERXW9HUQXQIWWREHEHWWHUFRPPXQLFDWHG7KLVFRXOGKDYHD




copying of articles, could help meta-ethical practice, would be the following one. A correct translation could prevent 
some sort of ambiguous (QJOLVKVHQWHQFHZKHUHµUHDVRQ¶FDQEHUHDGLQDYDULHW\RIZD\VWKDWUHVHPEOHVRPHRIWKH
seven types I distinguished in chapter 3. If, in such circumstances, it can be prevented that the reader chooses an 
interpretation that is sensible from a neutral perspective, while not being sensible from an exegetical perspective, a 
FRQIODWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶DVQRUPDWLYHDXWKRULWDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQFRQFHSWLRQDVPHQWLRQHGLQFKDSWHUµUHDVRQ¶DV
something intellectual (conception 2) and justificatory, normative (different from conception 1)/Scanlonian types of 
reasons at least will not be encouraged.. Thinking that it actively discourages seems to me wishful thinking rather 
than a realistic thought.  
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empirical conditions. In this second quotation Kant says that as intelligible beings, humans 
have an existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical conditions. This 
is not a particularly clear remark, to say the least. And in combination with the first and 
third quotation of this subsection and his practical philosophy at large, as a reader one faces 
DPELJXLWLHVDQGRWKHUXQFODULWLHVDVWRWKHFRQFHSWXDOQDWXUHRIµODZV¶LQ.DQW¶VZRUNDQGDQ\
relationship between mind-dependent and indeSHQGHQWODZVLIERWKDUHSDUWRI.DQW¶VZRUN 
 
 
8.5. Ratio subiectiue sumta DVDPDVWHURYHURQH¶VVHQWLPHQWV 
 
It is nothing else than personality, i.e. the freedom and independence from the mechanism of 
nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws (pure practical laws given 
by its own reason), so that the person as belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own 
personality in so far as he belongs to the intelligible world. (CprR: 193 / KpV: 86) 
 
What we see in this remark LVDQRWKHUZD\LQZKLFK.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\GLVWDQFHVLWVHOIIURP
WKHHPSLULFDOFRPSDUH.DQW¶VTXHVWIRUVRPHWhing absolutely necessary as addressed in § 
8.1). Here it comes in the form of there being a power of the soul in a human practical agent 
that can be a master over all untutored and somewhat reflective motives that lead him away 
from acting in line with his duties as set by KDQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHV,DVVXPHWKDWWKLV
power of the soul for Kant belongs to same faculty as the power of the soul that can follow 
FUL in thought and sets laws for himself on basis of FUL.  The ratio subiectui sumta that 
thinks and sets laws for himself is the same ratio subiectui sumta that can exercise control 
RYHUDQDJHQW¶Vmotivations and actions. That is, some sort of essential self. 20   
                                                          
20
 Note that when it comes to the DVSHFWRIµEHLQJDPDVWHURYHULQFOLQDWLRQV¶ZKDWPDWWHUVUDWKHUWKDQSUDFWLFDO
DJHQWVKDYLQJQRVHQWLPHQWVDWWKHWLPHRIDFWLQJLVWKDWDSUDFWLFDODJHQW¶VDFWLRQVproceed from the right motives. 
Actions that proceed from the right motive are those that proceed from respect for the moral law. For Kant these are 
the sole morally worthy forms of actions. It is this type of actions Kant regards as autonomous actions. By contrast, 
heteronomous actions have motives other than the motive to perform one's duty because it is a moral duty. Such 





In the previous sections I have offered several ingredients that reflect and/or explain in a 
holistic comprehensive way the nature of FUL. Let me make one further remark. There 
PLJKWEHDWHQVLRQEHWZHHQDGDLO\OLIHDVSHFWWKHUHLVWR.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\DQd the 
motivation for FUL ,SURSRVHGLQRQEHKDOIRI.DQW,Q,H[SODLQHGWKDW.DQW¶V
philosophy has a close connection to daily life. There is textual evidence that one way in 
which this is the case is in the sense that Kant thinks that philosophers only have the task of 
illuminating a principle that is already present daily life. That seems difficult to reconcile 
with my proposed motivation for FUL µWKHIXUWKHUZD\IURPWKHHPSLULFDOWKHPRUHORIW\¶
My proposal would be to be faithful to the first idea by ascribing some sort of fairly simple 
golden rule principle to Kant when he mentions that philosophers only have a task to make 
more clear what is already very much part of our daily life, while for the remaining putting a 
ILUPHPSKDVLVRQ.DQW¶s belief in necessity and a defeat of the empirical.  
In regard to the (possible) tension pointed to, it should also be noted that some parts 
RI.DQW¶VZRUNDOVRwithin his practical work) seem to have arisen from polemical motives 
in the author, while this is unlikely to be the case for others parts (see also Sullivan, 1989: 3, 
,WDNHLWWKDWRFFDVLRQVZKHUH.DQW¶VZULWLQJVDUHRUDUHOLNHO\WREHSROHPLFDODUHWKRVH
that have some VRUWRIFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK.DQW¶VLQFOLQDWLRQµWRJHWDZD\DVIDUIURPWKH
HPSLULFDODVSRVVLEOH¶7KDWLVLQWZRZD\V)LUVWLQWKHVHQVHRI.DQW¶VVHDUFKIRUDQG
emphasis on the importance of a hard form of generality: necessity (= a polemical response to 
Hume). Secondly, in the way of a polemical Kantian response to the moral sense theories of 
his contemporaries.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
DOVRSURFHHGIURPSULPLWLYHLQFOLQDWLRQVVD\DQXQUHIOHFWLYHIRUPRIV\PSDWK\WKDWVWULNHVDQDJHQW¶s mind and 




9. Kant on conscience and other aspects of the mind of the scoundrel 
.DQW¶VQDwYHRSWLPLVP 
 
$ODUJHSDUWRI.DQW¶VDFFRXQWRIHvil takes place in Religion within the boundaries of mere 
reason. Unfortunately one is ±or at least I am- looking in vain for a satisfactory explanation 
of the fundamental roots of evil behaviour. For Kant, evil behaviour is wilful acting out of 
line with ZKDWWKHFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHVSUHVFULEH$VWRµZLOIXO¶.DQWEHOLHYHV±quite 
plausibly- that unless the motives from which actions proceed are ones that can be chosen 
freely, practical agents cannot be held accountable for their actions. This counts both for 
good and bad actions. (see e.g. Rel: 21). As a result of this assumption, Kant avoids two 
commitments. First, he avoids a commitment to the idea that morally blameworthy actions 
are somehow an unavoidable upshot of our constitutional make-up. Secondly, Kant avoids a 
commitment to the idea that the performance of morally praiseworthy actions is necessarily 
supported by our naturalistic constitutional make-up. The latter seems problematic to me. 
However much reflective control a human being might have over his egoistic inclinations 
WKDWSXOOKLPDZD\IURPDFWLQJLQOLQHZLWK.DQW¶FDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHV,WDNHLWWKDW
without there being certain conditions related to her constitutional make-up, a human being 
ZRXOGQRWEHDEOHWREHPRWLYDWHGE\.DQW¶V categorical imperatives (or any other moral 
justifications). I take it that at least in the presence of extremely strong egoistic conative 
drive in the motivational profile of an adult human being (equally strong or stronger than 
the egoistic drives he was born with), while certain elements supportive of the performance 
of other-regarding actions were not in the constitutional motivational profile of this practical 
agent (elements such as the pre-dispositions to develop an other-regarding conscience and 
the natural disposition to experience empathic distress), a human being could not be 
motivated by FUL or any other Kantian categorical imperative. More about this in the next 
chapter. ,QWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKLVVHFWLRQ,SUHVHQWDQGEULHIO\GLVFXVVDSDVVDJHIURP.DQW¶V
Groundwork about the minds of evil people.  
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In his Groundwork Kant presents the following view of evil people: 
 
There is no one, not even the most hardened scoundrel-provided only he is accustomed to use 
reason in other ways-who, when presented with examples of honesty in purpose, of faithfulness 
to good maxims, of sympathy, and of kindness towards all (even when these are bound up with 
great sacrifices of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he too might be a man of like spirit. 
He is unable to realize such an aim in his own person²though only on account of his desires and 
impulses; but yet at the same time he wishes to be free from these inclinations, which are a 
burden to himself. By such a wish he shows that having a will free from sensuous impulses he 
transfers himself in thought into an order of things quite different from that of his desires in the 
field of sensibility; for from the fulfillment of this wish he can expect no gratification of his 
sensuous desires and consequently no state which would satisfy any of his actual or even 
conceivable inclinations (since by such an expectation the very Idea which elicited the wish 
would be deprived of its superiority); all he can expect is a greater inner worth of his own person. 
This better person he believes himself to be when he transfers himself to the standpoint of a 
member of the intelligible world. He is involuntarily constrained to do so by the Idea of 
freedom²that is, of not being dependent on determination by causes in the sensible world; and 
from this standpoint he is conscious of possessing a good will which, on his own admission, 
constitutes the law for the bad will belonging to him as a member of the sensible world²a law of 
ZKRVHDXWKRULW\KHLVDZDUHHYHQLQWUDQVJUHVVLQJLW7KHPRUDOµ,RXJKW¶LVWKXVDQµ,ZLOO¶IRUPDQ
DVDPHPEHURIWKHLQWHOOLJLEOHZRUOGDQGLWLVFRQFHLYHGE\KLPDVDQµ,RXJKW¶RQO\LQVRIDUKH
considers himself at the same time to be a member of the sensible world. (G-Paton: 122-3 / G: 
454-5) 
 
This passage has some clear scent of overly optimistic, naïve and also rather premature 
psychology. In the abovementioned quotation KaQWDUJXHVWKDW³WKHPRVWKDUGHQHG
VFRXQGUHO´DOWKRXJKXQDEOHWRUHDOL]HWKHDLPRIEHLQJDPRUDOEHLQJQHYHUWKHOHVVZLVKHVWR
be one. At least from a descriptive perspective of actual operative psychology, this seems to 
be a too ambitious claim in the form of a too ambitious generalization for those who are 
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slightly less hardened evil people. Furthermore, it seems to be an overambitious claim when 
it comes to some sort of deep self of the most hardened scoundrel. There may well be human 
beings (albeit perhaps only very few), whose deepest/essential self does not wish to be a 





In the next chapter, I say something about the concept of conscience as relevant to an 
argument about the limits of objectivity and as grounded in research about psychopathy. As 
we have seen in chapter 1, it is generally agreed that psychopaths do not have a conscience. 
Kant might have wanted to disagree with that claim. Kant states that every man, as a moral 
being, has a conscience inherent in him. Kant however might have wanted to exclude 
psychopaths from the class of creatures who could ever become a human being. He might 
have seen them as brute beasts who somehow permanently lack the subjective conditions for 
susceptibility to duty as presented in § 7. That is not clear. He might also have wanted to 
include some psychopaths and exclude others. An interesting question here seems to be 
whether Kant would have made a different judgement about the presence of a conscience for 
two different types of psychopaths Ben Karpman (1949) distinguishes on basis of his 
observations as a clinical psychiatrist. A type that has quite a reflective nature and one that 
has the nature of rather brute beasts. 
 In a footnote in MM .DQWUHJDUGVµFRQVFLHQFH¶DVHVVHQWLDOO\EHLQJDERXWVRPHVRUWRI
intrapersonal relationship. He argues: 
 
The man who accuses and judges himself in conscience must think of himself as a twofold 
personage, a doubled self who, on the one hand, has to stand in fear and trembling at the bar of 
the tribunal which is yet entrusted to him, but who, on the other hand, must himself administer 
the office of judge which he holds by inborn authority. And this requires clarification, if reason is 
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not to fall into self-contradiction. I, the prosecutor and yet the accused as well, am the same man 
(numero idem). But man as the subject of the moral legislation which proceeds from the concept 
of freedom and in which he is subject to a law that he himself gives (homo noumenon) is to be 
considered different (specie diversus) from man as a member of the sensible world who is 
endowed with reason. But it is only from the viewpoint of practical knowledge that he is to be 
regarded in this way, since there is no theoretical knowledge of the causal relation of the 
intelligible to the sensible; and this specific difference is that of the human faculties (the higher 
and the lower) which characterize man. The first is the prosecutor against whom the accused is 
granted a legal adviser (defence counsel). When the proceedings are concluded the inner judge, as 
the person vested with authority, pronounces the sentence of happiness or mystery, as the moral 
consequences of the deed. Our reason cannot pursue further his authority (as ruler of the world) 
in this function; we can only reverence his unconditioned iubeo or veto. (MM- Gregor 10421 / 
MM: 439; italics original; cf e.g. MM: 400-1 /MM-Gregor: 60-6222). 
 
What we see here is that Kant thinks of the nature of conscience as an intrapersonal 
relationship in a practical agent between a prosecutor and an accused. Saying that that there 
is a role for a prosecutor and an accused within the same man, seems to be a correct way of 
phrasing what Kant thought. Be that as it seems to be, what is not so clear is how we should 
conceive of the role of the prosecutor in terms of the agent being subject to a voice and the 
agent somehow creating this voice. It seems as if Kant somehow sees a passive role for the 
practical agent as one who is subject to the voice of the prosecutor. At the same time 
however, one gets the impression that is too much of a passive account to ascribe to Kant. 
There might have to be a more active role for the practical agent as a prosecutor.  
 
 
                                                          
21
 ,Q*UHJRU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHDFDGHP\YHUVLRQWKHRULJLQDO*HUPDQSDVVDJHLVWREHIRXQGRQSDJH,QP\
perception it is on page 439. 
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 ,Q*UHJRU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHDFDGHP\YHUVLRQWKHRULJLQDO*HUPDQSDVVDJe is to be found on pages 438. In my 




10. Looking ahead 
 
In the next chapter I make use of the very different elements I have addressed thus far in my 
thesis to provide one argument and a building block for two further lines of reasoning in 
favour of there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity. The Kant exegesis I have 
provided in this chapter should do the job of illustrating the first argument and helping us to 
see why it is important to focus on the human nature when being concerned with the 








In this final chapter I present one fully developed criterion for there being a non-realist 
component to the nature of moral objectivity (if there indeed is such a thing as moral 
objectivity; a problem that is beyond the purposes of this study). This criterion arises from 
+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\%HVLGHVSUHVHQWLQJWKLVIXOO\GHYHORSHGFULWHULRQLQWKLVILIWKFKDSWHU,
also present a comprehensive argumentative foundation for two further criteria for there 
being a non-realist component to moral objectivity. These two criteria I expect to arise from 
future research that builds on two qualitatively different lines of argumentative reasoning I 
develop into detail at the very end of this study, i.e. in its overall conclusion.  
The comprehensive argumentative foundation I present in this chapter consists in the 
combination of two ideas. The first idea reflects an empirical fact about psychopaths. The 
second arises from a hypothesis about the ultimate cause of psychopathy ±nature rather than 
environment-, while using this thought for a conclusion about the mind of non-psychopathic 
µW\SLFDO¶SUDFWLFal agents. Concretely, the two ideas are: 
 
(a) Within the class of human practical agents there is a class of agents (psychopaths) who 
do not take the interests of others seriously in practical deliberation and judgement. 
 
(b) Without there being certain elements in her constitutional make-up, elements given 
for free by the author of nature, (whoever or whatever that is) a human practical agent 
will not be able to have psychological experiences that include sincere moral reasoning 




So what I offer in this chapter is the abovementioned argumentative foundation. In the 
general conclusion then I offer two lines of reasoning that are two different argumentative 
branches for two different criteria for there being a non-realist component to moral 
objectivity. These two different argumentative branches have in common that they both 
build on the comprehensive argumentative foundation I present in this chapter. This 
comprehensive argumentative foundation on its turn builds on thoughts about psychopathy 
as presented in chapter 1.  
By the very end of this study I will have offered two detailed lines of argument that 
both have the potential to be criteria for there being a non-realist component to the nature 
of moral objectivity. My assumption is that future research by others and/or me that builds 
on this study delivers two criteria that follow from the lines of argument I offer in this study. 
Having just said that I assume that there arise two criteria from future research, future 
research might show that there do not arise two criteria. There is an issue with the first line 
of argument in the sense that it relies on a controversial largely empirical assumption I 
endorse. That is, the assumption that at least about some psychopaths it can accurately be 
said that they have (what by some philosophical criterion can qualify as) a genuine 
evaluative normative outlook on the world. In regard to the first line of argument I offer, I 
assume that the criterion for there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity does 
not get off the ground once this assumption is false. I explain this further in the general 
conclusion.  
For the second line of argument it is the case that future research needs to indicate 
how exactly the second line of argument constitutes an argument in favour of there being a 
non-realist component to the nature of moral objectivity. What delays a full-fledged 
development of this criterion are complex issues about necessity, contingency and possible 
worlds of human nature. These issues need attention in future research before any definite 
conclusions can be drawn about the exact nature of the second argument as reflective of a 
criterion for a non-realist component to moral objectivity. 
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In the general conclusion I lay out the two lines of argument into detail (up until the 
end point of this study). This I follow up by outlining the framework for philosophical and 
empirical research I take to be needed before definite conclusions can be drawn about 
whether and how ±in full detail- the two lines of argument as they arise from the 
argumentative foundation I present at the end of this chapter constitute an argument in 
favour of there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity. 
 This chapter is set up as follows. In § 2 I present the full-fledged first criterion for 
there being a non-realist component to the limits of moral objectivity. As indicated, this 
FULWHULRQLVEDVHGLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\0RUHVSHFifically, it is based in his philosophy of 
UHDVRQ6WULFWO\VSHDNLQJWKLVFULWHULRQDULVHVIURP+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\RQO\EXWLWLVZHOO-
LOOXVWUDWHGE\PHDQVRIFRQVLGHULQJLWLQWKHFRQWH[WRI.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\7KLV,ZLOOGR,Q
2.1, I do some preliminary work for understanding the nature of the criterion by recalling 
HVVHQWLDOWKRXJKWVDERXW.DQW¶VDQG+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶DVSUHVHQWHGLQFKDSWHU
DQG6XEVHTXHQWO\LQ,FRQQHFW+XPH¶VFRQFOXVLRQVDERXWWKHOLPLWHGSRZHUVRI
reason to .DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
In § 3, I recall some essential thoughts about psychopathy. That is, I recall thoughts 
about the nature of the syndrome as it presents itself in the mind and behaviour of 
psychopaths while I also refer back to scientific thoughts about the etiology of psychopathy.  
,Q,SUHVHQWWKHFRQFHSWRIµSUH-LQWHQWLRQDOHPRWLRQV¶DVGHYHORSHGE\5DWFOLIIH
µ3UH-LQWHQWLRQDOHPRWLRQV¶determine what kind of intentional state it is possible to have. 
They provide us a range of possibilities while excluding another range. They are emotions 
WKDWDUHFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DSHUVRQ¶VVHQVHRIZKDWLVSRVVLEOH5DWFOLIIH 
In § 5, I concentrate on theoretical explanations and examples of (a) cases in which 
SUDFWLFDODJHQWVFDQHDVLO\XQGHUVWDQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGVDQGEFDVHVLQZKLFKSUDFWLFDO
DJHQWVPLJKWKDYHUHDOGLIILFXOWLHVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPLQGV$VWREDIWHUKDYLQJ
focused on the case of depression for introductory purposes, I point out several ways in 
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which human beings without psychopathy are likely to have difficulties understanding the 
minds of psychopaths.  
In § 6, I develop two conceptual suggestions as to an ultimate etiological explanation 
of why it is psychopaths do not take the interests of others seriously in practical deliberation 
and judgement. The first represents a comprehensive conceptual idea that appeals to (a) a 
lack of pre-dispositions for empathic distress; (b) an absence of pre-dispositions for the 
development of a conscience and (c) an absence of pre-dispositions for the development of a 
particular dialectical self. This comprehensive first conceptual suggestion assumes that 
psychopaths have an animate perception of other human beings. The second conceptual 
suggestion reflects the idea that amongst the class of psychopaths, there might be some who 
have an inanimate perception of other human beings due to a particular perception of 
themselves. 
 SecWLRQLVDQLQWHUPH]]RVHFWLRQ,DSSO\5DWFOLIIH¶VFRQFHSWRISUH-intentional 
emotions to FUL LQVXFKDZD\WKDW,GHQ\.DQW¶VFODLPWKDWKLVXOWLPDWHPRUDOSULQFLSOHLV
completely free from empirical influences.  
,Q,LQWHUWZLQH5DWFOLIIH¶Vresearch and empirical research about psychopathy by 




2. Hume (and Kant): the first criterion 
5HFDOOLQJ.DQWDQG+XPHRQµUHDVRQ¶ 
 
In chapter 4 I have argued that there is a subjective component ±a capacity of the soul- as 
ZHOODVDQREMHFWLYHDVSHFWWR.DQW¶VFRQFHSWRIµUHDVRQ¶µ9HUQXQIW¶,KDYHSURYLGHGWKH
following suggestion as to how the subjective and objective component should be conjoined 
in one comprehensive Kantian concept.  
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µ9HUQXQIW¶DVDFDSDFLW\RIWKHVRXOUHIOHFWVDpotentiality of the soul the boundaries of 
which are fixed. (Recall that because of the 18th FHQWXU\PHDQLQJRIWKH/DWLQWHUPµIDFXOWDV¶
it should be DVVXPHGWKDWIRU.DQWDµFDSDFLW\¶LVnot something that is quantitatively 




NQRZOHGJH¶LILQGHHGDFTXLUHGUHIOHFWDQHIILFDFLRXVXVHRIWKH normatively rational 
potential of Vernunft as a power of the soul.     
,QFKDSWHU,DOVRIRFXVHGH[WHQVLYHO\RQ.DQW¶VFUL.  As explained, for Kant there is 
a strong relationship between FUL and reasoning. I have explained that FUL can be 
constructed as a practical syllogism. It can be done so from a non-subjective theoretical 
perspective. However, it could be that we even have to say that a (non-natural!) subjective 
reasoning procedure is SDUWRI)8/¶VHVVHQWLDOQDWXUH That is, for Kant FUL might not be able 
to exist without it being intrinsically connected to a test for the universalizability of maxims 
as conducted as a reasoning procedure in the supersensuous intellectual mind of practical 
agents. I am not entirely sure however as to whether or not we can or even should say this.  
,QRZVXPPDUL]H+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHDVRQ¶,QFKDSWHU,DUJXHGWKDWIRU+XPH
µUHDVRQ¶LVDQH[FOXVLYHO\SV\FKRORJLFDOFRQFHSW7KLVLQFRQWUDVWWRZKDWLVWKHFDVHIRU.DQW
As an exclusively psychRORJLFDOFRQFHSWIRU+XPHµUHDVRQ¶LVHVVHQWLDOO\Dreasoning 
process/activity. Possibly (sometimes) for Hume, this reasoning process is part of a faculty 
view of reason. Here then, I have claimed, the notion of contradiction becomes important for 
both the area of mathematics and the areas of matters of fact. I have claimed that Hume 
wants to argue that it is only when our faculty of reason cannot conceive of contrary 
instances that it can give us a priori knowledge as it can in mathematics. When reason does 
give us a priori knowledge the knowledge results from a priori reasoning processes that are 
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terminated by our faculty of reason by means of an a priori act of judgement resulting in an a 






reason, passion and morality. First, the claim that reason alone cannot generate moral 
discriminations. Secondly, the claim that passions are a necessary component of moral 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQV7KLUGO\WKHFODLPWKDW³UHDVRQDORQHFDQQHYHUEHDPRWLYHWRDQ\DFWLRQRI
WKHZLOO´7+XPHVXEVFULEHVWRDOOWKUHHDQG+XPHKLPVHOIGRHVQRWVHSDUDWHWKHP
clearly. And neither are they typically separated in scholarly literature. I believe however 
that they should be. It is helpful in terms of Humean exegesis. Also, it is crucial when 
FRPSDULQJ+XPH¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\ZLWKDFFRXQWVIURPRWKHUVSDUDGLJPDWLFDOO\.DQW,WLV
also a helpful tool when the aim is to make progress with the problem of the nature and 
status of moral discriminations. In this chapter, I provide support for the view that setting 
apart the first two Humean claims from the third is important in regard to KaQW¶VSKLORVRSK\
What results from my presentation of this argument is a paradigmatic illustration of the first 
FULWHULDIRUWKHOLPLWVRIPRUDOREMHFWLYLW\$VWRµLOOXVWUDWLRQ¶strictly speaking, an appeal to 
.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\LVQRWQHHGHGIRUDQLGHQWification of the first criterion. However, the 
argumentative force of the first criterion is revealed in a very clear way once it is considered 
LQWKHFRQWH[WRI.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\)XUWKHUPRUHDQDSSHDOWR.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\LQ
LQWHUDFWLRQZLWK+XPH¶VFRQFeption of reason (in the way I intend to present in this section) 
informs us about a high intellectual cost that seems to come with meta-ethical theories that 
challenge the first and second Humean claim identified above. That is, in case such theories 
do fundamentally rely on a Humean psychological conception of reason as reasoning. 
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Kant intended FUL to be an a priori justification. As explained in the previous 
chapter, there are two reasoning variants of FUL: CCT and CWT (G: 424). I take it that CCT  
as one reasoning variant of FUL LQVRPHZD\UHVSRQGVVXFFHVVIXOO\WR+XPH¶VFRQFHUQWKDW
reason alone cannot deliver moral discriminations, a claim of which the other side of the 
coin (at least for Hume) is that reason needs help from impressions. Namely, what 
characterizes FUL is its intrinsic reliance on an a priori reasoning procedure with an essential 
role for the principle of non-contradiction (the mother of all reason). Because of this, I take 
it, )8/¶V&&7 is not in need of any impressions (i.e. neither external sensory nor passion-type 
RILPSUHVVLRQVWRWHUPLQDWHDUHDVRQLQJSURFHVVDFRQFHUQ+XPHKDGDERXWµUHDVRQ¶My 
suggestion is that in the context of FUL, the principle of non-contradiction can do the same 
job of terminating a mental reasoning process as passions do for Hume. I suggest that FUL µV
CCT can function as a stopping tool for a reasoning process and is thereby a candidate for 
preventing that a practical agent with his capacity for linking thoughts step by step stands 
³OLNHWKHVFKRROPDQ¶V DVVLUUHVROXWHDQGXQGHWHUPLQHG´(30. This claim from Hume 
seems to be about motivation rather than moral judgement. What Hume seemingly wants to 
argue here is that unless there are passions, the will does not know what to will. However, 
given HumH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRILQIHUHQWLDOUHDVRQLQJ,WKLQNZHFDQDSSO\WKHSUHVHQWHG
Humean phrase to passion-type of impressions and judgement too as something Hume would 
have been sympathetic to in regard to his moral philosophy. Perhaps he can even be said to 
argue for it. Hume clearly thought that only passions can determine a reasoning process, but 
this claim is more explicit in his philosophy about causality/matters of fact than in his moral 
philosophy. Having said that, I think we can apply it intelligibly and indeed helpfully (even 
if just for purposes of Hume exegesis) to his moral philosophy. 
So )8/¶V&&7 seems to be able to substitute the role of impressions Hume thinks are 
necessary to terminate a reasoning process. If this counts as a success for Kant and/or FUL µV
CCT, the problem with the mentioned Kantian reasoning variant of FUL seems to be that 
outside the context of Kant exegesis (i.e. a context where an appeal to intelligible agents is 
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made) it runs the risk of being no more than a piece of philosophical curiosity having to do 
with non-contradiction (cf 2¶1HLOO3KUDVHGIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI)8/¶V&&7¶V 
VXFFHVVLQUHJDUGWR+XPH¶VFODLPWKHLVVXHLVWKHIROORZLQJ7KHDOOHJHGIDFWWKDWWKHUHLVD 
philosophical device to stop UHDVRQ¶VWKLQNLQJSURFHVVHVLVRQHWKLQJ7KDWGHYLFHKDYLQJ
authoritative force as a moral truth and/or binding force as a moral command is quite 
another.   
The above seems problematic about FUL.  However, it possibly is only problematic if 
FUL is considered outside the exegetical context LQZKLFKLWIRU.DQW¶VIXQFWLRQVDFRQWH[W
that appeals to intelligible beings in a supersensuous realm. As long as )8/¶V&&7functions 
within this context, it might be able to escape the problem for one or two related, but 
different reasons I explain below.  
As briefly indicated in chapter 4, it might not be accurate to say that there is a single 
µKLJKHVWSULQFLSOHRIPRUDOLW\¶IRU.DQW:KHWKHURUQRWLWLVinaccurate, there is anyhow 




Formula of the End in Itself (FEI); the Formula of Autonomy (FA); the Formula of the Law of 
Nature (FLN) and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (FKE).1 In scholarly literature it is 




FUL³Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a  
   universal law´. (G-Paton: 88 / G: 421; italics original). 
 
FEI:   ³Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,  
            never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end ´ (G-Paton: 96 / G: 4:429; italics original) 
 
FA:   ³1HYHUWRFKRRVHH[Fept in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as     
           XQLYHUVDOODZ´. (G-Paton: 108 /G 4:440) 
 
FLN: ³Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature´*-Paton: 89  
  / G: 421; italics original) 
 
FKE: ³>1@HYHUWRSHUIRUPDQDFWLRQH[FHSWRQDPD[LPVXFKDVFDQDOVREHDXQLYHUVDOODZDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\VXFK 





SX]]OHDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ.DQW¶VFUL, FEI, FA, FLN and FKE, arises especially in 
regard to the relationship between FUL and FEI, since these two give the impression to be 
the ones most important to Kant while their content looks very different. For the remainder 
of this section, an understanding of FUL and FEI will be relevant. Therefore recall that FUL 
states:   
 
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law. (G-Paton: 88 / G: 421; italics original) 
 
FEI states:  
 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end ´ (G-Paton: 96/ G: 
4:429; italics original) 
 
,WDNHLWWKDWµ9HUQXQIW¶DVDFRQFHSWLs central to all categorical imperatives. I also take it that 
µ9HUQXQIW¶KDVPRUHLPSOLFLWDQGH[SOLFLWPHDQLQJVLQWKHGLIIHUHQWYHUVLRQVRIWKH
categorical imperatives.  Here my assumption is that there is some comprehensive Kantian 
FRQFHSWLRQRIµ9HUQXQIW¶WKDWKDVGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVWRLWWKDWIRU.DQWKDYHVRPHVRUWRI
metaphysical relationship. The difference I have in mind here concerns an intellectual power 
and an essential self. I assume that Vernunft more explicitly and implicitly for different 
aspects and different &,¶Vunderlies all categorical imperatives. In FUL, e.g. it is primarily (or 
SHUKDSVEHWWHUµLQWKHIRUHJURXQG¶DQLQWHOOHFWXDOSRZHURIWKHVRXOWKDW±I suggest- in )8/¶V
CCT JHWVDQLPSXOVHRI.DQW¶VVWURQJV\PSDWK\IRUWKHa priori and his antipathy towards the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
           101 / G: 434; italics original) 
  
I borrow the abbreviations for the five (versions of the) categorical imperative(s) IURP2¶1HLOO(2004). 
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empirical. In FEI e.g. it is primarily an essential self. The essential self, I take it, is on some 
ultimate level also inherent to FUL but stays very much implicitly in the background there. 
Let me get back to my claim that as long as )8/¶V&&7functions within a Kantian 
exegetical context where an appeal is made to intelligible agents in an intelligible realm, 
FUL¶VCCT  perhaps can be said to rightfully escape the problem of being no moral 
justification while being DVXFFHVVIXOUHVSRQVHWR+XPH¶VFRQFHUQDERXWWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRI
reason. FUL might do so because FUL is inextricably bound up with the concept of Vernunft 
as seated in an practical agent. As such both Vernunft and FUL seem inextricably bound up 
with an essential intellectual self. Assuming this, the fact that there is an intellectual 
essential self to a practical agent that deserves respect may prevent FUL¶VCCT from being no 
moral justification, while having the feature of being a successful devise to answer a Humean 
concern about the limitations of reason. Alternatively or additionally, because Vernunft is 
WKHFRQQHFWRUIRUDOOYHUVLRQVRI.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHV)8/¶s CCT may be able to 
make use of the argumentative force of one or more of the RWKHUYHUVLRQVRI.DQW¶VKLJKHVW
principles of morality (assuming for the sake of the argument that at least some have indeed 
argumentative force).  
 
 
3. Recalling psychopathy 
 
In chapter 1 I have discussed psychopathy. Much of the discussion has revolved around the 
scientific hypotheses and claims of Robert Hare. I have intended to make clear that the 
discussion about the nature of psychopathy is not settled. While the dominant conception of 
SV\FKRSDWK\KROGVWKDWSV\FKRSDWK\LVDµSHUVRQDOLW\V\QGURPH¶ there are other conceptions 
as well in scientific literature (that however are often compatible with the conception of 
psychopathy as a personality syndrome). Furthermore, assuming that it is a personality 
syndrome, there is room for reflection as to what character traits and behaviours belong to it.    
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In chapter 1 I have explained that the dominant measurement tool for psychopathy is 
the PCL-R. I have explained that it consists of a semi-structured interview accompanied by 
case history information. Recall that the semi-structured interview consists of 20 items that 
FDQHDFKVFRUHDµ¶µ¶RUµ¶, giving a maximum score of 40.  I have also explained that a 
psychopathy diagnosis requires minimally a score of 30 out of 40.  Technically, this would be 
possible by scoring low on several items of the PCL-R that concern traits and behaviours that 
are generally considered to be core to psychopathy. I yet have to come across a case however, 
where someone has been diagnosed as a psychopath and VFRUHGµ¶RQWKHLWHPµODFNRI
HPSDWK\¶VRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVJHQHUDOO\FRQVLGHUHGWREHDQHVVHQWLDOIHDWXUHRI
psychopathy.2  Recall here that there is scientific consensus in psychological literature and 
clinical practice that something that is core to psychopathy are one or more affective 
atypicalities.  From the perspective of empirical literature, a lack of empathy is the first 
candidate for being an essential affective atypicality. Other affective candidates are a lack of 
remorse and guilt and a lack of conscience.3 Let us also recall that other (non-affective) 
features that are often considered to be a core characteristic of psychopathy are a sense of 
grandiosity, superficial charm and a disposition to lie frequently. 
We have seen that the classification of psychopathy, unlike the diagnoses of conduct 
disorder or antisocial personality disorder, identifies a relatively homogeneous population. 
There is a unitary disorder upon which a causal account can be developed. And on the basis 
of current research, there is reason to think that there is a genetic and not a social ultimate 
cause to the core of the syndrome (cf Blair et al., 2006). Clearly there is a lot of unclarity as to 
what it means that there is a strong genetic component to psychopathy, but nevertheless 
                                                          
2
 7KDWLVHYHQZLGHUWKDQ5REHUW+DUH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISV\FKRSDWK\DQGHYHQZLGHUWKDQHLWKHUWKH3&/-R concept 
or measurement tool which -unfortunately- are not so clearly separated. 
 
3
 Note that the former reflects an item of the PCL-R, while the latter does not. Having said that, it is a widely 
DFFHSWHGWKRXJKWWKDWSV\FKRSDWKVODFNDFRQVFLHQFH,QGLFDWLYHLVWKHWLWOHRI+DUH¶VVHPLQDOZRUNWithout 






there seems to be such a thing. Blair et al. (2005: 45) claim that ³JHQHWLFDEQRUPDOLWLHVJLYH
rise to a specific deficit in neurotransmitter function and neuro-development such that the 
emotional responsiveness of individuals with psychopathy is PXWHG´ 
 
 
4. Pre-intentional emotions 
 
Typically, in philosophy, emotions are regarded as intentional states, bodily feelings or a 
combination of both. There is also a tendency in the philosophical literature to focus on a 
fairly standard inventory of emotions moods, including anger, sadness, fear, joy, grief, 
jealousy, guilt, and so on. As a result, a range of other emotional states, many of which do not 
KDYHHVWDEOLVKHGQDPHVKDYHEHHQQHJOHFWHG$OWKRXJKWKHFDWHJRU\RIµQHJOHFWHGHPRWLRQDO
states¶ is not itself phenomenologically homogeneous, many of these neglected phenomena 
do have something in common. They are not intentional states, directed at objects, and they 
are not feelings of the body or some part of it. Instead, they amount to a felt sense of 
belonging to the world (Ratcliffe, 2012a: 23-24). Ratcliffe calls this type of emotional 
H[SHULHQFHµH[LVWHQWLDOIHHOLQJ¶) RUµSUH-intentLRQDOHPRWLRQ¶(2010). Ratcliffe uses 
these different terms in different articles while seeing them apparently as synonyms (see 
Ratcliffe, 2010: 605). Pre-intentional emotions determine what kind of intentional state it is 
possible to have. They provide us a range of possibilities while excluding another range. They 
DUHHPRWLRQVWKDWDUHFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DSHUVRQ¶VVHQVHRIZKDWLVSRVVLEOH5DWFOLIIH, 2010). 
7KHVHHPRWLRQVDUHW\SLFDOO\XQDFNQRZOHGJHGDVHOHPHQWVWKDWPDNHDFRQWULEXWLRQWRRQH¶V
life. The importance of them to our world-view typically becomes only obvious in the case of 
emotional disruptions in our life. It is when we are presented with the loss, exaggeration or 
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distortion of emotional aspects that we ordinary overlook that they become salient (see 
Ratcliffe, 2008, cited in 2012b: 483).4  
 
 
5. Easy and hard cases of understanding another person 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In our daily life we often have a good idea as to what is going on in the mind of another 
person. When we see someone running towards a bus waving, many of us will understand 
her mental state. In some veridical sense we might experience her sense of urgency. 
Empathetic understanding of a person rushing after a bus is easily achieved because it takes 
place against the backdrop of a shared cultural world. Because the person who is waving and 
running towards a bus shares a world with us characterized by certain norms and artifact 
functions, it is possible for us to quickly and automatically have a sense of the inner state of 
the other person (see Ratcliffe 2012b: 477). 
An absence of a shared cultural world can problematize empathetic understanding, 
but it need not do so. Much depends upon the content of the experience with which we are 
attempting to empathise. For example, when presented with a sobbing face clutched in a 
person¶s hands, cultural differences might not interfere at all with the ability to appreciate 
WKHSHUVRQ¶VVDGQHVVLQVRPHFDVHVDWOHDVW:KHQWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHH[SHULHQFHLVQRWMXVW
µ%LVVDG¶ but µB is sad about p¶, matters are different. As Ratcliffe makes clear, some people 
ZLOOILQGLWKDUGHUWKDQRWKHUVWRHPSDWKLVHZLWK%¶Vbeing sad about the fact that no one ever 
visits his Facebook page (Ratcliffe, 2012b: 478).  
  
                                                          
4
 I am not entirely sure what exactly Ratcliffe wants to argue for here. To use an example of a depressed person 
Ratcliffe could mean to say that up until the time of his depression the person had no idea that there was a default 
state of emotional experience in him. I would say that most probably Ratcliffe wants to argue for this claim. 
Probably Ratcliffe also wants to say that before his depression the depressed person had no idea about the nature of 




5.2. The depressed person 
 
In some circumstances many of us will have a really hard time understanding the mental 
experience of another person. Take the case of severe depression or a severe burn-out. Many 
of us, while reading some sort of article about depression, may fail to understand the first 
person claims of a depressed person that are cited in the article. We might wonder, e.g. how 
to understand the claim of depressed Jim that the world has no practical significance for him. 
We might get some sort of idea as to what Jim means, while having the feeling that we do 
not fully understand what Jim says.  
Suppose we do not get Jim fully. We may come to understand him better when being 
in his presence.  A personal encounter may help us understand his first-person claims. While 
such a personal encounter may be helpful to come closer to an understanding of the mental 
state of Jim, it might be the case that a maximally good understanding of his mental world (as 
ZHOODV-LP¶VILUVW-person claims resulting from it) is only possible once we have experienced 
a severe form of depression ourselves. Without a personal experience of depression the 
SURSRVLWLRQDOFRQWHQWRI-LP¶VFODLPPLJKWQRWULQJDUHDOEHOO7RXVHWKHPHWDSKRUWKH




5.3. Understanding psychopaths: profound experiential difficulties 
 
Just as it most probably is difficult for most of us to understand what it means to live in a 
world where all practical significance has disappeared as in the case of Jim, so it most 




beings with a certain temperament and say, relatively successfully socialized - to experience 
the world as a psychopath experiences it.  
$FFRUGLQJWR5REHUW+DUHLWLV³FORVHWRLPSRVVLEOH´WRLPDJLQHWKHZRUOGRI
psychopaths (Hare, 1993: 78). There is a variety of specific substantive ways we could 
XQGHUVWDQGWKDWFODLP)LUVWZHµW\SLFDOKXPDQDJHQWV¶PD\QRWEHDEOHWRXQGHUVWDQG
SV\FKRSDWKV¶SHUYDVLYHVHQVHRIHJRLVP 5  For psychopaths, egoism is an all-encompassing 
way of being. Typical human beings may not know what that is like in terms of experience. 
Because we typical human agents do not have exclusively egoistic experiences, we may lack 
an understanding of how it is to be an absolute egoist at all times. It sounds plausible to me 
that our own experience implies limits for understanding the mental world of psychopaths. 
Secondly, typical human beings may not be able to understand what it is like to be 
LQGLIIHUHQWWRWKHVXIIHULQJRIRWKHUV+HUHDVZHOOW\SLFDOKXPDQEHLQJV¶RZQH[SHULHQFHV
could imply limits for understanding the mental world of psychopaths. Indeed, that is what I 
would want to suggest. 
Thirdly, typical human beings may not understand what it is like to lead a life 
without an internal control mechanism. I believe Hare is right in claiming that in typical 
human agents the inner voice of conscience and the internalized norms and rules of society 
DFWDVDQµLQQHUSROLFHPDQ¶UHJXODWLQJRXUEHKDYLRXUHYHQLQWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHPDQ\
external controls, such as laws, our perceptions of what others expect of us, and real-life 
SROLFHPHQ+DUH,QSV\FKRSDWKV¶SV\FKRORJ\WKHUHLVQRVXFKLQWHUQDOSROLFHPDQ
Psychopaths carry out their evaluation of a situation - what they will get out of it and at 
what cost - without the usual anxieties, doubts, and concerns about being humiliated, 
causing others pain (Hare, 1993: 78). Without the shackles of a nagging conscience and other 
inhibiting mental mechanisms, psychopaths feel free to satisfy their needs and wants and do 
                                                          
5
 For the sake of avoiding unnecessary complexity as to the point at issue, I group all non-psychopaths in one class 
DQGUHIHUWRWKHPDVµW\SLFDOKXPDQDJHQWV¶2XWVLGHWKHFXUUHQWFRQWH[WGHSHQGHQWRQWKHVLWXDWLRQDUHIHUULQJWR
non-SV\FKRSDWKVDVµW\SLFDOKXPDQDJHQWV¶DQGESXWWLQJthem in one class as if there were a homogenous group, 




whatever they think they can get away with. Any anti-social act, from petty theft to bloody 
murder, becomes possible (see Hare, 1993: 76). 
My suggestion would be that we typical human beings do not have and cannot have a 
full-fledged idea as to what it is like to live a life without internal policeman, because there is 
no way in which our own experience can lead us to a deep grasp of that feature of 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶SV\FKRORJ\  
Fourthly, typical human agents are likely to be unable to understand what it is like to 
act in a mental atmosphere of strong primitive egoistic and sexual drives that strongly direct 
RQH¶VEHKDYLRXU7KLVDOVRDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLURZQH[SHULHQFH 
In terms of ways of having difficulties understanding the mental life of psychopaths, I 
would like to present one further suggestion related to the normative views of psychopaths, 
if they indeed have such things. In chapter 1 I have explained that psychopaths use other 
human beings as objects of self-gratification. Without being inhibited by typical mental 
barriers such as a conscience, psychopaths use others to fulfil their own egoistic needs. 
Psychopaths hold a selfish, instrumental world view, and prey upon and exploit others, using 
aggression and manipulative conversational skills as weapons (see Hancock, Woodworth & 
Porter, 2011). Psychopaths have no difficulty in making use of people whenever they think 
using others serves their interest. Their motives are to manipulate and take, ruthlessly and 
without remorse (Hare, 1993: 145). So psychopaths use RWKHUVDVµREMHFWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ¶
Some, if not all psychopaths however, also see their used objects of exploitation as legitimate 
objects of exploitation. As Babiak and Hare (2006: 46) argue, it is unlikely that for 
psychopaths people exist in any other way than objects, targets and obstacles (see Babiak & 
Hare, 2006: 46). Psychopaths view people as little more than objects to be used for their own 
gratification (Hare, 1993: 44). The weak and the vulnerable - whom they mock, rather than 
pity - are favourite targets (Hare, 1993: 44). 
While all psychopaths somehow seem to view people as little more than objects to be 
used for their own gratification, some seem to have and possibly only some have a real 
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normative rationale related to that view. For those psychopaths who can be said to have a 
normative rationale for their view, I take it that it is the case that they hold the normative 
view that people who are weak deserve to be exploited because they are weak. 6  As Hare 
FLWHVSV\FKRORJLVW5REHUW5LHEHU³7KHUHLVQRVXFKWKLQJLQWKHSV\FKRSDWKLc universe, as 
WKHPHUHO\ZHDN´:KRHYHULVZHDNLVDOVRDVXFNHUWKDWLVVRPHRQHZKRGHPDQGVWREH
H[SORLWHG´7 (Hare, 1993: 44). As non-psychopaths, we may not be able to see even some sort 
of minimal intelligibility in such a normative view. I do not want to suggest that those views 
are intelligible. More generally, in this section, I do not want to commit myself to any sort of 
normative view about the intelligibility of the view under consideration. It is a real option 
that his view of psychopaths is not intelligible in a normative sense (and therefore we would 
have good reason to not find them intelligible). Rather than commenting on that, in this 
VHFWLRQ,µMXVW¶ZDQWWRDUJXHWKDWZHDVQRQ-psychopaths might not understand the 
intelligibility of the view mentioned. And I want to claim that supplemented by the 
suggestion that we might not understand its intelligibility because we lack the possibility to 
H[SHULHQFHWKHH[SHULHQWLDOQDWXUHRISV\FKRSDWKV¶FRQYLFWLRQ*UDQWLQJIRUWKHVDNHRIWKH
argument that there are indeed some amongst the people in the class of non-psychopaths 
ZKRFDQQRWLQDQ\ZD\XQGHUVWDQGWKHLQWHOOLJLELOLW\RIWKHSV\FKRSDWKV¶YLHZ,DVVXPHWKDW
if those people were able to experience the sine qua non feeling and conviction coefficient 
WKDW+XPHUHJDUGVDVSDUWRIµEHOLHI¶WKH\ZRXOGFRPHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHSV\FKRSDWK¶VYLHZ
as intelligible. Probably one thorough experience would be enough. A working affective 
memory would do the rest.  
Comparing the inner world of psychopaths and non-psychopaths in a rather general 
all-HQFRPSDVVLQJZD\RIH[SHULHQFH,EHOLHYHWKDWSV\FKRSDWKVDQGµPRUHW\SLFDOKXPDQ
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range and nature of possibilities of belonging to the world. Indeed a very different 
phenomenological range and nature.8  
 
 
6. Bio-psychological conditions for not taking the interests of others into account 
6.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Psychopathy is typically regarded as a syndrome. That syndrome comes with a number of 
IHDWXUHVRISV\FKRSDWKV¶PHQWDOOLIHDQGEHKDYLRXU)RUHDFKIHDWXUHDQHPSLULFDOVFLHQWLVW
could try to give a causal explanation. Note that a behavioural feature or character trait 
characteristic of psychopathy can be causally explained in different ways as well as on 
different levels. As an empirical scientist one can for example try to identify some genes that 
as a rock-bottom fundamental cause can be given causal credits for the manifestation of a 
particular character trait or a particular type of behaviour. Additional or alternative to the 
fundamental level of genes, on a less fundamental level of explanation, one could try to 
identify a cause of a certain type of behaviour characteristic of psychopathy by identifying 
some sort of psychological mechanism that causes it. Or, to focus on different types of 
explanation (rather than levels), rather than attempting to give a genetic explanation, one 
could want to offer a neural explanation of particular character trait or type of behaviour 
that characterizes psychopathy.  
As explained in chapter 1, current empirical research suggests that there is a genetic 
and not a social ultimate cause to the core of the syndrome (cf Blair et al., 2006). In the 
remainder of this section, rather than focusing on the ultimate roots of psychopathy from an 
                                                          
8
 How flexible these ranges are is a very difficult empirical problem. It is also an issue for which it might be the case 




empirical perspective, I present several conceptual ideas. These ideas reflect a philosophical 
explanation of the core of the psychopathy syndrome. Importantly, they also reflect a 
characteristic feature of psychopaths: their psychological impossibility to take the interests of 
their fellow human beings into account in any form of evaluative judgement about practical 
life.  Following the dominant empirical view, the conceptual ideas I present concern the 
causal level of pre-dispositions.  
The reason I focus RQSV\FKRSDWKV¶DOOHJHGpsychological impossibility to take the 
interests of their fellow beings into account in their practical decision-making (and for some 
probably in what count as genuinely normative judgements²that have a sufficient rationale) 
is that I appeal to the object of this alleged psychological impossibility in both of my 
psychopathy based arguments as to their being limits to the objective nature of moral 
objectivity (recall that there is another argument based in Hume research). Roughly 
speaking, I do so by assuming that conceptually speaking the forms of moral objectivity 
contemporary moral realists and rationalists defend take the interests of others into account 
in some way.9  
                                                          
9
 It might even be the case that conceptually speaking all forms of moral objectivity are other-regarding in some 




normative one about it reflecting objective standards of rightness and wrongness in regard to states of affairs, 
courses of action et cetera. However, there are also descriptive definitions of morality, especially in psychology. I 
take it that if and when the mentioned normative definition of morality is used by academics it is meant to apply to a 
domain of the world where other human EHLQJVDUHDURXQGµ0RUDOLW\¶KHUHWKHQRQHFRXOGGHILQHDVEHLQJµWKH
standard of right and wrong in our dealings with RWKHUSHUVRQV¶DV7KRPDV1DJHOGRHV. Nagel might be 
happy to use the just mentioned GHILQLWLRQDOVRIRUWKHWHUPµmoral REMHFWLYLW\¶. In any case, the advantage of the 
mentioned Nagelian definition of morality, i.e. if we apply it to moral objectivity, seems to be that it is open to 
ethical egoism. This possibility seems to EHH[FOXGHGZKHQRQHFODLPVWKDWµall moral objectivity conceptually 
speaking is necessarily other-UHJDUGLQJ¶. Assuming for the sake of the argument that ethical egoism is excluded once 
the mentioned conceptualization of moral objectivity is adopted, that might be problematic. It might be problematic 
because (a) it might be both a necessary and sufficient condition that moral objectivity consists in  standards of 
rightness and wrongness in dealings with other persons; given (b) that the underlined phrase might accurately refer 
to what can normatively count DVµWKHPRUDOGRPDLQ¶DQGJLYHQWKDWLWVHHPVSODXVLEOHWRVHHHWKLFDOHJRLVPDVD
SKLORVRSKLFDOSRVLWLRQGHIHQGLQJDPRUDOVWDQGDUGZKHUHWKHDGMHFWLYHµPRUDO¶KHUHDWOHDVWPDWFKHVWKHXQGHUOLQHG
bit from an independent conceptual perspective, regardless how the particular author who intends to defend a form 
RIHWKLFDOHJRLVPLQWHQGVWRXVHWKHWHUP$GGLWLRQDOO\RUDOWHUQDWLYHO\IRUWKHDXWKRUWKHDGMHFWLYHµPRUDO¶DV
applicable to the normative standards of an ethical egoist might refer to standards DERXWµWKHJRRGOLIH¶ 
While I think it is an intelligible conceptual option to see all moral objectivity as necessarily other 
regarding, while - for the reason mentioned above- I also think that care should be exercised in assuming that all 
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6.2. Three types of missing seeds 
 
In this section I present three conceptual ideas that causally and conceptually explain 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶DOOeged psychological impossibility to take the interests of others seriously (and 
more broadly explains core traits and behaviour of psychopaths as presented in chapter 1). A 
psychological impossibility I assume to be long-term for all psychopaths, if not permanent 
for all. I assume it to be permanent at least for some. And at least for some of those 
psychopaths, I assume that the presumed psychological impossibility is due a constitutional 
incapacity to take account of others. In their union, the three ideas I present below can be 
taken as one type of comprehensive conceptual suggestion that causally explains 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶DOOHJHGpsychological impossibility to take the interests of others seriously, with 
another type of conceptual suggestion to follow afterwards (NB: the first (comprehensive 
type) of suggestion assumes that psychopaths have an animate perception of other human 
beings, while the second assumes that psychopaths have an inanimate perception of other 
human beings.)  
 The first idea I would like to offer as an ultimate conceptual explanation of the core of 
SV\FKRSDWK\LQFOXGLQJSV\FKRSDWKV¶DOOHJHGpsychological impossibility to take the interests 
of others seriously, is the following one. I assume that fundamentally psychopaths do not 
have an internal feedback mechanism in terms of pain and distress of others the roots of 
which I assume to be innate. They lack the possibility for empathic distress. I would want to 
suggest that empathic distress is largely an innate feedback mechanism freely given to 
practical agents and not under typical reflective control. That does not mean that I believe 
that once that mechanism is in place, it cannot be destroyed by others or the agent herself. I 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
forms of moral objectivity are other-regarding, one thing seems beyond dispute. That is, it seems beyond dispute 
that factually speaking almost all, if not all, contemporary forms of moral realism and moral rationalism are other-
regarding in some way. It seems to be the case that most if not all contemporary meta-ethicists who call themselves 
moral realists and moral rationalists subscribe to a form of moral objectivity that in its standards in one way or 





rather argue that typical practicDODJHQWVFDQ¶WKHOSQRWKDYLQJWKHVOLJKWHVWLQFOLQDWLRQQRWWR
be unsympathetic towards this feedback mechanism.10   
All three conceptual suggestions I provide are somewhat tentative in the sense of 
them being suggestions. But they are strong suggestions. More tentatively than what applies 
to the broad suggestion offered and the two upcoming ones, I suggest that the assumed 
constitutional incapacity for empathic distress addressed above, in very young infants, 
manifests itself in an inability to mimic otheUSHRSOH¶VIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQVDQGSRVVLEO\DOVRLQ
an inability to respond to the cries of fellow infants. As capacities, they might be precursors 
for a full-IOHGJHGFDSDFLW\WRYLFDULRXVO\H[SHULHQFHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPHQWDOVWDWHVLQFOXGLQJ
their distress.  
My second philosophical suggestion as to an ultimate cause that can explain 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶DOOHJHGpsychological impossibility to take the interests of others seriously, is 
the following one. I assume that some, if not all, psychopaths are constitutionally incapable 
RIGHYHORSLQJDQµother-regarding FRQVFLHQFH¶,IQRWconstitutionally (utterly) incapable, 
they may be in a constitutionally disadvantageous position, because of which they have a 
profound difficulty in developing one.  
Above, I have underlined WKHWHUPµRWKHU-UHJDUGLQJ¶IRUDQLPSRUWDQWUHDVRQ$VZH
have seen in chapter 1, it is claimed that psychopaths have no conscience.11 I doubt that this 
is an accurate conceptual claim in the sense of it being applicable to the mental world of 
psychopaths as we know it on basis of current scientific evidence. I doubt this because I am 
LQFOLQHGWRWKLQNWKDWWKHFRQFHSWµFRQVFLHQFH¶FDQQRWEHLGHQWLILHGZLWKµPRUDOFRQVFLHQFH¶,
share the dominant opinion in empirical science that psychopaths lack such a type of 
conscience. But I doubt that it follows from that both conceptually and conceptually-cum-
empirically that therefore psychopaths necessarily lack a (i.e. all types of) conscience. Said 
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 If they get to the point of introspectively recognizing that it is there.  
 
11
 Indicative is the title of the seminal work from Robert Hare: Without conscience, the disturbing world of the 




slightly differently, I tentatively assume that at least some psychopaths have something in 
WKHLUSV\FKRORJ\WKDWGHVHUYHVWKHODEHOµFRQVFLHQFH¶7KDWLV,ILQGLWSODXVLEOHWRWKLQNWKDW
in (current PCL-R diagnosed) psychopaths, there are some who are subject to an internal 
WULEXQDOWRXVH.DQW¶VWHUP0\VXJJHVWLRQwould be that in contrast to typical human 
agents, in (some) psychopaths there is a voice that does utter its disapproval, but in a 
different way as is the case for most other human beings. I presume that in psychopaths, the 
internal tribunal utters its disapproval once the acting agent misses out on opportunities for 
self-gratification in a way he can be held responsible for. 
My third and final suggestion as to the roots of the core of psychopathy, including the 
psychological impossibility to take account of the interests of others in practical judgement is 
connected to the second. That is, in the sense that I would like to suggest that the 
constitutional impossibility to develop an other-regarding conscience comes with a 
constitutional impossibility for the development of a dialectical self that allows for reflective 
disapproval of actions that negatively affect other practical agents. I assume that psychopaths 
generally do not have an intra-personal relationship of communicating with oneself that 
allows foUVLJQLILFDQWHYDOXDWLYHJDSVEHWZHHQWZRDVSHFWVRIDSUDFWLFDODJHQW¶VVHOIRQHZKR
desires, intends and does and one who keeps a critical normative eye on what this desiring, 
intending and doing self desires, intends and does.  
As to the abovementioned third suggestion, my tentative proposal is that due to some 
VHHGVEHLQJDEVHQW\RXQJµWXUQ-out-to-EHSV\FKRSDWKV¶KDYHQRWKDGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR
develop a particular type of intra-personal relationship of communicating with oneself that 
allows for significant normative gaps between the two types of selves mentioned. I assume 
that in typical human agents some egoistic inclinations that are generally present in human 
infants are perfectly apt for becoming less dominant and even vanish as a result of being 
equipped with a variety of constitutional pre-dispositions, including empathic and pro-social 
ones. My hunch would be that the early developmental route of cases of adult psychopathy is 
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characterized by the empathic and pro-social aspects not developing over time resulting in a 
small band width of a dialectical self. 
All three suggestions above are meant to be some sort of partial and ultimate 
explanation as to why it is psychopaths develop the traits and behaviour that are considered 
to be core to psychopathy, including the feature of not taking the interests of others seriously 
in practical deliberation and judgement. There seems to be a difference however between the 
first suggestion (on the one hand) and the second and third (on the other hand). That is, in 
the sense that it seems to be somewhat more sensible to think about the first suggestion in 
WHUPVRISV\FKRSDWKVµODFNLQJVHHGV¶IRUWKHIHDWXUHLQWKLVFDVHH[SHULHQFHRIHPSDWKLF
distress) than for the second and third (conscience and particular dialectical self, 
respectively). That might well be because the conceptual suggestions under de second and 
third point do not organically conceptually connect with the developmental capacities of a 
newborn baby. For the first suggestion it is the case that one can make good attempts to 
conceptualize it in such a way that it fits the developmental capacities of a baby. That is not 
quite the case for the second and third suggestion. The capacities I point to there and about 
which I claim that psychopaths are missing them in their actual psychology are advanced 
capacities that do not map onto the developmental state of a baby. Therefore the most one 
might be able to say about them in terms of predispositions is that psychopaths do not have 
predispositions for developing them. That seems a somewhat empty claim however. It might 
be better not to phrase the second and third suggestion in terms of µpredispositions¶5DWKHU
one may want to regard them as an ultimate conceptual explanation RISV\FKRSDWKV¶
psychological impossibility to take account of others, an ultimate conceptual explanation that 
as such has (i) a causal and (ii) etiological component to it. That is, in terms of it being a 
conceptual suggestion that involves (i) a causal claim about how the assumed mental 
impossibility comes about. And this while (ii), in that context of a causal claim being made, 
an appeal is made to the psychological development of children who later on as adults turn 
out to present with psychopathy. 
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6.3. Psychopaths and the perception of fellow human beings 
 
In the previous section I have offered three conceptual suggestions that can explain 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶(alleged) psychological impossibility to take the interests of others into account 
in evaluative judgement. An assumption, as yet unstated, about all three ways is that they 
come with an animate perception of human beings. In this section I present one conceptual 
suggestion in regard to psychoSDWKV¶psychological impossibility to take the interests of 
others into account in evaluative judgement that relates to an inanimate perception of 
human beings.  
In chapter 1 and above I have explained that psychopaths use RWKHUVDVµREMHFWVRI
exploitatioQ¶,KDYHH[SODLQHGDVZHOOWKDWVRPHLIQRWDOOSV\FKRSDWKVsee their used objects 
of exploitation as legitimate REMHFWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ:KHQLWFRPHVWRSV\FKRSDWKV¶DOOHJHG
SHUFHSWLRQRIRWKHUKXPDQEHLQJVDVOHJLWLPDWHµREMHFWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ¶Lt is the case that 
WKHUHLVDQDPELJXLW\LQWKHFRPSRXQGWHUPµREMHFWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ¶7KHVLPSOHWHUPµREMHFW¶
here, could be used just in a grammatical sense, while the emphasis is on exploitation. I take 
it that this is indeed what is typically meant when some claim is made about psychopaths 
XVLQJUHJDUGLQJRWKHUVDVµREMHFWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ¶%HWKDWDVLWVHHPVWREHZKHQLWFRPHVWR
SV\FKRSDWKVDQGµREMHFWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ¶LWPLJKWDOVREHWKHFDVHWKDWZLWKLQWKHJURXSRI
psychopaths there are sRPHSV\FKRSDWKVZKRUHJDUGRWKHUVDVµREMHFWV¶VRPHKRZLQWKHVHQVH
of µPHUHWKLQJV¶. I am inclined to think that the (current) class of psychopaths (as diagnosed 
by the PCL-R) incorporates a group of people who not only use other people as objects of 
self-gratification and exploitation and see them as legitimate objects of these activities.12 
Amongst the psychopaths, I am inclined to think, there is also a smaller or larger group who 
have a special perception of human beings. Some sort of inanimate mechanical perception. 
Be that my careful hypothesis, I would like to point out that currently, the psychopathy 
                                                          
12
 Either justified by just the view that self-gratification at whatever cost is perfectly alright and/or something like 




literature does not support my hypothesis in some sort of direct way, meaning as well that 
there are currently no scientific accounts as to what, phenomenologically, neurally etc. it 
PHDQVIRUVRPHSV\FKRSDWKVWRUHJDUGRWKHUVDVµPHUHREMHFWV¶ 
Let me say a little more about the hypothesis just mentioned that concerns the 
perception of other human beings in an inanimate, mechanistic way. Let us first look at the 
following quotation.  
 
I look at her, study her, praying to feel the life in her through the enveloping unreality. But she 
seems more a statue than ever, a manikin moved by mechanism, talking like an automaton. It is 
horrible, inhuman, grotesque. (Sechehaye, 1970: 3813; cited in Ratcliffe 2013, forthcoming) 
 
This quotation comes from a person diagnosed with schizophrenia. What I would like to 
suggest is that amongst the current class of PCL-R psychopaths there may be some for whom 
the lack of access is primarily caused by something else than what I discussed in § 6.2. That 
is, rather than the psychological impossibility for taking the interests of others seriously 
being due to one or more factors mentioned in the previous section, it might primarily/most 
ultimately be caused by the perception of human beings as inanimate. On a slightly deeper 
explanatory level, my hypothesis is that amongst the class of PCL-R psychopaths there are 
some who have a very mechanistic self-perception. I assume that there is an inverse 
relationship between this and the psychological possibility for taking account of others¶ 
interests in the following way. I assume that the perception of the other as non-mechanistic 
(as animate) is caused by a non-conceptual feeling. Assuming that psychopaths lack this 
feeling, I assume they lack an automatic means to connect with another human being. That 
FRXOGPDNHWKHPUHJDUGRWKHUVDVREMHFWVLQDµWKLQJ¶±sense of the term.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 Sechehaye, M. (1970). Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl. New York: Signet. 
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7.Intermezzo: FUL: not completely empirically free? 
 
In § 2, I KDYHIRFXVHGRQDVSHFLILFDSSOLFDWLRQYDULDQWRI.DQW¶VFUL: CCT. I have argued that 
Kant seems to succeed in keeping CCT impression ±and thereby empirical-free, while at least 
DQGSUREDEO\VROHO\RXWVLGHWKHFRQWH[WRI.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\LWVHHPVWRFRPHDWWKHFRVWRI
FUL not being a moral justification at all. In this section I approach FUL differently. That is, I 
focus on the concepts of universalizability/universality that characterize FUL. My purpose in 
this section is to suggest that despite what Kant intended, there may be an empirical element 
to FUL, although ±as far as I can see- not to CCT as an application variant of FUL. So, my 
suggestion will be that there may be an empirical element to FUL as a supreme principle of 
morality that has CCT and CWT as application variants, while there is no empirical element 
to CCT narrowly construed (leaving out any thoughts about implicit Kantian ideas about 
Vernunft as an essential aspect of the self as discussed in § 2.2).   
An essential aspect of FUL DVDSULQFLSOHZLWKMXVWµIRUP¶LVWKHLGHDRI
universalizability. While any moral justification seems to be in need of a scope of addressees 
and beneficiaries, FUL with its concept of universalizability essentially, by implication, 
appeals to a scope (while ±from a non-exegetical perspective- this need not necessarily be a 
cosmopolitan one, which it however is for Kant). On basis of what I have argued for in 
UHJDUGWRµSUH-LQWHQWLRQDOHPRWLRQV¶LQWKLVFKDSWHULQUHJDUGWRFUL, I would want to make 
the following claims.  
First, a psychological decision who is and who is not included in the universal range 
of FUL could differ in case of rock-bottom radically different background states of agency. 
Secondly, this seems to mean that a theoretical decision as to who is and who is not included 
in the universal range of FUL could be dependent on background states of agency. Let me 
explain this.  
For Kant it is a capacity for Vernunft that is a criterion for determining who is in the 
ballpark of FUL and who is not. If you have such a capacity, you are in. If not, you are out. 
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Having said that, what should we say from an exegetical point of view about how that 
decision is taken? There seem to be two plausible exegetical perspectives. Either Vernunft 
alone in the form of an intellectual power of the soul can take the decision that all those with 
Vernunft are in the ballpark of FUL. Alternatively it means that the decision can be taken 
completely externally while the decision is that all those who are in the ballpark of FUL are 
those with Vernunft.  
Evaluating both from a non-exegetical perspective, I do not consider it plausible that 
intellect alone can do the trick. Let us recall that psychopaths have rather intact intellectual 
faculties. For the remaining I cannot think of any other evidence for such a hypothesis.  
How about a full-blown externalist claim? My inclination would be to say that the 
theoretical decision as to who is in the ballpark and who is not cannot be taken completely 
externally. Decisions need to be made by minds and minds take some perspective. The 
decision will come from some perspective ±there is no view from nowhere. Within the 
framework of a particular background state of agency theorists will get a long way to 
externalist decision making. They can point to certain descriptive features of human beings 
that function as criteria for the ballpark. However, I think the fact remains that there is 
nothing in the world that can turn features of flesh and blood human beings theorists can 
descriptively pick out into normative claims about the range and nature of the ballpark. 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that there is a biological class of human beings that 
are part of an externally real world, I would suggest that there is nothing in the world that 
compels us to classify them similarly in the moral domain. Perceptual classification of them 
as fellow beings I assume is contingent and extremely occasionally someone biologically 
classed as a human being may carve up the world fundamentally differently from the typical 
case. Rock-bottom, background states of (embodied) minds might determine which 
descriptive features present themselves as normatively relevant in regard to the decision who 




8. A shared argumentative building block for a second and third criterion 
 
,QWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKLVFKDSWHU,KDYHIRFXVHGRQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\RIUHDVRQ,have done 
so to end up with a specific (fully developed) criterion for there being a non-realist 
component to moral objectivity. 7KHDUJXPHQWDVLWDULVHVIURP+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\RIUHDVRQ
is built on two fundamental assumptions. First, the assumption that any theoretical decision 
as to which actions can be identified as good and which ones as bad must necessarily rely on 
a (subjective) judgements made by some mind(s) that necessarily occupies/occupy a 
perspective. The second assumption on which the argument relies is that there is an 
important difference between the mental process of reasoning (on the one hand) and the 
mental act of judging which results in mental product of judgement (on the other hand). 
Relying on these two assumptions, the argument then holds that without there being 
an object of mattering, there is no way in which a mind capable of the mental process of 
reasoning can get to the psychological state of holding a judgemental outcome. A mind 
capable of reasoning but without having an object of mattering would be clueless as to what 
to judge, not knowing which direction to go in terms of making a decision. 
In this final chapter, I have also recalled and conceptually built on the science of 
psychopathy. Furthermore, I have focused on research from Matthew Ratcliffe. The 
combination of this delivers a comprehensive building consisting of two ideas for two 
possible further criteria for there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity. These 
two possible further criteria I will conceptually develop in the general conclusion. The two 
ideas that together constitute the comprehensive building block are: 
 
(a) Within the class of human practical agents there is a class of agents who do not take 




(b) Without there being certain elements in her constitutional make-up, elements given 
for free by the author of nature, (whoever or whatever that is) a human practical agent 
will not be able to have psychological experiences that include sincere moral reasoning 
and moral decision-making. 
 
Note that while the first criterion presented is an independent criterion, there is a 
relationship that can be drawn between the building block above and the first criterion. 
While the first criterion holds that there is an open judgemental end for a mind with just 
intellectual reasoning activities (assuming that any theoretical decisions must reflect a 
judgement), the comprehensive building block/psychopathy research suggests that 
judgemental outcomes can be essentially anti-moral. Thereby it supports my Hume-based 
suggestion that a deliberative14 intellect alone cannot do the trick in arriving at theoretical 
judgements as reflecting genuinely better and worse courses of practical action. Having said 
WKDWWKHILUVWFULWHULRQEDVHGLQ+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\RIUHDVRQFRQVLVWVLQDQHFHVVDULO\open 
ended outcome for minds with an exclusive intellectual capacity for inferential reasoning; it 




                                                          
14
 $VWRµLQWXLWLRQV¶,EHOLHYHWKDWDIIHFWFRQWULEXWHVWRDOOPRUDOLQWXLWLRQVDOEHLWLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VDQGVWUHQJWKV
dependent on the idiosyncratic psychological nature of the agent and typically also the sort of event/action about 
which an intuitive judgement is made (some propositional content ±e.g. strangling innocent babies- will in most 
human cases push emotional buttons more strongly and in different ways than other sorts of propositional content 






categories. (Blackburn, 1988: 371) 
 
I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself 
LQFDSDEOHRIEHOLHYLQJWKDWDOOWKDWLVZURQJZLWKZDQWRQFUXHOW\LVWKDW,GRQ¶WOLNHLW(Russell, 
RoE: 1651/Papers 11: 310-112) 
 
Blackburn is right. Anti-realists stress the dependence of the ordinary world on our minds. 
However, at the same time, many anti-realists, including Blackburn himself, want to depart 
from the extreme relativist view that anything goes in the moral domain. Said differently, 
Blackburn and some of his anti-realist colleagues want to defend the existence of moral 
objectivity; they want to defend that somehow there are genuinely better and worse courses 
of action within the domain of morality. 
The challenge for anti-realists as Blackburn, i.e. anti-realists who are sympathetic to 
the existence of a certain genuine form of moral objectivity, is to find: 
 
1) a theoretical criterion by means of which better and worse courses of action can be  
LGHQWLILHGZLWKRXW« 
2) this criterion reflecting forms of relativism that are incompatible with their  
commitment to the existence of moral objectivity3 DQGZKLOH« 
                                                          
1
  Russell, B. Russell on Ethics>DQWKRORJ\RI5XVVHOO¶VZULWLQJV@&KDUOHV3LJGHQHG/RQGRQ5RXWOHGJH 
referenced in Pigden, 2008. 
 
2
 Russell, B.  Last Philosophical Testament, 1943-68, vol.11 [collected papers]. London, New York: Routledge, 
1997; referenced in Pigden, 2008. 
  
3
 It is easy to get confused when talking about relativism in ethics. Below I make some distinctions that sometimes 




3) upholding their essential anti-realists commitment that morality is somehow  
dependent on human minds rather than morality being built into or otherwise 
essentially part of the fabric of the world. 
 
That is a real challenge and one very much worth philosophizing about. It is also a type of 
challenge however I have not been concerned with in this study.  
Above I have talked about a challenge for a specific group of anti-realists: those who 
want to defend the existence of some form of moral objectivity. More generally, the 
intellectual challenge for every anti-realist is either to (a) justify that really anything goes in 
the moral domain or else to (b) find a theoretical criterion by means of which a form of 
moral objectivity can be identified, a form that is compatible with the anti-realist 
commitment that morality is not part of the fabric of the world.  
Thus far I have talked about anti-realists. I now turn to the intellectual challenges for 
moral realists.   
Realists face the challenge either to (1) make plausible the view that moral objectivity 
(as something that reflects better and worse courses of action) is mind-independent. Or else 
to (2) find a convincing argument that incorporates the idea that that which counts as moral 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Descriptive ethical relativism: the empirical claim that certain groups differ in their views about what is right or 
good (or just or virtuous). 
 
 
Response-dependent metaphysical ethical relativism: what is right or good (or just or virtuous) is metaphysically 
dependent on certain fundamental characteristics of practical agents.  
 
Normative ethical relativism is the claim that at least sometimes when evaluating moral actions, it is true that no 
genuinely better and worse courses of action can be identified. In its most radical form this form of relativism 
consists in the idea that anything goes in the moral domain. Normative ethical relativism can primarily make a claim 
about the equal normative value of actions (telling an inconvenient truth to a friend is equally good as not telling it 
because it would cause harm). Normative relativism can also primarily make a claim about the moral opinions of 
particular individuals or groups. (the moral opinions of people of this tribe in the north of Africa are no less true or 
false than the moral opinions of people of this tribe in the south of Africa). If so, then this kind of claim will often be 
mixed with another sort of normative claim about ethical truth. That is, the claim that the moral opinions of people 
in the north of Africa are true for them, while the moral opinions of people in the south of Africa are true for the 
people in the south. 
 
There are difficult intellectual problems when it comes to the relationship between especially response-dependent 
metaphysical ethical relativism and forms of normative relativism. 
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objectivity is mind-dependent, but in such a way that excludes an anti-realist idea of the 
mind-dependent nature of moral objectivity. That is, the idea that there is an important 
qualitative difference between certain real things in the world (if they exist) and morality 
even if morality somehow reflects genuinely better and worse courses of action - a 
qualitative difference one must recognize when as a theorist one wants to give an accurate 
description of the nature of morality.  
As mentioned, one way for a moral realist to express his commitment to moral 
REMHFWLYLW\LQWKHIRUPRIWKHUHEHLQJµPRUDOUHDOLW\¶LVWRGHIHQGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIPLQG-
independent moral objectivity. A moral realist who wants to embark on this argumentative 
route has a difficult task. He needs to explain how the mind-independent substantive bits of 
moral reality that according to the mind-independent realist exist in our world have come to 
occupy and can continue to occupy a place in our universe. Here then one can reasonably 
wonder whether a plausible explanation can ever be given; a plausible explanation without 
any appeal to human minds.  
The mind-independent moral realist has a hard task defending his view, given that it 
seems rather implausible that morality is completely mind-independent. Assuming that it is 
rather implausible that morality is completely mind-independent, that gives reason to 
wonder about the intelligibility of putting effort in defending the view that morality is 
completely mind-independent. Having said that, from some perspective it is intelligible to 
make an attempt to argue for the existence of mind-independent moral objectivity. That is to 
say, (complete) mind-independence means that morality is free from all forms of subjectivity. 
That rules out some big threats. Namely, subjectivism as an essential feature of moral 
objectivity cannot only imply a form of response-dependent metaphysical ethical relativism 
(what is right or just or virtuous or good is metaphysically dependent on certain fundamental 
characteristics of practical agents) that is defended by many moral realists. It also runs the 
risk of lapsing into a form of (i) anti-realism (substantive bits of moral objectivity if they exist 
at all cannot qualify as somehow being essentially part of the universe) and (ii) (anti-realist) 
296 
 
relativism (there is no normative difference to be made between some or all courses of 
action) by necessarily having to appeal to a response-dependent form of subjectivity. 
In this study I have wanted to explore where the limits of moral objectivity - as 
understood in terms of objective morality being somehow significantly anti-realist - lie. That 
is, if there is something anti-realist to objective morality at all. I have wanted to deliver 
something theoretically realistic, non-preposterous and secure by providing some anti-realist 
boundaries ±if there are such things- within which moral objectivity might exist.  Note that 
up until the point of anti-realist counterevidence arising I have kept the option open that 
there are no anti-realist limits to the nature of moral objectivity (which explains my 
engagement with .DQW¶V FUL that on a (reflective) first impression seems to have a 
component of mind-independence while it is also seems to be a moral principle that is 
strictly objective). 
The outcomes of the investigation conducted in this study are three lines of reasoning 
in support of the view that moral objectivity, if it exists, is essentially non-realist.  The first 
OLQH,KDYHSUHVHQWHGDOUHDG\DWWKHHQGRIFKDSWHU,WUHYROYHVDURXQG+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQ
of reason. I will recall this line of reasoning shortly. The second and third line of reasoning 
will be laid out in the remainder of this conclusion.  The second line of reasoning consists in 
an advanced argument that, although advanced, needs some extra empirical investigation 
and conceptual reflection in future research. This due to the second line of reasoning being 
dependent on a controversial empirical assumption that needs more empirical investigation 
and due various conceptual issues about possible worlds of human nature that ± to make it 
more problematic - also argumentatively interact with controversial empirical matters about 
the same topic.   
The third line of reasoning consists in ZKDWLVEHVWFDOOHGµan argumentative 
foundation for a potential criterion that identifies why morality is essentially non-realist¶. 
This line of reasoning is in need of more development than the second line. This due to 
conceptual matters about constitutional luck and freedom of will that exist alongside 
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problems and interact with issues about possible worlds of human nature that have both 
conceptual and empirical aspects.   
Both the second and third line of reasoning build on the following comprehensive 
argumentative building block provided at the end of the previous chapter. 
 
(a) Within the class of human practical agents there is a class of agents who do not take 
the interests of others seriously in practical deliberation and judgement. 
 
(b) Without there being certain elements in her constitutional make-up, elements given 
for free by the author of nature, (whoever or whatever that is) a human practical agent 
will not be able to have psychological experiences that include sincere moral reasoning 
and moral decision-making. 
 
I point out that the three (potential) arguments I offer are not meant to be exhaustive in 
terms of fundamental criteria for regarding the nature of morality as non-realist rather than 
realist. There may be more (potential) criteria for there being a non-realist component to 
moral objectivity than my study identifies/provides building blocks for. I will now recall the 
first line of reasoning before I present the second and third line of reasoning.  
The first line of reasoning KDVDULVHQRXWRIDFRPSUHKHQVLYHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI+XPH¶V
conception of reason. The argument is built on two fundamental assumptions. First, the 
assumption that any theoretical decision as to which actions can be identified as good and 
which ones as bad must necessarily rely on a (subjective) judgement  made by some mind(s) 
that necessarily occupies/occupy a perspective. The second assumption on which the 
argument relies is that there is an important difference between the mental process of 
reasoning (on the one hand) and the mental act of judging which results in mental product of 
judgement (on the other hand). 
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 By means of a comprehensive investLJDWLRQRI+XPH¶VSKLORVRSK\RIUHDVRQWDNLQJ
into account different areas of his work, I have argued that without there being an object of 
mattering, there is no way in which a mind capable of the mental process of reasoning can 
get to the psychological state of holding a judgemental outcome. A mind capable of reasoning 
but without having an object of mattering would be clueless as to what to judge, not 
knowing which direction to go in terms of making a decision.  
I have discussed the first criterion in tKHFRQWH[WRI.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\,QP\VWXG\
.DQW¶VFormula of Universal Law proved to be an indirect illustration of the force of the first 
criterion.4 :KDWWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQ+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQDQGFUL shows is that 
if one tries to come up with a moral justification that is maximally free from empirical 
influences while grounded in the intellectual reasoning capacities of practical agents, one 
runs the risk of having no justification at all.  I have argued that the Contradiction in 
Conception variant of FUL FDQUHVSRQGVXFFHVVIXOO\WR+XPH¶VFRQFHUQDERXWWKHOLPLWDWLRQV
of the powers of reason. If that counts as a success, the problem seems to be that outside the 
FRQWH[WRI.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\FUL runs the risk of being no more than a philosophical tool 
WKDWFDQDQVZHU+XPH¶VFRQFHUQDERXWUHDVRQ7KDWLVZKLOHLWFDQGRWKDWFUL, in its CCT 
variant, might fail to be any form of moral justification. Being a successful tool to answer 
+XPH¶VFRQFHUQLVRQHWKLQJ%HLQJDPRUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQLVquite another. 
I have just discussed the fully developed criterion for a non-realist nature of morality 
my study offers. As mentioned, my study offers also an argument that needs some extra 
reflection in future research and an argumentative building block for a potential criterion as 
I expect it to arise from future research that builds upon the argumentative contribution for 
this criterion I offer in this study.  
                                                          
4
 Recall that the initial two reasons (individually as well in their combination) for a focus on FUL were the 
following ones. First, FUL is an object of challenge for any theory about the limits of moral objectivity because a 
(reflective) first impression points to FUL somehow having a mind-independent nature. Secondly, FUL seems 
grounded in the reasoning capacities of agents. Generally such a feature meets the requirement that any plausible 




I now lay out the second line of reasoning. It revolves around a radical form of 
normative relativism about practical ways of living.   
I start by recalling (as presented at the end of the previous chapter) a fundamental 
assumption about the kind of moral justifications contemporary moral realists and moral 
rationalists defend on which my argument relies.  The fundamental conceptual assumption, 
on which my argument relies is the idea that the moral justifications of contemporary moral 
UHDOLVWVDQGPRUDOUDWLRQDOLVWVDUHµRWKHU-UHJDUGLQJ¶LQRQHZD\RUDnother. Note that in a 
footnote, I have suggested that it might even be the case that all that can rightfully be called 
moral objectivity is necessarily other-regarding. I also recall, once more, the shared 
argumentative foundation on which both the second and third line of reasoning are 
fundamentally built: 
 
(a) Within the class of human practical agents there is a class of agents who do not take 
the interests of others seriously in practical deliberation and judgement. 
 
(b) Without there being certain elements in her constitutional make-up, elements given 
for free by the author of nature, (whoever or whatever that is) a human practical agent 
will not be able to have psychological experiences that include sincere moral reasoning 
and moral decision-making. 
 
What is implied by point (a) above is the idea that in our actual world there is radical 
conceptual variation as to substantive subjective decisions in regard to practical living. 
Psychopaths, across the board of many different life situations, make radically different 
practical decisions ±without any consideration for others- WKDQµW\SLFDO¶KXPDQDJHQWVGR  
Other human beings can be justifiedly exploited if and when this serves the needs of a 
psychopath. Or so psychopaths believe. They believe that self-JUDWLILFDWLRQDWRWKHUSHRSOH¶V





In line with the scientific claim that the core of psychopathy ±including a complete 
disregard to the interests of other human beings - is not primarily caused by environmental 
influences, in my study I have developed two conceptual suggestions that each reflect a 
proposal as to how it is possible to have a background state of agency that has a range of 
possibilities that excludes moral decision-making.  The first of these two conceptual 
suggestions identifies three factors that on a deep etiological level explain why and how it is 
human beings with psychopathy lack mental access to the realm of other-regarding thought. 
The three factors are: (i) a lack of predispositions for the experience of empathic distress; (ii) 
the absence of a possibility for the development of a conscience and (iii) the absence of a 
possibility for the development of a particular dialectical self5.  The second suggestion I have 
offered reflects the idea that some psychopaths may have an inanimate perception of human 
beings due to a particular perception of themselves.   
$VDUJXHGLQSV\FKRSDWKV¶SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOZRUOGWKHUHLVQRVSDFHIRURWKHUV
%HFDXVHRIWKLVEHLQJGHSHQGHQWRQSV\FKRSDWKV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPDNH-up (or so I suggest), 
deliberating and believing out of line with what I have argued to be a feature of all 
contemporary moral realist and moral rationalist positions seems biologically determined in a 
handful of human agents. My assumption is that a necessary other side of the psychological 
coin of a full-fledged phenomenological exclusion of others in thought is full-fledged egoism. 
If that is true and if some or all psychopaths can be said to have a genuine justification for 
their egoistic practical decisions, then thereby there seems to arise a counter argument 
against the existence of moral reality by means of there being radically anti-moral practical 
                                                          
5
 $VWRWKHODFNRISUHGLVSRVLWLRQVIRUWKHH[SHULHQFHRIHPSDWKLFGLVWUHVVUHFDOO%ODLU¶VHPSLULFDOVXJJHVWLRQ
(chapter 1, § 9) that genetic anomalies reduce the salience of punishment information (perhaps as a result of 
noradrenergic disturbance). As explained in chapter 1, the suggestion Blair offers is that this noradrenergic 
disturbance has an effect on various aspects of amygdala function, most importantly the ability to form stimulus±
punishment associations, including stimulus punishment associations UHODWHGWRSXQLVKPHQWE\DYLFWLP¶VGLVWUHVV 




thought amongst the class of human practical agents; radically anti-moral thought that 
fundamentally depends on constitutional features, where qualitatively similar, but 
substantively different constitutional features constitute moral thought. If an appeal to the 
latter is featuring in a response-dependent form of moral realism, meaning that morality as a 
normative institution is metaphysically dependent on fundamental features of practical 
DJHQW¶s psychology, then there seems no reason to theoretically regard the constitutional 
IHDWXUHVWKDWVWDQGLQDIXQGDPHQWDOFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKSV\FKRSDWKV¶UDGLFDOO\HJRLVWLF
world-view as of less normative importance than the world-view of agents who think 
morally. From that it might follow that there is no theoretical criterion to conceive of 
SV\FKRSDWKV¶ZRUOGYLHZDVDQRUPDWLYHO\OHVVJRRGYLHZDERXWSUDFWLFDOZD\VRIOLYLQJWKDQ
the world-view of agents who think morally. That on its turn would imply a fundamental 
form of normative relativism about practical ways of living and that speaks against the 
existence of mind-independent and mind-dependent forms of moral reality. 
Assuming for the sake of the argument and reality that there is radically anti-moral 
practical thought, I assume that this radically anti-moral practical thought can be seen as 
reflective of a criterion for there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity only 
once at least some psychopaths can be said to have a genuine rationale for their daily 
practical decisions that never take the interests of others into account. This positive claim 
brings me to a caveat about the argument just discussed. I would want to argue that the first 
potential criterion will not get off the ground in case a largely empirical assumption on 
which it relies is false. An assumption that is controversial. The controversial assumption 
concerns the hypothesis that at least some psychopaths can be said to hold a genuine 
normative rationale for their view that there is no need to take the interests of others into 
account.  As discussed in chapters 1 and 5, possibly it is the case that some of those who are 
currently classified as psychopaths (by means of the PCL-R) do indeed have such a genuine 
rationale for their view. As discussed in chapters 1 and 5, on basis of scientific research we 
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would have to assume that such psychopaths justify their practical decisions by claiming that 
that those who are so stupid/weak to allow for being exploited deserve to be exploited. 
When it comes to the just discussed first argumentative contribution for there being a 
non-realist component to moral objectivity there are argumentative issues related to possible 
world problems that should be investigated in future research.  
Most importantly, there are issues about metaphysically possible and metaphysically 
plausible worlds that are different from our actual world. These issues are especially and 
perhaps exclusively of relevance in case a moral realist wants to argue that a handful of 
psychopathic outliers amongst the class of human practical agents should not be able to 
threaten the existence of moral reality. Apart from the fact that one counterexample coming 
from our actual world may suffice to challenge a moral realist claim about the existence of 
moral reality that is meant to apply to our actual world (that include psychopaths), there is 
the following issue. Within the boundaries of the current natural laws of science, it is 
possible to have a possible world of practical judges that is highly significantly different from 
the one we live in now.  If somehow we were to actively wipe out a large number of virtuous 
morals agent from the world (alternatively for some reason they die organically from some 
sort of virus), while letting psychopaths actively reproduce, what is our actual world now, in 
all likelihood would be very different in terms of the type of practical agents it inhabits 
twenty years later. Future philosophical research should shed light on what sorts of possible 
and plausible worlds that fit within the current scientific framework affect the argument I 
have offered and how they do so. Does it matter, and if so how, that 20 or 45 per cent of the 
ZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQcould have consisted of/could come to consist of human agents with the 
characteristics I have ascribed to psychopaths due to some contingencies of the world?  This 
is a matter about possibility and contingency. Another question to explore would be how my 
argument would be affected by an actual empirical fact of psychopathy percentage X, Y and 
Z in our world. In regard to both questions (and possibly others), attention should be paid to 
scientific research about gene-based evolutionary criminology (recall chapter 1, § 7.6) in 
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terms of realistically possible minimal and especially also maximal prevalence rates of 
psychopaths. There should be reflection on how such scientific theories deserve their place 
in any philosophical reflection on different possible worlds of human nature with different 
prevalence rates of psychopathy.  
Additional to considerations about metaphysically possible worlds, (at least some 
initial) reflective attention should be given to considerations about logically possible worlds 
(and metaphysically possible worlds that are somehow out of line with the current laws of 
science, if such worlds can exist as metaphysically possible worlds). While attention should 
be given to the worlds mentioned, a wakeful eye should be kept on exotic/esoteric 
theorizing. Only when it serves an intellectual goal that matters in terms of understanding 
and solving the problem of the limits of moral objectivity should reflections on logically 
possible and rather exotic metaphysically possible worlds be continued. 
I now turn to the third line of reasoning, or, one could say, the second way in which 
my study of psychopathy contributes to the debate about the nature of moral objectivity. 
Future research should develop this second type of argumentative contribution into a full-
fledged argument. The argument as it stands has the potential to develop into a fully 
developed argument in favour of there being a non-realist component to moral objectivity (if 
it exists) by using psychopathy as a negative test case. That is, the argument under 
consideration relies on the idea that a good understanding of the syndrome of psychopathy 
in combination with knowledge about the etiology of psychopathy can be used to learn 
something about the way typical human practical agents make moral judgements. Such 
WHDFKLQJVDERXWµXV¶,ZRXOGZDQW to argue, can result in an argument revolving around the 
idea of there being some form of involuntariness in moral judgement making as a result of 
constitutional luck. I suggest that if (subjective token) moral judgements are fundamentally 
dependent on constitutional luck, this makes it plausible (though not demonstratively 
provable) that moral objectivity as some sort of institution consisting in/representing the best 
moral normativity does have a non-realist component. 
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As mentioned, the third line of reasoning also fundamentally arises from the 
following two ideas that also underlie the argument about normative relativism just 
discussed:  
 
(a) Within the class of human practical agents there is a class of agents who do not take 
the interests of others seriously in practical deliberation and judgement. 
 
(b) Without there being certain elements in her constitutional make-up, elements given 
for free by the author of nature, (whoever or whatever that is) a human practical agent 
will not be able to have psychological experiences that include sincere moral reasoning 
and moral decision-making. 
 
Furthermore, the third line of reasoning is built on the following assumption:  
 
All principles, judgements, actions, traits and events in the domain of practical action that 
GHVHUYHWREHFDOOHGµPRUDO¶DQGTXDOLI\DVJHQXLQHO\objective take account of others, minimally 
by requiring a genuine consideration of their interests in the justificatory process fundamentally 
grounding the objective nature of a moral principle, action, trait or event.  
 
Assuming the above, in my study and in relation to idea (b), recall that in line with the 
scientific claim that the core of psychopathy is not primarily caused by environmental 
influences, I have developed the two conceptual suggestions mentioned earlier in this 
conclusion (and in chapter 5) that each reflect a proposal as to how it is possible to have a 
background state of agency that has a range of possibilities that excludes moral decision-
making. What the first conceptual suggestions as to the possibility for other-regarding 
thought and judgement tells us and what seems plausible about the second as well is that 
nature has given us some constitutional presents at birth, the absence of which would mean 
that there is no way in which human beings can come to take the interest seriously and 
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therefore no way to opt for a moral life as a reasonable practical life of living. And that is 
likely to mean that moral objectivity is not part of the fabric of the world, something which 
on its turn seems to imply some form of non-realism about morality. That is, in case the 
object of challenge is a mind-dependent form of realism and unless what I take to be an 
implausible view in the presence of an acceptance of my naturalistic conclusions is true. The 
implausible view I take to be that morality is somehow mind-independent or mind-
dependently essentially part of the world while it is possible that no human being has 
epistemic access to it.  
As mentioned, in the argument reflected by the third line of reasoning- psychopaths 
are used as a negative test case. They do the job of giving us information about what the 
constitution and psychology of typical human beings capable of making moral judgements is 
like. Here then it is important to note the following. Once there are/were no psychopaths in 
our world that does not seem to mean that the yet underdetermined final conclusions for the 
argument as should arise from future research cannot be true, whatever these conclusions, 
after careful philosophical research, turn out to be. Neither does an absence of psychopaths 
in our actual world seem to mean that those final conclusions future research is supposed to 
generate and that have something to do with constitutional luck cannot be reached by other 
means than using psychopaths as a negative test case. An absence of psychopaths in our 
actual world in regard to this argument only seems to mean that there disappears a possibility 
for philosophers (or others) to use the presence of psychopaths as a means to get an argument 
off the ground about something that apparently has to do with there being an element to 
moral decision-making a practical agent is inevitably subject to and cannot be held 
responsible for.  
One thing that should be investigated in further research is how exactly this alleged 
free aid functions in an argument about the limits of moral objectivity. That is, what happens 
to the argument if there is such a thing DVDSUDFWLFDODJHQW¶Vpower to overrule what an agent 
gets for free at birth? This question for future research should be split into at least the 
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IROORZLQJTXHVWLRQVDµ:KDWLVWKHDUJXPHQWDWLYHUHOHYDQFHRIhaving a (possibly latent) 
power of the mind WRRYHUUXOHQDWXUH¶VKHOS¶"Eµ:KDWLVWKHDUJXPHQWDWLYHUHOHYDQFHRIDQ
agent making use of this power/what is the argumentative relevance of him actually 
overruling QDWXUH¶VKHOS"LQVLWXDWLRQV;<DQGRU=¶Fµ:KDWLVWKHUHOHYDQFHRIDQ
involuntary absence of a willingness to overrule, while an actual power to overrule is 
SUHVHQW"¶ 
Thus far I have pointed to complexities having to do with the relationship between 
constitutional luck and reflective control over freely given elements. This is an issue that 
concerns necessity, contingency and possibility for change of a dominant if not fixed 
LQIOXHQWLDOIDFWRURQRQH¶VPRUDOGHFisions-making. There are further complexities in regard 
WRLVVXHVKDYLQJWRGRZLWKQHFHVVLW\FRQWLQJHQF\DQGµSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUFKDQJH¶LVVXHVWKDW
have a relationship with technological development. In a future possible world, genetic 
equipment and/or actual psychological capacities may be an object of technological 
interference in the sense that some technique might be able to add, change and/or eliminate 
factors that now naturally/organically contribute to practical evaluative decision-making in 
typical human agents. Certain genetic, hormonal or neural factors that affect normative 
decision-making and that cannot be temporarily or permanently changed now, might be a 
realistically possible object of change at some point in future due to technological 
development. Think for example about the development of a pill by a group of scientists that 
somehow influences our inclinations for moral decision-making. A pill practical agents can 
voluntarily decide or refuse to take in a similar way as they decide whether to take a 
paracetamol when they have some sort of physical pain. For ethical reasons as well as for 
reasons of technological complexity it is not so likely that within the next five decades there 
will be a pill on the market that can bring about radical changes in moral decision-making of 
WKHW\SHµWKHSV\FKR-phenomenological world of psychopaths can change into one of typical 
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PRUDOEHLQJVDQGRUWKHRWKHUZD\DURXQG¶ 6 Having said that, scientists are looking into the 
SRVVLELOLW\RILPSODQWLQJFKLSVLQSV\FKRSDWKV¶EUDLQVWKDWLIVXFFHVVIXOZRXOGWUDQVIRUP
their mental life rather radically.  
I have just talked about (relatively nearby and at the same time still quite distant) 
possible worlds where there are possibilities to change practical decisions due to 
technological developments. While this necessarily is, or at least can reasonable considered 
as an issue about other possible worlds than our actual one, the starting point here has still 
been that the judges we are concerned with are human beings operating within certain 
neuro-bio-psychological scientific laws. Now, it might be the case that the argumentative 
problems for completion of this second argument increase by invoking considerations about 
non-human practical judges, either as some sort of actual metaphysical possibility or as a 
merely logical possibility. Perhaps there is reason to invoke such beings in one way or 
another when thinking about the second criterion as it arises from research about 
psychopathy. And perhaps some of these considerations justifiably problematize the 
argument after a longer time of philosophical reflection. Perhaps (leaving aside an initial call 
upon them) neither of them is at issue, which would probably mean that when debating the 
issue of the limits of moral objectivity, exotic theorizing is of no help to understand and/or 
solve the problem and perhaps even destructive to understanding and/or solving the problem 
of moral objectivity.  
The only real moral judges we currently know of are human judges. But right now or 
in future there might be judges of another type ±on some distant planet for example- whose 
                                                          
6
 However, less drastic forms of practical engineering issues are not unlikely to be somehow of influence within the 
next five decades. Think for example about the availability of oxytocin6 pills that we can take after a day of hard 
work. Oxytocin pills that make it more easy not to shout at our beloved three-year old because of stress-related 
irritation caused by hindering lego all over the floor or to be angry with our beloved 16-year old, because of him 
having left his muddy trainers on the white carpet.  
Many people have a gut response of aversion to such forms of engineering (including me), but it does not 
seem to particularly easy to get this gut responses justified. If chemical things like paracetamol are justified for a 
headache, why would an oxytocin pill not be justified after a day of hard work? What are the normatively relevant 
differences between holding a baby as justified as a means to increase our oxytocin levels, and taking an oxytocin 




psychology is somehow wildly dissimilar to the psychology of human beings and/or does not 
operate within the natural laws of say, neuroscience. What would the existence of such 
creatures mean for an argument about the limits of moral objectivity as grounded in 
conclusions about freedom of evaluative judgement?  Perhaps even their logical possibility 
means something. Does it? Also in regard to this third line of reasoning I would want to 
argue that while at least at an initial stage consideration should be given to the worlds 
mentioned, a wakeful eye should be kept on exotic/esoteric theorizing. Only when it serves 
an intellectual goal that matters in terms of understanding and/or solving the problem of the 
limits of moral objectivity should reflections on logically possible and rather exotic 
metaphysically possible worlds be continued. 7 When it comes to the usefulness of esoteric 
theorizing, my hunch is that the relevance of it depends on the scope of the realist claim 
about moral reality in terms of our actual world, nearby possibly world (specified in way X 
and or Y etc.) and worlds further away. That scope will dictate the kind of counterexamples 
as consisting in certain practical agents with a certain constitutional make-up or psychology 
that are relevant; counterexamples that dependent on the scope are or are not allowed to 
appeal to features of human constitution and psychology that are out of line with what we 
know about them currently from our scientific inquiries, phenomenological introspection or 
other methods relevant and applicable to our actual world. 
                                                          
7Kant seems to have believed that there is intelligent life on other planets. Louden argues:  
 
³In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sWDWHVFRQILGHQWO\WKDWKHLV³UHDG\WREHWHYHU\WKLQJ 
[alles@´$%KHKDVLQGHIHQVHRIWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWLQWHOOLJHQWOLIH 
does exist on other planets, and in his early work Universal Natural History and Theory 
of the Heavens (1755) he DQQRXQFHVWKDW³PRVWRIWKHSODQHWVDUHFHUWDLQO\LQKDELWHG 
[gewis bewohnt@´DQGWKDW³KXPDQQDWXUHRFFXSLHVH[DFWO\WKHPLGGOHUXQJ´ 
RQWKHODGGHUEHWZHHQ³WKHPRVWVXEOLPHFODVVHVRIUDWLRQDOFUHDWXUHV´ZKRLQKDELW 
Jupiter and Saturn, and the less intelligent ones, who live on Venus and Mercury (1: 
6RLWLVFOHDUWKDW.DQWOLNH³PDQ\HPLQHQWSKLORVRSKHUV²among others Aristotle, 
Nicolas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Gassendi, Locke, Lambert, . . . and William Whewell² 
believed WKDWWKHUHLVH[WUDWHUUHVWULDOOLIH´>IQRPLWWHG@%XWLQKLVPRUHHPSLULFDOO\VREHUDQWKURSRORJLFDO 
writings he acknowledges that we have no reliable evidence for this claim. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Kant clearly does believe in intelligent extraterrestrial life 
DOVRLQGLFDWHVWKDWKHGRHVQRWVXEVFULEHWR³WKHIDQWDV\RIKXPDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVP´>IQRPLWWHG@ 
a fantasy allegedly fueled by our own narcissism. Kant is not in humanist despair over 
JLYLQJXS³WKHVSHFLDOQHVVRIEHLQJKXPDQ´>IQRPLWWHG@EHFDXVe he does not think we humans 
know for sure that we are special. There may be others out there like us´ (Louden, 2011:xx) 
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In this conclusion, I have discussed one criterion that challenges the realist nature of 
moral objHFWLYLW\DVDULVLQJIURPDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI+XPH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQ,KDYHDOVR
presented two further argumentative contributions that challenge the realist nature of moral 
objectivity. I have presented one argument that arises from the study of psychopathy that 
needs some further reflection in future research and that centres on a radical form of 
normative relativism. I have also presented an argumentative building block building 
centering on constitutional luck and freedom that has the potential to develop into argument 
that demonstrates a necessary non-realist component to moral objectivity. Note that 
empirical/empirically informed philosophical conclusions about the etiology of psychopathy 
as I have used them in the second and third line of reasoning can organically enrich the first 
Hume-based line of reasoning. The Hume-based argument relies on the assumption that all 
theoretical criteria for whatever substantive form of moral objectivity are dependent on a 
theoretical decision. Argumentatively supported by views about background states of agency, 
it then argues that no theoretical decision about what qualifies as a genuinely morally 
objective principle, action or event can be made perspectiveless (there is no view from 
nowhere to echo the title of 1DJHO¶V book8). Nor can such a subjective decision be made 
without a mind having a preference which requires an object of mattering. Here then 
psychopathy research can organically enrich the first line of reasoning, indeed in such a way 
as visible in the second and third line of reasoning. What it suggests is that this object of 
mattering that is needed for any theoretical decision about what qualifies as right and wrong 
within the practical domain ± at least when it is assumed that all moral objectivity is µRWKHU-
UHJDUGLQJ¶± is an object of mattering that is contingent, at least (there might be more 
grounds) as a result of the contingent constitutional genetic basis for a neural capacity to not 
be indifferent to the well-being of others. 
                                                          
8




As mentioned, the second and third line of reasoning are based in psychopathy 
research. And, as I have just mentioned, the study of psychopathy as conducted in this 
chapter can also enrich the first line of reasoning. There is a fourth way in which my study 
of psychopathy contributes to the debate about moral objectivity. Below I discuss this way. 
This fourth way is more of an unintended, but helpful contribution to the debate about 
moral objectivity as a result of a thorough empirical investigation of the phenomenon of 
psychopathy than an intended argumentative contribution as is the case for the first two 
ways. 
A fourth way in which a deep investigation of the phenomenon of psychopathy as 
conducted in chapter 1 contributes to the debate about the limits of moral objectivity is by 
dismissing a particular argumentative appeal often made by moral realists to defend the 
existence of moral reality against the anti-realist argument that there are radical differences 
in normative opinions practical agents hold. The argumentative appeal I am pointing to is the 
appeal that human beings who do not grasp what according to moral realists are the correct 
moral beliefs to hold, suffer from epistemic defects due a wrong upbringing or otherwise 
unfortunate educational/cultural environment. Here then, an investigation of psychopathy 
can pull realists out of their comfort zone. Their claim that people who do not have what 
according to the realists are the correct moral beliefs suffer from epistemic defects due to a 
wrong upbringing and/or otherwise bad cultural environment becomes implausible in regard 
to psychopaths when there is rather strong convergence of opinion amongst scientists that 
psychopathic behaviour and personality do not primarily arise from (an) environmental 
cause(s).  
My contribution to the debate about the limits of moral objectivity consists in having 
identified one fully-fledged criterion for it, one argument that needs some further reflection 
in future research and one comprehensive argumentative buildings blocks for a criterion 




building blocks are based in psychopathy research. Let me end this study by means of one 
further remark about those building blocks being based in psychopathy research.  
My arguments for claims about the limits of moral objectivity are partly based in 
(empirically informed) conclusions about psychopathy. That is, conclusions about its actual 
psychology, but especially also conclusions about the developmental history of traits and 
behaviours that empirical scientists and I take to be characteristic of psychopathy. Empirical 
scientists and I might be wrong about the fundamental roots of psychopathy. I might also be 
wrong about related conceptual conclusions (via the philosophical tool of using psychopaths 
as a negative test case) about the constitutional origins for moral judgements of typical 
human beings.9  If I am wrong about one or both of these two matters, this has a drastically 
bad effect on the plausibility of the second argument. The first argument seems less affected 
in the sense that an argument about there being radical normative relativism in regard to 
practical ways of living may not necessarily need an appeal to constitution in order to 
function as an argument in favour of there being an anti-realist component to moral 
objectivity. As to me potentially being wrong about the strong constitutional component to 
psychopathy and in regard to what I have discussed in the previous paragraph, note that once 
psychopathy does not have the strong constitutional component I have assumed it to have, 
the doors open again for the moral realist to argue that psychopaths suffer from epistemic 
defects due to a bad educational and/or cultural environment.  
In this study, I have focused a lot on issues having to do with human nature. I have 
done so because I believe it should become an integral component of the study of moral 
objectivity. I expect that integrating human nature issues in the philosophical study of moral 
objectivity at times is like facing a can of rather unattractive controversial and difficult 
empirical-cum-conceptual worms in regard to which one may be quickly inclined to look for 
                                                          
9
 Research by Paul Bloom and colleagues however points to innate senses of justice (and prosocial behaviour) in 





the lit. That however should not prevent us from opening the can. Opening it seems much 
better than collective meta-ethical avoidance of issues that are no doubt difficult, but of 
crucial importance to both a sufficiently deep understanding and a sufficiently good solution 




will be sufficient for me, if I can bring it into a little more fashion. (Hume, T: 273)10 
 
And it would be great if I myself in this study have managed to bring the science of man into 










                                                          
10
 Compare Kant. As Louden states, Kant argues in three difIHUHQWWH[WVWKDWWKHTXHVWLRQ³:KDWLVthe human 
EHLQJ"´LVWKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQLQSKLORVRSK\RQHWKDWHQFRPSDVVHVDOORWKHUVLogik 9: 25; cf. letter to 
Stäudlin of May 4, 1793, 11: 429; Politz 28: 533±34; cited in Louden, 2011: xvii).  
 
11
 I take it that (empirically informed?) reflection on the nature (and actual?) existence of malicious beings is also of 
great relevance to the contemporary debate about moral projectivism. What it is the (actual? some sort of possible?) 
H[LVWHQFHRI+XPH¶VPDOLFLRXVEHLQJVRUSHRSOHOLNHSV\FKRSDWKV who think in a radical anti-moral way show us? 
Does their (actual? possible?) existence tell that these malicious human creatures are blind to some authoritative bits 
RIPRUDOQRUPDWLYLW\WKDWFDQEHVDLGWREHUHDOO\WKHUHLQWKHZRUOGOHWXVFDOOWKHVHELWVµIDFWV¶ZKLOHOHDYLQJRSHQ
their metaphysical robustness)? Or else, is it rather the case that they demonstrate the projectivist consequence of a 
relational philosophy of moral distinctions by providing an example of a single thing, a moral feature, which can be 
judged good and bad by a human being as a result of different sensibilities without this implying a normative defect? 
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